Doyle Lee Hamm v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-14376
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:06-cv-00945-KOB-JEO
DOYLE LEE HAMM,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF ALABAMA,
Respondents - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(August 3, 2015)
Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Petitioner-Appellant Doyle Lee Hamm was convicted in 1987 of the capital
crime of robbery-murder and sentenced to death by an Alabama court. Following
unsuccessful direct appeals and collateral proceedings in the Alabama state courts,
Hamm filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in federal
court, which the district court denied. Hamm appeals the rejection of his petition
on three grounds. Hamm contends that unconstitutionally obtained prior
convictions were impermissibly used as an aggravating circumstance in his death
sentence. He also asserts that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in
presenting a case in mitigation of the death penalty. And finally, Hamm argues
that his conviction is infirm because the prosecution failed to turn over evidence
that would have impeached the state’s primary witness. After a thorough review of
the record and arguments, we affirm the denial of Hamm’s petition.
I.
Petitioner-Appellant Hamm was convicted of robbery-murder, in violation
of Ala. Code § 13A-5-40(a)(2), and sentenced to death by an Alabama court in
1987. The events that led to this conviction are recounted below, as drawn from
Hamm’s proceedings in both state and federal court.
A. The Criminal Offense and Trial
On January 24, 1987, Patrick Cunningham was working as the desk clerk
for the Anderson’s Motel in Cullman, Alabama. Hamm v. State, 564 So. 2d 453,
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455 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (“Hamm Direct Appeal”). At approximately 10:30
p.m., Kathy Flanagan1 stopped at the motel to rent a room for the night. Id. While
Flanagan was registering, a small-framed white male entered the motel to ask
about a room. Id. Cunningham informed the male that he needed a reservation,
and the male left. Id. Moments later, the first male returned accompanied by a
second male wearing blue jeans and a faded green army jacket. Id. Cunningham
told Flanagan that “it ‘looks like there is going to be trouble’” and apparently
pointed Flanagan in the direction of a room, but Flanagan returned to her car. Id.
From her car, Flanagan saw the individual in the green jacket point a revolver at
the registration desk but could not see behind the desk; she also saw the first male
standing by the door and noticed a banged-up 1970s model car in the parking lot,
with its engine running, and possibly a third individual inside. Id. Flanagan left
the scene, drove to a nearby telephone, and called police to report a possible
robbery. Id.
Upon arriving at the motel, police discovered Cunningham’s body on the
floor behind the front desk. Id. Cunningham had been killed by a single shot to
the head from a .38-caliber pistol. Id. The evidence further established that he had
been shot in the temple from a distance of approximately 18 inches while he was
1
In some documents, her name is spelled “Flannagan.”
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lying on the floor. Id. Cunningham’s wallet, containing approximately $60 was
missing, as was approximately $350 from the motel’s cash drawer. Id.
A Cullman police officer learned that two men matching the descriptions
given by Flanagan were also wanted for a robbery-murder that had taken place in
Mississippi that same day. Id. at 455-56. A nickel-plated .38-caliber revolver had
been taken during that robbery. Id. at 456.
On January 25, the same officer spoke with Douglas Roden, who had been
stopped while driving a car matching the description given by Flanagan. Id.
Roden claimed that he and his sister-in-law, Regina Roden, had been kidnapped by
Hamm and two others. Id. Roden further stated that he and Regina had been held
captive in a trailer home during the time of the motel robbery while Hamm and
another individual left with the car. Id. In addition, Roden asserted that he and
Regina had escaped the trailer that morning and had taken the car. Roden directed
police to the trailer. Id. At some point, the police learned that the trailer was
owned by Hamm’s nephew. Id.
Later that day, a search warrant was obtained for the trailer and a fugitive-
from-justice warrant was obtained for Hamm for a robbery in Mississippi. Id.
During the search of the trailer, authorities discovered a nickel-plated .38-caliber
pistol, a green army jacket, and several rounds of .38-caliber ammunition,
including some in the pocket of the jacket. Id.
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Hamm was arrested and booked on the fugitive warrant. Id. He initially
denied any involvement in the murder and robbery at the Anderson’s Motel, and
Flanagan failed to identify Hamm in a lineup. Id. Nevertheless, Hamm was placed
under arrest for the motel robbery. Id. The next day, Hamm gave a statement to
the police that was recorded, in which he admitted his initial statements were false
and he confessed to the robbery and murder of Cunningham. Id.
Subsequently, it was discovered that the Rodens had lied in their initial
statements. Id. They had not been kidnapped and, in fact, Douglas and Regina
were the two individuals present with Hamm at the Anderson’s Motel during the
robbery and murder; Douglas was the first male individual to enter the motel. Id.
The Rodens entered into agreements with the state where, in exchange for
testimony against Hamm, they would receive lesser charges. Douglas agreed to
plead guilty to murder and received a life sentence; Regina pled guilty to robbery
and hindering prosecution. Id. at 456-57.
Hamm was tried in the Circuit Court of Cullman County, Alabama, and
found guilty by a jury of robbery-murder on September 26, 1987. Id. at 464. A
separate sentencing hearing was then held before the same jury. Id. During the
hearing, the state moved into evidence all evidence from the guilt phase of the trial
as well as two convictions for robbery Hamm received in Tennessee in 1978. Id. at
464, 466.
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Hamm’s counsel called two witnesses in mitigation: Hamm’s sister Ruthie
Murphy2 and a Cullman County deputy sheriff, Dennis Johnson. Murphy testified
about Hamm’s harsh upbringing, the extensive criminal histories of Hamm’s
brothers, Hamm’s alcohol and drug abuse, and Hamm’s epilepsy. Murphy also
testified about their abusive father, who, among other things, was a criminal and
alcoholic who forced his children to drink alcohol and steal (or otherwise they
weren’t “a Hamm”), required the children to bring him switches (presumably for
beatings), and would line his children up and shoot a firearm over their heads.
Johnson testified that Hamm had been a cooperative prisoner during his time in
county jail.
The jury recommended on September 28, 1987, by a vote of 11 to 1, that
Hamm be sentenced to death. The state court then found that two aggravating
circumstances had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt: that a capital offense
was committed during a robbery (the underlying crime here of robbery-murder
satisfied that factor), and that Hamm had previously been convicted of a felony
involving the use, or threat of violence to a person (the Tennessee convictions).
Hamm Direct Appeal, 564 So. 2d at 466.
The sentencing court then found that none of the statutory mitigating factors
were present in Hamm’s case, but did find the existence of non-statutory mitigating
2
In some documents, Hamm’s sister’s last name is spelled “Murphree.”
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factors based on Murphy’s and Johnson’s testimony. Id. at 466-68. The court
credited Murphy’s testimony and found that Hamm’s father “created an obstacle to
the development of [the Hamm boys’] character, which was, indeed, difficult to
overcome,” and that Hamm’s upbringing “absolutely had a negative influence on
the Defendant.” Id. at 468. The court noted, though, that Hamm’s two sisters were
able to rise above this influence and be good citizens. Id. The court also
acknowledged that Hamm had a poor education and suffered from epilepsy. Id.
Finally, the court recognized that Hamm had been a cooperative prisoner at
Cullman County jail, that he had agreed to talk to offenders about changing their
lives, and that he did voluntarily confess to the crime. Id.
Despite the existence of these mitigating factors, the court found that the
aggravating circumstances outweighed them and sentenced Hamm to death by
electrocution. Id. at 469. Hamm’s conviction was upheld on direct appeal to the
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, id. at 464, and the Alabama Supreme Court,
Ex parte Hamm, 564 So. 2d 469, 473 (Ala. 1990). Both courts conducted a plain-
error review of the proceedings and found nothing warranting reversal. Hamm
Direct Appeal, 564 So. 2d at 463-64; Ex parte Hamm, 564 So. 2d at 473. The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Hamm v. Alabama, 498 U.S. 1008,
111 S. Ct. 572 (1990).
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B. State Collateral Proceedings
On December 3, 1991, Hamm filed a collateral attack on his conviction and
sentence under Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. A hearing
was held on July 26, 1999, and the state trial court denied Hamm relief on
December 6, 1999.3 The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals (“ACCA”) affirmed
the denial of relief on February 1, 2002, and the Alabama Supreme Court denied
certiorari on May 20, 2005. See Hamm v. State, 913 So. 2d 460 (Ala. Crim. App.
2002) (“Hamm Collateral Appeal”). The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari on the state collateral proceedings in November 2005. Hamm v.
Alabama, 546 U.S. 1017, 126 S. Ct. 651 (2005).
Of particular relevance to the appeal before this Court, Hamm raised in his
Rule 32 petition a claim that the underlying Tennessee robbery convictions were
impermissibly used as aggravating circumstances in his sentencing because they
were allegedly obtained via an unconstitutional guilty plea, and, therefore, were
effectively invalid although never actually invalidated by any court. Hamm
3
The Rule 32 Court’s order, entered on Monday, December 6, 1999, was apparently a
verbatim adoption of the state’s “Proposed Memorandum Opinion” that was filed on Friday,
December 3, 1999. The Rule 32 Court did not even strike the word “Proposed” from the order.
Although this procedural shortcut has no bearing on our disposition of Hamm’s federal habeas
appeal, see Jones v. GDCP Warden, 753 F.3d 1171, 1182-83 (11th Cir. 2014), we take this
opportunity to once again strongly criticize the practice of trial courts’ uncritical wholesale
adoption of the proposed orders or opinions submitted by a prevailing party. See, e.g., Anderson
v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 571-73, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1510-11 (1985); Colony
Square Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. (In re Colony Square Co.), 819 F.2d 272, 274-75 (11th
Cir. 1987).
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Collateral Appeal, 913 So. 2d at 479. The ACCA found that this claim was
procedurally barred by Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.2(a)(5), Ala. R. Crim. P., because it
could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal but was not. Id. Alternatively,
the ACCA also found that Hamm’s trial and appellate counsel were not deficient
because no legal authority supported the contention that “trial counsel had a duty to
challenge in a Tennessee court the merits of the nine-year-old convictions so that
he could then prevent consideration of the prior convictions at the 1987 capital
sentencing hearing.” Id.
Hamm also asserted in the state courts that the prosecution withheld
exculpatory information from the defense during trial. Specifically, Hamm argued
that the prosecution did not turn over inconsistent statements from Flanagan until
her cross-examination was underway, and failed to turn over sealed records
regarding Douglas Roden that could have been used for impeachment. See id. at
479-80. The Flanagan claim was raised in the Rule 32 petition, and the Rule 32
trial court found it was barred because it had been raised and addressed at trial and
it had not been raised again on direct appeal. Id. As for the Roden claim, because
it was not raised in the Rule 32 petition, the ACCA held that it could not be
considered on appeal. Id. at 480. Alternatively, the ACCA concluded that the
Roden claim was also procedurally barred because it could have been raised at trial
or on direct appeal. Id.
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Hamm also raised a number of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims in
his Rule 32 petition. Among those relevant to this appeal, Hamm claimed that his
trial attorneys were ineffective because they “failed to properly investigate
aggravating and mitigating circumstances for the penalty phase and failed to
present ‘compelling evidence’ at the sentencing portion of Hamm’s trial.” Id. at
486. The Rule 32 Court ruled, and the ACCA affirmed, that trial counsel were not
deficient in investigating and presenting mitigation evidence. Id. at 486-88.
Hamm produced documents at the Rule 32 hearing that he believed should have
been offered by counsel at trial, but the state court considered the documents to be
largely cumulative of Hamm’s sister’s testimony. Id. at 487. Further, one of
Hamm’s trial attorneys, Hugh Harris, testified that the documents would have put
more of Hamm’s own criminal history before the jury, so, for that reason, he opted
only for the sister’s testimony. Id. The ACCA held that this strategic decision was
“virtually unassailable,” id., and affirmed that trial counsel’s performance was not
deficient, adding that, even if the proffered documents had been presented to the
jury, the outcome would not have been different. Id. at 488.
