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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-11529
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 8:11-cr-00373-JSM-AEP-3
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DARRIN JOSEPH HOFFMAN,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(February 26, 2013)
Before CARNES, HULL and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Darrin Joseph Hoffman appeals his mandatory life sentence imposed,
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii), after Hoffman was convicted for
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methamphetamine trafficking and possession. After review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Indictment, Notice of Enhanced Penalties, and Trial
On July 19, 2011, Hoffman and two co-defendants were indicted in
connection with a methamphetamine trafficking conspiracy. Hoffman was
charged with: (1) conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50
or more grams of methamphetamine and 500 or more grams of methamphetamine
mixture, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (Count 1); (2) two counts of
possession with intent to distribute a quantity of methamphetamine, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Counts 7 and 8); and (3) possession with intent to
distribute 5 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (Count 10).1 Hoffman pled not guilty.
Before trial, the government filed a notice, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, that
it intended to seek enhanced punishment based on Hoffman’s prior drug
convictions. The government’s notice stated that Hoffman had been convicted in
Florida state court of: (1) conspiracy to traffic in cocaine; and (2) possession of
1
On June 17 and 22, 2011, Hoffman sold to a confidential informant 1.7 grams and 1.8
grams, respectively, of methamphetamine. Law enforcement officers searched Hoffman’s home
and discovered 46.3 grams of methamphetamine and other drug paraphernalia. After receiving
warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436,
86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), Hoffman
admitted that, for the past year, he had been buying 1–2 ounces of methamphetamine per week
for re-sale from one of his co-defendants.
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cocaine and delivery of cocaine. The notice indicated that these convictions were
“prior convictions for a felony drug offense” under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A),
which provides that having two such prior convictions raises the mandatory
minimum punishment for a § 841(a), (b)(1)(A) conviction (Counts 1 and 10
against Hoffman) from ten years’ imprisonment to life imprisonment. Hoffman
filed no response or written objections to the government’s § 851 notice.
Hoffman proceeded to trial. Mid-way through the trial, Hoffman began
acting erratically, calling his competence into question. The district court
appointed a forensic psychologist to examine Hoffman, and the psychologist
concluded that Hoffman was malingering and faking his mental health symptoms.
The district court found Hoffman competent to proceed. On November 30, 2011,
a jury found Hoffman guilty on all charges.
B. Presentence Investigation Report
The probation office prepared a presentence investigation report (“PSI”).
The PSI found the drug quantity attributable to Hoffman, based on Hoffman’s
custodial statements made after receiving Miranda warnings, to be 2.21 kilograms
of methamphetamine. The PSI calculated Hoffman’s advisory guidelines range by
assigning a base offense level of 34, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3), with no
adjustments to the offense level, and a criminal history category of IV, yielding an
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initial advisory guidelines range of 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment. However,
the PSI noted that Hoffman’s applicable guideline range became life, pursuant to
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) and 851, because of Hoffman’s prior felony drug
convictions.
The PSI described Hoffman’s prior convictions, including the two prior
felony drug convictions set forth in the government’s § 851 notice. Hoffman
committed both offenses in March 1985, while he was a 17-year-old juvenile. For
the conspiracy to traffic in cocaine offense, Hoffman was arrested March 4, 1985.
Hoffman “possessed and delivered a plastic baggie containing 32 grams of cocaine
to an undercover officer.” For the possession and delivery of cocaine offense,
Hoffman was arrested on April 26, 1985 for having “possessed and delivered
cocaine to a law enforcement officer who was working in an undercover capacity”
on March 1, 1985. On August 4, 1986, Hoffman was adjudicated guilty of these
offenses in the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County, Florida, and was sentenced
as a youthful offender to four years in prison followed by two years’ probation.2
The PSI stated that “[t]he presentence investigation supports the validity of
2
Besides these two juvenile arrests and convictions, the PSI indicated that Hoffman was
arrested or convicted 23 other times for various offenses between 1986 and 2011. In addition to
the August 1986 drug convictions, the PSI lists convictions for arson, failure to appear, grand
theft (twice), failure to re-deliver a hired vehicle, possession of crack cocaine, driving with a
suspended license, obstructing an officer without violence (twice), escape, and petit theft.
