Charles A. Rehberg v. James v. Paulk ( 2010 )

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 16, 2010
No. 09-11897 JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 07-00022-CV-WLS-1
CHARLES A. REHBERG,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JAMES P. PAULK,
in his individual capacity,
KENNETH B. HODGES, III,
in his individual capacity and
in his official capacity as District
Attorney of Dougherty County
KELLY R. BURKE, in his
individual capacity,
Defendants-Appellants,
DOUGHERTY COUNTY,
Defendant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(July 16, 2010)
ON PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING
Before CARNES, HULL and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
HULL, Circuit Judge:
Upon consideration of Plaintiff-Appellee’s petition for rehearing and to the
extent it seeks panel rehearing, we vacate the prior opinion in this case, issued on
March 11, 2010 and published at 598 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2010), and substitute
the following opinion in its place. Plaintiff-Appellee’s petition for panel rehearing
is granted in part and denied in part.
In this § 1983 action, Plaintiff Charles Rehberg sued former District
Attorney Kenneth Hodges, specially appointed prosecutor Kelly Burke, and Chief
Investigator James Paulk, alleging federal claims for malicious prosecution,
retaliatory investigation and prosecution, evidence fabrication, and conspiracy to
violate Rehberg’s constitutional rights. Defendants Hodges, Burke, and Paulk, in
their individual capacities, appeal the district court’s denial of absolute and
qualified immunities. After review and oral argument, we affirm in part and
2
reverse in part.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We review Rehberg’s version of the events as alleged in his complaint,
accepting them as true.1
A. The Investigation
From September 2003 to March 2004, Plaintiff Rehberg sent anonymous
faxes to the management of Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital (the “hospital”).
The faxes criticized and parodied the management and activities of the hospital.
Defendant Hodges, then the District Attorney of Dougherty County,
Georgia, and Defendant Paulk, the Chief Investigator in the District Attorney’s
Office, investigated Rehberg’s actions as a “favor” to the hospital, to which
Hodges and Paulk are alleged to have political connections. Rehberg alleges
Hodges and Paulk lacked probable cause to initiate a criminal investigation of him.
From October 2003 to February 2004, Defendants Hodges and Paulk
prepared a series of subpoenas on Hodges’s letterhead and issued the subpoenas to
BellSouth and Alltel (later Sprint), requesting Rehberg’s telephone records. “Mr.
Paulk also prepared and issued a subpoena to Exact Advertising, the Internet
1
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we accept as true the factual allegations
in the complaint and all reasonable inferences therefrom. Jackson v. Okaloosa County, Fla., 21
F.3d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1994).
3
service provider of one of Mr. Rehberg’s email accounts, and obtained Mr.
Rehberg’s personal e-mails that were sent and received from his personal
computer.” Compl. ¶ 37. Although no grand jury was impaneled at the time, the
subpoenas purported to require appearance before a Dougherty County grand jury.
Rehberg’s case was not presented to a grand jury until December 14, 2005.
Defendant Paulk gave the results of the subpoenas, consisting of Rehberg’s
personal emails and phone records, to private civilian investigators, who allegedly
directed the substance of the subpoenas. These civilian investigators paid the
District Attorney’s Office for Rehberg’s information, often making payments
directly to BellSouth and the other subpoenaed parties, allegedly to pay debts of
the District Attorney’s Office.
After receiving unfavorable press coverage of his relationships with the
hospital, Hodges recused himself from prosecuting Rehberg. Burke was appointed
a special prosecutor in Hodges’s place. Hodges continued to supervise Paulk and
remained in communication with Burke throughout the investigation, but he “never
served as the actual prosecutor of the charges against Mr. Rehberg before the
Grand Jury.”
B. First Indictment
On December 14, 2005, a grand jury indicted Rehberg on charges of
4
aggravated assault, burglary, and six counts of “harassing phone calls.” Burke was
the prosecutor, and Paulk was the sole complaining witness against Rehberg before
the grand jury. The first indictment alleged Rehberg assaulted Dr. James Hotz
after unlawfully entering Dr. Hotz’s home. In fact, Rehberg has never been to Dr.