In addition, Hamm contended that his trial counsel were ineffective for not
ensuring that the charge of “armed robbery” was removed from the Tennessee
conviction records submitted to the jury because Hamm had only pled guilty to
“simple robbery.” Id. at 488. The record reflects, and the Rule 32 Court found,
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that Hamm’s attorney did object to this language and, at least initially, the
prosecutor agreed to redact the “armed robbery” language. See id. Nevertheless,
the “armed robbery” language was apparently still shown to the jury when the
judge eventually overruled the objection. Despite this, the Rule 32 Court found
that neither the jury instructions nor the trial court’s sentencing order referenced or
relied upon the “armed robbery” language in any way. Id. at 488. Thus, the
ACCA affirmed the Rule 32 Court’s determinations that counsel was not deficient
because he had objected and that Hamm was not prejudiced because the sentencing
court considered the simple robbery convictions only in its sentencing order. Id.
Hamm also, apparently, claimed in his Rule 32 petition that his counsel was
ineffective during the guilt phase of his trial for not adequately objecting to the
prosecution’s failure to turn over the exculpatory and impeaching Flanagan and
Roden materials. See id. at 485-86; see also Hamm v. Allen, 2013 WL 1282129, at
*91 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 27, 2013) (“Hamm § 2254 Order”). On collateral appeal,
though, the Brady-related4 ineffective-assistance claims were included in a
“laundry list” of over twenty ineffective-assistance allegations presented to the
ACCA with “no citations to the record or to any legal authority to support his
specific allegations” beyond a broad statement that details of the claims could be
found in Hamm’s initial petition. Hamm Collateral Appeal, 913 So. 2d at 485-86.
4
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963).
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Because Hamm provided no argument or citations to the record or legal authority,
the ACCA held that Hamm’s brief ran afoul of Rule 28(a)(5) of the Alabama Rules
of Appellate Procedure.5 Accordingly, the ACCA found that Hamm waived
appellate review of these claims. Id.
Hamm also asserted that his counsel on direct appeal (the same attorneys
who represented him at trial), were ineffective because they “failed to raise any of
the substantive issues” discussed elsewhere in Hamm’s Rule 32 petition. Id. at
491. Both attorneys testified at the Rule 32 hearing, and the Rule 32 Court found
that their decisions to limit Hamm’s appeal to the most viable issues bore “the
hallmark of effective appellate advocacy.” Id. The ACCA agreed. Id. Moreover,
the ACCA noted that it and the Alabama Supreme Court had conducted a plain-
error review on direct appeal and had found no reversible error, so even if counsel
had raised certain claims, they would not have been sustained. Id.
5
The relevant provision is now found in Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., which governs
the contents of appellate briefs and provides,
(10) Argument. An argument containing the contentions of
the appellant/petitioner with respect to the issues presented, and the
reasons therefor, with citations to the cases, statutes, other
authorities, and parts of the record relied on. Citations of authority
shall comply with the rules of citation in the latest edition of either
The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation or ALWD
[Association of Legal Writing Directors] Citation Manual: A
Professional System of Citation or shall otherwise comply with the
style and form used in opinions of the Supreme Court of Alabama.
Citations shall reference the specific page number(s) that relate to
the proposition for which the case is cited[.]
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C. Federal Habeas Petition
Hamm filed a federal petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in
the Northern District of Alabama on May 16, 2006. Briefing was completed in
April 2007, and the district court denied Hamm an evidentiary hearing in March
2008. On March 26, 2013, the district court issued a thorough 167-page order
denying Hamm’s § 2254 petition. See Hamm § 2254 Order, 2013 WL 1282129.
Hamm’s federal petition sets forth twenty-four substantive claims (labeled
“A” through “X” in the district court’s order); Claim F is an ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim that sets forth thirty-two alleged instances of ineffective
representation. The § 2254 claims relevant to this appeal are described below.
1. The Tennessee Convictions
Hamm argued to the district court in Claim C that the two Tennessee
convictions used as an aggravating factor in Hamm’s sentencing were
unconstitutionally obtained, and, therefore, were invalid and could not have been
used as an aggravating factor. Id. at *35. The district court did not reach the
merits of this claim, however, because it found that it did not have jurisdiction to
address the validity of the Tennessee convictions under the Supreme Court’s
decision in Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 121 S. Ct.
1567 (2001), and, alternatively, that the claim was procedurally defaulted. Hamm
§ 2254 Order, 2013 WL 1282129 at *38, *39.
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After his conviction in Alabama, Hamm’s post-conviction counsel attempted
to challenge the Tennessee convictions in state and federal court, beginning in
1992. The Tennessee courts determined that the statute of limitations on Hamm’s
challenge had run and that Tennessee law did not permit habeas relief when an
individual was not held in custody and his convictions had expired. Id. at *35
n.26. The Tennessee appellate court affirmed, and the Tennessee Supreme Court
declined to hear the case. Id.
Hamm then pursued federal relief in the Middle District of Tennessee. Id. at
*35 n.27. The federal court did not consider the petition as an attack on his
Alabama conviction, but rather as one directed to only the Tennessee convictions.
Id. That court held that it did not have jurisdiction to grant relief under § 2254
because Hamm was not in custody on the Tennessee convictions. Id. Hamm
conceded that Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 108 S. Ct. 1923 (1989), controlled
the issue. Both the Tennessee district court and the Sixth Circuit denied a
certificate of appealability, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Hamm §
2254 Order, 2013 WL 1282129 at *35 n.27.
The district court, in considering Hamm’s habeas petition in this case, first
held that Coss prohibited the district court from reaching the merits of the expired
Tennessee convictions when reviewing the Alabama conviction on a § 2254
petition. Id. at *35-38. The district court found that Coss applied to Hamm’s
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capital sentence and that the sole exception articulated in Coss did not apply to
Hamm. Id. Alternatively, the district court determined that Hamm’s claims
regarding the Tennessee convictions were procedurally defaulted in the state court
and that Hamm could not overcome the default with a showing of cause or
prejudice or by showing he was actually innocent of the Tennessee crimes to which
he pled guilty. Id. at *38-39.
2. The Mitigation Case
In Claims F.4, F.14, and F.30, Hamm argued that he was entitled to habeas
relief because his trial counsel failed to adequately investigate and present a
mitigation case during the penalty phase of his trial. Id. at *55. Hamm argues that
by relying on the testimony of only two witnesses, counsel failed to uncover and
present “a wealth of documents” and testimonial evidence concerning the criminal
histories of Hamm’s family members, Hamm’s school records, Hamm’s history of
substance abuse, and Hamm’s medical and mental-health records. Id. at *55-56.
Hamm also asserts that it was improper for his counsel to introduce certain
mitigation evidence through his sister’s “bald assertions” that “sounded like a
bunch of lies” without any “corroborating” documentary evidence.
Although Hamm presented his mitigation-related ineffective-assistance
argument as three separate claims, the district court evaluated them together. See
id. at *55. Because the Alabama state courts had considered these claims on their
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merits, Hamm Collateral Appeal, 913 So. 2d at 478-79, 486-88, the district court
limited its § 2254 analysis to a deferential review of the evidence before the state
courts. Hamm § 2254 Order, 2013 WL 1282129 at *56-57.
The ACCA had concluded that Hamm’s trial counsel competently
investigated and presented a mitigation case. See Hamm Collateral Appeal, 913
So. 2d at 486-88. In reviewing this finding, the district court determined that the
Alabama state courts had reasonably applied the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
standards articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052
(1984), and that the cases cited by Hamm to support his inadequacy argument were
all distinguishable. Hamm § 2254 Order, 2013 WL 1282129 at *59-65.
3. The Alleged Brady Violation
In Claim B, Hamm argues that the prosecution failed to turn over evidence
that Douglas Roden “had been ‘diagnosed as having borderline and possibly
antisocial personality, and was suffering from alcohol and substance abuse
problems.’” Id. at *25. Hamm contends that, without this evidence, he had no
evidence to impeach Roden—who was the state’s principal witness and only
alternative shooter—about Roden’s record of lying, substance abuse, and mental-
health problems. Id.
Although Hamm concedes that the Roden claim was not raised at trial or on
direct appeal, he asserts that that is because Roden’s sealed records were not
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discovered until April 20, 1995—more than seven years after trial. Id. at *26.
Similarly, the Roden claim was not raised in the Rule 32 petition, which was
initially filed in December 1991. Id. The district court observed that this
information was discovered four years before Hamm’s Rule 32 evidentiary hearing
but pointed out that Hamm never amended or modified his petition to include the
Roden claim. Id. Nonetheless, Hamm contends that this information was properly
before the Rule 32 Court because Hamm submitted the records to the court in pro
se capacity, despite the fact that he was represented by counsel at the time. Id. In
submitting the records, Hamm also asked that the court consider the attached
evidence, but he offered no explanation of its relevance. Id.
Hamm renewed his request that the Rule 32 Court consider “all the
evidence” at the evidentiary hearing. Id. Hamm’s Rule 32 counsel apparently
asked about the records, to which the court responded, “Yes. Yes. All of that has
been file stamped and included as part of the Court record.” Id. (quoting the Rule
32 hearing transcript). During the Rule 32 hearing itself, the Roden records were
not mentioned or specifically offered into evidence. Id. at *27. Thus, the first time
that the Roden claim was expressly articulated was in the Rule 32 appeal before
the ACCA, where the ACCA found the claim barred because it was not presented
to the Rule 32 Court, or, alternatively, because it could have been raised at trial or
on direct appeal but was not. Id.; see Hamm Collateral Appeal, 913 So. 2d at 480.
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During the § 2254 proceedings in the district court, the state argued that the
Roden Brady claim was procedurally defaulted because it was not presented to the
trial court, on direct appeal, or in the Rule 32 petition. Hamm § 2254 Order, 2013
WL 1282129 at *27. Hamm, on the other hand, asserted that this claim was raised
through the pro se materials presented to the Rule 32 Court. Id. The district court
concluded that the claim was not fairly presented in the state court because Hamm,
while still represented by the same counsel who helped uncover the Roden records,
had ample opportunity between 1995 and 1998 to amend the Rule 32 petition;
Hamm failed to explain the relevance of the materials he submitted to the court pro
se; and Hamm’s counsel at the Rule 32 hearing never argued or admitted into
evidence those documents during the hearing. Id. at *28. Accordingly, the district
court found the ACCA’s holding to be proper and that this procedural default in
state court barred federal habeas relief. Id. The district court then held, citing
Martinez v. Ryan, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), that Rule 32 counsel’s
failure to preserve a Brady claim before the collateral Rule 32 Court cannot
constitute cause to overcome the procedural default. 2013 WL 1282129 at *28.
Alternatively, the district court determined the Roden Brady claim to be
without merit. The court “harbor[ed] serious questions” about whether the
withheld impeachment evidence was truly favorable to Hamm and held that the
evidence “was not material to Hamm’s case at either the guilt or penalty phase.”
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Id. at *29-30. The district court felt that the evidence of Roden’s possible anti-
social personality, his illicit drug abuse, and his lying about the drug abuse, “would
not have resulted in a devastating cross-examination for Roden at trial,” and would
“certainly not [have been] enough to undermine confidence in the guilt or penalty
phase of the trial,” in light of the topics Roden was cross-examined on, the
corroborating testimony of Regina Roden, and Hamm’s own confession. Id.
II.
A. General Standards in § 2254 Cases
Federal law permits a prisoner held “in custody pursuant to the judgment of
a State court” to seek habeas relief “only on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(a). Generally, a prisoner must first “fairly present” his federal claims to the
state court and exhaust his state-court remedies before seeking federal habeas
relief. Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998).
When a state court has adjudicated a prisoner’s claim on the merits, a federal
court may not grant habeas relief with respect to such a claim unless the state
court’s adjudication
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States; or
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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). These standards are highly deferential and demand that state
court decisions be given “the benefit of the doubt.” Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,
703 F.3d 1316, 1325 (11th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). A decision “is not ‘contrary to’ federal law unless it ‘contradicts
the United States Supreme Court on a settled question of law or holds differently
than did that Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.’” Id. (citation
omitted). A state court’s decision “is not an ‘unreasonable application’ of federal
law unless the state court ‘identifies the correct governing legal principle as
articulated by the United States Supreme Court, but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of the petitioner's case, unreasonably extends the principle to
a new context where it should not apply, or unreasonably refuses to extend it to a
new context where it should apply.’” Id. (citation omitted). The federal court does
not ask whether the state decision is correct, but rather whether it is unreasonable.