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the[] convictions” outlined in the government’s § 851 notice. Hoffman filed no
written objections to the PSI.
C. Sentencing Hearing
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel stated that he was unable to
discuss the PSI with Hoffman because Hoffman either refused to meet with
counsel, interrupted him, or made “nonsensical statements.” The district court
asked Hoffman whether he wanted to speak with his counsel about the PSI before
the hearing continued, but Hoffman declined. The district court found Hoffman
competent to proceed with the sentencing hearing.3
The district court presumed Hoffman objected to the PSI’s factual accuracy,
but “adopt[ed] the factual findings of the jury and the application of the Guidelines
as contained in the [PSI].” Defense counsel orally raised an objection about the
predicate convictions for the § 851 sentence enhancement simply because he had
not been able to speak to Hoffman about them, but defense counsel could
articulate no reason why the prior convictions were not valid, so the district court
overruled the objection.
The district court sentenced Hoffman to life imprisonment on Counts 1 and
3
Hoffman does not challenge on appeal the district court’s findings that he was competent
at trial and at sentencing.
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10 and 262 months’ imprisonment on the other two counts, to run concurrently.
Before announcing Hoffman’s sentence, the district court expressly stated that it
“reviewed the presentence report and considered the advisory Guidelines and the
factors of 18 U.S.C., Section 3553.” The district court stated that “[t]he sentence
imposed is the minimum mandatory sentence required by statute.” After imposing
the sentence, the district court asked whether either party had objections. Neither
party had any objections.
Hoffman appealed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
On appeal, Hoffman raises two issues. Hoffman first argues that his
mandatory life sentence as to Counts 1 and 10 constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment because the basis for the statutory
enhancement was two prior convictions for offenses Hoffman committed when he
was 17 years old. Second, Hoffman argues that his sentence was unreasonable
because the district court considered only the amount of methamphetamine and the
prior drug convictions, and failed to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.4
Because Hoffman failed to raise either issue in the district court, we review
4
Hoffman does not challenge his 262-month sentence on Counts 7 and 8.
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both issues for plain error. See United States v. Patterson,
595 F.3d 1324, 1326
(11th Cir. 2010) (“Where the defendant has failed to raise [an] issue below, we
review for plain error.”). “Plain error requires the defendant to show: (1) an error;
(2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
Id. “An error is
not plain unless it is contrary to explicit statutory provisions or to on-point
precedent in this Court or the Supreme Court.” United States v. Schultz,
565 F.3d
1353, 1357 (11th Cir. 2009).
B. Eighth Amendment Challenge to Use of Juvenile Drug Convictions
Section 841(b)(1)(A) provides that if a person with “two or more prior
convictions for a felony drug offense” is convicted for possessing with intent to
distribute 50 or more grams of methamphetamine (or conspiring to do so, see 21
U.S.C. § 846), he “shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment.”
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). Hoffman does not dispute that his 1986 state
cocaine possession, delivery, and trafficking conspiracy convictions qualify as
“prior convictions for a felony drug offense” under § 841(b)(1)(A). Instead, he
argues that because he committed the state drug offenses while he was a juvenile,
imposing a mandatory life sentence based upon those offenses violates the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
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Hoffman has not met his burden of showing plain error. Hoffman cites
Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551,
125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005), in which the Supreme
Court held that the “Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the
death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were
committed.”
Id. at 568, 578, 125 S. Ct. at 1194, 1200. Roper is inapposite for
several reasons. First, Roper concerned imposition of the death penalty, not life
imprisonment. See
id. at 568, 125 S. Ct. at 1194 (noting that the Eighth
Amendment applies in death penalty cases “with special force”).
