United States v. Riley Graham ( 2011 )

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-14736 JUNE 14, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 05-00269-CR-TWT-9-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RILEY GRAHAM,
a.k.a. Riley Williams,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(June 14, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, CARNES, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
CARNES, Circuit Judge:
Riley Graham was indicted along with seventeen other people in a mortgage
fraud case.1 He was tried separately from his co-defendants because he insisted on
proceeding pro se—at least until the very day his trial began. After a four-day
trial, at which he was represented by counsel, a jury returned a guilty verdict on all
counts, and he was convicted. His appeal was consolidated with his co-
defendants’ appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(b)(2). We are issuing this separate
opinion in Graham’s case in order to address the three issues he has raised, which
are distinct from the issues his co-defendants have raised.
I.
The jury’s guilty verdict against Graham was on all of the offenses charged
against him in the third superseding indictment: conspiracy to commit wire fraud
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1343 (count 15); wire fraud in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2 (counts 16–18, 46 & 47); conspiracy to commit mail fraud,
to commit wire fraud, to make false credit applications, to launder money, and to
engage in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful
activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1341, 1343, 1014, 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) &
1
Of the seventeen other people named in that third superseding indictment with Graham,
twelve were tried together, ten were convicted, and nine appealed together: Phillip Hill, Marcus
Alcindor, Robert Powers, Christine Laudermill, David Van Mersbergen, Fred Farmer, David
Thomas, Leslie Rector, and Barbara Brown. That consolidated appeal is addressed in a separate
opinion issued today, which includes a detailed recitation of the facts underlying the mortgage
fraud scheme that led to Graham’s indictment and convictions. See United States v. Hill, No.
07-14602, — F.3d — (11th Cir. June 14, 2011). This opinion addressing Graham’s appeal sets
forth only those facts that are relevant to the three issues he has raised.
2
(B)(i), and 1957 (count 19); mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and 2
(count 38); engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified
unlawful activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957 and 2 (counts 85–90 & 94);
and money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1), (A)(i), & (B)(i) and
2 (counts 179 & 180). Counts 15–18 involved a fraudulently obtained loan from
Centrum Financial Services, and the other counts arose from various loans on
residential real estate. Graham was convicted and sentenced to 60 months
imprisonment on counts 15–19, 46, and 47, running concurrently with a
120-month sentence on the remaining counts, 38, 85–90, 94, 179, and 180, for a
total of 120 months.2
Graham challenges his convictions, contending that (1) his right to counsel
and due process rights were violated because the district court denied his request
for a continuance on the first day of trial; (2) his due process rights were violated
because he appeared before the jury in an orange jail suit instead of in street
clothes; and (3) his right to a fair trial was violated because the district court
admitted “expert” testimony by lay witness William Key, a former closing attorney
who had pleaded guilty to participating in fraudulent mortgage transactions.
2
Graham has been imprisoned since 2003 and is serving a 20-year sentence for an earlier
drug offense conviction in Michigan. His sentence in the present case runs consecutive to that
earlier one.
3
II.
Graham made his initial appearance in the district court on August 11, 2006,
when he pleaded not guilty. On August 23, 2006, Graham told the court he
wanted to proceed pro se, and the next day the court appointed Scott Semrau as
standby trial counsel for Graham.3 During a September 8, 2006 pre-trial
conference, the district court judge emphatically warned Graham about the risks of
proceeding pro se and extensively questioned him about his ability to do so. The
trial was specially set for August 20, 2007.
In a September 25, 2006 status conference before a magistrate judge, that
judge also warned Graham:
Okay. Again, Mr. Graham, you have got good counsel there.
I do encourage you to make use of the resources that have been
provided.
And I caution you again about what everybody would caution you
about.
It’s a mistake to try to represent yourself, but I wish you luck.
Standby counsel Semrau was present at that hearing. On the subject of discovery,
Semrau told the magistrate judge:
We received volumes of information from the Government, four CDs
3
Semrau is serving as Graham’s appellate counsel.
4
or five.
We have copied them, and we are in the process of mailing those to Mr.
Graham.
