United States v. Timothy Joseph Aubry ( 2019 )


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  •             Case: 17-15726   Date Filed: 01/10/2019   Page: 1 of 5
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 17-15726
    Non-Argument Calendar
    D.C. Docket No. 2:15-cr-00283-LSC-HNJ-21
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    TIMOTHY JOSEPH AUBRY,
    a.k.a. Tweety,
    a.k.a. FNU LNU,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Alabama
    (January 10, 2019)
    Before MARCUS, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
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    Timothy Aubry appeals his lifetime supervised release term. He argues that
    his lifetime supervised release term was procedurally unreasonable because the
    district court failed to adequately explain its decision, and substantively
    unreasonable because the district court ignored 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)’s mandate to
    impose a sufficient term no greater than necessary.
    We generally review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential
    abuse-of-discretion standard of review. Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 41
    (2007). We determine, first, whether the district court committed any significant
    procedural error, and second, whether the sentence was substantively reasonable
    under the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Turner, 
    626 F.3d 566
    , 573
    (11th Cir. 2010).
    In analyzing a sentence for significant procedural error, we examine factors
    such as whether the district court failed to calculate (or improperly calculated) the
    guideline range, treated the guidelines as mandatory, failed to consider the § 3553(a)
    factors, selected a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failed to adequately
    explain the chosen sentence. Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 51
    . A district court, in explaining its
    sentence, is not required to explicitly articulate its consideration of each sentencing
    factor, so long as the record reflects the court’s consideration of many of those
    factors. United States v. Ghertler, 
    605 F.3d 1256
    , 1262 (11th Cir. 2010); but see
    United States v. Livesay, 
    525 F.3d 1081
    , 1093 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding a district
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    court’s sentence was procedurally unreasonable where it failed to give any reasoning
    or indication of an explanation beyond listing the § 3553(a) factors).
    Where a district court offers a party an opportunity to object and that party
    does not object to procedural reasonableness at the time of sentencing, we review for
    plain error. United States v. Vandergrift, 
    754 F.3d 1303
    , 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). In
    order to establish plain error, a party must show that (1) the district court erred; (2)
    the error was plain; and (3) the error affected the party’s substantial rights. United
    States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 732 (1993). If all three conditions are met, we may
    exercise our discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if the error seriously
    affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 
    Id.
    We look at whether the sentence is substantively reasonable under the totality
    of the circumstances. United States v. Tome, 
    611 F.3d 1371
    , 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
    The weight accorded to any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the
    sound discretion of the district court. United States v. Clay, 
    483 F.3d 739
    , 743 (11th
    Cir. 2007). A district court, however, abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to afford
    consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight; (2) gives
    significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) commits a clear error of
    judgment in considering the proper factors. United States v. Irey, 
    612 F.3d 1160
    ,
    1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). We will remand only if we are left with the definite
    and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in
    weighing the § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 1190.
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    Congress intended supervised release to assist individuals in their transition to
    community life, and thus supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from
    those served by incarceration. United States v. Johnson, 
    529 U.S. 53
    , 59 (2000).
    Accordingly, “[s]entencing courts, in determining the conditions of a defendant’s
    supervised release, are required to consider, among other factors, ‘the nature and
    circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,’
    ‘the need . . . to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; . . . to protect the
    public from further crimes of the defendant; . . . and to provide the defendant with
    needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
    treatment.’” 
    Id. at 59-60
     (quoting 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)). Additionally, we may
    consider a defendant’s ability to petition the district court for modification of the
    conditions of supervised release when weighing reasonableness under the totality of
    the circumstances. See United States v. Trailer, 
    827 F.3d 933
    , 937-38 (11th Cir.
    2016).
    Here, the district court did not procedurally err, plainly or otherwise, when it
    sentenced Aubry to a lifetime term of supervised release because it adequately
    explained the basis for the sentence and the record indicates its consideration of
    several of the applicable § 3553(a) factors including the nature and circumstances of
    Aubry’s offense, his history and characteristics, and the need to provide him with
    correctional treatment. Furthermore, the supervised release term is not substantively
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    unreasonable in light of the applicable § 3553(a) factors and the totality of the
    circumstances.
    AFFIRMED.
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