Christopher J. Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office ( 2015 )

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-14396
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 9:12-cv-81416-WPD
CHRISTOPHER J. WEILAND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PALM BEACH COUNTY SHERIFF’S
OFFICE,
DEPUTY CHRISTOPHER FLEMING,
individually,
DEPUTY MICHAEL JOHNSON,
individually,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(July 8, 2015)
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Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, and RESTANI, ∗ Judge, and ROBRENO, ∗∗
District Judge.
ED CARNES, Chief Judge:
Nearly one hundred and thirty years ago, one of Georgia’s greatest judges
described the ideal in pleading:
Pleading is pure statement; just as much as a letter addressed to your
sweetheart or your wife or your friend. The plaintiff complains that
he has such a case, and he tells you what it is. The defendant says
either that that is not so, or something else is so, and he makes his
statement. The true rule ought to be this: the statement ought to
consist precisely of what has to be [proven]. It ought not to fall short,
or go beyond. If it goes beyond, it has surplusage matter that is
unnecessary. Whatever is irrelevant, whatever is non-essential in
statement, ought not to be in. Let the law declare that every man’s
pleadings shall embrace a full and clear statement of all matters of
fact, which he is required to [prove], and no other.
Logan Bleckley, “Pleading,” 3 Ga. Bar Assoc. Report 40, 41–42 (1886). The
complaint that gave rise to this appeal does not approach that ideal, but it claims
that the plaintiff has a case, and parts of it do a good enough job in telling what that
case is to require the defendants to say “either that that is not so, or something else
is so.”
∗
Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge for the United States Court of International Trade,
sitting by designation.
∗∗
Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
2
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The story that Christopher Weiland’s complaint tells is about two Palm
Beach County Sheriff’s Office deputies shooting, tasering, and beating him in his
own bedroom without warning or provocation during their response to a “Baker
Act call.”1 Finding that the latest version of Weiland’s complaint failed to comply
with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 10(b), the district court
dismissed with prejudice his § 1983 claims against the deputies and the Sheriff’s
Office. As an alternative ground for the dismissal of the § 1983 claims against the
Sheriff’s Office, the court found that Weiland had failed to plausibly allege a
custom or policy of deliberate indifference sufficient to impose municipal liability.
The district court also dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds two of his three
state law claims; the third one it remanded to state court. This is Weiland’s appeal.
I.
The allegations in Weiland’s third amended complaint, which we accept as
true for present purposes, are as follows.
On April 6, 2007, Weiland’s father called 911 and stated that his son — who
at the time suffered from bipolar disorder — was “acting up,” was “on drugs”
(prescription painkillers), and “probably ha[d] a gun.” This was not the first time
1
The Baker Act is a Florida law that permits a person to be “involuntarily examin[ed]”
by a mental health facility “if there is reason to believe that the person has a mental illness and
because of his or her mental illness . . . [t]here is a substantial likelihood that without care or
treatment the person will cause serious bodily harm to himself or herself or others . . . .” Fla.
Stat. § 394.463(1)(b)(2).
3
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the Sheriff’s Office had dealt with the younger Weiland; in fact, he had been
“Baker Acted” on at least two earlier occasions after threatening to harm himself.
Deputies Christopher Fleming and Michael Johnson were dispatched to the
Weiland residence. Weiland’s father met them outside of the house and explained
that his son had threatened to harm himself and that he might have a gun. As he
escorted the deputies into the house, he told them that Weiland was in a bedroom
at the end of a hallway.
Fleming and Johnson, guns drawn, approached the bedroom without calling
out or identifying themselves. The deputies “came upon [Weiland] sitting on the
edge of a bed looking down at a shotgun that lay loosely in his lap.” Suddenly and
without warning, Johnson fired two rounds at Weiland, knocking him off the bed.2
As Weiland lay on the floor bleeding and critically injured, Fleming tasered him.
Then both Johnson and Fleming “physically beat and assault[ed] [Weiland] before
finally handcuffing one of his hands to a dresser.” At no point did Weiland raise
the shotgun from his lap or point it at the deputies.
In an effort to cover up their assault on Weiland, Johnson and Fleming
“fabricated an elaborate story about [Weiland] running from them into another
room, grabbing a shotgun, sitting in a chair and then pointing the gun at the
2
The complaint does not say what happened to the gun that “lay loosely” on Weiland’s
lap before he was knocked off the bed.
4
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Deputies as they entered the doorway.” They also said that Weiland’s gun had
discharged during the scuffle.
Weiland was charged with two counts of aggravated assault on a law
enforcement officer and incarcerated for nearly two years awaiting trial. And then
at his trial:
[Fleming] and [Johnson]’s story fell apart . . . . No blood was found in
the office/bedroom they claimed Weiland ran into before he armed
himself and was subsequently shot. No buckshot or other projectiles
were recovered from a hole in the office wall [Fleming] and [Johnson]
claimed was from [Weiland]’s alleged shotgun blast. In fact, during
trial, it was revealed that [Johnson] had removed [Weiland]’s shotgun
from the so-called crime scene to another unknown location, finally
returning and placing it in the custody of crime scene investigators
nearly 7-8 hours after the incident.
The jury acquitted Weiland of the charges against him.
II.
Weiland filed this lawsuit in state court on January 12, 2011. His original
complaint and first amended complaint asserted only state law claims. On
December 17, 2012, Weiland filed a second amended complaint that added
multiple claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants removed the case to the
Southern District of Florida and filed a motion to dismiss.
In May 2013 the district court dismissed without prejudice all of Weiland’s
§ 1983 claims. It concluded that the four counts asserting those claims violated
Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 10(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because they
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“incorporate[d] all of the factual allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 30
inclusive, fail[ed] to identify which legal theories or constitutional amendments
govern which counts, and fail[ed] to identify which allegations are relevant to the
elements of which legal theories.” Even though it dismissed all of Weiland’s
federal claims, the district court observed that “viewing the alleged facts in the
light most favorable to Weiland . . . Defendants violated Weiland’s fourth
amendment constitutional rights when they shot him.” The court gave Weiland
until May 29, 2013 to amend his complaint.