Hotz’s home, and Dr. Hotz never reported an assault or burglary to law
enforcement agencies. Paulk later admitted that he never interviewed any
witnesses or gathered evidence indicating Rehberg committed an aggravated
assault or burglary. And the alleged “harassing” phone calls to Dr. Hotz all were
related to the faxes Rehberg had already sent criticizing the hospital.
The City of Albany Police Department2 did not participate in the
investigation. Paulk stated that he and Hodges initiated and handled the
investigation on their own because they lacked confidence in the police
department’s ability to handle the investigation.
Rehberg contested the legal sufficiency of the first indictment. On February
2, 2006, Defendant Burke dismissed and nol-prossed the first indictment.
C. Second Indictment
On February 15, 2006, Defendants Burke and Paulk initiated charges before
a second grand jury. Paulk and Dr. Hotz appeared as witnesses. The grand jury
2
The City of Albany, Georgia, is in Dougherty County.
5
issued a second indictment, charging Rehberg with simple assault against Dr. Hotz
on August 22, 2004 and five counts of harassing phone calls.
Rehberg contested the sufficiency of the second indictment too. Rehberg
alleged he was “nowhere near Dr. Hotz on August 22, 2004,” and “[t]here was no
evidence whatsoever that Mr. Rehberg committed an assault on anybody as he was
charged.” At a pretrial hearing on April 10, 2006, Defendant Burke announced the
second indictment would be dismissed, but Burke did not dismiss it. On July 7,
2006, the state trial court ordered it dismissed.
D. Third Indictment
On March 1, 2006, Defendants Burke and Paulk appeared before a third
grand jury and secured a third indictment against Rehberg, charging him with
simple assault and harassing telephone calls. At some unspecified time, Rehberg
was arrested and briefly detained pursuant to an arrest warrant issued as a result of
the second and third indictments.
On May 1, 2006, the state trial court issued two orders dismissing all charges
against Rehberg because the third indictment did not sufficiently charge Rehberg
with a criminal offense.
The three indictments against Rehberg were widely reported in the local
press. Defendant Burke conducted interviews with the press and issued statements
6
saying: (1) “[I]t is never free speech to assault or harass someone, no matter who
they are and no matter how much you don’t like them,” and (2) “It would be
ludicrous to say that an individual has the right to go onto someone else’s property
and burn a cross under the guise of free speech, which is tantamount to what these
defendants are claiming.”
E. District Court Proceedings
Plaintiff Rehberg filed a verified complaint against Defendants Hodges,
Burke, and Paulk, in their individual capacities. Rehberg’s complaint alleges ten
counts, including these four federal § 1983 claims at issue in this appeal:3 (1)
malicious prosecution against Hodges and Paulk in violation of Rehberg’s Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights (Count 6); (2) retaliatory investigation and
prosecution against Hodges and Paulk, for their alleged retaliation against Rehberg
because he exercised First Amendment free speech rights (Count 7); (3)
participation in evidence fabrication, calling Paulk to give false testimony to the
grand jury, and giving false statements to the media against Burke only (Count 8);
and (4) conspiracy to violate Rehberg’s constitutional rights under the First,
3
Rehberg’s complaint also alleges state-law claims for negligence (Counts 1 & 2) and
invasion of privacy (Counts 3 & 4) against Paulk, which the district court refused to dismiss. At
this juncture, Defendant Paulk has not appealed the district court’s rulings on those state-law
claims. At oral argument, counsel for Defendant Paulk confirmed to the Court that the state-law
claims in Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 against Paulk were not on appeal.
7
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, against Hodges, Burke, and Paulk (Count
10).4
Defendants Hodges, Burke, and Paulk moved to dismiss these counts
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). They claimed absolute
immunity, and, alternatively, qualified immunity. The district court denied the
Defendants’ motions.
Defendants Hodges, Burke, and Paulk, in their individual capacities, appeal
the district court’s denials of immunity as to Rehberg’s above four federal
constitutional claims.5 We discuss absolute and qualified immunity and then
Rehberg’s claims.
II. IMMUNITY LAW
A. Absolute Immunity
Traditional common-law immunities for prosecutors apply to civil cases
4
Plaintiff Rehberg also sued Dougherty County and Hodges, in his official capacity.
Rehberg withdrew Count 5 against Dougherty County in response to its claim of sovereign
immunity. Rehberg has not appealed the district court’s dismissal of Count 9 against Dougherty
County, which effectively dismissed Count 9 against Hodges because an official capacity claim
against Hodges is another moniker for a claim against Dougherty County, Hodges’s employer.