So I agreed to being the middleman to that extent.
And then also to a certain degree there’s just things that he can’t get to.
And I have agreed to be his eyes and ears, I suppose.
For instance, I think much of the discovery in this case is contained in a
room at the Federal Defender’s Office; and I have agreed to go in and get an
index of that material and provide that to Mr. Graham.
The government told the magistrate judge that “we have made everything
available that we have right now.” The judge gave Graham an extension of 30
days to file motions.
In a July 25, 2007 status conference, Graham asked for a continuance
because he was having trouble viewing discovery on the CDs that the government
had provided. The district court granted the request, continuing the trial to the
next available calendar. The district court judge had this exchange with Graham:
THE COURT: Well, what I am telling you, Mr. Graham, is this is
just part of your problem which is that you are trying to represent
yourself rather than allowing the Court to appoint a lawyer for you.
If we appoint a lawyer for you, that lawyer could get the discovery, could
look at it and could tell you what’s in there.
And you could make an intelligent decision about what to do about your
5
case.
THE DEFENDANT: I want to proceed to represent myself.
THE COURT: Well, that’s a stupid decision.
It’s just really foolish, and I am just going to be quite blunt about it.
There’s very little I can do to assist you as long as you persist in
representing yourself.
The court also had this exchange with standby counsel Semrau:
THE COURT: Mr. Semrau, is there anything you think I could do that
would persuade Mr. Graham to refrain from this folly of trying to represent
himself?
MR. SEMRAU: No, sir.
I think you have done what I have done, sir, which is explain to Mr. Graham
that even a very intelligent person—clearly Mr. Graham is that—benefits
from having counsel because counsel adds respectability and can advocate
on someone’s behalf.
And I think I have explained that, and I can only respect Mr. Graham’s
decision to do this.
I think he has been in a jury trial before represented by counsel, and
apparently that’s not what he wants.
So I assume he knows exactly what he is doing. But I have given him the
same advice that you have, Judge.
The problems Graham was having viewing discovery were addressed in the
next status conference with the district court over four months later on December
6
6, 2007. Counsel for the government told the court:
The decision was made that since there seemed to be a problem
reading it on the computer we made hard copies of everything.
We sent them through Mr. Semrau to Mr. Graham, and that was done
several months ago.
And so he should have everything and has had it for a while.
The court once again cautioned Graham about the dangers of representing
himself, and Semrau confirmed that he had received the discovery from the
government and had delivered it to Graham:
THE COURT: Mr. Graham, are you still insisting upon representing
yourself in this matter?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I can’t say too strongly how foolish I think that
decision is in your case, but we have had this discussion several
times. And if you are simply determined to represent yourself even
though it would not be in your best interest, I can’t stop you. You
seem to be a very intelligent, articulate person. You’ve complied with
all my directions. You have not been disruptive. And in the absence
of those kind of factors, I can’t prevent you from representing
yourself.
Although, I will tell you again as I have on numerous other occasions that
that’s not a good decision. It’s a very, very bad decision.
What do you have to say to that?
THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, Your Honor.
7
THE COURT: Mr. Semrau, have you had any further discussions
with Mr. Graham about how he intends to proceed as far as
representing himself in this case?
MR. SEMRAU: No, sir, I haven’t, not since our last meeting.
[Government counsel] indicated I got discovery from her.
I did that. I haven’t actually heard from Mr. Graham since I delivered
discovery to him. But I understand he’s got some questions for me, and I
think he is going to call me. I have a phone number at my office that people
who are in custody can call collect. So Mr. Graham has that ability to call
me collect, and I can go visit him.
So I will continue to counsel with him. No, I haven’t had any discussions
with him, Judge.
Also at the December status conference, the court proposed a January 2008 trial
date, and Graham once again sought to delay the proceedings, asking for a
February date instead. The court once again accommodated Graham and set the
trial for February 4, 2008. Graham assured the court, “I will be ready anytime in
February.” And once again, the court warned him:
THE COURT: Now, do you understand you have got the right to represent
yourself or you have got the right to have a lawyer appointed for you; you
don't have the right to both?
