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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-10243
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:05-cr-60311-JIC-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SMITI LIBERSE,
a.k.a. Smiti Liberisther,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(July 30, 2012)
Before CARNES, HULL, and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
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CARNES, Circuit Judge:
This is the third decision we have issued in the past month concerning the
application of Amendments 750 and 759 to the sentencing guidelines and the
scope of a district court’s authority to reduce a defendant’s sentence under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In the first two decisions, we held that those amendments did
not authorize a court to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(2) if the defendant’s
guidelines range remained the statutory mandatory minimum after the amendments
or if the guidelines range was otherwise not affected by the amendments. See
United States v. Glover, — F.3d —, No. 12-10580,
2012 WL 2814303, at *3–4
(11th Cir. July 11, 2012) (statutory mandatory minimum); United States v.
Lawson, — F.3d —, No. 11-15912,
2012 WL 2866265, at *2–3 (11th Cir. July 13,
2012) (otherwise unchanged guidelines range). Our decisions in Glover and
Lawson establish that “a court cannot use an amendment to reduce a sentence in a
particular case unless that amendment actually lowers the guidelines range in that
case.” Glover,
2012 WL 2814303, at *3.
This appeal raises a different issue because the pro se appellant’s original
guidelines range of 121 to 151 months was above, and thus not affected by, the
applicable statutory mandatory minimum of 120 months. As a result,
Amendments 750 and 759 would reduce his guidelines range. For those reasons,
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§ 3582(c)(2) gives the district court authority to reduce the sentence in its
discretion. Because the court believed it lacked that authority, we vacate its order
denying the motion for resentencing and remand for the court to determine
whether to exercise its discretion to reduce the sentence.
I.
In 2006, Smiti Liberse was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine. Liberse’s presentence investigation
report held him accountable for at least 50, but less than 150, grams of crack
cocaine. The offense carried a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years
(or 120 months) imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2006). Applying
the 2005 sentencing guidelines, the PSR set his base offense level at 32. See
United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1(c)(4) (Nov. 2005). He received a 3-
level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, see
id. § 3E1.1, making his total
offense level 29. With a criminal history category of IV, his guidelines range was
121 to 151 months imprisonment. Although Liberse was subject to a 120-month
statutory mandatory minimum, that mandatory minimum did not affect the
calculation of his guidelines range because it was less than the 121-month bottom
of the range. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) (“Where a statutorily required minimum
sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the
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statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.”);
id. §
5G1.1(c) (“In any other case, the sentence may be imposed at any point within the
applicable guideline range, provided that the sentence . . . is not less than any
statutorily required minimum sentence.”).
The district court sentenced Liberse to 121 months imprisonment, the
bottom of his guidelines range. The government later filed a Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 35(b) motion to reduce Liberse’s sentence based on his
substantial assistance to the government. The district court granted that motion
and reduced his sentence to 97 months, below his guidelines range and below the
statutory mandatory minimum. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (“Upon motion of the
Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level
established by statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant’s
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who
has committed an offense.”); U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 (“Upon motion of the government
stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation
or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may
depart from the guidelines.”).
In 2010, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-220,
124 Stat. 2372, which “increased the drug amounts triggering mandatory
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minimums for crack trafficking offenses from 5 grams to 28 grams in respect to
the 5-year minimum and from 50 grams to 280 grams in respect to the 10-year
minimum,” Dorsey v. United States, — U.S. —,
132 S. Ct. 2321, 2329 (2012); see
21 U.S.C. § 841. “[T]he Fair Sentencing Act instructed the Commission to ‘make
such conforming amendments to the Federal sentencing guidelines as the
Commission determines necessary to achieve consistency with other guideline
provisions and applicable law.’”
Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2329 (quoting Fair
Sentencing Act § 8(2), 124 Stat. at 2374). The Sentencing Commission then
promulgated Amendment 750 to the guidelines, which revised the crack cocaine
quantity tables listed in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), to comply with the Fair Sentencing
Act’s instructions. See U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 750 (Nov. 2011). The
Commission made Amendment 750 retroactively applicable by Amendment 759.