See Brown v. Neumann, 188 F.3d 1289, 1290 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus only Counts 6, 7, 8, and 10
are involved in this appeal.
5
The denial of absolute or qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss is an appealable
interlocutory order. See Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1280-81 (11th Cir. 1999); Maggio v.
Sipple, 211 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105
S. Ct. 2806, 2817-18 (1985)). We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion to
dismiss on the basis of absolute or qualified immunity. Maggio, 211 F.3d at 1350; Scarbrough
v. Myles, 245 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001).
8
brought under § 1983. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-28, 96 S. Ct. 984,
993-94 (1976). “[A]t common law, ‘[t]he general rule was, and is, that a
prosecutor is absolutely immune from suit for malicious prosecution.’” Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1097 (1986) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S.
at 437, 96 S. Ct. at 998). In § 1983 actions, prosecutors have absolute immunity
for all activities that are “‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process.’” Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 855, 860
(2009) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S. Ct. at 995); accord Jones v. Cannon,
174 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999).
Absolute immunity does not depend entirely on a defendant’s job title, but
involves a functional approach granting immunity based on conduct. Jones, 174
F.3d at 1282. This functional approach looks to “the nature of the function
performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.” Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2613 (1993); accord Imbler, 424
U.S. at 431 n. 33, 96 S. Ct. at 995 n. 33.
Absolute immunity accordingly applies to the prosecutor’s actions “in
initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at
431, 96 S. Ct. at 995. Prosecutors are immune for appearances in judicial
proceedings, including prosecutorial conduct before grand juries, statements made
9
during trial, examination of witnesses, and presentation of evidence in support of a
search warrant during a probable cause hearing. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490-
92, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 1942 (1991); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 126, 118 S. Ct.
502, 507-08 (1997); see also Van de Kamp, 129 S. Ct. at 861. “A prosecutor
enjoys absolute immunity from allegations stemming from the prosecutor’s
function as advocate.” Jones, 174 F.3d at 1281. Such absolute immunity also
“extends to a prosecutor’s acts undertaken . . . in preparing for the initiation of
judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an
advocate for the State.” Id. (quotation marks omitted); accord Rowe v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding prosecutor who
proffered perjured testimony and fabricated exhibits at trial is entitled to absolute
immunity, but a prosecutor who participated in the search of a suspect’s apartment
is entitled to only qualified immunity).
If a prosecutor functions in a capacity unrelated to his role as an advocate for
the state, he is not protected by absolute immunity but enjoys only qualified
immunity. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 121, 118 S. Ct. at 505 (concluding prosecutor was
acting as a witness in personally attesting to truth of averments in a “Certification
for Determination of Probable Cause” for an arrest warrant and was not absolutely
immune for that witness act, but that prosecutor was absolutely immune for
10
preparing and filing an “information charging respondent with burglary and a
motion for an arrest warrant”); Buckley, 509 U.S. at 275-77, 113 S. Ct. at 2616-18(concluding prosecutor’s pre-indictment fabrication of third-party expert testimony
linking defendant’s boot to bootprint at murder scene and post-indictment
participation in a press conference were not protected by absolute immunity);
Burns, 500 U.S. at 496, 111 S. Ct. at 1944-45 (stating prosecutors do not enjoy
absolute immunity for giving pre-indictment legal advice to the police). A
prosecutor is not entitled to absolute immunity when he “performs the investigative
functions normally performed by a detective or police officer.” Buckley, 509 U.S.
at 273, 113 S. Ct. at 2616; accord Jones, 174 F.3d at 1281-82 (“Although
absolutely immune for actions taken as an advocate, the prosecutor has only
qualified immunity when performing a function that is not associated with his role
as an advocate for the state”); see also Malley, 475 U.S. at 340-41, 106 S. Ct. at
1096 (concluding police officer was not absolutely immune for drafting “felony
complaints” with malice and without probable cause and submitting them in
support of an application for arrest warrants).
B. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity shields government officials who perform discretionary
governmental functions from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate
11
any “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct.
2727, 2738 (1982). A government agent is entitled to immunity unless his act is
“so obviously wrong, in the light of pre-existing law, that only a plainly
incompetent officer or one who was knowingly violating the law would have done
such a thing.” Lassiter v. Ala. A&M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir. 1994)
(en banc).