So if you still intend to represent yourself, when we start the trial Mr.
Semrau is going to be gone.
He is not going to be here.
THE DEFENDANT: I understand that.
8
THE COURT: And you may well encounter situations where you may think
you need the benefit of trained legal counsel. There’s not going to be
anybody here for you.
THE DEFENDANT: I understand that, Your Honor.
THE COURT: He is going to be gone. He is going to stay in the case as
standby counsel in the hope that you will change your mind and allow him
to represent you. But once we start the trial, you are going to be on your
own and it’ll be too late to change your mind then.
You understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
And yet again:
THE COURT: Mr. Graham, mortgage fraud cases are very complicated.
They are very document intensive. [Government counsel] has had a lot of
practice trying them, so she is very good at it. She knows what to do, knows
how to present one of these cases very well.
There will be a lot of documents. And the way we handle one of these cases,
I don’t stop the trial once a jury is impaneled to give the Defendant or the
defense attorney the time to examine the documents that are being
introduced and discussed with the witnesses.
So you are going to have to be fully familiar with all the Government’s
documents before the trial of the case.
Are you prepared to do that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
The court emphasized that “the case will definitely, absent some extraordinary
9
circumstances, go forward on February the 4th.”
At the January 11, 2008 status conference, Graham sought a third
continuance, and unsurprisingly the court was not receptive to that request:
THE COURT: Mr. Graham, I warned you when we first talked about the
difficulty you were going to have preparing at the jail that it was going to
create problems for you and difficulties and that that’s one of the
disadvantages of trying to represent yourself rather than having Mr. Semrau
represent you at the trial of the case.
At the last pretrial conference, I was ready to put this case down for trial in
January.
The Government indicated they were ready to try the case in January. You
asked for a February trial date.
I gave it to you.
And I am going to deny your request for any further postponement of it
because I think you have been given a reasonable amount of time to prepare,
and we need to get this case resolved.
THE DEFENDANT: Okay.
Also at that conference, Graham assured the court that he would have someone
bring him street clothes for the trial:
THE COURT: I also said that you are going to be dressed in street clothes.
Have you got somebody bringing your clothes?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
10
And one last time, the court made sure that Graham intended to represent himself:
THE COURT: All right. Again, Mr. Semrau, thank you for trying to assist
the Court on this. And, Mr. Graham, you still insist on going forward
representing yourself at trial?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, Your Honor.
THE COURT: It’s not a good idea for the reasons I have discussed with
you before. But if you are determined to do it, I am going to let you do it.
THE DEFENDANT: Thank you.
THE COURT: It’s not that I am going to let you, it’s that I have no choice in
the matter. All right. If there’s nothing further, then we will be adjourned.
Graham was brought to court for trial on February 4, 2008, and on the very
day that the trial was scheduled to begin he told the court he was not ready to
proceed. He refused to participate if the trial went forward. Standby counsel
Semrau was contacted during a recess, and he came to court at noon.
On that same day—after Graham had been proceeding pro se for about a
year-and-a-half—he told the court that he wanted to “[w]ithdraw [from]
proceeding pro se” and that he was “hiring counsel right now.” He identified
Marcia Shein and Daniel Kane as lawyers he was considering hiring, and he stated
that both of those lawyers had spoken with counsel for the government but had not
11
yet given him a price for their services. He asked for a ten-day continuance so that
one of those lawyers could begin representing him. The court responded:
Mr. Graham, this is too late for you to try to ask to delay the trial of this
case the morning it’s scheduled for trial when I have warned you all along
that this case was going to go forward and that if you continued to insist on
representing yourself that it was going to create problems for you and you
were not going to be happy with the result.
Graham stated again that he refused to participate in the trial. When standby
counsel Semrau arrived, he told the court that he “would like an opportunity to
prepare for the trial properly, and [he] would need some time to do that.” The
court responded:
Well, I understand the difficult position this puts you in, Mr. Semrau. And I
am entirely sympathetic with the point of view that you have just expressed.
But I find that by telling me for months that he was going to represent
himself, refusing all my pleas that he reconsider that decision and allow you
or some other attorney to represent him that Mr. Graham has waived his
right to effective assistance of counsel; and I am going forward on that
basis.