On that deadline, Weiland filed a third amended complaint, which is the
operative one in this case. The first 49 paragraphs of the third amended complaint
consist of an introductory statement (paragraph 1), a jurisdiction section 3
(paragraphs 2 through 5), a parties section (paragraphs 6 through 9), and a facts
section (paragraphs 10 through 49). The facts section has three subsections: (1)
“Facts Surrounding the Shooting of [Christopher Weiland]” (paragraphs 10
through 32); (2) “[The Sheriff’s Office’s] Deliberate Indifference” (paragraphs 33
through 38); and (3) “[The Sheriff’s Office’s] Coverup” (39 through 49). The
remainder of the complaint is organized into seven counts, each of which begins,
3
The jurisdiction section of the third amended complaint is unchanged from the three
earlier versions of the complaint, all of which asserted facts relevant to jurisdiction in the Florida
state court where this case was originally filed. Defendants removed the case from that court to
federal court after Weiland filed his second amended complaint and added § 1983 claims,
making the case removable under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Weiland never filed a motion to remand
or otherwise challenged the jurisdiction of the federal court, and it is clear that federal subject
matter jurisdiction does exist in this case. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3).
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“Plaintiff realleges and reavers the allegations of paragraphs 1– 49 inclusive, and
alleges further . . . .”
The first four counts are § 1983 claims. Count one claims that Fleming,
Johnson, and John Doe Deputies,4 acting under color of state law, violated
Weiland’s constitutional rights by “using excessive and unreasonable force.”
Count two claims that the Sheriff’s Office “did not adequately train or supervise its
Sheriff Deputies in . . . [the use of] appropriate and proportioned force” in
detaining mentally ill citizens. Count three claims that Fleming, Johnson, and the
Sheriff’s Office conspired to cover up their violations of Weiland’s constitutional
rights. And count four claims that the Sheriff’s Office had a custom or policy of
using its internal affairs investigations to “perpetrate a coverup of any misconduct
by Deputies.”
The final three counts of the complaint are brought under Florida tort law
and allege excessive use of force (count five), intentional infliction of emotional
distress (count six), and malicious prosecution (count seven). All three of those
claims are brought only against the Sheriff’s Office.
Defendants moved to dismiss the third amended complaint. On August 28,
2013, the district court issued an order granting in part and denying in part
4
“As a general matter, fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in federal court.”
Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir. 2010). Because the “John Doe Deputies”
are not proper parties to this action, we will not mention them again.
7
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defendants’ motion to dismiss and remanding the remainder of the action to state
court. The court dismissed all four of the § 1983 claims (counts one through four)
— this time with prejudice — because the pleading of them “duplicate[d] the
violations of Rule 8(a)(2) and 10(b) which formed the basis of the [c]ourt’s
[earlier] dismissal of th[o]se counts.” The court also concluded, with respect to
three of the § 1983 claims asserted against the Sheriff’s Office, that the
“allegations . . . fail[ed] to provide any factual support . . . beyond merely referring
to alleged practices and policies promulgated by [the Sheriff’s Office].” 5
As an alternative ground for dismissal of counts two and four, which alleged
that the Sheriff’s Office failed to adequately train its deputies and maintained a
custom or policy of covering up constitutional violations, the court determined that
Weiland did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted because he failed
to plausibly allege an official policy or custom, as is required for municipal
liability under § 1983.
As an alternative ground for the dismissal of the part of count three that
involves the Sheriff’s Office itself, the court ruled that Weiland’s allegations of
conspiracy among Fleming, Johnson, and the Sheriff’s Office were “conclusory”
as to the Sheriff’s Office. But not as to Fleming and Johnson, as the court added in
5
Though not explicit in the court’s order, the clear implication is that it believed that
count one provided enough “factual support” to state a claim against the individual deputies and
would have survived the motion to dismiss if not for its perceived violations of Rules 8(a)(2) and
10(b).
8
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a footnote: “However, the [c]ourt finds that with respect to Defendants Fleming
and Johnson, the Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to meet the pleading
requirements for a conspiracy.” Just as the court had earlier observed that
Weiland’s second amended complaint stated a Fourth Amendment claim, it found
that his third amended complaint stated a conspiracy claim even though it had
dismissed that claim based on Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b).
Finally, the court concluded that sovereign immunity barred Weiland’s state
law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and malicious
prosecution and dismissed them for that reason. The court, however, took “no
position” on whether Weiland had stated a claim under Florida law for excessive
force; instead, it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and remanded that
claim to state court.
III.
A.
We first address whether the district court abused its discretion when it
dismissed Weiland’s constitutional claims against Johnson and Fleming in counts
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one and three of the complaint 6 for failure to comply with Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2) and 10(b). 7
1.
It is unclear from the district court’s order what authority it relied on in
dismissing the claims against Johnson and Fleming. The order does not cite Rule
41(b) — which authorizes the dismissal with prejudice of an action for failure to
obey a court order or a federal rule — nor does it make the findings necessary to
justify a dismissal under that provision. See Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533,
1535 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The legal standard to be applied under Rule 41(b) is
whether there is a clear record of delay or willful contempt and a finding that lesser
sanctions would not suffice.”) (quotation marks omitted). For that reason, we will
not assume that the court was acting under Rule 41(b). And given the court’s
observations that Weiland’s allegations against Johnson and Fleming could state a
claim for relief, we infer that the dismissal of those particular claims was not based
on the failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
With Rule 41(b) and Rule 12(b)(6) off the table, we are left to conclude that
the dismissal of Weiland’s claims against the two deputies was based on the
6
For the sake of simplicity, in the remainder of this opinion we refer to the third amended
complaint as simply “the complaint,” except where necessary to distinguish between it and one
of the three earlier versions of Weiland’s complaint.
