[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-12013
D. C. Docket No. 6:07-cv-01785-GAP-KRS
MAHALA AULT,
on her own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
STACIE RHEA,
on her own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
DAN WALLACE,
on his own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
JERRY MILLER,
DISABILITY RIGHTS ADVOCATES FOR TECHNOLOGY,
DANIEL M. GADE,
ALAN A. MACCINI,
JAMES F. OVERBY,
Intervenor Plaintiffs-Appellants,
JERRY KERR,
Interested Party-Appellant,
versus
WALT DISNEY WORLD CO.,
Defendant–Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
(August 30, 2012)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, JORDAN and ALARCON,* Circuit Judges
DUBINA, Chief Judge:
This appeal is brought by objectors to the district court’s approval of a class
action settlement. The underlying case involves allegations that Appellee Walt
Disney World Company (“Disney”) is violating Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, et seq. (“Title III”), by implementing a policy
that bans the use of two-wheeled vehicles, including Segways®, by customers
within its parks and hotels, without exception. The district court certified a
settlement-only class and found that the settlement reached between the class
representatives and Disney was fair. Objectors appeal both of these orders,
arguing that (1) class certification is inappropriate under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23; and (2) the district court abused its discretion by approving the
settlement agreement after an extensive fairness hearing. We conclude that there
was no abuse of discretion and affirm the district court’s orders.
*
Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, sitting by designation.
2
I.
Disney has a policy that bans the use of all two-wheeled vehicles in all of
the parks and hotels within its Walt Disney World Resort and Disneyland Resort
(collectively “Disney Resorts”). The ban effectively prohibits the use of
Segways®1 and has no exceptions, even for those with disabilities. On November
9, 2007, Mahala Ault, Stacie Rhea, and Dan Wallace (collectively “class
representatives”) brought a class action suit against Disney on behalf of past and
future Disney customers who have a mobility disability and rely upon a Segway®
for mobility assistance. The class action suit alleges that Disney’s policy violates
Title III and seeks an injunction directing Disney to permit the use of Segways®
within Disney Resorts.
A year later, the parties entered into a class-wide settlement agreement.
According to the terms of the settlement, Disney will maintain its ban on
Segways® and, in return, will develop a four-wheeled, electric stand-up vehicle
(“the ESV”) for those for whom a stand-up mobility device is a necessity and who
are unable to utilize a mobility device that requires sitting, such as an electronic
wheelchair or motorized scooter. The settlement agreement also includes a
1
Because the only two-wheeled vehicle mentioned in this case is the Segway®, we refer
to Disney’s policy as a ban on Segways®.
3
nationwide waiver of declaratory or injunctive claims relating to Disney’s policy.
Upon review of the settlement, the district court granted conditional class
certification and preliminarily approved the settlement.
Following the district court’s approval of the settlement and dispersal of the
required class notice to individual class members and to members of organizations
that support people with mobility disabilities, several parties filed objections to the
settlement. The objectors include Appellant Disability Rights Advocates for
Technology (“DRAFT”), the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”),which
filed an amicus curiae brief in this appeal, 23 State Attorneys General, and others
(collectively “objectors”).
After receipt of the objections, the district court conducted a fairness
hearing to hear the objectors’ challenges. At the hearing, Disney’s Chief Safety
Officer, Greg Hale, presented evidence that allowing customers to bring
Segways® into the Disney Resorts would pose a significant safety risk to other
guests. Disney also presented evidence that the ESV was a beneficial substitute.
In rebuttal, the objectors presented testimony of people with severe mobility
disabilities—from amputations to neurological disorders—for whom, objectors
insist, using a Segway® is necessary and operating the ESV is impossible.
After conducting the fairness hearing, the district court vacated its prior
4
order conditionally certifying the class and dismissed the case for lack of
prudential standing, finding that because all of the named plaintiffs and objectors
were able to use wheelchairs or motorized scooters, none had been denied access
to Disney’s parks. Class representatives appealed to a panel of this court, which
held that the class representatives’ interests “are arguably within the zone of
interest protected by [Title III]” and remanded the case to the district court for “a
determination as to whether the claims of the named plaintiffs are typical of the
claims of the class and whether they are adequate representatives of the class.”
Ault v. Walt Disney World Co., 405 F. App’x. 401, 401 (11th Cir. 2010) (per
curiam).