Id. (citation omitted).
If a prisoner fails to present his claims to the state court in a timely and
proper manner, and the state court declines to address the merits, those claims are
procedurally defaulted. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30, 111 S.
Ct. 2546, 2554 (1991). Procedural default “ordinarily qualifies as an independent
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and adequate state ground for denying federal review.” Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S.
449, 465, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1780 (2009). This bar on federal habeas relief for
procedurally defaulted claims can be overcome, though, if the prisoner can
demonstrate “cause” for the default and “prejudice” suffered as a result, or the
prisoner can demonstrate that failure to consider his claims would result in a
“fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451,
120 S. Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S. Ct. at 2565. The
“fundamental miscarriage of justice” test applies narrowly in the “extraordinary
instances when a constitutional violation probably has caused the conviction of one
innocent of the crime.” McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S. Ct. 1454,
1470 (1991).
The “existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on
whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense
impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule.” Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2645 (1986). Objective factors that
demonstrate cause include interference by state officials that frustrates compliance
with the procedural rules, the unavailability to counsel of the factual or legal basis
for a claim, and constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. McCleskey, 499
U.S. at 493-94, 111 S. Ct. at 1470. To establish prejudice, the “habeas petitioner
must show ‘not merely that the errors at . . . trial created a possibility of prejudice,
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but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire
trial with error of constitutional dimensions.’” Murray, 477 U.S. at 494, 106 S. Ct.
at 2648 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170,
102 S. Ct. 1584, 1596 (1982)).
B. The Martinez Decision
Until 2012, it was generally established that because a prisoner has no
constitutional right to counsel in collateral proceedings, ineffective assistance of
counsel during those proceedings cannot create cause to overcome procedural
default in those proceedings. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 757, 111 S. Ct. at 2568.
However, the Supreme Court issued a limited qualification to this tenet in Martinez
v. Ryan, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). In that case, an Arizona prisoner
sought to overcome the procedural default of his ineffective-assistance-of-trial-
counsel claim by arguing that his post-conviction attorney was constitutionally
ineffective for failing to raise the trial-counsel claim in the post-conviction
collateral petition. Id. at 1313-15. The district court held that, under Coleman,
post-conviction errors by counsel could not serve as cause to overcome a default
and denied relief, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1315. However, as the
Ninth Circuit noted, Coleman left open the question of whether an ineffective-
assistance-of-collateral-counsel claim could be cause “in those cases ‘where state
collateral review is the first place a prisoner can present a challenge to his
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conviction,’” and the Martinez court turned its attention to that question. Id.
(quoting Martinez v. Schriro, 623 F.3d 731, 736 (9th Cir. 2010)); see Coleman,
501 U.S. at 755, 111 S. Ct. at 2567-68.
In doing so, Martinez expressly avoided deciding whether a prisoner has a
constitutional right to counsel in those post-conviction proceedings that represent
the first opportunity to raise certain challenges to the prisoner’s conviction (so
called “initial-review collateral proceedings”). Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315.
Instead, the Court “qualifie[d] Coleman by recognizing a narrow exception:
Inadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may
establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective
assistance at trial.” Id. The Court thus established an equitable, rather than
constitutional rule, that permits a prisoner to overcome default of a trial-counsel
claim when that claim can be raised for the first time only in a collateral
proceeding and 1) the state does not appoint counsel in that initial-review collateral
proceeding or 2) appointed counsel in the initial-review proceeding was ineffective
under the standards of Strickland. Id. at 1318. Additionally, a petitioner must
“demonstrate that the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a
substantial one,” with “some merit.” Id.
The Supreme Court took pains, however, to emphasize the narrow and
limited nature of its holding in Martinez:
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The rule of Coleman governs in all but the limited
circumstances recognized here. The holding in this case
does not concern attorney errors in other kinds of
proceedings, including appeals from initial-review
collateral proceedings, second or successive collateral
proceedings, and petitions for discretionary review in a
State’s appellate courts. . . . It does not extend to attorney
errors in any proceeding beyond the first occasion the
State allows a prisoner to raise a claim of ineffective
assistance at trial, even though that initial-review
collateral proceeding may be deficient for other reasons.
In addition, the limited nature of the qualification to
Coleman adopted here reflects the importance of the right
to the effective assistance of trial counsel and Arizona’s
decision to bar defendants from raising ineffective-
assistance claims on direct appeal. Our holding here
addresses only the constitutional claims presented in this
case, where the State barred the defendant from raising
the claims on direct appeal.
Id. at 1320 (citations omitted). And while the dissent in Martinez expressed
skepticism that this “newly announced ‘equitable’ rule will remain limited to
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel cases,” id. at 1321 (Scalia, J., dissenting),
the Supreme Court has so far only extended the exception to cases where the
state’s procedural system, while ostensibly allowing ineffective-assistance-of-trial-
counsel claims to be raised on direct review, makes it virtually impossible to do so
in reality. See Trevino v. Thaler, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1914-15 (2013). But
as this Court has repeatedly emphasized, Martinez does not extend beyond claims
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
742 F.3d 940, 945 (11th Cir. 2014); Arthur v. Thomas, 739 F.3d 611, 630 (11th
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Cir. 2014) (“As our discussion shows, the Martinez rule explicitly relates to
excusing a procedural default of ineffective-trial-counsel claims and does not apply
to AEDPA's statute of limitations or the tolling of that period.”); Gore v. Crews,
720 F.3d 811, 816 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“By its own emphatic terms, the
Supreme Court's decision in Martinez is limited to claims of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel that are otherwise procedurally barred due to the ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel.”).
III.
On appeal, Hamm argues first that the Alabama sentencing court
impermissibly relied on “unconstitutionally obtained” Tennessee convictions as an
aggravating factor that led the state court to impose the death penalty, in violation
of Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 108 S. Ct. 1981 (1988), and Hamm’s due-
process rights. Hamm asserts that his guilty pleas in Tennessee in 1978 violated
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709 (1969), because Hamm was
never informed of his constitutional right to confront his accusers or his privilege
against self-incrimination, and was never informed that he was waiving these
constitutional rights by pleading guilty.6
6
Although Hamm confidently asserts that his Tennessee plea “was clearly invalid under
Boykin,” we do not find a Boykin violation so patently obvious here. Boykin requires an
“affirmative showing that [a guilty plea] was intelligent and voluntary.” 395 U.S. at 242, 89 S.
Ct. at 1711. And while Hamm was not informed of certain specific rights, the plea colloquy does
support the notion that his guilty plea was intelligent and voluntary. And the binding precedent
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The district court found that Hamm could not challenge the Tennessee
convictions through his § 2254 petition, as those convictions, which had expired
and were no longer subject to direct or collateral attack, were conclusively valid
and unassailable on a § 2254 petition attacking Hamm’s Alabama death sentence.
Alternatively, the district court also determined that Hamm’s claim with respect to
the Tennessee convictions was procedurally defaulted and that the default could
not be overcome. Hamm attacks both holdings on appeal on a variety of grounds.
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court’s holding on both
rationales.
A. Under Coss, Federal Courts Do Not Have Jurisdiction to Entertain a Challenge
to the Validity of Hamm’s Tennessee Convictions
Hamm argues that the holding of Johnson precludes consideration of the
“invalid” Tennessee convictions as an aggravating circumstance. In Johnson, the
defendant was sentenced to death in Mississippi based, in part, on the aggravating
of both the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits indicates that Boykin does not necessarily require specific
articulation and express waiver of the constitutional rights of which Hamm was not expressly
informed. See McChesney v. Henderson, 482 F.2d 1101, 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1973) (“We hold,
therefore, that there is no requirement that there be express articulation and waiver of the three
constitutional rights referred to in Boykin, by the defendant at the time of acceptance of his guilty
plea, if it appears from the record that the accused's plea was intelligently and voluntarily made,
with knowledge of its consequences.”), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); see also Stano v.
Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1141 (11th Cir. 1991); Brown v. Jurnigan, 622 F.2d 914, 915 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 958 (1980); Armstrong v. Egeler, 563 F.2d 796, 799 (6th Cir.
1977); Fontaine v. United States, 526 F.2d 514, 516 (6th Cir. 1975); Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d
882, 885 (6th Cir. 1988), abrogated on other grounds by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356
(2010). Contrary to Hamm’s certainty, we find the question of whether Hamm’s Tennessee
pleas were intelligent and voluntary to be debatable at best, but we do not resolve this debate
because binding Supreme Court case law precludes us from reaching the merits of this claim.
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circumstance of a prior conviction in New York. 486 U.S. at 581, 108 S. Ct. at
1984. Following his Mississippi conviction, the New York courts reversed the
New York conviction. Id. at 582, 108 S. Ct. at 1985. Johnson challenged his death
sentence in Mississippi on the grounds that the reversed New York conviction
could not serve as an aggravating circumstance, but the Mississippi Supreme Court
upheld the death sentence. Id. at 583, 108 S. Ct. at 1985. The Supreme Court
reversed that decision and remanded for new sentencing proceedings. Id. at 590,
108 S. Ct. at 1989. The Court recalled the “special need for reliability” in death
cases, id. at 584, 108 S. Ct. at 1986 (citation and quotation marks omitted), and
observed, “It is apparent that the New York conviction provided no legitimate
support for the death sentence imposed on petitioner. It is equally apparent that the
use of that conviction in the sentencing hearing was prejudicial.” Id. at 586, 108 S.
Ct. at 1987.
Facially, of course, Hamm’s case differs from Johnson in one important
respect: Hamm’s Tennessee convictions have never been declared invalid by any
court, and, in fact, Hamm’s direct challenges to those convictions were rejected by
the state and federal courts in Tennessee. Consequently, Hamm’s case falls
squarely within the Supreme Court’s holding in Lackawanna County District
Attorney v. Coss.
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In Coss, the Supreme Court addressed the question of “whether federal
postconviction relief is available when a [state] prisoner challenges a current
sentence on the ground that it was enhanced based on an allegedly unconstitutional
prior conviction for which the petitioner is no longer in custody.” 532 U.S. at 396,
121 S. Ct. at 1570. Coss had been convicted in 1986 of simple assault, institutional
vandalism, and criminal mischief and sentenced to two consecutive prison terms of
six months to one year. Id. at 397, 121 S. Ct. at 1570-71. Coss filed a challenge to
those convictions in Pennsylvania court alleging they were constitutionally invalid
because of ineffective counsel. The Pennsylvania courts never ruled on those
claims and Coss finished serving his sentence. Id. at 397-98, 121 S. Ct. at 1571.
In 1990, Coss was convicted on charges of aggravated assault. Id. at 398,
121 S. Ct. at 1571. After his initial sentence of six-to-twelve years was vacated,
the state court then reimposed a six-to-twelve-year sentence based, in part, on his
1986 convictions. Id. at 398-99, 121 S. Ct. at 1571. Coss then filed a federal
habeas petition under § 2254, arguing that his sentence had been illegally enhanced
by the 1986 convictions, which were allegedly invalid because of the ineffective
assistance of counsel. Id. at 399, 121 S. Ct. at 1572. The district court found that
it had jurisdiction to consider the validity of the 1986 convictions, and it held an
evidentiary hearing where it found that the 1986 counsel was ineffective but that
habeas was inappropriate because Coss was not prejudiced by counsel’s deficient
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performance. Id. at 400, 121 S. Ct. at 1572. The Third Circuit affirmed the
exercise of jurisdiction but reversed the district court’s determination that no
prejudice had been suffered. Id.