7
Because we affirm on other grounds the district court’s dismissal of Weiland’s claims
against the Sheriff’s Office, see infra Part II.C, we limit the discussion in this section to the
claims asserted against Johnson and Fleming in counts one and three.
10
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district court’s inherent authority to control its docket and ensure the prompt
resolution of lawsuits, which in some circumstances includes the power to dismiss
a complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 10(b). Our standard
of review of such dismissals is abuse of discretion. See Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v.
M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005) (“We review for abuse of
discretion a district court’s dismissal for failure to comply with the rules of
court.”).
Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to include “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 10(b) further
provides:
A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs,
each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. A
later pleading may refer by number to a paragraph in an earlier
pleading. If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a
separate transaction or occurrence — and each defense other than a
denial — must be stated in a separate count or defense.
2.
Complaints that violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both, are often
disparagingly referred to as “shotgun pleadings.” The first published opinion to
discuss shotgun pleadings in any meaningful way (albeit in a dissenting footnote),
described the problem with shotgun pleadings under the federal rules. See T.D.S.
Inc. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir. 1985). The footnote, which
began by quoting Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b), commented:
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The purpose of these rules is self-evident, to require the pleader to
present his claims discretely and succinctly, so that, his adversary can
discern what he is claiming and frame a responsive pleading, the court
can determine which facts support which claims and whether the
plaintiff has stated any claims upon which relief can be granted, and,
at trial, the court can determine that evidence which is relevant and
that which is not. “Shotgun” pleadings, calculated to confuse the
“enemy,” and the court, so that theories for relief not provided by law
and which can prejudice an opponent’s case, especially before the
jury, can be masked, are flatly forbidden by the [spirit], if not the
[letter], of these rules.
Id. at 1544 n.14 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).8 That footnote described the complaint at
issue in T.D.S. as “a paradigmatic shotgun pleading, containing a variety of
contract and tort claims interwoven in a haphazard fashion.” Id.T.D.S. was this Court’s first shot in what was to become a thirty-year salvo
of criticism aimed at shotgun pleadings, and there is no ceasefire in sight.9 Some
of our shooting, which has mostly been done with nonlethal dicta, has at times
been nearly as lacking in precision as the target itself. At times we have used the
8
The last thirteen words of the quoted passage from the opinion actually say “are flatly
forbidden by the letter, if not the spirit, of these rules.” Because we are sure that the words
“spirit” and “letter” were inadvertently transposed in the opinion, we have switched and
bracketed them in our quotation of it.
9
See, e.g., Paylor v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 748 F.3d 1117, 1125 n.2 (11th Cir. 2014)
(citing twenty-one published opinions condemning shotgun pleadings); Davis v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 516 F.3d 955, 979 n.54 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[S]ince 1985 we have explicitly
condemned shotgun pleadings upward of fifty times.”); Strategic Income Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear,
Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d 1293, 1295 n.9 (11th Cir. 2002) (“This court has addressed the
topic of shotgun pleadings on numerous occasions in the past, often at great length and always
with great dismay.”); see also Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d
364, 367 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Experience teaches that, unless cases are pled clearly and precisely,
issues are not joined, discovery is not controlled, the trial court’s docket becomes unmanageable,
the litigants suffer, and society loses confidence in the court’s ability to administer justice.”).
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term “shotgun pleading” to mean little more than “poorly drafted complaint.”10 In
the hope that we could impose some clarity on what we have said and done about
unclear complaints, we have examined more than sixty published decisions issued
since the T.D.S. decision in 1985. One thing we looked for is how many types of
shotgun pleadings have been used, wittingly or unwittingly, by attorneys and
litigants.
Though the groupings cannot be too finely drawn, we have identified four
rough types or categories of shotgun pleadings. The most common type — by a
long shot — is a complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts the
allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that
10
While plaintiffs have the responsibility of drafting complaints, defendants are not
without a duty of their own in this area. We have said that a defendant faced with a shotgun
pleading should “move the court, pursuant to Rule 12(e), to require the plaintiff to file a more
definite statement.” Anderson, 77 F.3d at 366. But we have also advised that when a defendant
fails to do so, the district court ought to take the initiative to dismiss or strike the shotgun
pleading and give the plaintiff an opportunity to replead. See Wagner v. First Horizon Pharm.
Corp., 464 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Given the district court’s proper conclusions that
the complaint was a shotgun pleading and that plaintiffs’ [sic] failed to connect their causes of
action to the facts alleged, the proper remedy was to order repleading sua sponte.”); Cramer v.
Florida, 117 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e note that the district court, acting on its
own initiative, should have stricken [the shotgun pleading] and instructed counsel to replead their
cases. . . .”). Where a plaintiff fails to make meaningful modifications to her complaint, a district
court may dismiss the case under the authority of either Rule 41(b) or the court’s inherent power
to manage its docket. See Betty K. Agencies, 432 F.3d at 1337.
However, “a dismissal with prejudice, whether on motion or sua sponte, is an extreme
sanction that may be properly imposed only when: ‘(1) a party engages in a clear pattern of
delay or willful contempt (contumacious conduct); and (2) the district court specifically finds
that lesser sanctions would not suffice.’” Id. at 1337–38 (emphasis omitted) (quoting World
Thrust Films, Inc. v. Int’l Family Entm’t, Inc., 41 F.3d 1454, 1456 (11th Cir. 1995).
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came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint.11 The
next most common type, at least as far as our published opinions on the subject
11
See, e.g., Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., 749 F.3d 1034, 1045 n.39 (11th Cir. 2014) (“The
complaint, through its incorporation into successive counts all preceding allegations and counts,
is a quintessential ‘shotgun’ pleading. . . .”); Paylor, 748 F.3d at 1126 (stating that a shotgun
pleading occurs where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts); Thompson v.
RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628, 650 n.22 (11th Cir. 2010) (Tjoflat, J., concurring in the
appeal, No. 07-13225, and dissenting in the cross-appeal, No. 07-13477) (finding “a typical
‘shotgun’ pleading” where “each count incorporated by reference all preceding paragraphs and
counts of the complaint notwithstanding that many of the facts alleged were not material to the
claim, or cause of action, appearing in a count’s heading”); PVC Windoors, Inc. v. Babbitbay
Beach Constr., N.V., 598 F.3d 802, 806 & n.4 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding a “typical shotgun
pleading” where the last of a complaint’s ten counts “amounts to an amalgamation of all
counts”); Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 500 F.3d 1293, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007)
(en banc) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (stating that the practice of incorporating each count’s
allegations into successive counts is the “cardinal sin of ‘shotgun’ pleading”); United States ex
rel. Atkins v. McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 1354 n.6 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding that the complaint was
a “typical shotgun pleading” where each count incorporated all previous allegations); Wagner,
464 F.3d at 1279 (“Shotgun pleadings are those that incorporate every antecedent allegation by
reference into each subsequent claim for relief or affirmative defense.”); Daewoo Motor Am.,
Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 459 F.3d 1249, 1264 n.7 (11th Cir. 2006) (Tjoflat, J., specially
concurring) (finding that the complaint was “a typical ‘shotgun pleading’ containing multiple
counts, each incorporating by reference all the (usually irrelevant) allegations of previous
counts”); SEC v. Diversified Corporate Consulting Grp., 378 F.3d 1219, 1221 n.2 (11th Cir.
2004) (“[Plaintiff’s] complaint is a typical shotgun pleading in that each count incorporates by
reference every allegation preceding it.”) (citation omitted); Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v.
Pagés Morales, 368 F.3d 1320, 1330 n.22 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding a shotgun pleading where
“[m]any [counts] adopt the material allegations of the preceding counts or paragraphs such that
some counts appear to state more than one cause of action”); Lumley v. City of Dade City, 327
F.3d 1186, 1192 & n.13 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding a shotgun pleading where “[e]ach count
incorporates by reference the allegations of the preceding counts and thus includes allegations
that are irrelevant to the cause(s) of action the count ostensibly states”); Strategic Income Fund,
305 F.3d at 1295 (“The typical shotgun complaint contains several counts, each one
incorporating by reference the allegations of its predecessors, leading to a situation where most
of the counts (i.e., all but the first) contain irrelevant factual allegations and legal conclusions.”);
Sikes v. Teleline, Inc., 281 F.3d 1350, 1356 n.9 (11th Cir. 2002) (“We note that the plaintiffs’
complaint is yet another example of what we have often criticized as ‘shotgun pleadings,’ where
each count ‘incorporates’ all of the preceding paragraphs and counts.”), abrogated on other
grounds by Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 646, 661, 128 S. Ct. 2131,
2137, 2145 (2008); Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Each count
incorporates by reference the allegations made in a section entitled ‘General Factual Allegations’
— which comprises 146 numbered paragraphs — while also incorporating the allegations of any
count or counts that precede it.”); Moore v. Am. Fed’n of Television & Radio Artists, 216 F.3d
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reflect, is a complaint that does not commit the mortal sin of re-alleging all
preceding counts but is guilty of the venial sin of being replete with conclusory,
vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of
action. 12 The third type of shotgun pleading is one that commits the sin of not
separating into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief. 13 Fourth,
1236, 1240 (11th Cir. 2000) (dubbing the complaint a shotgun pleading because it was “96 pages
long with 232 numbered paragraphs; [and] each count incorporate[d] by reference all previous
paragraphs”); BMC Indus., Inc. v. Barth Indus., Inc., 160 F.3d 1322, 1326 n.6 (11th Cir. 1998)
(describing as “a quintessential example” of a shotgun pleading a complaint in which each
successive count incorporated by reference both the factual and legal allegations of the previous
counts); Thornton v. City of Macon, 132 F.3d 1395, 1396 n.1 (11th Cir. 1998) (describing as a
“quintessential shotgun pleading” a two count complaint where the second count “incorporated
all of the preceding allegations of the complaint, including those of Count One”); Johnson v.
City of Fort Lauderdale, 126 F.3d 1372, 1376 n.4 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding that a complaint was
a shotgun pleading where “each of the complaint’s nine counts incorporates all of the factual
allegations of earlier counts”); Anderson, 77 F.3d at 366 (describing a complaint as a shotgun
pleading where “each count also adopts the allegations of all preceding counts”).
12
See, e.g., Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1359 n.9 (11th Cir. 1997)
(finding a shotgun pleading where “a reader of the complaint must speculate as to which factual
allegations pertain to which count”); Cramer, 117 F.3d at 1261 (describing the complaint at issue
as “a rambling ‘shotgun’ pleading that is so disorganized and ambiguous that it is almost
impossible to discern precisely what it is that these appellants are claiming”); Ebrahimi v.
Huntsville Bd. of Educ., 114 F.3d 162, 164 (11th Cir. 1997) (describing a complaint that
“offered vague and conclusory factual allegations in an effort to support a multiplicity of
discrimination claims leveled against 15 defendants” as a “prototypical ‘shotgun complaint’”);
Anderson, 77 F.3d at 366 (complaint was “perfect example of ‘shotgun’ pleading in that it [was]
virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact [were] intended to support which claim(s)
for relief”) (citation omitted); Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 63
F.3d 1030, 1046 n.51 (11th Cir. 1995) (characterizing the complaint at issue as “a quintessential
shotgun pleading, replete with vague and cursory allegations”); Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d
1465, 1518 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[Plaintiff’s complaints] are quintessential ‘shotgun’ pleadings,
replete with factual allegations that could not possibly be material to any of the causes of actions
they assert.”).