See U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 759 (Nov. 2011).
In light of those developments, Liberse filed a pro se motion under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to reduce his sentence, contending that Amendment 750 to the
sentencing guidelines had lowered his guidelines range to 70 to 87 months
imprisonment. The district court denied the motion. The court reasoned that
because Liberse was originally sentenced before the Fair Sentencing Act went into
effect, he was subject to the same 120-month statutory mandatory minimum that
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he had been when he was originally sentenced. And because “[t]he Sentencing
Commission has no authority to alter a statutory mandatory penalty,” the district
court concluded that it lacked authority to reduce Liberse’s sentence. He contends
that the district court does have authority to reduce his sentence, arguing that
Amendment 750 lowered his guidelines range to 70 to 87 months in prison.1
II.
“As a general rule, district courts may not modify a term of imprisonment
once it has been imposed . . . .” United States v. Williams,
549 F.3d 1337, 1339
(11th Cir. 2008). There is an “exception . . . for a defendant who has been
sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has
subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.”
Id. (quotation marks
omitted); accord 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). When that has happened, “the court may
reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is
consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.”
Williams, 549 F.3d at 1339 (quotation marks and alteration
1
We review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions about the sentencing guidelines
and the scope of its authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). United States v. Davis,
587 F.3d
1300, 1303 (11th Cir. 2009). We review only for clear error the factual findings underlying the
district court’s legal conclusions.
Id.
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omitted); accord 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
A court, however, “cannot use an amendment to reduce a sentence in a
particular case unless that amendment actually lowers the guidelines range in that
case.” Glover,
2012 WL 2814303, at *3. We have explained that “[t]he purpose
of § 3582(c)(2) is to give a defendant the benefit of a retroactively applicable
amendment to the guidelines. . . . But he is not to receive a lower sentence than he
would have received if the amendment had been in effect at the time of his
sentencing.”
Id. For that reason, “a sentencing court lacks jurisdiction to consider
a § 3582(c)(2) motion, even when an amendment would lower the defendant’s
otherwise-applicable Guidelines sentencing range,” if the defendant’s guidelines
range was, and remains, the statutory mandatory minimum under U.S.S.G. §
5G1.1(b) (Nov. 2011).
Id. (quotation marks omitted); accord United States v.
Mills,
613 F.3d 1070, 1077–78 (11th Cir. 2010); U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) (“Where a
statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the
applicable guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the
guideline sentence.”).
When a retroactively applicable guidelines amendment lowers the
guidelines range in a case, a district court usually may not reduce a defendant’s
sentence to a term below the amended guidelines range. See U.S.S.G. §
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1B1.10(b)(2)(A) (Nov. 2011). But there is an exception. Section 1B1.10(b)(2)(B)
of the sentencing guidelines, as revised by Amendment 759, states:
Exception for Substantial Assistance.—If the term of imprisonment
imposed was less than the term of imprisonment provided by the
guideline range applicable to the defendant at the time of sentencing
pursuant to a government motion to reflect the defendant’s substantial
assistance to authorities, a reduction comparably less than the
amended guideline range determined under subdivision (1) of this
subsection may be appropriate.
Id. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B). Expressly included within this exception are government
substantial assistance motions under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 or Rule 35(b), like the one
the government filed in Liberse’s case. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.3.
The government contends that Liberse was sentenced based on the 120-
month statutory mandatory minimum, even though he received a Rule 35(b)
substantial assistance reduction. So, according to the government, the district
court lacks authority to reduce Liberse’s sentence because Amendment 750 did not
lower his applicable guidelines range. See
id. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B); see also United
States v. Moore,
541 F.3d 1323, 1330 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Where a retroactively
applicable guideline amendment reduces a defendant’s base offense level, but does
not alter the sentencing range upon which his or her sentence was based,
§ 3582(c)(2) does not authorize a reduction in sentence.”).