The Supreme Court reversed, with Justice O’Connor writing for five
Justices, holding
that once a state conviction is no longer open to direct or
collateral attack in its own right because the defendant
failed to pursue those remedies while they were available
(or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), the
conviction may be regarded as conclusively valid. . . . If
that conviction is later used to enhance a criminal
sentence, the defendant generally may not challenge the
enhanced sentence through a petition under § 2254 on the
ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally
obtained.
Id. at 403-04, 121 S. Ct. at 1574 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court based its
decision “on considerations relating to the need for finality of convictions and ease
of administration.” Id. at 402, 121 S. Ct. at 1573.
Five Justices also joined the part of the opinion that identified an exception
to this rule when “the prior conviction used to enhance the sentence was obtained
where there was a failure to appoint counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment,
as set forth in Gideon v. Wainwright.” Id. at 404, 121 S. Ct. at 1574. The Court
noted that the failure to appoint counsel is a “unique constitutional defect” of a
jurisdictional nature, deserving “special treatment.” Id. (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court also noted that this Gideon exception did not
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implicate ease-of-administration concerns because “failure to appoint counsel . . .
will generally appear from the judgment roll itself, or from an accompanying
minute order.” Id. (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). The failure-to-appoint-counsel exception is the only exception joined by
five Justices in Coss, and, consequently, it is the only recognized exception to the
general prohibition on reviewing prior expired sentence-enhancing convictions.
Justice O’Connor also identified two other possible exceptions to the rule
announced in Coss, but only two other Justices joined this part of her opinion. Id.
at 405-06, 121 S. Ct. at 1574-75; see id. at 395, 121 S. Ct. at 1570 (noting
O’Connor, Rehnquist, and Kennedy as the only Justices joining Part III-B of the
opinion). Those exceptions include a defendant’s lack of fault in failing to obtain
review of the prior convictions or the discovery of “compelling evidence that he is
actually innocent” of the prior crimes. Id. at 405, 121 S. Ct. at 1575. These
exceptions were rooted in the notion that, “[i]n such situations, a habeas petition
directed at the enhanced sentence may effectively be the first and only forum
available for review of the prior conviction.” Id. at 406, 121 S. Ct. at 1575.
Hamm offers four reasons for why Coss should not apply to bar a merits
review of his expired Tennessee convictions. First, he argues that Coss is
applicable to non-capital cases only and that its holding has never been “extended”
to the death-penalty context. Second, he asserts that because Coss was decided
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more than a decade after Hamm’s Alabama conviction and appeals, it is
inapplicable, and, instead, the “unqualified rule” of Johnson applies. Third, Hamm
contends his Tennessee convictions “involved the outright denial of the right to the
effective assistance of counsel and the right to counsel on appeal,” so they fall
within the majority-identified exception outlined in Coss. And finally, Hamm
argues his case represents “the rare type of case where, after the time for collateral
review of the underlying prior conviction has expired, a defendant obtains
evidence of actual innocence,” falling within the actual-innocence exception of the
plurality portion of Coss. We find, however, that Coss bars revisiting Hamm’s
expired Tennessee convictions and that none of Hamm’s attempts to distinguish
Coss are persuasive.
1. Is Coss Applicable in Capital Cases?
Hamm argues, essentially, that Coss does not apply to capital cases because
“death is different.” In Hamm’s view, Johnson established a rule applicable to
capital cases that has not been overturned or overruled by Coss or any other
decision. Hamm’s position is that the motivating concerns of Coss—the need for
finality in convictions and ease of administration—are necessarily outweighed in
the capital context by the need for reliability in the death sentence, and,
consequently, a court should ensure that reliability by reaching the merits of
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expired convictions used to enhance a capital sentence, despite the holding of
Coss.
The problem with Hamm’s argument is twofold. First, the Johnson “rule”
requires, as a predicate, a prior enhancing conviction to be invalidated. See 486
U.S. at 585-87, 108 S. Ct. at 1986-87. While Hamm strenuously argues that the
Tennessee convictions are constitutionally invalid under Boykin, those convictions
have never been invalidated by any court, despite Hamm’s attempts to do so.
Johnson simply does not address convictions that have never been overturned, nor
does it discuss the scope of a federal court’s review of presumptively valid but
challenged convictions used in imposing a death sentence.
The second problem with Hamm’s argument is that Coss is the case most
directly on point with respect to the scope of a federal court’s review under § 2254
of challenged but expired sentence-enhancing prior convictions. While Coss did
not specifically address the death penalty, it also did not engage in any analysis of
the type of sentence involved. Coss, instead, construed the scope of federal review
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254—the same statutory vehicle being used by Hamm to seek
review of his case. And Coss directly stands for the proposition that a prisoner
cannot challenge an expired sentence-enhancing conviction when challenging the
enhanced sentence under § 2254, regardless of what that sentence is.
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2. Does Coss Modify Johnson in a Way That Implicates Retroactivity
Concerns?
Hamm has also argued that Coss, issued in 2001, “modified” Johnson after
Hamm was sentenced, and, therefore, the Johnson rule was the only rule that
“applied at the relevant time.”7 However, Coss cannot plausibly be read as
“modifying” Johnson in any way. In fact, Coss never once even mentions
Johnson. Hamm cites no case law that has construed Coss as a modification of
Johnson. As noted above, Coss construes the scope of review on § 2254 petitions
without regard to the sentence at issue. And as Hamm’s § 2254 petition was filed
in 2006—five years after Coss was issued—Coss clearly applies to Hamm’s
petition. Accordingly, we find no merit in Hamm’s arguments that an “old”
Johnson rule overcomes the dictates of Coss.
3. Does Hamm Fall Within Coss’s Gideon Exception?
Hamm also contends that his Tennessee convictions “involved the outright
denial of the right to the effective assistance of counsel and the right to counsel on
appeal,” bringing his case within the only exception adopted by a majority of the
justices in Coss: the failure to appoint counsel in violation of Gideon v.
Wainwright. He argues that his Tennessee counsel was constitutionally ineffective
during the plea hearing and, apparently, by failing to advise Hamm that he could
7
Johnson was handed down in 1988, after Hamm was sentenced but while his conviction
was pending direct review.
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appeal the Tennessee guilty pleas. According to Hamm, his Tennessee counsel’s
ineffectiveness brings his case within the failure-to-appoint-counsel exception.
Hamm also asserts that a failure to appoint counsel for an appeal of his Tennessee
pleas likewise falls within this exception.
Even assuming arguendo that Hamm’s Tennessee counsel was ineffective,
these “Gideon-type” errors do not fall within the Coss exception. While the
Supreme Court has spoken of constitutionally ineffective counsel as “not
functioning as ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment,” see Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, we do not believe the Supreme Court intended
to extend its failure-to-appoint exception in Coss to ineffective-assistance claims.
First, the Coss opinion expressly mentions only the “failure to appoint counsel in
violation of the Sixth Amendment, as set forth in Gideon,” 532 U.S. at 404, 121 S.
Ct. at 1574; it somewhat tellingly does not expand its exception to include
ineffective-assistance claims under Strickland, when it could have, and Gideon
itself involved only the appointment of counsel to indigent defendants for trial.
See id. at 404-05; 121 S. Ct. at 1574. Even more persuasively, though, the basis on
which Coss attacked his expired convictions was that his counsel in those
proceedings was constitutionally ineffective. See id. at 397, 400, 121 S. Ct. at
1571, 1572. The five-Justice majority that agreed on the Gideon exception did not
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bother to analyze Coss’s ineffective-assistance argument, strongly suggesting that
it did not contemplate such challenges to fall within the exception.8
Also persuasive is that in discussing this exception, Justice O’Connor notes
that “allowing an exception for Gideon challenges does not implicate our concern
about administrative ease, as the ‘failure to appoint counsel . . . will generally
appear from the judgment roll itself, or from an accompanying minute order.’” Id.
at 404, 121 S. Ct. at 1574 (alteration in original) (citing Custis v. United States,
511 U.S. 485, 496, 114 S. Ct. 1732, 1738 (1994)). Clearly, ineffective-assistance
claims cannot be easily determined from the “judgment roll” or “minute order,”
and instead involve inquiries that “often depend on evidence outside the trial
record.” Cf. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. Thus, in carving a Gideon exception out
of the rule in Coss, the Supreme Court did not intend to include ineffective-
assistance claims as part of that exception.
For similar reasons, the narrow focus on Gideon in Coss suggests that the
failure to appoint appellate counsel, as required by Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 83 S. Ct. 814 (1963), does not fall within the exception outlined in Coss for a
failure to appoint trial counsel. Moreover, Hamm apparently did not appeal his
8
Additionally, the related decisions of Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 114 S. Ct.
1732 (1994), and Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 121 S. Ct. 1578 (2001), both involved
ineffective-assistance and faulty-guilty-plea claims that the Supreme Court distinguished from
the “unique constitutional defect” of Gideon claims, holding that while Gideon error permitted
an assault on sentence-enhancing state convictions, ineffective-assistance and faulty-guilty-plea
claims did not. See Custis, 511 U.S. at 496, 114 S. Ct. at 1738; Daniels, 532 U.S. at 378, 382,
121 S. Ct. at 1581, 1583.
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guilty-plea convictions, either because he could not or was incorrectly advised that
he could not,9 and he does not show evidence that he ever was denied access to
appellate counsel. Thus, it is not even clear that a Douglas violation even arguably
exists.
Here, the record reflects that Hamm was represented by counsel, Travis
Gobble, during his 1978 hearing where he pled guilty and was convicted of two
counts of simple robbery. The record does not reflect that Hamm was ever denied
appointed counsel in violation of Gideon (or for that matter, Douglas). His only
argument relating to the Gideon exception of Coss is that his Tennessee
convictions suffer from the “Gideon-type” errors of ineffective assistance in the
Tennessee proceedings. But the majority opinion in Coss recognizes an exception
for Gideon error only, not “Gideon-type” errors. Therefore, Hamm cannot avail
himself of the sole exception outlined in Coss.
9
The district court, in considering this argument below, held that Hamm did not have a
right to appeal his Tennessee guilty pleas. The district court relied on Capri Adult Cinema v.
State, 537 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tenn. 1976), which stated “that ordinarily there can be no appeal
from a plea of guilty,” in finding that Tennessee did not permit Hamm to appeal his pleas.
However, both Capri and State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1977), suggest that in
Tennessee in 1978, a defendant likely could appeal the voluntariness of his guilty plea. Capri,
537 S.W.2d at 898; Mackey, 553 S.W.2d at 340. This issue is harmless, though, because
Douglas error is not an exception to Coss, and it is not even clear that Hamm was denied
appellate counsel in violation of Douglas.
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4. Does Coss Provide an “Actual Innocence” Exception That is Available to
Hamm?
Finally, Hamm argues that his case falls within the Coss plurality’s “actual
innocence” exception because it represents “the rare type of case where, after the
time for collateral review of the underlying prior conviction has expired, a
defendant obtains evidence of actual innocence.” The “actual innocence”
argument is unpersuasive for a number of reasons, including the fact that the
“newly discovered evidence” consists of either victim “recantations” or witness
statements that could have been presented or argued at the time of the original
Tennessee trial, and the fact that Hamm’s actual-innocence arguments have already
been raised in and rejected by Tennessee state and federal courts. But the biggest
problem for Hamm is that the “actual innocence” exception language in Coss was
joined by only three Justices and has not been embraced by a majority of the
Supreme Court as an exception to the general rule established in Coss.