To evaluate claims of qualified immunity, the Court considers whether (1)
the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the
right was “clearly established” at the time of the defendant’s misconduct. This
two-pronged analysis may be done in whatever order is deemed most appropriate
for the case. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 808, 821 (2009).
With this immunity background, we turn to Rehberg’s claims.
III. COUNT 6 – MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
Count 6 alleges Defendants Hodges and Paulk violated Rehberg’s Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights through their “malicious prosecution” of him,
resulting in his indictment and arrest.6 Rehberg alleges that (1) Hodges and Paulk
6
Rehberg alleges his arrest was an unreasonable seizure. The Fourth Amendment
protection against “unreasonable” searches and seizures was made applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177, 1179 n.4
(11th Cir. 2003).
12
knew there was no probable cause to indict him, and therefore they got together
with malice, fabricated evidence (i.e., Paulk’s false testimony), and decided to
present that fabricated evidence to the grand jury; (2) Paulk, at Hodges’s direction,
then testified falsely before the grand jury, resulting in Rehberg’s indictment and
arrest; and (3) Hodges and Paulk invaded Rehberg’s privacy by illegally issuing
subpoenas to BellSouth, Alltel, and Exact Advertising, without any pending
indictment and as a discovery device for private civilians. We first discuss Paulk’s
false testimony before the grand jury and then the Defendants’ pre-indictment
conduct and subpoenas.
A. Paulk’s Grand Jury Testimony
Even if Hodges and Paulk knew Paulk’s testimony was false, Paulk receives
absolute immunity for the act of testifying to the grand jury. Briscoe v. LaHue,
460 U.S. 325, 326, 103 S. Ct. 1108, 1111-12 (1983) (affirming that common-law
immunities granted to witnesses in judicial proceedings required giving absolute
immunity from § 1983 suit to police officer accused of giving false testimony at
trial); Burns, 500 U.S. at 492, 111 S. Ct. at 1942 (holding prosecutor was
absolutely immune for “appearance in court in support of an application for a
search warrant and the presentation of evidence at that hearing”); Jones, 174 F.3d
at 1288 (“[P]rosecutors and witnesses have absolute immunity for claims of
13
conspiracy to commit perjury based on a witness’s allegedly false testimony at
trial, before a grand jury, or at a post-conviction hearing.”); Strength v. Hubert,
854 F.2d 421, 422-24 (11th Cir. 1988) (concluding investigator for state Attorney
General’s office received absolute immunity for false testimony to a grand jury, at
which the defendant investigator was the sole witness);7 Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d
1544, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding detective immune for grand jury testimony).
We recognize that Plaintiff Rehberg alleges Defendant Paulk was the sole
“complaining witness” before the grand jury. However, in Jones, “we expressly
reject[ed] carving out an exception to absolute immunity for grand jury testimony,
even if false and even if [the detective] were construed to be a complaining
witness.” Jones, 174 F.3d at 1287 n.10; see Rowe, 279 F.3d at 1285 (stating Jones
“reject[ed] an exception for the testimony of ‘complaining witnesses’”). In Jones,
this Court aligned itself with the Third Circuit’s decision in Kulwicki v. Dawson,
969 F.2d 1454, 1467 n.16 (3d Cir. 1992), which rejected the “complaining
witness” exception to absolute immunity for false grand jury testimony. Jones,
174 F.3d at 1287 n.10. The Jones Court reasoned that allowing civil suits for false
grand jury testimony would result in depositions, emasculate the confidential
nature of grand jury testimony, and eviscerate the traditional absolute immunity for
7
Overruled on other grounds, Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581 (11th Cir. 1996).
14
witness testimony in judicial proceedings:
[T]his case vividly illustrates the serious problems with
carving out such an exception and imposing civil liability
for . . . false testimony deceiving the grand jury. To
prove or to defend against such a claim would necessitate
depositions from the prosecutor, the grand jury witnesses,
and the grand jury members . . . [which], in effect, would
emasculate both the absolute immunity for grand jury
testimony and the confidential nature of grand jury
proceedings. The remedy for false grand jury testimony
is criminal prosecution for perjury and not expanded civil
liability and damages.