The district court thus appointed Semrau to serve as Graham’s trial counsel
but declined to grant an additional continuance. Semrau acknowledged that he did
not “take argument with [the court’s] point that Mr. Graham has certainly had
every opportunity to either retain counsel or indicate that he wanted the assistance
of counsel.” Semrau contended, however, that the court was making a mistake by
12
having him act as counsel at that point in the proceedings. The court decided to go
forward with the trial and reminded the parties that it had already informed them
that the court would conduct voir dire. The court instructed Graham that he could
propose follow-up questions if he chose to do so, and the court would consider
them.
As for Graham’s attire, he arrived in court dressed in an orange jail suit.
Semrau stated that if Graham intended to be in the courtroom in the presence of
the jury: “I would ask that he be taken out of his jail suit so that he can appear
before the jury in street clothes. I have none for him, of course; but that’s my
request.” The court responded that it had “asked about that at the last pretrial
conference. And Mr. Graham told [the court] his family was going to be providing
him with court clothes which again as in so many things didn’t happen, and that’s
why he is in the jumpsuit.” Semrau said: “Yes, sir. I do recall that. And,
nevertheless, that’s my request.” The court denied the request. Neither Semrau
nor Graham proposed any alternative way to get street clothes for Graham without
delaying the start of the trial. During the trial Graham was not in leg irons. After
a four-day trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts, and Graham was
convicted.
13
III.
Graham contends the district court abused its discretion by denying his
request for a continuance of the trial in order to obtain counsel of his choice. He
argues that the district court erred by finding that he had waived his right to
effective counsel. According to Graham, he was not obstructive and he did not
deliberately manipulate the proceedings. He argues that even though it might
appear as if, in order to delay the trial, he waited until the last minute to request
counsel, he actually asked for a continuance a month before trial.
Graham fails to point out, however, that although he did ask the district
court for yet another continuance a month before trial, he did not request counsel
at that time. If he had, standby counsel would have been appointed to represent
him, and he would not have faced the alleged problems he now argues occurred as
a result of the district court’s refusal to grant his last-minute request. Graham
admits that he “certainly contributed to his dilemma by requesting counsel at the
11th hour and he certainly had time to prepare his own defense,” but he asserts that
“his continued requests for further information, more time, and ultimately counsel
indicate that he realized his failure at self representation.”
A.
“We review the disposition of requests for trial continuances for abuse of
14
discretion.” United States v. Bowe, 221 F.3d 1183, 1189 (11th Cir. 2000). “The
party denied the continuance must also show specific, substantial prejudice in
some circumstances, such as when the claim is based on an alleged inadequate
opportunity to prepare for trial.” Id. at 1189 n.5; see also United States v.
Verderame, 51 F.3d 249, 251 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating that to establish a due
process violation, a defendant “must show that the denial of the motion for
continuance was an abuse of discretion which resulted in specific substantial
prejudice”). “Whether a denial of a request for continuance to obtain counsel is
violative of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to counsel must be
resolved on a case by case basis, depending upon the particular circumstances,
including the reasons for the request presented to the trial judge.” United States v.
Terry, 449 F.2d 727, 728 (5th Cir. 1971).4
“[T]he Supreme Court has made it clear that not every denial of a request
for a continuance is a denial of due process.” United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d
1189, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005). “The proper exercise of the trial court’s discretion
thus requires a delicate balance between the defendant’s right to adequate
representation by counsel of his choice and the general interest in the prompt and
4
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we
adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before
October 1, 1981.
15
efficient administration of justice.” Id.
B.
In the present case the district court repeatedly warned Graham of the risks
he was taking by choosing to proceed pro se. On more than one occasion the court
specifically instructed him that discovery would be particularly difficult because
he was incarcerated. Graham had about 18 months between his arraignment and
the first day of the specially set trial. Hard copies of the discovery materials were
provided to him because at the jail he had technical problems with viewing the
CDs provided by the government. He was accommodated in every way possible.