Hamm tries to overcome this fact by arguing that Marks v. United States,
430 U.S. 188, 97 S. Ct. 990 (1977), requires this court to adopt the three-Justice
plurality discussing the innocence exception as the “narrowest ground” involved in
deciding Coss. In Marks, the Supreme Court stated, “When a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” 430
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U.S. at 193, 97 S. Ct. at 993 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Marks was addressing the effect of a prior case where three
Justices wrote the opinion of the court and two other Justices concurred in the
judgment based on the broader reasoning they had put forward in other cases and
incorporated by reference into the opinion. Id. at 193-94, 97 S. Ct. 993-94. Unlike
the case discussed in Marks, the Coss judgment and its Gideon exception,
“enjoy[ed] the assent of five Justices.” There was no separate concurring-in-the-
judgment opinion needed to reach a majority in Coss. In fact, Hamm’s view would
require us to completely disregard the fact that two of the majority’s Justices
obviously chose not to endorse the “actual innocence” exception.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the “actual innocence”
exception announced by Justice O’Connor were valid law, Hamm’s situation does
not fit within its terms. As specifically articulated, the exception applies when,
“after the time for direct or collateral review has expired, a defendant may obtain
compelling evidence that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was
convicted, and which he could not have uncovered in a timely manner.” Coss, 532
U.S. at 405, 121 S. Ct. at 1575 (emphasis added). Here, Hamm’s “evidence” of
“actual innocence” consists of witness recantations and other eye-witness
testimony that was all theoretically available within the time he could have
challenged his Tennessee convictions during a trial in the first instance. Although
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Hamm cursorily states that he “exercised due diligence in finding this evidence and
presenting it,” he does not explain how waiting fourteen years after his Tennessee
convictions to “discover” and present this evidence satisfies any meaning of the
word “diligent.”
In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision in Coss controls the question in
this case of whether Hamm can challenge the validity of his Tennessee convictions
in a § 2254 petition challenging his Alabama death sentence and answers that
question in the negative. None of Hamm’s attempts to circumvent the Coss
decision or apply its sole recognized exception are ultimately persuasive in light of
binding Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, the district court correctly
concluded that it had no jurisdiction to reach the merits of Hamm’s challenge to his
Tennessee convictions while evaluating his § 2254 petition.
B. Even If Coss Does Not Bar Consideration of the Tennessee-Conviction Claims,
They Are Nonetheless Procedurally Defaulted
After holding that it could not entertain a challenge to the validity of
Hamm’s Tennessee convictions due to the rule in Coss, the district court held in
the alternative that Hamm’s substantive claims were procedurally defaulted and
that Hamm could not establish cause to overcome the default. The district court
also found that Hamm could not overcome the default by demonstrating a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. On appeal, Hamm appears to be arguing that
he can establish cause for the default because his Alabama trial and appellate
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counsel were constitutionally ineffective by failing to investigate and challenge his
Tennessee convictions during the sentencing and appeal proceedings. Hamm is
also apparently arguing that his alleged “actual innocence” of the Tennessee
convictions entitles him to habeas relief. And finally, Hamm argues that the
“pervasive” problems with his counsel’s representation in both Tennessee and
Alabama entitle him to “equitable relief” under Martinez. None of these
arguments are availing.
1. The State and District Courts’ Decisions
Hamm asserted an independent ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on
this topic in his Rule 32 petition in Alabama state court. The Rule 32 trial court
passed on the merits of the claim:
Hamm contends in paragraph 170 of the Rule 32
petition that his attorneys were ineffective because they
failed to adequately investigate and challenge his prior
convictions in Tennessee. . . .
Hamm failed to present facts in support of this
claim in his Rule 32 petition or at the evidentiary hearing.
In fact, Hugh Harris testified that he was aware of the
Tennessee convictions and had obtained copies of the
convictions before trial. (Rule 32 transcript, pp. 16-17)
Thus, Mr. Harris had investigated these convictions
before the trial. The records introduced at Hamm’s trial
to prove these convictions show that Hamm was charged
with two counts of armed robbery but pleaded guilty to
simple robbery. There is no evidence in the record that
Hamm did not know what he was doing when he pleaded
guilty to these charges. Further, a review of the records
filed by Hamm in the Rule 32 proceeding show that a
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challenge to these guilty pleas was unsuccessful in 1995
and would have been unsuccessful in 1986. (Rule 32
transcript, Hamm’s Exhibit 6) Hamm has not shown that
his attorney’s performance was deficient or that the
outcome of the proceedings would have been different
had his attorneys challenged the Tennessee convictions.
This claim is therefore without merit.
Rule 32 Op. at 32-33.
On appeal in state court, the state of Alabama argued that the substantive
claim about the use of the Tennessee convictions as an impermissible aggravating
circumstance was procedurally barred because it could have been raised at trial or
on direct appeal but was not, and the ACCA agreed. Hamm Collateral Appeal,
913 So. 2d at 479. The ACCA treated Hamm’s related ineffective-assistance
argument (that counsel should have investigated and challenged the convictions) as
an “alternative” argument and affirmed the Rule 32 Court’s denial of the
ineffective-assistance claim, stating, “Hamm’s assertion that Alabama trial counsel
had a duty to challenge in a Tennessee court the merits of the nine-year-old
convictions so that he could then prevent consideration of the prior convictions at
the 1987 capital sentencing hearing is not supported by any legal authority.” 10 Id.
10
Hamm makes a convoluted argument that these two holdings by the ACCA are
“inconsistent” and thus represent a clearly erroneous and unreasonable application of federal
law. According to Hamm, “Both of these contentions cannot be true: either trial counsel was in
fact effective, in which case counsel would have undertaken a reasonable investigation of the
prior conviction under the circumstances and with due diligence, discovered the invalidity of the
prior [convictions] . . . ; or a reasonable investigation could not unearth the invalidity of the
conviction, and the claim could not have been raised on trial or direct appeal.” Hamm appears to
be conflating the procedural issue with the merits of counsel’s effectiveness to create
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Hamm effectively concedes11 that this claim is procedurally defaulted, but insists
he can overcome the default.
2. Cause and Prejudice to Overcome Default of the Substantive Prior-
Convictions Claim: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Because the Alabama state courts weighed the merits of Hamm’s
ineffective-assistance claim, those decisions are entitled to deference and can be
set aside only if they are contrary to or involve unreasonable applications of federal
law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Additionally, when evaluating the performance prong
of an ineffective-assistance claim in the habeas context, a federal court’s review is
“doubly deferential,” looking through both the “highly deferential” lens of
inconsistency where there is none. The procedural ruling—when Hamm’s counsel could have
raised a claim about the use of an invalid aggravating factor—is distinct from the substantive
question of whether the aggravating factor was actually invalid, or whether counsel was
ineffective in not investigating its validity.
11
In his reply brief, Hamm contends that there can be no procedural default because a
claim about the validity of his Tennessee convictions “is not the type of claim that should be
raised at trial or on appeal, but rather is the type of claim that is properly raised after proper
investigation in Rule 32 post-conviction proceedings.” Hamm offers no legal support for this
assertion, although, his argument that the claim can be raised only in collateral proceedings
because his trial counsel had insufficient time to investigate the prior convictions before trial
seemingly undermines his argument that trial counsel was ineffective for not investigating the
prior convictions. Moreover, Hamm continues to conflate procedural and substantive issues.
Despite Hamm’s contention, the procedural default would still exist because an invalid
aggravating factor should still be challenged at trial or on appeal. But if it were inherently
impossible for counsel to discover the invalidity of the aggravating factor in time, cause for
overcoming the default would not be based counsel’s ineffectiveness but rather on some other
“objective factor external to the defense [that] impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the
State’s procedural rule,” Murray, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S. Ct. at 2645, such as “a showing that the
factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel,” McCleskey, 499 U.S.
at 494, 111 S. Ct. at 1470 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Strickland12 and the deferential lens of § 2254(d). Cullen v. Pinholster, __ U.S. __,
131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011).
Hamm argues that his trial and direct-appeal counsel were constitutionally
ineffective because they failed to adequately investigate and challenge the validity
of the Tennessee convictions used as an aggravating circumstance in his death
sentence. The question before the state court, then, was whether Strickland
required Hamm’s trial counsel to conduct such an investigation or challenge. The
question before the federal court is whether the state court’s answer to that
question is contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. See
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100-01, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011). “Under §
2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or,
[if none were given,] could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it
must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those
arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this
12
To prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim under Strickland, a petitioner must show
that (1) counsel’s performance was so deficient that “counsel was not functioning as the
‘counsel’ guaranteed” by the Sixth Amendment and (2) that counsel’s performance prejudiced
the defense to the extent the defendant was deprived of a fair, reliable trial. Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. “To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a
conviction must show that ‘counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.’” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). A court applies a strong presumption that
counsel’s representation fell within the wide range of reasonable professional conduct. Id. To
establish prejudice, a petitioner “must demonstrate ‘a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id.
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2052).
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Court.” Id. at 102, 131 S. Ct. at 786; Johnson v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 643 F.3d
907, 910 (11th Cir. 2011). If fair-minded jurists could disagree over the
correctness of the state court’s determination, the federal habeas claim is
precluded. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102, 131 S. Ct. at 786.
Hamm’s argument rests largely on Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S.
Ct. 2456 (2005), in which the Supreme Court held that a “lawyer is bound to make
reasonable efforts to obtain and review material that counsel knows the prosecution
will probably rely on as evidence of aggravation at the sentencing phase of trial,”
even if the defendant does not suggest such evidence exists. Id. at 377, 125 S. Ct.
at 2460. Rompilla was convicted in Pennsylvania of murder and related offenses.
Id. at 378, 125 S. Ct. at 2460. During the sentencing phase, the prosecutor sought
to prove as an aggravating factor that Rompilla “had a significant history of felony
convictions indicating the use or threat of violence.” Id. Rompilla’s attorney was
aware that the prosecutor intended to introduce Rompilla’s prior rape-and-assault
conviction as evidence and also was aware that the prosecutor intended to read the
victim’s testimony from the trial transcript to emphasize Rompilla’s violent
character. Id. at 383-84, 125 S. Ct. at 2464. Nevertheless, Rompilla’s attorney
never requested or reviewed the case file or transcript of the prior conviction,
despite its ready availability in the same courthouse where Rompilla was being
tried. Id. at 384, 125 S. Ct. at 2464. Instead, Rompilla’s counsel limited his
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investigation to discussions with Rompilla, his relatives, and three mental-health
experts. Id. at 381-82, 125 S. Ct. at 2462-63.
The Supreme Court held that counsel’s performance was constitutionally
deficient because he failed to request and review the prior conviction’s case file.
The Court observed that a reasonable attorney in defense counsel’s position would
have done so, emphasizing Rompilla’s counsel’s awareness of the prosecution’s
intended use of the transcript and the ready availability of the file in the
courthouse. Id. at 385-86, 125 S. Ct. at 2465. The Supreme Court also cited the
American Bar Association’s Standards for Criminal Justice13 in effect at the time
of Rompilla’s trial, which advised counsel to “explore all avenues leading to facts
relevant to . . . the penalty,” including information in the possession of “the
prosecution and law enforcement authorities.” See id. at 387, 125 S. Ct. at 2466
(quoting the ABA Standards). This obligation “exists regardless of the accused’s
admissions or statements to the lawyer.” Id. The Supreme Court took care to note,
however, that it was not adopting a “per se rule” requiring counsel to completely
review every prior conviction file in all cases, but that the unreasonableness of
13
The district court felt that Hamm may have been arguing that the Rompilla Court
wholesale adopted the ABA Standards as the framework for evaluating Strickland claims and
rejected that argument as fruitless. While the district court was correct that the ABA Standards
do not replace Strickland’s reasonableness inquiry, the ABA Standards are nonetheless viewed
as persuasive guidance by the Supreme Court. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387, 125 S. Ct. at 2466
(“We have long referred to these ABA Standards as guides to determining what is reasonable.”
(quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2536-37 (2003)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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counsel’s investigation in Rompilla’s case was dependent on the facts of the case.
Id. at 389-90, 125 S. Ct. at 2467; see also id. at 393-96, 125 S. Ct. at 2469-71
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
Here, the district court found Rompilla distinguishable on its facts. In
Hamm’s case, counsel had no notice that any underlying facts from the Tennessee
convictions other than the convictions themselves would be used in the sentencing
phase (and, in fact, no underlying facts beyond the convictions were used).
Hamm’s attorney, Harris, ordered copies of the convictions from Tennessee and
discussed the guilty pleas with Hamm, who did not reveal any information that
would have led Harris to conclude the pleas were involuntary or otherwise invalid.