13
See, e.g., Davis, 516 F.3d at 979–80 (describing a complaint with “untold causes of
action, all bunched together in one count” as “a model ‘shotgun’ pleading”); Bickerstaff Clay
Prods. Co. v. Harris Cnty., 89 F.3d 1481, 1485 n.4 (11th Cir. 1996) (“The complaint is a typical
15
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and finally, there is the relatively rare sin of asserting multiple claims against
multiple defendants without specifying which defendant(s) are responsible for
which acts or omissions, or which of the defendant(s) the claim is brought
against. 14 The unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they
fail to one degree or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants
adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim
rests.15
shotgun pleading, in that some of the counts present more than one discrete claim for relief.”);
Cesnik v. Edgewood Baptist Church, 88 F.3d 902, 905 (11th Cir. 1996) (characterizing as a
shotgun pleading a complaint that “was framed in complete disregard of the principle that
separate, discrete causes of action should be plead in separate counts”); Novak v. Cobb Cnty.
Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 74 F.3d 1173, 1175 & n.5 (11th Cir. 1996) (referring to a complaint
that pleaded multiple causes of action in a single count as “a quintessential ‘shotgun pleading’”);
Cole v. United States, 846 F.2d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 1988) (labeling as a shotgun pleading a
complaint that set forth, in one count, “every act, [regardless of which defendant committed the
act], which, in the pleader’s mind, may have had a causal relationship to the [injury]”). We have
indicated that this type of shotgun pleading likely runs afoul of Rule 10(b). See Anderson, 77
F.3d at 366 (finding that failure to “present each claim for relief in a separate count, as required
by Rule 10(b),” constitutes shotgun pleading).
14
See, e.g., Magluta, 256 F.3d at 1284 (“The complaint is replete with allegations that
‘the defendants’ engaged in certain conduct, making no distinction among the fourteen
defendants charged, though geographic and temporal realities make plain that all of the
defendants could not have participated in every act complained of.”); Ebrahimi, 114 F.3d at 164(describing a complaint that “offered vague and conclusory factual allegations in an effort to
support a multiplicity of discrimination claims leveled against 15 defendants” as a “prototypical
‘shotgun complaint’”). But see Kyle K. v. Chapman, 208 F.3d 940, 944 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The
fact that defendants are accused collectively does not render the complaint deficient. The
complaint can be fairly read to aver that all defendants are responsible for the alleged conduct.”).
15
See Sledge v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires N. Am., Ltd., 275 F.3d 1014, 1018 n.8 (11th Cir.
2001) (“The failure of the plaintiff to identify his claims with sufficient clarity to enable the
defendant to frame a [responsive] pleading constitutes shotgun pleading.”); see also Boatman v.
Town of Oakland, 76 F.3d 341, 343 n.6 (11th Cir. 1996) (characterizing as a “‘shotgun’
pleading” a complaint that failed to place a defendant on notice of what the claim was and the
grounds upon which it rested).
16
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3.
The district court dismissed Weiland’s § 1983 claims against Johnson and
Fleming, which were contained in counts one and three of the complaint, because
those counts: (1) incorporated “all of the factual allegations contained in
paragraphs 1 through 49 inclusive”; and (2) failed “to identify which allegations
are relevant to the elements of which legal theories” and “which constitutional
amendments govern which counts.” The court dismissed those claims even though
it was able to determine from the complaint that Weiland had stated a claim for
relief against the two deputies under the Fourth Amendment and for conspiracy to
violate his constitutional rights. Its reasoning for dismissing with prejudice claims
that it could discern from the complaint was that it had given Weiland an
opportunity to replead his complaint, and his amended pleadings “duplicate[d] the
violations of Rule 8(a)(2) and 10(b) which formed the basis of the [c]ourt’s
[earlier] dismissal of th[o]se counts.”
Weiland’s re-alleging of paragraphs 1 through 49 at the beginning of each
count looks, at first glance, like the most common type of shotgun pleading. 16 But
it is not. As we have already discussed, this Court has condemned the
incorporation of preceding paragraphs where a complaint “contains several counts,
16
The district court rejected the defendants’ argument that the counts alleging Weiland’s
state law claims violated Rule 10(b) even though all three of those counts contain the identical
language re-alleging paragraphs 1–49 that his § 1983 counts do. The court stated that the state
law claim counts “provide notice as to the charges, the allegations, and the cause of action which
they fall within,” but it did not explain why the same was not true of the § 1983 claim counts.
17
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each one incorporating by reference the allegations of its predecessors [i.e.,
predecessor counts], leading to a situation where most of the counts (i.e., all but the
first) contain irrelevant factual allegations and legal conclusions.” Strategic
Income Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th
Cir. 2002); see also Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001)
(identifying a complaint as a shotgun pleading where “[e]ach count incorporates by
reference the allegations made in a section entitled ‘General Factual Allegations’
— which comprise[d] 146 numbered paragraphs — while also incorporating the
allegations of any count or counts that precede[d] it.”) (emphasis added). What
we have here is different. The allegations of each count are not rolled into every
successive count on down the line.
More importantly, this is not a situation where a failure to more precisely
parcel out and identify the facts relevant to each claim materially increased the
burden of understanding the factual allegations underlying each count. This may
explain why the defendants did not move for a more definite statement under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) or otherwise assert that they were having
difficulty knowing what they were alleged to have done and why they were liable
for doing it. And it may also explain why the district court could and did
understand the claims that were stated in these two counts.