He had a lot of time and a lot of encouragement to consider and reconsider his
decision to proceed pro se, but he did not announce a desire for counsel until the
day set for trial, after the district court had already granted him two continuances.
Arguing that Graham had plenty of time to prepare for trial, the government
relies on the reasoning in United States v. Terry, 449 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1971).5 In
Terry the defendant was arraigned and trial was set for six weeks later. Id. at 727.
Counsel for the defense moved for a continuance about two weeks before trial, and
that motion was denied. Id. at 727–28. On the day set for the trial to begin, the
defendant showed up without counsel and asked for a continuance so that he could
5
See note 4, supra.
16
retain new counsel because he had fired his lawyer. Id. at 728.
The government was prepared for trial and its witnesses were ready, but the
court gave Terry 48 hours to retain new counsel. Id. When the case was called
again two days later, Terry once again appeared without counsel and said that
counsel did not have enough time to prepare. Id. He finally asked the court to
appoint counsel for him, but there was no suggestion that he was indigent or
lacked funds, and the court refused to appoint counsel. Id. Trial went forward,
and Terry was unrepresented. Id. Our predecessor court held that Terry had been
given a reasonable time to secure counsel of his choice and he was financially able
to do so; as a result “his failure to retain counsel was properly treated by the court
as a waiver of his right to counsel.” Id. There was no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s refusal to grant a third continuance. Id. at 729.
Terry supports the conclusion that the district court did not err when it
refused to grant Graham a third continuance. Almost a year-and-a-half before the
trial began Semrau was appointed as Graham’s standby counsel. Semrau attended
all of the pre-trial hearings and conferences and even helped Graham obtain
discovery documents. During all of that time and in the face of repeated
cautionary statements from the court, Graham insisted on proceeding pro se.
Finally, on the first day of trial, Graham refused to go forward with the trial
17
and said he wanted to be represented by counsel but he wanted some other lawyer
and not his standby counsel. The other lawyers Graham had contacted indicated
that he had not retained them. It is unlikely that, starting from scratch, they could
have prepared for trial during the 10-day continuance that Graham requested
anyway.
A defendant cannot use the right to counsel as a means to manipulate the
court and cause delay: “The right to assistance of counsel, cherished and
fundamental though it be, may not be put to service as a means of delaying or
trifling with the court.” United States v. Fowler, 605 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir.
1979).6 The sequence of events in this case strongly suggests that Graham was
engaging in calculated maneuvers designed to force the court to delay his trial.
The denial of Graham’s request for a continuance did not result in the loss
of Graham’s right to counsel. Cf. Terry, 449 F.2d at 728. Although Semrau was
not as prepared for trial as he could have been had he been representing Graham
from the beginning, any error in that regard was invited by Graham’s manipulative
conduct and his repeated insistence on representing himself in spite of the district
court’s admonitions against it. Cf. United States v. Ross, 131 F.3d 970, 988 (11th
Cir. 1997) (“It is a cardinal rule of appellate review that a party may not challenge
6
See note 4, supra.
18
as error a ruling or other trial proceeding invited by that party.” (quotation marks
omitted)). Furthermore, Graham does not mention anything specific that his
counsel would have done differently if a continuance had been granted. The
record indicates that, far from being ineffective, standby counsel Semrau capably
and zealously represented Graham, particularly given that Graham’s attempts to
“delay[ ] or trifl[e] with the court,” Fowler, 605 F.2d at 183, left Semrau with very
little time to prepare for trial.
Even so, Graham argues that his request was not to obtain counsel of his
choice or to get additional time to prepare his defense; instead, he asked for time
to hire competent counsel who was prepared for trial. Before the trial began
Graham had a year-and-a-half to decide to hire any lawyer he chose or to accept
the services of his standby appointed counsel. If Graham failed to obtain what he
considered to be ideal counsel, it is nobody’s fault but his own. In Gandy v.
Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1323 (5th Cir. 1978), our predecessor court held: “Due
process demands that the defendant be afforded a fair opportunity to obtain the
assistance of counsel of his choice to prepare and conduct his defense. The
constitutional mandate is satisfied so long as the accused is afforded a fair or
reasonable opportunity to obtain particular counsel, and so long as there is no
arbitrary action prohibiting the effective use of such counsel.” Id. at 1323.