For these reasons, the district court found that Harris was not unreasonable in not
requesting the plea-hearing transcript when he had no indication that any shade of
doubt might have clouded the Tennessee convictions’ validity. The State of
Alabama basically adopts the district court’s analysis as its argument on appeal.
We find that this is a close question, but ultimately conclude that Hamm is
not entitled to relief. Rompilla, decided in 2005, did not announce a per se rule
requiring investigation of prior-conviction case files in all cases. While the same
ABA Standards the Rompilla Court found persuasive were in effect during
Hamm’s trial and arguably support the notion that Hamm’s counsel should have
obtained and explored the “avenue” of the Tennessee conviction files, the facts of
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Rompilla are significantly distinguishable from Hamm’s case. Unlike in Rompilla,
there was no indication here that the prosecution would introduce anything more
than the fact of Hamm’s prior convictions during sentencing. Thus, there was no
obvious need to check the transcript for the accuracy of the prosecution’s
quotation. Nor did Hamm’s counsel have any indication that a review of the
transcript would reveal other mitigation leads. And finally, Hamm’s prior
conviction file was not readily available in the Alabama courthouse but was
located in another state.
Additionally, the context of Rompilla is different; there, an investigation
would have turned up numerous mitigation leads, and counsel undoubtedly had a
duty to present a mitigation case. But here, an investigation would have turned up
a potentially questionable, but nonetheless still valid, conviction. The utility of
that information would have depended on separate collateral proceedings in
Tennessee, which, as discussed below, a reasonable attorney was arguably not
required to bring.
Thus, to us, it is a close question whether counsel’s failure to investigate the
Tennessee plea transcript was deficient under Strickland. But the Alabama state
courts found Hamm’s counsel was not deficient. Under the deference due here,
fair-minded jurists could disagree over the correctness of the state court’s
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determination that counsel’s investigation was not deficient, so habeas relief is not
proper. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102, 131 S. Ct. at 786.
Moreover, even if counsel’s failure to investigate the file were deficient, no
legal authority indicates that Hamm’s trial counsel in Alabama had a duty to
challenge the expired Tennessee convictions in Tennessee courts at any time
before, during, or after Hamm’s sentencing in 1987. Although Hamm attempts to
stretch Rompilla to establish such a duty, nothing in Rompilla suggests that, at the
time of Hamm’s trial, Strickland obligated counsel to challenge the validity of
prior convictions, either as a matter of course or under the facts of this case.14 In
the absence of any such authority, it is certainly debatable among fair-minded
jurists whether the Alabama court was correct in determining that no legal
authority supports Hamm’s argument.
In summary, Hamm has failed to demonstrate that the Alabama courts
unreasonably concluded that his trial counsel’s not investigating or challenging his
14
In 2003, the ABA issued revised “Guidelines” regarding the performance of counsel in
death-penalty cases, which included the following Commentary language: “Counsel must also
investigate prior convictions, adjudications, or unadjudicated offenses that could be used as
aggravating circumstances or otherwise come into evidence. If a prior conviction is legally
flawed, counsel should seek to have it set aside.” Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387 n.7, 125 S. Ct. at
2466 (citing ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases (rev. ed. 2003), published in 31 Hofstra L. Rev. 913, 1027 (2003)). This
Commentary language was not included in original death-penalty guidelines, which were
published in 1989 (after Hamm’s trial), and was not included as part of the ABA Criminal
Justice Standards in effect during the 1987 trial. While the ABA Guidelines suggest that now
counsel would have an obligation to challenge a flawed prior conviction, in the absence of any
other binding or persuasive legal authority in effect in 1987, it is debatable that the prevailing
professional standards at the time would have required a challenge.
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expired Tennessee convictions did not fall outside the wide range of reasonable
professional conduct.15 Because counsel’s performance was not deficient under
Strickland, Hamm cannot establish cause16 to overcome his procedural default by
virtue of his counsel’s allegedly ineffective assistance, particularly under the
“doubly deferential” standard we must apply to Strickland claims in the habeas
context.
3. Overcoming the Procedural Default Via a “Miscarriage of Justice”
In the district court, Hamm attempted to overcome the procedural default by
arguing that failure to address his substantive claim regarding the Tennessee
convictions would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Hamm does not
explicitly make this argument in his brief to this Court, but he does consistently
reiterate his alleged “actual innocence” of the Tennessee robbery and claims that it
is unjust that he should be executed “without at least one merits review” of the
Tennessee convictions’ validity. Whether these arguments can be read as an
15
Hamm raises in his appellate brief an argument he advanced below, that his trial
counsel was otherwise ineffective because he failed to prevent the trial court from showing the
sentencing jury the Tennessee records that noted Hamm had been indicted for “armed robbery”
when his plea and convictions were only to “simple robbery.” This argument is not properly
before us with respect to the substantive prior-convictions claim, as whatever “tainting” effect
this language may have had is a separate claim from whether the convictions themselves were
unconstitutionally obtained and erroneously used in sentencing. Even if Hamm’s trial counsel
had been ineffective in failing to keep this language out of the jury’s sight—and to be clear, we
do not believe counsel was ineffective—the ineffectiveness with respect to the “armed robbery”
language could not serve as cause to overcome a default of the claim that the convictions
themselves should never have been used in sentencing.
16
The district court did not address the “prejudice” prong of the “cause and prejudice”
analysis, and we need not address it here, as Hamm has failed to show cause.
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argument that the miscarriage-of-justice exception to procedural default applies
here is questionable, but, nonetheless, we analyze why the district court was
correct in holding that exception inapplicable here.
In Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2518 (1992), the
Supreme Court noted that, ordinarily, cause and prejudice is the means by which a
petitioner must overcome the procedural default of his habeas claims. But when
cause and prejudice cannot be established, a narrow exception exists when failure
to hear the claims would result in a miscarriage of justice—in other words, the
conviction of someone “actually innocent” of the crime. Id. at 339, 112 S. Ct.
2519 (citing Murray, 477 U.S. at 496, 106 S. Ct. at 2649). In the context of a
capital-sentencing proceeding, the Supreme Court, while acknowledging the
awkwardness of someone being actually “innocent” of the death penalty, held that
the inquiry must be focused on the eligibility of the defendant for a death sentence
under state law. Id. at 341, 346-48, 112 S. Ct. at 2520, 2523. Accordingly, to
overcome a procedural default via the miscarriage-of-justice exception in the
capital context, a petitioner must show “by clear and convincing evidence that but
for constitutional error, no reasonable juror would find him eligible for the death
penalty under [state] law.” Id. at 348, 112 S. Ct. at 2523 (emphasis added); see
also Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 388, 124 S. Ct. 1849 (2004).
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As the district court noted, the Alabama sentencing court found that two
aggravating factors existed in Hamm’s case to warrant imposition of the death
penalty: the underlying robbery-murder itself and the prior Tennessee
convictions.17 See Hamm Direct Appeal, 564 So. 2d at 466. Alabama requires the
existence of just one aggravating factor to support the death penalty. See Ala.
Code § 13A-5-45(f). Thus, even if consideration of the Tennessee convictions
were assumed to be constitutionally erroneous, Hamm was still eligible for the
death penalty by virtue of his underlying conviction for the capital crime of
robbery-murder, itself an aggravating circumstance under Alabama law.
Accordingly, Hamm cannot use the “miscarriage of justice” exception to overcome
the procedural default of his substantive Tennessee-convictions claim. And if
Hamm cannot otherwise establish cause and prejudice to overcome the default, the
Tennessee-convictions claim is procedurally defaulted and beyond the reach of
federal habeas review.
4. Is there an Equitable Remedy Under Martinez?
As noted earlier, in Martinez, the Supreme Court, based on considerations of
equity, issued a narrow holding that “[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initial-
17
The statutory aggravating circumstances in Alabama include the following: “The
defendant was previously convicted of another capital offense or a felony involving the use or
threat of violence to the person,” Ala. Code. § 13A-5-49(2), and “[t]he capital offense was
committed while the defendant was engaged or was an accomplice in the commission of, or an
attempt to commit, or flight after committing, or attempting to commit, rape, robbery, burglary
or kidnapping,” id. §13A-5-49(4).
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review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural
default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1315.
Martinez dealt with the law in Arizona, where petitioners can bring ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claims for the first time in a collateral proceeding only.
Id. at 1313. Martinez based its rationale on the equitable concern that “[w]hen an
attorney errs in initial-review collateral proceedings, it is likely that no state court
at any level will hear the prisoner’s claim,” and without allowing cause to be
established based on collateral-counsel’s errors, no federal court will review the
prisoner’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim either. Id. at 1316.
From this language, Hamm tries to read a broad proposition that Martinez
“provides for equitable relief in situations where a petitioner would otherwise not
have the substance of a claim heard.” Hamm argues that a federal habeas court
should hear the merits of his Tennessee-convictions claim, because “[t]o fail to do
so, and avoid substantive review by means of purely procedural hurdles, would
amount to a straightforward violation of the principles of equity which drove the
Court’s holding in Martinez.”18
But Hamm’s novel argument is not supported by any legal authority. As
noted above, the Supreme Court has so far extended the Martinez exception to only
18
In some respects, Hamm is also arguing that he should be able to overcome procedural
default on a “fundamental fairness” rationale, an argument the Supreme Court has long
dismissed. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 493-497, 106 S. Ct. at 2648-50.
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those cases where the state procedural system, while ostensibly allowing
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims to be raised on direct review, makes
it virtually impossible to do so in reality. See Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1914-15. The
exception still applies solely to defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel
claims. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320 (“The rule of Coleman governs in all but
the limited circumstances here. . . . Our holding here addresses only the
constitutional claims presented in this case . . . .”). And this Court has emphasized
that Martinez does not extend beyond claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. See Chavez, 742 F.3d at 945; Arthur, 739 F.3d at 630; Gore, 720 F.3d at
816. No authority suggests that Martinez has created a broad equitable exception
that would apply to Hamm’s defaulted substantive claim about his Tennessee
convictions.
Moreover, the logic of Martinez does not plausibly extend to Hamm’s case.
The equitable concern of Martinez and Trevino arose from the injustice posed
when a claim that a state’s rules forced, either legally or practically, to be raised in
a first-level collateral attack was not raised because of collateral counsel’s
deficiencies. Accordingly, without an exception to the bar on raising collateral-
counsel’s ineffectiveness, no opportunity arose for a defendant to raise the
substantive claim. Here, though, Hamm could and should have raised the
substantive prior-convictions claim at trial or on direct appeal. He didn’t and
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defaulted the claim. To the extent that he was precluded from doing so by the
ineffectiveness of his trial or appellate counsel, he could have and did raise that
ineffectiveness issue in his collateral proceedings and received consideration of the
merits of trial counsel’s effectiveness in state court. Adopting Hamm’s broad
reading of Martinez would essentially require us to disregard or sweep away the
existing law of procedural default in the habeas context. Accordingly, Martinez
does not provide a broad equitable tool for Hamm to overcome the procedural
default of his substantive prior-convictions claim.
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of federal habeas
relief based on Hamm’s claim that his prior Tennessee convictions were
impermissibly used as an aggravating factor in his death sentence. The Supreme
Court’s ruling in Coss prohibits us from reaching and assessing the validity of
these convictions, and no exceptions permit Hamm to avoid the dictates of Coss.
Alternatively, the district court properly found the claim to be procedurally
defaulted, and Hamm has advanced no argument that allows him to overcome the
default.
IV.
In his second argument on appeal, Hamm asserts that the district court erred
in not granting habeas relief on his claim that his trial counsel did not adequately
investigate and present a mitigation case. Hamm argues that counsel failed to
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uncover and present “a wealth of documents and testimonial evidence” concerning
the criminal histories of Hamm’s family members, Hamm’s school records, and
Hamm’s medical and mental-health records. Hamm also argues that it was
improper for his counsel to introduce the mitigation evidence he did present
through the testimony of Hamm’s sister, which, in Hamm’s opinion, appeared to
be “bald assertions” that “sounded like a bunch of lies” unsupported by any
“corroborating” documentary evidence. After a thorough review, we affirm the
district court on this issue as well.