18
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Count one claims that Fleming and Johnson, 17 “while acting under color of
law,” violated Weiland’s constitutional rights by “using excessive and
unreasonable force.” The task of figuring out which of the 49 paragraphs that are
incorporated into count one are relevant to a claim of “excessive and unreasonable
force” is hardly a task at all. It is greatly simplified by the organization of the 49
paragraphs of factual allegations into three subsections, the first of which is titled
“Facts Surrounding the Shooting of [Christopher Weiland]” and consists of 23
paragraphs spanning just over six pages. This subsection is over-inclusive for
purposes of an excessive force claim (the final 10 paragraphs are about the role the
deputies played in the alleged coverup, which is not an element of excessive force).
But the first 13 paragraphs clearly and concisely describe the events of April 6,
2007, from the 911 call to the shooting, tasering, beating, and arrest of Weiland.
Count one is not a model of efficiency or specificity, but it does adequately put
Fleming and Johnson on notice of the specific claims against them and the factual
allegations that support those claims.
Count three — the conspiracy count — restates in paragraphs 69 through 74
the facts relevant to a conspiracy claim against Fleming and Johnson, including the
allegations that Fleming and Johnson agreed to “fabricate an elaborate story” that
17
As we have mentioned, one type of shotgun pleading fails to identify the defendant or
defendants against whom each claim is brought. See, e.g., Magluta, 256 F.3d at 1284.
Weiland’s third amended complaint did not do that. Count one, for example, is titled “42 U.S.C.,
Sections 1983 and 1988 against Fleming [and] Johnson . . . individually.”
19
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would justify their use of deadly force and, in furtherance of that agreement,
falsified police reports and tampered with evidence. According to count three, the
deputies’ conspiracy resulted in the deprivation of multiple constitutional rights.
As we will explain, only one of those alleged deprivations yields a cognizable
claim, but for present purposes, it is enough to say that count three, like count one,
gives Fleming and Johnson adequate notice of the claims against them and the
factual allegations that support those claims.
4.
Finally, we disagree with the district court’s characterization of Weiland’s
complaint as “fail[ing] to identify . . . which constitutional amendments govern
which counts.” The complaint does identify the constitutional amendment or
amendments that govern each count. 18 The fact that it includes constitutional
amendments under which he is not entitled to relief would be dispositive in a Rule
18
Count one states that “[Johnson’s] and [Fleming’s] acts and omissions in using
excessive and unreasonable force . . . violated [Weiland’s] Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment
rights, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Count three states that
Fleming and Johnson’s conspiracy violated “[Weiland’s] constitutional rights under the Fourth
and Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.”
A complaint is not always required to contain a separate count for each constitutional
provision that the same set of facts is claimed to violate. Rule 10(b) states only that “[i]f doing
so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . must
be stated in a separate count or defense.” It does not state that a contention that one transaction
or occurrence violates multiple constitutional provisions must be stated in multiple counts.
Multiplicity does not always equate with clarity. A separate count for the Fourth Amendment
claim, the Fifth Amendment claim, and the Eighth Amendment claim — all based on the same
“transaction or occurrence” of allegedly excessive and unreasonable force — would not
“promote clarity” in this case.
20
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12(b)(6) analysis, but it is not dispositive of the separate question of whether the
claims in this complaint are so poorly pleaded that they warrant a dismissal under
Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b) regardless of whether they state viable claims. A dismissal
under Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b) is appropriate where “it is virtually impossible to
know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief.”
Anderson, 77 F.3d at 366 (emphasis added). No such virtual impossibility exists in
this case.
5.
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion
when it dismissed Weiland’s count one and count three claims against Fleming and
Johnson on the ground that those counts did not comply with Rules 8(a)(2) and
10(b). In concluding that the court should not have dismissed those two counts, we
are not retreating from this circuit’s criticism of shotgun pleadings, but instead are
deciding that, whatever their faults, these two counts are informative enough to
permit a court to readily determine if they state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. The district court implicitly recognized as much when it observed in the
orders dismissing counts one and three that they actually do state claims upon
which relief can be granted. Whether those observations are correct is a question
to which we now turn.
21
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B.
Deputies Johnson and Fleming did not argue in their motion to dismiss
Weiland’s third amended complaint, or in their brief to this Court, that they are
entitled to qualified immunity. We limit our analysis to whether the allegations in
Weiland’s complaint are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted without regard to the qualified immunity defense. Our review is de novo.
Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2014).
1.
We begin with count one, which claims that the deputies used excessive
force to seize Weiland. A citizen’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures includes “the right to be free from the use of
excessive force in the course of an arrest.” 19 Id. at 1266–67. To determine
whether the amount of force used to seize a person is “reasonable” under the
Fourth Amendment, courts consider, among other things, “whether the suspect
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham v. Connor,
19
In count one, Weiland alleges that Fleming and Johnson’s use of excessive and
unreasonable force violated his “Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment rights, applicable to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment.” It is clear, however, that the only constitutional
provision under which Weiland could possibly prevail on a claim of excessive force is the Fourth
Amendment. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, — U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020 (2014); accord
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989) (“[A]ll claims that law
enforcement officers have used excessive force — deadly or not — in the course of an
arrest . . . or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment
and its ‘reasonableness’ standard.”).
22
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490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872 (1989). Reasonableness is judged
objectively “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than
with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id.Count one of Weiland’s complaint states a Fourth Amendment claim against
both Johnson and Fleming in their individual capacities. It alleges that when the
deputies arrived at the residence, Weiland’s father informed them that his son was
agitated, had threatened suicide, and might have a gun. With guns drawn, Fleming
and Johnson approached the bedroom without calling out or identifying
themselves. When they encountered Weiland sitting on a bed and “looking down
at a shotgun that lay loosely in his lap,” Johnson fired two rounds at Weiland,
hitting him and knocking him to the floor. As Weiland lay bleeding and critically
injured, Fleming tasered him. And both officers then “physically beat and
assault[ed] [Weiland] before finally handcuffing one of his hands to a dresser.”