19
Eighteen months furnished more than a fair opportunity for Graham to obtain
counsel and to prepare for trial. Instead, Graham insisted on proceeding
pro se despite the district court’s repeated warnings about the hazards of doing so.
Graham did more than contribute to his own situation; he created it. And
the record shows that he intentionally created it. We will not permit Graham to
game the system by asserting at this point in the proceedings that he was denied
his right to competent counsel of his choice. The district court acted well within
its discretion when it refused to grant Graham yet another continuance on the day
set for the trial to begin.
IV.
Graham contends that his rights to due process were violated because he
appeared at trial in an orange jail suit. It is a Fourteenth Amendment violation to
“compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison
clothes,” but “the failure to make an objection to the court as to being tried in such
clothes, for whatever reason, is sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion
necessary to establish a constitutional violation.” Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S.
501, 512–13, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 1697 (1976). If a constitutional error has occurred,
we review to determine whether it is “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
United States v. Harris, 703 F.2d 508, 512 (11th Cir. 1983).
20
Even though a defendant cannot be compelled to wear identifiable prison
clothes before a jury at trial, see Estelle, 425 U.S. at 512–13, 96 S.Ct. at 1697, the
Supreme Court has recognized that “it is not an uncommon defense tactic to
produce the defendant in jail clothes in the hope of eliciting sympathy from the
jury.” Id. at 608, 96 S. Ct. at 1695. Along those lines, the Seventh Circuit has
observed: “[S]ome defendants may not care, or may believe that it confers a
strategic advantage to appear as a captive. A litigant should not be permitted to
seek this advantage (if advantage it is), and then set up the same point as a reason
for reversal.” Duarte v. United States, 81 F.3d 75, 77 (7th Cir. 1996).
Graham contends that his failure to bring his own clothes to trial is an
insufficient basis for holding that he waived his constitutional rights. He asserts
that the district court “ruled that Graham had essential[ly] assumed the onus of
providing his own clothing when he assumed his own defense.” Actually, Graham
unequivocally told the court that he was obtaining street clothing and then offered
no explanation whatsoever for appearing on the first day of trial in prison attire.
Graham put on the burden of providing his own clothes by telling the court he
would do it. Graham appeared in jail clothes before the jury as a result of his own
conduct. He assured the court that someone would provide him with street clothes
on the day of trial. When that day came he had no street clothes, no explanation
21
for why he lacked them, and no proposal for a way to get any without delaying the
trial. Under the circumstances the district court properly refused to delay the trial.
Graham created his own problem. Cf. SunAmerica Corp. v. Sun Life Assur. Co.
of Can., 77 F.3d 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that when parties “make
factual representations in the district court or in this Court that denial of a stay will
moot the appeal, they may be estopped from arguing after the stay is denied that
the appeal is not moot”).
Not only that, but Graham’s counsel also adeptly managed to use the orange
jail suit for strategic advantage, incorporating a reference to it in his opening
statement:
Mr. Graham is wearing an orange suit. I have mentioned it, and it is
unusual. But he is doing it very deliberately. He will explain to you why he
is wearing an orange suit. It’s because he is in jail, and he wants everybody
to know about it. He is not happy about it. And he is going to testify, and
he is going to be passionate. He is going to be thorough; and he is going to
explain to you why it’s unjust, why it’s wrong and why he should not be in
jail one day longer.
Graham chose to take the stand, and during his direct examination Graham’s
counsel asked him why he was wearing “an unusual suit for a trial.” Graham
testified:
I am wearing it because of the things that the Government has done to
me. And putting me in prison not only was illegal but it was—it just
was ridiculous. And I am wearing it to let them know no matter what
22
suit I wear or however long I am going to be incarcerated I am going
to never forget this for the rest of my life.
The jury did not learn that Graham was incarcerated simply by seeing him in
a prison suit; Graham told the jury that he had been incarcerated since 2003 after
pleading guilty to a drug offense in a separate case and that he was wearing the
prison suit “because of the things that the Government ha[d] done to [him].”