Jones, 174 F.3d at 1287 n.10.8 And the Supreme Court “consistently ha[s]
recognized that the proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the
secrecy of grand jury proceedings.” United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S.
418, 424, 103 S. Ct. 3133, 3138 (1983) (quotation marks omitted). Based on
Jones, we reject Rehberg’s “complaining witness” exception to absolute immunity
for false grand jury testimony.9
8
In Mastroianni v. Bowers, 173 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 1999), this Court declined to decide
whether to adopt a “complaining witness” exception because there was no factual finding in that
case that the defendant Georgia Bureau of Investigation officer was equivalent to a “complaining
witness.” Id. at 1367 n.1. So Mastroianni did not answer the question presented here, but Jones
did.
9
Two circuits carved out a complaining-witness exception to absolute immunity for false
grand jury testimony. See, e.g., Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1199 (9th Cir. 1997) (Deputy
U.S. Marshals not absolutely immune for false testimony before a grand and petit jury); White v.
Frank, 855 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1988) (police officer, as the “complaining witness,” was not
absolutely immune for false grand jury testimony). These decisions rely on Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. at 340, 106 S. Ct. at 1096, which concluded that a police officer did not receive
absolute immunity for drawing up “felony complaints” with malice and without probable cause
and submitting them in support of an application for arrest warrants. The Supreme Court held
15
B. Hodges and Paulk’s Pre-Indictment Investigation
Distilled to its essence, Defendants’ alleged pre-indictment conduct
(excepting the subpoenas) is this: Hodges and Paulk, acting as investigators, got
together as a favor to the hospital, with malice and without probable cause, and
made up a story about Rehberg, and then Paulk (at Hodges’s direction) told that
fake story under oath to the grand jury, leading to Rehberg’s indictment and arrest.
We already determined supra that Paulk receives absolute immunity for the actual
grand jury testimony itself. The question before us now is whether absolute
immunity applies to the alleged conspiracy decision in the investigative stage to
make up and present Paulk’s false testimony to the grand jury. Our precedent
answers this question too. See Mastroianni, 173 F.3d at 1367; Rowe, 279 F.3d at
1282; Jones, 174 F.3d at 1289.
In Mastroianni, the plaintiff alleged defendant Yeomans, a Georgia Bureau
of Investigation agent, “engaged in a pretestimonial conspiracy to present false
evidence, for which neither absolute nor qualified immunity is available.”
similarly in Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. at 120, 129-31, 118 S. Ct. at 505, 509-10, finding a
prosecutor was not absolutely immune for acting as a witness in personally attesting to the truth
of averments in a certification affidavit supporting an application for probable cause for an arrest
warrant.
Acknowledging White v. Frank relies on Malley, the Jones Court noted that carving out
an immunity exception for grand jury testimony would eviscerate the secrecy of grand jury
proceedings, a concern not implicated by the “felony complaints” filed to support an arrest
warrant in Malley and the personal certification for an arrest warrant in Kalina.
16
Mastroianni, 173 F.3d at 1367. This Court first stressed that “a witness has
absolute immunity from civil liability based on his grand jury testimony. See
Strength, 854 F.2d at 425, relying on Briscoe v. La Hue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S. Ct.
1108 [ ] (1983).” Id. The Mastroianni Court then pointed out that while the
plaintiff “contend[ed] that Yeomans committed numerous acts in furtherance of a
conspiracy to present false testimony before the grand jury convened, the record
itself support[ed] such an inference only if we consider as evidence Yeomans’
testimony as it relates back to Yeomans’ pretestimonial acts and statements.”
Mastroianni, 173 F.3d at 1367. In other words, because the only evidence to show
a conspiracy in the pre-indictment phase was Yeomans’s later false grand jury
testimony, and because Yeomans was immune for that testimony, we concluded
that Yeomans was absolutely immune for conspiracy to present or give grand jury
testimony. Id. (“Because we may not consider such testimony as a factor upon
which to base Yeomans’ potential liability, we conclude that Yeomans is entitled
to absolute immunity for his actions in this case”).