Between the district court’s dismissal for lack of prudential standing and
this court’s decision, the DOJ issued a new Title III regulation, 28 C.F.R. §
36.311. This regulation requires a public accommodation, such as Disney Resorts,
to “make reasonable modifications in its policies . . . to permit the use of other
power-driven mobility devices” unless Disney can demonstrate that the device
“cannot be operated in accordance with legitimate safety requirements.”
Id. §
36.311(b)(1).
After this court’s remand, the district court granted final class certification
based upon its prior findings, approved the settlement as fair and reasonable based
5
upon the factors set forth in Bennett v. Behring Corp.,
737 F.2d 982, 986 (11th
Cir. 1984), and overruled all objections. In determining that the class
representatives were unlikely to prevail at trial, one of the Bennett factors, the
district court made two findings. First, the district court afforded the new DOJ
regulation no deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense
Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 844,
104 S. Ct. 2778, 2782 (1984), because the court
found that “the revised regulations conflict with the plain language of Title III.”
[R. 252 at 7.] Second, the district court found that even if the new DOJ regulation
is afforded deference, class representatives are still likely to fail in their claim
because of Disney’s legitimate safety concerns. The objectors then perfected this
appeal.
II.
The district court’s certification of a class pursuant to Rule 23 is reviewed
for abuse of discretion. Heffner v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc.,
443 F.3d
1330, 1337 (11th Cir. 2006). We also review the district court’s approval of a
class action settlement agreement for abuse of discretion. Faught v. Am. Home
Shield Corp.,
668 F.3d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 2011). “The proponents of class
actions settlements bear the burden of . . . demonstrating that the settlement
distribution is fair, reasonable, and adequate.”
Id. (internal quotation marks
6
omitted).
III.
Objectors first argue that the class does not satisfy the prerequisites to class
certification set forth in Rule 23(a), insisting that “the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are [not] typical of the claims or defenses of the class[.]”
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3).2 Objectors argue that the class representatives’ claims
lack the required typicality because the class representatives do not rely upon their
Segways® for mobility to the same extent as other class members. For example,
Wallace only uses his Segway® once or twice a week, while Ault uses a cane or
scooter for help with mobility and infrequently uses her Segway®. In contrast,
according to the objectors, a Segway® for several class members is an absolute
necessity for mobility, which makes the claims of these class members sufficiently
different from those of the class representatives to defeat class certification.
In the first order granting preliminary class certification, the district court
found that the claims of the class representatives are typical because all class
members assert that Disney’s Segway® ban violates Title III and precludes them
2
Objectors also argue that class representatives are not adequate representatives of the
class, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4), and that the district court improperly certified the class pursuant to
Rule 23(b)(2). We have considered these arguments and find them unpersuasive. Therefore, we
summarily reject them.
7
from using and enjoying Disney’s parks to the fullest. Following this court’s
remand, the district court found no reason to disturb this previous finding, and we
agree. Class members’ claims all stem from the same policy prohibiting the use of
Segways® within Disney Resorts, and all claims require analysis of Title III to
determine the outcome. While each class member may have a stronger or weaker
claim depending upon his or her degree of reliance, we conclude that this alone
does not make class representatives’ claims atypical of the class as a whole. Class
members’ claims need not be identical to satisfy the typicality requirement; rather,
there need only exist “a sufficient nexus . . . between the legal claims of the named
class representatives and those of individual class members to warrant class
certification.” Prado-Steiman v. Bush,
221 F.3d 1266, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2000).
This nexus exists “if the claims or defenses of the class and the class
representative arise from the same event or pattern or practice and are based on the
same legal theory.” Kornberg v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.,
741 F.2d 1332, 1337
(11th Cir. 1984). All claims in this class action arise from the same
policy—Disney’s ban on Segways®—and are all based upon liability pursuant to
Title III. Thus, we conclude that the district court clearly did not abuse its
discretion by finding that the claims of the class representatives and class members
are typical and warrant class certification.
8
IV.
Class actions can only be settled with the approval of the court. FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(e). In approving the settlement, the district court must conduct “a
hearing and . . . [find] that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate.”
Id. 23(e)(2). The
district court must also find that the settlement “is not the product of collusion
between the parties.”
Bennett, 737 F.2d at 986 (internal quotation marks omitted).