Though the complaint does not specify what happened to the shotgun on Weiland’s
lap when he fell off the bed, it does allege that “[a]t no point did [Weiland] ever
raise the shotgun from his lap or point it in the direction of the Deputies.”
Construing the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as we
are required to do, count one alleges that Deputy Johnson shot Weiland without
warning when he was not posing a threat to the deputies or anyone else; that while
he was on the ground bleeding from the gunshot wound and not offering any
23
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resistance or threat, Deputy Fleming tasered Weiland; and that while he was on the
ground seriously injured by both the shooting and the tasering and not offering any
resistance or threat, both deputies beat him without cause. Count one states an
excessive force claim upon which relief can be granted against both deputies.
Because the district court erred in dismissing count one, we will reverse that part of
its judgment.
2.
Count three asserts that Johnson and Fleming, after violating Weiland’s
Fourth Amendment rights, conspired to cover up those violations. To state a claim
for conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendants reached
an understanding or agreement that they would deny the plaintiff one of his
constitutional rights; and (2) the conspiracy resulted in an actual denial of one of
his constitutional rights. See Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11th Cir.
2008). Here is how count three describes the agreement and actions taken in
furtherance of it:
On or about April 6, 2007, after [Weiland] had been shot and Tasered,
[Fleming] and [Johnson] . . . entered into an agreement to fabricate an
elaborate story about [Weiland] running from them into another room,
grabbing a shotgun, sitting in a chair, and then pointing the gun at
them as they entered the doorway.
As part of this agreement, [Fleming] and [Johnson] falsely alleged
that during the altercation, [Weiland] discharged the shotgun, either at
the Deputies or himself.
24
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In furtherance of that agreement, [Johnson] took the shotgun from
[Weiland]’s residence to an unknown location where it was
discharged. It was then returned to the scene.
[Fleming] and [Johnson] agreed to present false police reports
documenting their fabricated account of the incident.
As an overt act, [Johnson] physically removed the shotgun from the
[Weiland] residence against all police procedure and protocol.
As an overt act, [Fleming] and [Johnson] . . . prepared false incident
reports documenting the fabrication.
Those allegations adequately state that there was an agreement between the two
deputies to frame Weiland for a crime he did not commit.
Count three goes on to allege that the deputies’ agreement, and the actions
taken in furtherance of that agreement, resulted in the deprivation of Weiland’s
constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
It also identifies “unjust incarceration” as the constitutional injury that Weiland
suffered as a direct and proximate result of the conspiracy. (Weiland was
imprisoned for nearly two years between his arrest and trial, at which point he was
acquitted.)
Two of the four constitutional bases for count three are out for obvious
reasons. The Fifth Amendment is out because it protects a citizen’s rights against
infringement by the federal government, not by state government. See Riley v.
25
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Camp, 130 F.3d 958, 972 n.19 (11th Cir. 1997); Buxton v. Plant City, 871 F.2d
1037, 1041 (11th Cir. 1989). And the Eighth Amendment is out because it applies
only after a citizen has been convicted of a crime, and Weiland never was. See
United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566, 1571 (11th Cir. 1992).
We are left, then, with the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment. Weiland claims that he was detained improperly and prosecuted for
charges based on evidence fabricated by the deputies and lies contained in their
police reports. “Our Court has identified malicious prosecution as a violation of
the Fourth Amendment and a viable constitutional tort cognizable under § 1983.”
Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003). Additionally, the specific
injury identified by Weiland — i.e., unjust incarceration — is a deprivation of
liberty redressable under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Campbell v. Johnson, 586 F.3d 835, 840 (11th Cir. 2009). Because count
three specifies a causal connection between the alleged cover up and the specific
deprivation of Weiland’s constitutional rights, it sufficiently alleges “an underlying
actual denial of his constitutional rights,” which is required to state a claim for
conspiracy under § 1983. Hadley, 526 F.3d at 1332 (quotation marks omitted).
For these reasons, we will reverse the part of the district court’s judgment
dismissing count three as to Deputy Johnson and Deputy Fleming.
26
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C.
We now turn to the question of whether Weiland’s complaint states a claim
upon which relief can be granted against the Palm Beach Sheriff’s Office.
Although the Supreme Court has held that local government may be subject to
liability under § 1983, a plaintiff cannot rely upon the doctrine of respondeat
superior to hold the government liable. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 693–94, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2037 (1978). He must instead establish that the
government unit has a “policy or custom” that caused the injury. City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (1989).
1.
In counts two and four, Weiland claims that the Sheriff’s Office maintained
two unconstitutional policies: (1) a policy of not training its deputies in the
appropriate use of force when seizing mentally ill citizens for transportation to
mental health facilities (count two); and (2) a policy of using internal affairs
investigations to cover up the use of excessive force against mentally ill citizens
(count four). We take the two claims in that order.
“In limited circumstances, a local government’s decision not to train certain
employees . . . to avoid violating citizens’ rights may rise to the level of an official
government policy for purposes of § 1983.” Connick v. Thompson, — U.S. —,
131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011). But “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations
27
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by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate
indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Id. at 1359–60 (quotation marks
omitted). 20 Count two does not allege a pattern of similar constitutional violations
by untrained employees. Although it contains the conclusory allegation that the
Sheriff’s Office was “on notice” of the need to “promulgate, implement, and/or
oversee” policies pertaining to the “use of force” appropriate for “the seizure of
mentally ill persons and their transportation to mental health facilities,” no facts are
alleged to support that conclusion. 21 Instead, it is clear that the claim outlined in
count two arises from a single incident and the actions of two deputies.
20
See also Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 1998) (“This Court
repeatedly has held that without notice of a need to train or supervise in a particular area, a
municipality is not liable as a matter of law for any failure to train and supervise.”); Wright v.