This Court subsequently applied Mastroianni in Jones and Rowe, in each
case concluding that absolute immunity applied equally both to the false testimony
itself and to the alleged conspiracies to present false testimony. Jones, 174 F.3d at
1289 (“To allow a § 1983 claim based on subornation of perjured testimony where
17
the allegedly perjured testimony itself is cloaked in absolute immunity would be to
permit through the back door what is prohibited through the front”); Rowe, 279
F.3d at 1282 (“It would be cold comfort for a prosecutor to know that he is
absolutely immune from direct liability for actions taken as prosecutor, if those
same actions could be used to prove him liable on a conspiracy theory involving
conduct for which he was not immune”).
Since Paulk receives absolute immunity for his false testimony before the
grand jury, Hodges and Paulk are similarly immune for their alleged conspiracy to
fabricate and present false testimony to the grand jury. Rowe, 279 F.3d at 1282(“[A] witness’s absolute immunity from liability for testifying forecloses any use
of that testimony as evidence of the witness’s membership in a conspiracy prior to
his taking the stand”).
It is important to point out that Hodges and Paulk generally would not
receive absolute immunity for fabricating evidence, because investigating and
gathering evidence falls outside the prosecutor’s role as an advocate. See Buckley,
509 U.S. at 262-64, 113 S. Ct. at 2610-11 (no immunity for prosecutor who
fabricated expert testimony linking defendant’s boot with bootprint at murder
scene); Rowe, 279 F.3d at 1281 (no immunity for fabrication of jump rope); Jones,
174 F.3d at 1289-90 (no immunity for fabrication of bootprint); Riley v. City of
18
Montgomery, Ala., 104 F.3d 1247, 1253 (11th Cir. 1997) (no immunity for police
officer’s planting of cocaine). All of these cases involved a particular discrete item
of physical or expert evidence that was falsely created during the investigative
stage to link the accused to a crime.
In contrast, there is no allegation of any physical or expert evidence that
Hodges or Paulk fabricated or planted. There is no allegation of a pre-indictment
document such as a false affidavit or false certification. Rather, Hodges and Paulk
are accused of fabricating together only the testimony Paulk later gave to the grand
jury. No evidence existed until Paulk actually testified to the grand jury. Stated
differently, the only evidence Rehberg alleges was fabricated is Paulk’s false grand
jury testimony, for which Paulk receives absolute immunity.10
For all these reasons, we conclude Hodges and Paulk are entitled to absolute
immunity for the pre-indictment conduct of conspiring to make up and present
Paulk’s false testimony to the grand jury.
C. Subpoenas During Investigation
Rehberg’s allegations regarding the subpoenas to his telephone and Internet
10
Rehberg does not allege, for instance, that Hodges and Paulk fabricated physical
evidence linking him to Dr. Hotz’s house or convinced another witness to testify falsely about
Rehberg’s involvement. The only evidence presented to the grand jury was Paulk’s testimony
and Dr. Hotz’s testimony (which Rehberg does not allege was false).
19
providers all recount pre-indictment investigative conduct by Hodges and Paulk.11
A prosecutor loses the cloak of absolute immunity by stepping out of his role as an
advocate and performing “investigative” functions more commonly performed by
law enforcement officers. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273, 113 S. Ct. at 2616; Burns,
500 U.S. at 496, 111 S. Ct. at 1944-45; Rowe, 279 F.3d at 1280; Jones, 174 F.3d at
1285. Hodges and Paulk accordingly do not receive absolute immunity for
preparing and filing subpoenas during the investigation of Rehberg.
Hodges and Paulk may, however, receive qualified immunity if Rehberg’s
subpoena allegations either do not state a constitutional violation or do not state a
constitutional violation that was clearly established. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 815-16,
821-22. Rehberg claims the subpoenas violated his Fourth Amendment right to be
free of unreasonable search and seizure.12
In order for Fourth Amendment protections to apply, the person invoking the
protection must have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the place
searched or item seized. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88, 119 S. Ct. 469, 473
(1998); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S. Ct. 507, 512 (1967). To
11
Rehberg’s complaint does not allege Defendant Burke participated in the issuance of
the subpoenas.
12
The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . .
.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
20
establish a reasonable expectation of privacy, the person must show (1) that he
manifested “a subjective expectation of privacy” in the item searched or seized,
and (2) a willingness by society “to recognize that expectation as legitimate.”
United States v. McKennon, 814 F.2d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir. 1987).
The Supreme Court “consistently has held that a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 2582 (1979). “[T]he
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a
third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.” United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 1624 (1976).