Graham’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial was not violated by the fact
that he wore prison attire instead of furnishing his own street clothes as he had
promised the court he would do.
V.
Finally, Graham contends that the admission of “expert” testimony by lay
witness and former attorney William Key violated his right to a fair trial. We
generally review evidentiary decisions only for abuse of discretion. United States
v. Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1264–65 (11th Cir. 2005). “As a practical matter, the
abuse of discretion standard means that a district court has a range of choice.” Id.
at 1265. The government contends, however, that we should review only for plain
error because Graham did not object on the grounds that Key was providing expert
testimony even though he was a lay witness. See United States v. Hansen, 262
F.3d 1217, 1233–34 (11th Cir. 2001). Regardless of the applicable standard of
23
review, the record clearly shows that Key was testifying based on his own
personal knowledge as a former attorney who had engaged in fraudulent real estate
closings, and the district court did not err by admitting his testimony.
Key, a former real estate attorney who was serving time in prison, was
called as a witness for the government, and he testified about mortgage fraud.
After Graham objected to Key’s testimony on lack of foundation grounds, the
government established that Key had personal knowledge based on his
participation in fraudulent real estate closings.7 Key testified that he had already
pleaded guilty to mortgage fraud in a case in Savannah and was serving time in
prison. He testified that he also “did” fraudulent loans for one of Graham’s co-
7
Graham’s three objections to Key’s testimony were: (1) “He has no basis of knowledge
for that testimony”; (2) “I object. Can we be more — to relevance. I don’t know what we are
talking about, what transaction specifically.”; and (3) “He is not testifying from personal
knowledge. He is speculating at this point.”
The first objection based on lack of foundation was overruled and was followed by Key’s
testimony that he was describing what he personally knew about based on his own involvement
in fraudulent real estate closings. Graham’s second objection on relevance grounds was
overruled and was followed by more of Key’s testimony about his personal experience
conducting fraudulent real estate closings. He testified that one way to defraud the lender was for
the buyer and seller to “agree on paper that the buyer put 10 percent earnest money down at the
time of signing the sales contract when, in fact, the buyer never did really put down any money
whatsoever.” According to Key, a copy of the check would be made and sent to the lender as
proof, but the check was never cashed. Key testified that he personally included that type of
verification in loan files— knowing it was nothing more than a picture of a check—and that he
did so on behalf of Phillip Hill and others in fraudulent real estate closings. Graham’s third
objection was that Key was speculating instead of testifying based on his own personal
knowledge. The court instructed Key not to speculate, and the government asked him to recall
specifically what had happened during transactions in which he was involved.
24
conspirators, Phillip Hill, in Atlanta. When asked about the scope of his illegal
activity, he testified as follows:
Well, I am an attorney and I do real estate transactions. And I pled
guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud concerning a
real estate transaction in Augusta, Georgia. The scope of those
transactions involved two mortgage brokers plus an independent real
estate investor. And they would buy houses, and they would fix up
houses. But they would overstate their repairs, and so they would put
repair money into their pockets, and they would not actually use the
repair money to repair the house.
So when the developer went into bankruptcy, he defaulted on
probably 20 mortgage loans that the mortgage brokers helped him get.
Key testified that he knew those loans were fraudulent at the time he was helping
others obtain them. Then Key testified about specific transactions he did for
Phillip Hill with the knowledge that those deals were also fraudulent.
Key also testified about other specific fraudulent loan transactions, such as
one for Cheryl Denny. Key stated that Graham was involved in the Denny deal
and had brought her to the closing. He said that he had engaged in discussions
with Graham about the payments Denny was supposed to make.