We reject the government’s contention. Liberse was sentenced to 121
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months based on an original guidelines range of 121 to 151 months. Amendment
750’s revisions to the crack cocaine quantity tables lowered Liberse’s base offense
level from 32 to 26, making his total offense level 23 with his 3-level acceptance-
of-responsibility reduction. Based on that new offense level and a criminal history
category of IV, his amended guidelines range would be 70 to 87 months, unless
the applicable statutory minimum is above the bottom of the amended guidelines
range. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) (stating that the statutory minimum sentence is
the guidelines sentence if the statutory minimum sentence exceeds the otherwise
applicable guidelines range);
id. § 5G1.1(c). In light of the Fair Sentencing Act,
however, it is not clear what Liberse’s statutory mandatory minimum is now.
As we have already discussed, the Fair Sentencing Act “increased the drug
amounts triggering mandatory minimums for crack trafficking offenses from 5
grams to 28 grams in respect to the 5-year minimum and from 50 grams to 280
grams in respect to the 10-year minimum.”
Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2329; see 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1). The Supreme Court in Dorsey held that the Fair Sentencing
Act’s lower mandatory minimums apply to defendants who committed a crack
cocaine crime before the Act went into effect but who were not sentenced for the
first time until after it went into
effect. 132 S. Ct. at 2326. The Court did not
decide, however, whether the Fair Sentencing Act applies to a defendant, like
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Liberse, who was sentenced before the Act went into effect and who files a §
3582(c)(2) motion to reduce his sentence after the Act’s effective date. And we do
not have to decide that issue either, because it does not matter to the outcome of
this appeal.
Here’s why. If the Fair Sentencing Act does apply in a § 3582(c)(2)
proceeding in these circumstances, Liberse would be subject to a 5-year mandatory
minimum because he conspired to possess with intent to distribute at least 50, but
less than 150, grams of crack cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii)
(requiring a 5-year mandatory minimum for possession with intent to distribute at
least 28 grams, but less than 280 grams, of crack cocaine). Liberse’s amended
guidelines range after Amendment 750 would then be 70 to 87 months. However,
if the Act does not apply, Liberse would be subject to the same 10-year (or 120-
month) mandatory minimum that he was subject to at his original sentencing. See
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2006) (requiring a 10-year mandatory minimum for
possession with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine). And that
mandatory minimum would be his amended guidelines range because it is greater
than the top of his otherwise applicable amended guidelines range of 70 to 87
months. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b).
So, whether the Fair Sentencing Act applies or not, Amendment 750 lowers
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Liberse’s guidelines range. Both a guidelines range of 70 to 87 months (if the Fair
Sentencing Act applies) and a guidelines range of 120 months (if the Fair
Sentencing Act does not apply) are below Liberse’s original guidelines range of
121 to 151 months. Because Amendment 750 does lower Liberse’s guidelines
range, the district court erred by concluding that it lacked the authority to reduce
his sentence under § 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Bravo,
203 F.3d 778, 780
(11th Cir. 2000) (“[A] district court has discretion to reduce the term of
imprisonment of an already incarcerated defendant when that defendant was
sentenced based on a sentencing range that was subsequently lowered by the
Sentencing Commission . . . .”). Also, because Liberse received a Rule 35(b)
substantial assistance reduction of his original sentence, “a reduction comparably
less than the amended guideline range . . . may be appropriate.” U.S.S.G. §
1B1.10(b)(2)(B). For these reasons, we vacate the district court’s denial of
Liberse’s § 3582(c)(2) motion and remand for the district court to consider the
extent to which, if any, Liberse’s sentence should be reduced. We leave it to the
district court in the first instance to decide whether, in light of Dorsey, the Fair
Sentencing Act applies to this case.2
2
The issue of whether the Fair Sentencing Act applies in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding to a
defendant who was sentenced before the Act went into effect is presented in another case
currently pending before this Court. An order has been issued in that case indicating it will be
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VACATED AND REMANDED.
scheduled for oral argument after supplemental briefs are filed on this issue. See United States v.
Hippolyte, No. 11-15933.
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