The Alabama state courts considered this claim on its merits. 19 See Hamm
Collateral Appeal, 913 So. 2d at 478-79, 486-88. Therefore, the “doubly
deferential” standard of review applies to the state courts’ evaluation of the
performance prong here as well. Additionally, the review of this claim on federal
habeas is “limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the
claim on the merits.”20 Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 1398. In this case, that evidence
19
Actually, in the district court (and the Rule 32 Court), Hamm presented his mitigation-
case ineffective-assistance claims in three separate sub-claims. The district court found it
prudent to address them together, and on appeal here, Hamm argues them as one claim as well.
20
The only pertinent evidence that was excluded by the state courts is the affidavit of Dr.
Dale Watson, a psychologist who diagnosed Hamm with “neuropsychological impairment and
presumptively brain damage” and found Hamm was in the “borderline range of measured
intellectual ability overall.” The state court found Dr. Watson was not a licensed psychologist at
the time of Hamm’s trial and could not have offered expert testimony at that time. Hamm
Collateral Appeal, 913 So. 2d at 478. Dr. Watson conducted his evaluation of Hamm in 1996
but did not prepare his written evaluation until 1999. Id. When Hamm’s counsel attempted to
admit Dr. Watson’s written report during the Rule 32 hearing, the state objected on the basis that
it could not cross-examine Watson, and the court sustained the objection. Id. The ACCA noted
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includes the testimony of Hamm’s trial attorneys Harris and Williams; certified
copies of the extensive criminal records of Hamm’s father and seven brothers, as
well as the criminal records of other family members (Exhibit 1); Hamm’s
personal and family history, including references to Hamm’s own past criminal
conduct, as well as Hamm’s vital, school, and employment records (Exhibit 2);
vital records for members of Hamm’s family (Exhibit 3); medical and
psychological records for members of Hamm’s family (Exhibit 4); and Hamm’s
that cross-examination would have been particularly important, given the time gap between Dr.
Watson’s examination and the compilation of his report. Id. at 478 & n.8. The ACCA
concluded that the Rule 32 Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Watson’s report.
Id. at 479. Relying on 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), the district court declined to hold an evidentiary
hearing on whether the Alabama court properly excluded the report.
On appeal, Hamm argues first that Watson’s report is properly before this Court because
it was “stamped and included as part of the Court record.” Hamm is quoting the Rule 32
transcript, where the state court acknowledged receipt of a plethora of documents Hamm had
submitted pro se, despite being represented by appointed counsel. Id.. Based on the Rule 32
Court’s statement that these documents that were submitted pro se were “included as part of the
record,” Hamm contends they were included within the state-court “record” within the meaning
of Cullen.
While Hamm is correct that Cullen speaks in terms of the “record,” he nevertheless fails
to reconcile the Rule 32 Court’s clear sustaining of the objection to admitting Watson’s report,
and the ACCA’s upholding of that determination. See 913 So. 2d at 478-79. Cullen’s rationale
rested on the record that was used in the state court’s adjudication of the merits, 131 S. Ct. at
1398, and here the Watson affidavit was never admitted or used by the state court in adjudicating
Hamm’s claim. Moreover, the state courts’ underlying determination that Dr. Watson’s affidavit
was not part of the record is certainly entitled to deference under § 2254.
Hamm also argues that Martinez applies because his Rule 32 counsel was ineffective in
not calling Dr. Watson to testify during the Rule 32 hearing. However, as discussed above,
Martinez applies only in the context of overcoming defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-
counsel claims. Hamm’s mitigation-related trial-counsel claim was not defaulted and was
considered on the merits in state court; accordingly, collateral counsel’s ineffective assistance is
irrelevant to that claim. Moreover, an unfavorable evidentiary ruling, while in some sense
“procedural,” is not a “procedurally defaulted” constitutional claim that can be overcome by
cause and prejudice. And finally, to the extent that Hamm is raising an independent claim for
ineffective assistance of his collateral counsel as a basis for habeas relief, such a claim is not
cognizable. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320.
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own medical records developed during his various periods of incarceration
(Exhibit 5).
The ACCA, in reviewing the merits of this claim, upheld the Rule 32
Court’s determination that “trial counsel conducted an adequate investigation into
Hamm’s past and were well aware of the difficult circumstances in which Hamm
grew up,” and that trial “counsel presented much of this information by way of
testimony from Hamm’s sister at the sentencing hearing.” 913 So. 2d at 486. The
ACCA also observed the Rule 32 Court’s determination that Hamm had failed to
establish prejudice under Strickland “because the evidence was cumulative and
would not have affected the outcome of the proceeding,” and the evidence was
credited by the sentencing judge. Id. at 486-87. In addition, the court credited
Harris’s testimony that, as a matter of strategy, he would not have introduced many
of the documents proffered in the Rule 32 hearing because they would have been
detrimental to Hamm by, among other things, revealing his own sordid criminal
history. Id. at 487. The ACCA agreed that Harris’s trial strategy was
“unassailable” and that counsel were not deficient in their investigation and
presentation of mitigating evidence. Id. Further, the ACCA agreed that Hamm
had demonstrated no prejudice. Id. at 488. The district court found this to be a
reasonable application of Strickland.
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The district court’s conclusion is correct. Harris met with Hamm over
twenty-five times before his trial; he had a good relationship with Hamm and no
difficulties communicating with him. Although Harris presented only two
witnesses at the sentencing hearing, the evidence that Hamm contends Harris failed
to discover and introduce is in fact largely cumulative of the evidence that Hamm’s
sister Ruthie testified about. Thus, Hamm’s case is distinguishable from the cases
he cites like Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 383, 390, 125 S. Ct. at 2464, 2468 (failure to
obtain the prior conviction file when the state’s case relied heavily on it and that
file would have revealed a plethora of unknown mitigation evidence); Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523-27, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2536-38 (2003) (failure to compile a
personal history and follow up on investigative leads and failure to present an
actual mitigation case); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395, 120 S. Ct. 1495,
1514 (2000) (last-minute investigation, unjustified failure to investigate records of
a “nightmarish childhood,” and limiting presentation to just lukewarm character
evidence); Ferrell v. Hall, 640 F.3d 1199, 1203, 1227 (11th Cir. 2011) (failure to
conduct mental-health investigation, despite obvious “red flags,” or investigate a
history of abuse); and Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043, 1045 (11th Cir. 2002)
(failure to investigate, obtain, or present any mitigation evidence to a jury). Unlike
counsel in these cases, Hamm’s counsel investigated and presented significant
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mitigation information about Hamm’s mental health and upbringing, albeit largely
through the testimony of a single witness.
For example, Hamm says counsel should have introduced records
concerning Hamm’s epilepsy and history of seizures to “prove up” Hamm’s
mental-health impairment. But Ruthie testified that her brother suffered from
epilepsy and had seizures in 1980 or 1981. Additionally, the record reflects that
Harris, after learning about Hamm’s seizures, had Hamm’s mental health evaluated
at a state medical facility, whose experts found Hamm was competent both at the
time of trial and the time of the murder. Moreover, unlike in Ferrell, 640 F.3d at
1227-28, no record evidence exists that Hamm displayed any obvious “red flags”
that he suffered from any other mental impairment. Thus, regarding Hamm’s
mental health, the sentencing jury and judge were made aware of Hamm’s history
of epilepsy, and the state courts’ conclusion that Harris’s mental-health
investigation was adequate was not an unreasonable application of Strickland.
Similarly, Hamm argues that Harris should have introduced the voluminous
criminal records of Hamm’s father and brothers and other family members. But
although he did not obtain the records specifically, Harris was aware of the
extensive family criminal-history records. Ruthie testified that Hamm’s father and
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six of Hamm’s brothers had been or currently were in prison.21 Nevertheless,
Hamm asserts22 that it was constitutionally deficient for Harris not to introduce the
voluminous criminal records, contending that Ruthie’s testimony was not credible
because Harris presented no documentary evidence to back it up.
The success of Hamm’s argument is significantly undermined, though, by
the original sentencing judge’s findings of fact, which show that he obviously
believed Ruthie’s account of the family criminal history. See Hamm Direct
Appeal, 564 So. 2d at 468. Thus, with respect to the family criminal history, the
state courts’ conclusions that Harris’s investigation satisfied the performance prong
of Strickland and that the cumulative nature of the records defeated the prejudice
prong of Strickland are not unreasonable applications of Strickland. See, e.g.,
Holsey v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 694 F.3d 1230, 1270-71 (11th Cir.
2012) (discussing cases where cumulative evidence undermines a finding of
prejudice).
21
It bears mentioning that the presentation of any family history during sentencing,
including criminal history, child abuse, and alcoholism, was resisted by Hamm, who felt “it was
‘nobody’s business but his family’s.’” Rule 32 Op. at 76 (Appellant’s App’x Vol. III at A618).
22
Hamm renews on appeal an argument he made in the district court that Harris “straight
lie[d]” during his Rule 32 testimony when he allegedly testified that he strategically chose not to
reveal the family criminal records. The district court concluded that Hamm misstated Harris’s
testimony, finding that Harris was referring not to the family criminal records but to Hamm’s
medical records from his prison time (Exhibit 5), which Harris did not want to introduce because
it would have emphasized Hamm’s past incarcerations. We see no reason to disturb the district
court’s conclusion.
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Hamm further contends that he can establish prejudice from the failure to
introduce the family’s criminal-history records based on the sentencing judge and
jury’s “mistaken” conclusion that the Hamm women had overcome their terrible
upbringing. Hamm bases this contention on Harris’s testimony of his post-trial
conversations with the jury, where jury members recounted their feelings “that if
Ruthie and her sister could have gone through life without being involved in crime
that the boys could have too.” The sentencing judge drew a similar conclusion,
stating, “It is to be noted, however, that the two girl children were able to rise
above this influence and appear to be good citizens.” See Hamm Direct Appeal,
564 So. 2d at 468. The family criminal-history documents, though, reveal that
Ruthie was charged with “[a]ssault with [i]ntent to [m]urder,” and her sister Linda
was charged with public drunkenness. Hamm argues that this establishes prejudice
from the failure to introduce the family criminal records because, if the jury had
seen the two (and only two) charges against his sisters, the jury’s conclusion about
the women’s ability to persevere in the face of adversity would have been
undermined, and it would have been less inclined to condemn Hamm.
We disagree that the failure to introduce the sisters’ criminal histories
undermines Hamm’s death sentence. First, Ruthie was never convicted of the
charge—which grew out of an intoxicated altercation among her extended
family—apparently as part of an agreement that required the entire Hamm family
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to leave Colbert County, Alabama, permanently. And, in stark comparison with
the male members of the Hamm family, these are the only run-ins with the law
reflected in the record for Ruthie or Linda. A single run-in with the law each over
the course of their lives does not undermine confidence in the conclusion that the
“girl children were able to rise above this influence”—particularly where they were
not convicted, nor does it suggest that the sentencing court would have reached a
different outcome.
The one category of evidence introduced during the Rule 32 proceedings
that was not presented to the sentencing jury, and thus not cumulative of Ruthie’s
testimony, is evidence of Hamm’s low intelligence and poor school performance.
When asked if Hamm had “any problems at school,” Ruthie testified, “No, sir, not
that I can remember.” In the Rule 32 proceedings, though, Hamm introduced
evidence of his low grades and poor attendance; standardized testing scores that
indicated that Hamm was in the bottom 1% for reading and bottom 4% for spelling
among eighth graders; and the fact that Hamm dropped out of school in the ninth
grade.
Although mitigation evidence of Hamm’s intellectual standing should have
been introduced, particularly to correct Ruthie’s testimony that Hamm had no
school problems, we conclude that Hamm has not established prejudice under
Strickland due to counsel’s failure to introduce Hamm’s school records. Looking
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at the circumstances and evidence as a whole, we cannot say that the addition of
these school records creates “a mitigation case that bears no relation” to the case
that was presented to the jury. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 393, 125 S. Ct. at 2469;
Holsey, 694 F.3d at 1272. Given the horribly abusive environment in which
Hamm was raised—a background that was fully conveyed to the sentencing jury—
Hamm’s poor school performance is not surprising,23 and the absence of this
evidence is not sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of Hamm’s
sentencing.