Furthermore, Roper did not involve sentence enhancement for an adult
offender. In United States v. Wilks,
464 F.3d 1240, 1242–43 (11th Cir. 2006), this
Court rejected a challenge based on Roper to the use of youthful offender
convictions as predicate offenses to enhance a sentence under the career offender
sentencing guideline and the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
The Wilks Court reasoned:
Roper does not deal specifically—or even tangentially—with sentence
enhancement. It is one thing to prohibit capital punishment for those
under the age of eighteen, but an entirely different thing to prohibit
consideration of prior youthful offenses when sentencing criminals who
continue their illegal activity into adulthood. Roper does not mandate
that we wipe clean the records of every criminal on his or her eighteenth
birthday.
Wilks, 464 F.3d at 1243.
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Hoffman argues that Wilks is distinguishable because it did not involve
imposition of a life sentence. But even assuming this is so, Hoffman cites no
binding authority that holds that a mandatory life sentence based in part upon prior
juvenile offenses violates the Eighth Amendment. Further, this Court has twice
held that § 841(b)(1)(A)’s imposition of a mandatory life sentence on defendants
with two or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense does not violate the
Eighth Amendment. See United States v. Lopez,
649 F.3d 1222, 1248 (11th Cir.
2011); United States v. Willis,
956 F.2d 248, 251 (11th Cir. 1992).5
Hoffman points to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. —,
132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460
(2012), in which the Supreme Court recently held that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits a mandatory life-without-parole sentence for defendants who were under
age 18 when they committed the crime. But Miller is inapposite because it
involved a juvenile offender facing punishment for a crime committed when he
was a juvenile, and thus it focused on the reasons why it would be cruel and
unusual for a juvenile to face a mandatory life sentence. See
id. at —, 132 S. Ct.
at 2464–68. Nothing in Miller suggests that an adult offender who has committed
prior crimes as a juvenile should not receive a mandatory life sentence as an adult,
5
Neither Lopez nor Willis mentions the age of the defendant at the time of the predicate
felony drug offenses. See
Lopez, 649 F.3d at 1248;
Willis, 956 F.2d at 251.
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after committing a further crime as an adult. As we said of Roper in Wilks, the
Supreme Court in Miller did “not deal specifically—or even tangentially—with
sentence enhancement,” and it is a far different thing to prohibit sentencing a
juvenile offender to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole
than it is “to prohibit consideration of prior youthful offenses when sentencing
criminals who continue their illegal activity into adulthood.”
Wilks, 464 F.3d at
1243.
Hoffman has not met his burden of showing on-point precedent holding that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits using juvenile felony drug convictions to
enhance to life imprisonment an adult defendant’s sentence for a crime he
committed as an adult. Thus, Hoffman has not shown that the district court
committed plain error.
B. Unreasonableness of Sentence
Hoffman’s second claim is that his sentence is unreasonable because the
district court considered only Hoffman’s prior felony drug convictions and the
amount of methamphetamine involved in the current offense, instead of
considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).6
6
Section 3553(a) requires the district court to consider certain factors in determining what
sentence to impose. The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness
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After United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220,
125 S. Ct. 738 (2005),
sentencing requires two steps: (1) the district court must first correctly calculate
the advisory guidelines range, and (2) the district court must then consider the
§ 3553(a) factors in arriving at a reasonable sentence. United States v. Talley,
431
F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005). Hoffman challenges only the second step.
However, he has shown no error, plain or otherwise.
The district court remains bound by statutory mandatory minimum
sentences, even post-Booker. United States v. Castaing-Sosa,
530 F.3d 1358,
1362 (11th Cir. 2008).7 The district court stated that it had considered the
§ 3553(a) factors—which include “the kinds of sentences available,” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(3)—and imposed the sentence mandated by statute. The district court
was statutorily required to sentence Hoffman to life, regardless of the other
§ 3553(a) factors. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii);
Castaing-Sosa, 530 F.3d at
1362.
of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3)
the need for deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant
with needed educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences
available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing
Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide
restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
7
A district court is not authorized to sentence a defendant below the statutory minimum
unless the government filed a substantial assistance motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), or
the defendant falls within the safety-valve provision of § 3553(f).
Castaing-Sosa, 530 F.3d at
1360–61. Neither exception applies here.
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AFFIRMED.8
8
This appeal was originally scheduled for oral argument, but under 11th Circuit Rule
34–3(f) it was removed from the oral argument calendar.
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