When the district court initially approved the settlement in the present case, the
district court considered the six factors espoused by this court in Bennett and
found that the class was unlikely to succeed at trial. See
id. Based upon this
finding, the district court looked at the other Bennett factors and determined that
the settlement agreement afforded at least some relief that was fair and reasonable.
See
id. The district court’s initial determination regarding the class’s likelihood of
success at trial occurred before the DOJ issued the new regulation that requires a
public accommodation to modify its policies to permit mobility assistance devices
such as Segways® unless the public accommodation determines that such devices
cannot be operated safely. 28 C.F.R. § § 36.104, 36.311(b)(1). Before the district
court and this court, in its amicus brief, the DOJ argues that the regulation alters
the landscape of Title III jurisprudence in such a way as to make it likely the class
would succeed at trial if allowed to proceed. However, after this court’s remand,
9
the district court disagreed with the DOJ and found that even if the new DOJ
regulation is afforded deference,3 Disney’s legitimate safety concerns present a
significant hurdle to the class’s ability to succeed at trial.
The first Bennett factor is “the likelihood of success at
trial[.]” 737 F.2d at
986. During an extensive fairness hearing before the district court, Hale testified
regarding the safety risks posed by the operation of Segways® in Disney Resorts.
The very factors Hale considered before deciding that Segways® are too
dangerous for operation in Disney Resorts are the very factors facilities are
required to consider under the new regulation. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.311(b)(2)(i)–(v)
(requiring a public accommodation to consider the attributes of the device, the
volume of foot traffic in the facility, the design and operational characteristics of
the facility, whether safety restrictions on the use of the device can mitigate its
danger, and whether operation of the device will harm the environment in
determining if a specific device is allowable in the facility). The district court
found that based upon this testimony Disney is likely to succeed at trial in
3
We acknowledge that the district court also found that the DOJ regulation should be
given no deference, finding it to be contrary to Title III. See
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44, 104 S.
Ct. at 2782. However, because we affirm the case on other grounds, we defer answering this
question and leave it for another day.
10
showing that it has fulfilled its obligations under Title III.4 Objectors and the DOJ
would like us to hold that this finding constitutes an abuse of discretion. We
decline to do so. The issue before us is not who prevails over whom, but rather,
the question is whether the district court abused its discretion in its finding
regarding who was most likely to prevail at trial. We conclude from the record
that there is no abuse of discretion.
The second Bennett factor that must be considered is “the range of possible
recovery[.]” 737 F.2d at 986. Class representatives in this class only seek
injunctive or declaratory relief; therefore, the class receives either nothing or an
injunction requiring Disney to permit Segways® at Disney Resorts. Because the
district court found that class representatives were unlikely to prevail at trial, the
district court found that Disney’s agreement to produce and make available the
ESVs is a beneficial remedy for the class. This finding does not constitute an
4
Following oral argument, this court was made aware of the recent decision of
Baughman v. Walt Disney World Co., No. 10-55792, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. July 18, 2012), where
the Ninth Circuit ruled that Disney was not entitled to summary judgment in a case filed by an
individual challenging its Segway® ban because genuine issues of material fact existed. The
Ninth Circuit did not hold that Title III requires Disney to permit Segways® in Disney Resorts,
and, in fact, explicitly stated that Segways® can be excluded if Disney determines that the safety
factors listed in 28 C.F.R. § 36.311(b)(2) warrant exclusion. Baughman, __ F.3d at __. In the
present case, the district court found that if this action went to trial, Disney was likely to prevail
because of its reliance upon those exact safety factors. Therefore, Baughman is factually and
procedurally different from the case at bar and does not transform the district court’s well-
reasoned analysis into an abuse of discretion.
11
abuse of discretion. If Disney prevails at trial, the class will be left with no
remedy at all. This settlement precludes such a Draconian result and ensures that a
stand-up mobility device is available at Disney Resorts if it conforms to Disney’s
unique safety requirements. Therefore, we conclude that the district court’s
finding that the settlement results in a “fair, adequate, and reasonable” remedy
within the range of possible recoveries is also not an abuse of discretion. See
Bennett, 737 F.2d at 986.5
V.
After a careful review of the record and with the benefit of oral argument,
we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the
class and in approving the settlement. Accordingly, we affirm its orders.
AFFIRMED.
5
We also summarily reject objectors’ arguments regarding the nationwide waiver of
claims included in the settlement agreement.
12