More specifically, a person does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy
in numerical information he conveys to a telephone company in the ordinary
course of business. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44, 99 S. Ct. at 2582 (“[E]ven if
petitioner did harbor some subjective expectation that the phone numbers he dialed
would remain private, this expectation is not one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable”) (quotation marks omitted); accord United States v.
Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249, 1250 (11th Cir. 1991) (“The Supreme Court has held
21
that the installation of a pen register does not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution and does not warrant invocation of the
exclusionary rule.”).
Here, Rehberg lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the phone and
fax numbers he dialed. Once he voluntarily provided that information to BellSouth
and Alltel (later Sprint), Rehberg lacked any further valid expectation that those
third parties would not turn the information over to law enforcement officers.
Absent a valid right of privacy, Rehberg cannot state a constitutional violation
regarding the subpoenas for his phone and fax information, and Paulk and Hodges
accordingly are entitled to qualified immunity for issuing those subpoenas to
BellSouth and Alltel.
This case presents a closer question over whether Paulk violated Rehberg’s
Fourth Amendment rights by issuing a subpoena to Rehberg’s Internet Service
Provider (“ISP”) and obtaining “Mr. Rehberg’s personal e-mails that were sent and
received from his personal computer.” Compl. ¶ 37. This is a question of first
impression in this Circuit. Thus, we examine how other circuits have considered
privacy rights in email material, such as email addresses, Internet subscriber
information, and the contents of emails stored either on an ISP server or on a
private computer/server, or both.
22
Several circuits have concluded that a person lacks legitimate privacy
expectations in Internet subscriber information and in to/from addresses in emails
sent via ISPs. See, e.g., United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204-05 (10th
Cir. 2008) (“Every federal court to address this issue has held that subscriber
information provided to an internet provider is not protected by the Fourth
Amendment’s privacy expectation”) (collecting cases from the Fourth, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits and district courts in West Virginia, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Maryland, New York, and Kansas); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510
(9th Cir. 2008) (“[E]-mail and Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the
to/from addresses of their messages or the IP addresses of the websites they visit
because they should know that this information is provided to and used by Internet
service providers for the specific purpose of directing the routing of information.”).
To date only a few circuit decisions address the issue of Fourth Amendment
protection of email content. Some circuit decisions suggest in dicta that a person
loses a legitimate expectation of privacy in emails sent to and received by a third-
party recipient. In Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001), the Sixth
Circuit noted that Internet bulletin board users lack a valid Fourth Amendment
expectation of privacy in materials they voluntarily posted to a public Internet
bulletin board. Id. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that a person would lose a
23
legitimate expectation of privacy in a sent email that had already reached its
recipient, analogizing an emailer to a letter-writer, whose “‘expectation of privacy
ordinarily terminates upon delivery’” of a letter. Id. (quoting United States v.
King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1995)). Ultimately, however, the Sixth Circuit
did not resolve this constitutional question because it determined that the plaintiffs
had not shown a genuine issue of fact over whether the defendants actually
searched their emails, and thus could not show a Fourth Amendment violation even
assuming a privacy right had been violated. Id. at 335.13
In United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190 (2d Cir. 2004), the Second
Circuit cited Guest and noted that the defendant, who challenged the
constitutionality of a probation condition allowing monitoring of his computer,
“may not [] enjoy [] an expectation of privacy in transmissions over the Internet or
e-mail that have already arrived at the recipient.” Id. However, the Second Circuit
13
Plaintiff Rehberg points to Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007),
reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (6th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007) (criminal investigation of
plaintiff), in which a Sixth Circuit panel concluded “that individuals maintain a reasonable
expectation of privacy in e-mails that are stored with, or sent or received through, a commercial
ISP.” Id. at 473. In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit panel distinguished its circuit
precedent in Guest: “Although we stated that an e-mail sender would ‘lose a legitimate
expectation of privacy in an e-mail that had already reached its recipient,’ analogizing such an
e-mailer to ‘a letter-writer,’ this diminished privacy is only relevant with respect to the recipient,
as the sender has assumed the risk of disclosure by or through the recipient. [Guest, 255 F.3d] at
333. Guest did not hold that the mere use of an intermediary such as an ISP to send and receive
e-mails amounted to a waiver of a legitimate expectation of privacy.” Id. at 472. The Sixth
Circuit en banc subsequently vacated the Warshak opinion because the criminal investigation
was over, there was no ongoing possibility of a Fourth Amendment violation, and thus the case
was not ripe. Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008).