In summary, the Alabama state courts did not unreasonably apply Strickland
to Hamm’s claims that his trial counsel was deficient in investigating and
presenting a mitigation case, and the district court did not err in denying habeas
relief. Although Harris called only two witnesses and did not present evidence of
Hamm’s low intelligence, he did investigate and present to the jury an accurate
picture of Hamm’s harsh upbringing, drug and alcohol abuse, and epilepsy. The
documentary evidence that Hamm produced during his Rule 32 proceedings
enhanced the picture painted by Ruthie’s testimony, but that’s all it did. With the
exception of the school records, Hamm has not pointed to distinct mitigation
23
In fact, the sentencing judge did state that Hamm had a “poor education,” although it is
not clear from what evidence the sentencing judge drew that conclusion. See Hamm Direct
Appeal, 564 So. 2d at 468.
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evidence that Harris failed to uncover or present, but rather has identified merely
more of the same evidence that was presented to the sentencing court.
And even if Harris’s performance had been deficient, the evidence adduced
at the Rule 32 hearing was cumulative of Ruthie’s testimony, weakening any
argument that the failure to introduce it during sentencing was prejudicial. In
pronouncing sentence, the sentencing court largely credited those mitigating
factors represented by Hamm’s Rule 32 evidence. Hamm Direct Appeal, 564 So.
2d at 468. Hamm has not produced a quantity of evidence in his collateral attack
that would alter the weight that a fact-finder may have applied against the
aggravating factors, and consequently, the state courts’ conclusion that there was
no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different had the
additional evidence been presented is not unreasonable. For these reasons, we
affirm the district court’s denial of habeas relief on the mitigation-case claim.
V.
In his final argument on appeal, Hamm contends that the prosecution
violated his Brady rights by not turning over three sets of records that, according to
Hamm, would have impeached the prosecution’s chief witness, Douglas Roden.
These records include Roden’s diagnosis of borderline and, possibly, antisocial
personality disorders, Roden’s alcohol and drug addictions, and Roden’s use of
marijuana while in a drug-treatment program and, relatedly, his alleged lying to
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counselors in the program. On appeal, Hamm argues that his Brady claim
concerning the Roden impeachment evidence was properly before the Rule 32
Court and that his claim is meritorious. For the reasons set forth below, we
conclude that Hamm’s Brady claim here is procedurally defaulted and that a merits
review is precluded. Alternatively, we find the claim to be without merit.
A. The Brady Claim Is Procedurally Defaulted and the Default Cannot be
Overcome
The last state court to consider the Roden Brady claim, the ACCA, found
that Hamm had raised the claim for the first time in that court during his appeal of
the Rule 32 Court’s decision. Hamm Collateral Appeal, 913 So. 2d at 479-480.
Accordingly, the ACCA declined to address the merits because the claim was not
presented to the Rule 32 trial court, citing Alabama law, which holds that “[a]
petitioner for post-conviction relief may not raise on appeal grounds not presented
in the petition or presented at the hearing on the petition.” Id. (citing Morrison v.
State, 551 So. 2d 435 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989)); Morrison, 551 So. 2d at 437.
Hamm disagrees and contends that the Roden claim was properly presented to the
Rule 32 Court when Hamm, despite being represented by counsel, submitted
records to the Rule 32 Court pro se and asked that they be considered in support of
his Rule 32 petition.
The district court found that the ACCA’s procedural-default ruling was
proper because Hamm did not fairly present the claim to the Rule 32 Court. Hamm
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§ 2254 Order, 2013 WL 1282129, at *28. Specifically, the district court noted that
Hamm could have amended his 1991 Rule 32 petition to add the Roden Brady
claim between the time that he discovered the records in 1995 and the time that he
submitted them and participated in the Rule 32 hearing in 1999. Id. at *26. The
district court also noted that even when Hamm asked the Rule 32 Court to consider
his collection of submitted documents, he never explained the relevance of the
Roden documents, and neither Hamm nor his counsel mentioned the Roden Brady
claim during the Rule 32 hearing. Id. at *26-27.
1. Was the Roden Brady Claim Presented to the Rule 32 Court?
Whether a particular claim is subject to the doctrine of procedural default is
a mixed question of fact and law that this Court reviews de novo. Judd v. Haley,
250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1302
(11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)). A district court’s findings of fact, though, are
reviewed for clear error. Id. at 1313 n.2 (citing Byrd v. Hasty, 142 F.3d 1395, 1396
(11th Cir. 1998)).
Here, the district court’s determination that the Roden Brady claim was not
fairly presented to the Rule 32 Court was not clearly erroneous, and it correctly
interpreted the Alabama procedural rule precluding review at the appellate level of
claims not presented in the Rule 32 petition to constitute a default of the Roden
Brady claim. Hamm does not raise any argument here that the Alabama
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procedural rule was not an independent and adequate ground upon which to base
its decision. Hamm also does not dispute the district court’s relevant underlying
factual findings—that the petition was never amended, that the relevance of the
Roden documents was never explained to the Rule 32 Court, and that the Roden
Brady claim was never specifically articulated to the Rule 32 Court by anyone.
While Hamm asserts that merely submitting and seeking admission of these
documents was sufficient to preserve and present his claim to the Rule 32 Court,
the Supreme Court has noted that a claim is not fairly presented to a state court “if
that court must read beyond a petition or a brief (or a similar document) that does
not alert it to the presence of a federal claim.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32,
124 S. Ct. 1347, 1351 (2004). Additionally, merely seeking to admit evidence into
the record, without more, is insufficient to present a claim. Cf. Castille v. Peoples,
489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989) (rejecting that a claim is fairly
presented in state court “where the claim has been presented for the first and only
time in a procedural context in which its merits will not be considered”).
Accordingly, Hamm’s argument that his Roden Brady claim was presented to the
Rule 32 Court solely through his delivery of the records to that court is unavailing.
Absent any other challenge to the Alabama procedural ruling, the district court was
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correct in finding the Roden Brady claim was procedurally defaulted for purposes
of federal habeas relief.24
2. Can Hamm Overcome the Default with Martinez?
Hamm attempts to overcome the procedural default of the Roden Brady
claim by once again invoking Martinez. Here, Hamm argues that his post-
conviction counsel was ineffective for not preserving the Brady claim during the
Rule 32 proceedings and that this ineffectiveness should serve as cause to
overcome the default of the Roden Brady claim. As already described above,
though, Martinez applies to defaulted ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims
only and not, for example, to Brady claims—a reality repeatedly emphasized in
this Circuit. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320; Chavez, 742 F.3d at 945; Arthur,
739 F.3d at 630; Gore, 720 F.3d at 816.
Admittedly, the logic of Hamm’s Martinez argument is stronger here,
because Brady claims often arise and can be presented only after direct appeals are
exhausted. Under the circumstances of this case, Hamm’s Roden Brady claim was
24
Whether a claim is fairly presented to a state court, and thus exhausted for purposes of
§ 2254, is a related but separate and distinct concept from whether the claim has been
procedurally defaulted—and the question here is whether Hamm’s claim has been procedurally
defaulted. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92-93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2386-87 (2006).
However, because the question of default here is tied to a state-law rule that bars review of
unpresented claims, the Supreme Court’s case law on fairly presenting a claim is appropriately
instructive in determining whether Hamm’s claim was not fairly presented and, thus, defaulted.
Cf. Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375, 122 S. Ct. 877, 885 (2002) (“The adequacy of state
procedural bars to the assertions of federal questions . . . is itself a federal question.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 422, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 1078
(1965))).
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not discovered until after his direct appeals were exhausted, and the Rule 32
proceeding was Hamm’s first opportunity to raise the claim. As Justice Scalia
recognized in his Martinez dissent,
Moreover, no one really believes that the newly
announced “equitable” rule will remain limited to
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel cases. There is not
a dime’s worth of difference in principle between those
cases and many other cases in which initial state habeas
will be the first opportunity for a particular claim to be
raised: claims of “newly discovered” prosecutorial
misconduct, for example, see Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), claims
based on “newly discovered” exculpatory evidence or
“newly discovered” impeachment of prosecutorial
witnesses, and claims asserting ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel. The Court's soothing assertion, ante,
at 1320, that its holding “addresses only the
constitutional claims presented in this case,” insults the
reader’s intelligence.
132 S. Ct. at 1321 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But despite Justice Scalia’s views on the
matter, neither the Supreme Court nor any Circuit has applied Martinez to
defaulted Brady claims.25 Until the Supreme Court instructs otherwise, we are
constrained to respect the explicitly limited holding of Martinez and the narrow
construction our opinions have given that decision. Accordingly, Hamm cannot
overcome the procedural default of his Brady claim by invoking Martinez.
25
In fact, the Ninth Circuit has rejected such an application. See Hunton v. Sinclair, 732
F.3d 1124, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2013).
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B. Alternatively, the Roden Brady Claim Lacks Merit
Even if Hamm could overcome the default of his Brady claim, though, the
claim itself is without merit. Although the district court found that the claim had
been properly procedurally defaulted, it nonetheless analyzed the merits of the
claim. Hamm § 2254 Order, 2013 WL 1282129, at *28-31. It concluded that,
contrary to Hamm’s assertion, the evidence in the Roden health records was at best
only marginally favorable in terms of impeachment and was “certainly not enough
to undermine confidence in the guilt or penalty phase of the trial.” Id. at *30.
Brady holds that suppression of evidence that is favorable to an accused and
material to guilt or punishment violates the accused’s due-process rights. 373 U.S.
at 87, 83 S. Ct. at 1196-97. Impeachment evidence is included within the ambit of
Brady. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3380 (1985).
“There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must
be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is
impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully
or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Stickler v. Greene, 527 U.S.
263, 281-82, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1948 (1999). Favorable evidence is that evidence
that “if disclosed and used effectively, it may make the difference between
conviction and acquittal.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, 105 S. Ct. at 3380. In
demonstrating the materiality of a Brady violation, “[t]he question is not whether
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the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the
evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial
resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434,
115 S. Ct. 1555, 1566 (1995). Suppressed evidence must be judged on the
“cumulative,” “net effect” such evidence has on the reasonable probability the
result would have been different. Id. at 421, 437, 115 S. Ct. at 1560, 1567.
Assuming arguendo that the Roden records are both favorable to Hamm and
were suppressed within the meaning of Brady, we nonetheless disagree that this
impeachment evidence undermines confidence in Hamm’s trial. First of all,
Hamm’s comparison of Roden’s inconsistent and fabricated statements to the
police with the informant’s inconsistent statements in Kyles is irrelevant here,
because Roden’s statements were disclosed to Hamm’s defense and used in the
cross-examination of Roden at Hamm’s trial. See Hamm § 2254 Order, 2013 WL
1282129, at *26 n.19, *30. Thus, any prejudice must stem from the cumulative
effect of Roden’s health records and those records alone. Although Hamm asserts
that his cross-examination of Roden would have been different with these records,
the only concrete example he gives is that Roden’s history of alcohol abuse would
have impeached his testimony that he (Roden) only “had a buzz going” on the
night of the robbery-murder. Even assuming that Roden’s psychological
diagnosis, substance abuse, and “lying” undermined his testimony about his role in
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the robbery-murder, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that the
cumulative effect of the suppressed impeachment evidence is small compared to
the actual impeachment evidence used at trial: Roden’s agreement to testify against
Hamm in exchange for leniency, Roden’s criminal history, and Roden’s
inconsistent statements to police in this case. See id. at *30. Additionally, the
probability of a different outcome is further reduced by the strength of the evidence
against Hamm, particularly Hamm’s own confession. Accordingly, the district
court did not err when it concluded in the alternative that Hamm’s Roden Brady
claim was without merit, because Roden’s undisclosed health records fail to
undermine the outcome of Hamm’s trial.
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s denial of Hamm’s petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is AFFIRMED.
72