Renee Bell v. Florida Highway Patrol, Larry Costanzo ( 2012 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-15687 MAY 24, 2012
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 05-01806-CV-ORL-31-DAB
RENEE BELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
FLORIDA HIGHWAY PATROL,
LARRY COSTANZO,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(May 24, 2012)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Renee Bell, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of her
third amended complaint due to her failure to follow the court’s orders. She
argues that the district court erred when it dismissed her third amended complaint
because (1) the factual allegations contained therein were sufficient to state a
claim for relief and (2) the complaint complied with the applicable Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to dismiss
a complaint for failure to comply with a court order or court rules. Goforth v.
Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985). Discretion means that the district
court may act within a “range of choice,” and we will not disturb its decision “as
long as it stays within that range and is not influenced by any mistake of law.”
Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005).
A district court may dismiss a case under its inherent authority to manage its
docket. Id. “[D]ismissal upon disregard of an order, especially where the litigant
has been forewarned, generally is not an abuse of discretion.” Moon v. Newsome,
863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). When a complaint is
dismissed without prejudice and the plaintiff elects to pursue an appeal rather than
amend the complaint, “the order to dismiss without prejudice is considered an
adjudication on the merits” over which we have jurisdiction. Jackson v. Okaloosa
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Cnty., 21 F.3d 1531, 1536 n.4 (11th Cir. 1994). Although pro se pleadings are to
be construed liberally, “procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation” should not be
interpreted “so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”
McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S. Ct. 1980, 1984 (1993).
Here, the district court provided Bell with instructions in its order
dismissing her second amended complaint. Bell’s third amended complaint failed
to comply with these detailed instructions regarding how to plead claims and
which claims to present. Bell (1) failed to abide by the district court’s specific
instructions to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10, (2) included
causes of action that she had previously disclaimed, and (3) added new claims that
had not been asserted in any of the prior pleadings.
Pro se status cannot excuse noncompliance with the district court’s precise
orders or the federal rules governing how to file a properly pleaded complaint.
See McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113, 113 S. Ct. at 1984. Accordingly, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Bell’s third amended complaint.*
AFFIRMED.
*
To the extent that Bell raises a separate argument on appeal regarding the classification
of her case under the district court’s local rules for discovery management, this argument cannot
succeed because her case never reached the discovery phase in the district court.
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