Key also testified about a closing with Cortney Jackson. Graham attended
that closing on behalf of the Alcindor-Williams Group. At one point in his
testimony, Key spoke in more general terms about what was involved in
processing loans, but he did that in order to explain his actual conduct in these
25
transactions, and there was no objection from Graham. In fact, on cross-
examination Graham’s counsel asked Key some general questions about how the
loan transactions worked. Counsel for the government objected based on lack of
foundation, but her objection was overruled. Counsel for Graham also asked Key
a “[t]echnical question: What is an option to purchase real estate?” Key provided
an answer. Graham himself testified about real estate options when he took the
stand in his own defense.8
8
Graham had this to say about options:
I could take an option and I could get a juror or anyone to agree to a price and I
could have a buyer to want to buy and I never have to take title to the property. I
could flip the property with an option. It’s done thousands of times a day on the
stock market. I could have a call and a buyer.
Graham further explained options to the jury in this exchange with counsel on direct
examination:
[Graham:] All right. Let’s assume that somebody lived on Peachtree and was
poor. The guy couldn’t buy a meal. He could draw up an option on a piece of
paper and go find a property that someone is losing that wants to preserve their
credit. The property –
[Defense Counsel] Okay. Let’s say that’s me. Let’s say that I have good
credit but I lost my job and I own a house. Is that what you are talking about?
[Graham:] Yes.
[Defense Counsel:] Okay.
[Graham:] I would come to you and I’d say, Scott, how long have you had the
house? He would say, well, you know, we have been in it for ten years or
whatever. So what would happen is you built up something called equity. I say,
Scott, you owe the mortgage company $300,000. I will give you $340,000. Would
you take it? You say yeah. I say, Scott, because I live on the street I don’t have
26
We have held that a witness who has particularized knowledge by virtue of
his position in a certain company can give an opinion about the manner in which
that company conducts its business, even if the witness is not qualified as an
expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. See Tampa Bay Shipbuilding &
Repair Co. v. Cedar Shipping Co., 320 F.3d 1213, 1223 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Tampa
Bay’s witnesses testified based upon their particularized knowledge garnered from
years of experience within the field.”). Key provided some testimony about the
kind of conduct he engaged in or personally witnessed during fraudulent mortgage
transactions, and he testified about his personal knowledge concerning the conduct
of other participants in the mortgage fraud scheme. He did so based on his own
experience. The most general question Key answered was one posed by Graham’s
counsel on cross-examination about the definition of an option to purchase real
money to give you for this option. Would you do it for the valuable consideration
that I am going to go out there and sell it to somebody else? So you would say
yeah. The option would give me actual rights to the title so that you couldn’t sell it
during that period, but technically I have —I don’t own the property. So if then I
would go and locate a buyer and I would go to the next guy and I’d say, hey,
Scott’s house is worth 600,000. I’ll take 550 for it. Would you buy it? He would
say yes, so at the closing I make $200,000.
About Graham’s own testimony, we have this to say: “Defendants in criminal trials are
not obliged to testify. And, a defendant who chooses to present a defense runs a substantial risk
of bolstering the Government’s case.” United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314 (11th Cir.
1995). Furthermore, and “[m]ost important, a statement by a defendant, if disbelieved by the
jury, may be considered as substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” Id.
27
estate. Graham cannot complain about that testimony given that he asked for it,
and in his own testimony he expounded upon how he believed options worked.9
The district court did not err in permitting Key to testify as a lay witness.
Because the part of Key’s testimony that was elicited by the government was
based on his own personal knowledge of mortgage fraud, which he had acquired
through his experience as a former real estate closing attorney who had engaged in
fraudulent transactions of that nature, he did not have to be qualified as an expert
under Rule 702. See Tampa Bay Shipbuilding & Repair Co., 320 F.3d at
1222–23.
AFFIRMED.
9
When Graham’s counsel asked Key to testify about options, counsel for the government
objected on the basis of relevancy, and Graham’s counsel told the court: “I can connect this with
Mr. Graham’s testimony, Judge, because I believe that this transaction did, in fact, involve an
option.” The district court overruled the government’s objection. Graham’s counsel asked Key,
“Can an option allow an individual to obtain a property and sell it if they don’t own it?” Key’s
answer was “No.” The jury was free to weigh that testimony against Graham’s own, to credit the
witness who seemed more credible, and to consider Graham’s testimony, if disbelieved, as
substantive evidence of his guilt. See Brown, 53 F.3d at 314.
28