Sheppard, 919 F.2d 665, 674 (11th Cir. 1990) (concluding that a sheriff’s department was not
liable for a deputy’s act where “no evidence of a history of widespread prior abuse . . . put the
[department] on notice of the need for improved training or supervision”); Brooks v. Scheib, 813
F.2d 1191, 1193 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that the city did not have adequate notice of past
police misconduct even where there had been ten citizen complaints about the implicated officer
because the plaintiff “never demonstrated that past complaints . . . had any merit”).
21
Weiland’s assertions that he had been “Baker Acted” by deputies on at least two earlier
occasions and that the Sheriff’s Office was “familiar with [Weiland’s] history of bipolar
disorder” are not enough, especially absent allegations that the prior Baker Act calls resulted in
similar violations (or, for that matter, any violations) of Weiland’s constitutional rights or that
the Sheriff’s Office was aware of those violations and therefore “on notice” of a need to train and
supervise deputies in this particular area.
During oral argument, Weiland’s attorney directed us to paragraph 33 of the complaint,
which alleges that “[n]umerous police shootings of people with mental illnesses, both in Palm
Beach County and nationally, in addition to thousands of contacts between [the Sheriff’s Office]
Deputies and people with mental illnesses, have placed [the Sheriff’s Office] on notice that there
is a need for specialized training of Deputies to deal with people with mental illnesses.” Those
allegations are not enough. Mere “contacts” between deputies and mentally ill citizens are
insufficient to put the Sheriff’s Office on notice of the need for training, especially where “the
28
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Our analysis is not altered by the fact that evidence of previous incidents is
not required to establish city policy if the need to train and supervise in a particular
area is “so obvious” that liability attaches for a single incident. See Gold, 151 F.3d
at 1352. The complaint does not allege that the need for specialized training in the
constitutional restrictions on the use of force when dealing with mentally ill
citizens is “so obvious” that the failure to provide such training amounts to
deliberate indifference. The district court’s dismissal of count two is correct.
As for count four, the complaint does not plausibly allege that the Sheriff’s
Office has had a policy of using internal affairs investigations to cover up the use
of excessive force against the mentally ill. The only facts that it alleges in support
of that claim are about Deputies Fleming and Johnson’s own conduct after the
shooting coupled with the naked assertion that the internal affairs investigation into
the administrative complaint that Weiland filed “sought [only] to uncover
misconduct on the part of [Weiland] and his father.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (“[A] complaint [does not] suffice if it
failure to train or supervise is generally not ‘so likely’ to produce a wrong decision as to support
an inference of deliberate indifference.” Sewell v. Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 490
(11th Cir. 1997) (quotation marks omitted). Any alleged shootings outside of the Sheriff
Office’s jurisdiction do not establish a pattern of similar constitutional violations by employees
of the Sheriff’s Office that would put it on notice that its own training is inadequate. Finally, to
the extent that police shootings of the mentally ill have occurred in Palm Beach County, Weiland
must allege, with some “factual enhancement,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557,
127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966 (2007), that those shootings gave rise to “similar constitutional
violations,” Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360 (noting that previous Brady violations by prosecutors
were insufficient to put the district attorney’s office on notice of the need to train because “those
incidents [were] not similar to the violation at issue”). He has not done so.
29
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tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966 (2007)). The
district court’s dismissal of count four is correct.
2.
The complaint attempts to state one other § 1983 claim against the Sheriff’s
Office. Count three alleges that the Sheriff’s Office conspired with Johnson and
Fleming to conceal the deprivation of Weiland’s constitutional rights. While this
Court has never had occasion to hold that a conspiracy claim against a municipality
must include the existence of a policy or custom underlying the conspiracy, that
has to be so. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S. Ct. at 2036 (“[T]he language of
§ 1983, read against the background of the same legislative history, compels the
conclusion that Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless
action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional
tort.”) (emphasis added). Neither count three nor any other part of the complaint
contains sufficient, non-conclusory allegations that there is an official “policy or
custom” of covering up constitutional deprivations like the ones that Weiland
claims to have suffered. The district court’s dismissal of count three insofar as it is
against the Sheriff’s Office is correct.
30
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3.
The only remaining claims against the Sheriff’s Office that are before us in
this appeal are the state law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress
(count six) and malicious prosecution (count seven). The district court ruled that
both claims were barred by sovereign immunity. Florida courts have long
recognized that Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a) — which provides that the State and its
subdivisions “shall not be liable in tort for the acts or omissions of an officer,
employee, or agent . . . committed . . . in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful
disregard of human rights, safety, or property” — bars claims for both intentional
infliction of emotional distress and malicious prosecution. See Williams v. City of
Minneola, 619 So. 2d 983, 986 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (compiling Florida cases that
use “reckless conduct” and “willful and wanton conduct” interchangeably and
holding that the reckless conduct element of an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim “would at least constitute willful and wanton conduct” under
§ 768.28(9)(a)); Johnson v. State Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 695 So. 2d 927,
930 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (citing several cases for the proposition that “[s]ection
768.28(9)(a) bars an action for malicious prosecution against the state or its
subdivisions arising from the malicious acts of their employees”). The district
court’s dismissal of counts six and seven against the Sheriff’s Office is correct.
31
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IV.
We REVERSE the part of the district court’s judgment dismissing count one
of Weiland’s third amended complaint. We also REVERSE the part of the
judgment dismissing count three as to Fleming and Johnson. However, we
AFFIRM the dismissal of count three as to the Sheriff’s Office and the dismissal of
counts two, four, six, and seven in their entirety.
The district court’s discretionary remand of count five to state court was
predicated on its belief that “[no] viable federal claims” remained. Because that
has now changed, we VACATE the part of the district court’s order that remanded
count five to state court. And we REMAND this case to the district court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; VACATED IN PART;
REMANDED.
32