24
ultimately noted that as a probationer, the defendant would be subject to a reduced
expectation of privacy. The Second Circuit thus did not issue a constitutional
holding on the privacy rights of private citizens in email content. Id.The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question of privacy rights in
email material. Plaintiff Rehberg thus relies on Supreme Court precedent on
privacy rights accorded to the contents of telephone communications. In Katz, the
Supreme Court first recognized a privacy expectation in the contents of a telephone
conversation in a closed public phone booth. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 88 S. Ct. at
512. In Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court refined that privacy expectation,
noting the distinction between the contents of a telephone call (for which a
legitimate privacy expectation exists) and the actual phone numbers dialed (no
privacy expectation). 442 U.S. at 743-44, 99 S. Ct. at 2582.
The Supreme Court’s more-recent precedent shows a marked lack of clarity
in what privacy expectations as to content of electronic communications are
reasonable. In City of Ontario v. Quon, No. 08-1332, slip. op., 78 U.S.L.W. 4591(U.S. June 17, 2010), the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision that
held a government employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in text
messages sent and received by a third party. The plaintiff police sergeant sued the
City for violating his Fourth Amendment rights by obtaining and reviewing
25
transcripts of personal text messages he sent and received from a pager that was
owned by the City and issued to him for work use. Id. at 1, 5. The parties disputed
whether the plaintiff, as a public employee, had an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in those text messages. Id. at 9-10.
Even after the briefs of 2 parties and 10 amici curiae, the Supreme Court
declined to decide whether the plaintiff’s asserted privacy expectations were
reasonable. Id. at 9, 11-12. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the case
“touches issues of far-reaching significance.” Id. at 1. After remarking that it
“must proceed with care when considering the whole concept of privacy
expectations in communications made on electronic equipment owned by a
government employer,” the Supreme Court cautioned that “[t]he judiciary risks
error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging
technology before its role in society has become clear.” Id. at 10. The Supreme
Court explained: “In Katz, the Court relied on its own knowledge and experience
to conclude that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone booth.”
Id. In contrast, the Supreme Court found “[i]t is not so clear that courts at present
are on so sure a ground” as to electronic devices. Id. Therefore, the Supreme
Court admonished that “[p]rudence counsels caution before the facts in the instant
case are used to establish far-reaching premises that define the existence, and
26
extent, of privacy expectations” in communications on electronic devices. Id. The
Supreme Court specifically noted that ongoing “[r]apid changes in the dynamics of
communication and information transmission” caused similar rapid change “in
what society accepts as proper behavior.” Id. at 11.
To underscore its disinclination to establish broad precedents as to privacy
rights vis-a-vis electronic devices and emerging technologies, the Supreme Court
explained the difficulty in determining what privacy expectations are reasonable,
stating:
[T]he Court would have difficulty predicting how
employees’ privacy expectations will be shaped by those
changes or the degree to which society will be prepared
to recognize those expectations as reasonable. Cell
phone and text message communications are so pervasive
that some persons may consider them to be essential
means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even
self-identification. That might strengthen the case for an
expectation of privacy. On the other hand, the ubiquity
of those devices has made them generally affordable, so
one could counter that employees who need cell phones
or similar devices for personal matters can purchase and
pay for their own. And employer policies concerning
communications will of course shape the reasonable
expectations of their employees, especially to the extent
that such policies are clearly communicated.
Id. at 11. The Supreme Court again eschewed “a broad holding,” finding it
“preferable to dispose of this case on narrower grounds” and “settled principles.”
Id. at 1, 11-12. It declined to answer the constitutional question of whether the
27
plaintiff’s privacy expectation was reasonable or even to set forth the governing
principles to answer that question. Instead, the Supreme Court (1) assumed
arguendo that plaintiff Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy, (2) assumed
that the government’s review of a transcript of his text messages was a search
under the Fourth Amendment, and even (3) assumed principles governing a search
of a physical office applied to “the electronic sphere.” Id. at 12. It then concluded
that the plaintiff’s government employer did not violate the Fourth Amendment
because its review of his personal text messages on a government-owned pager
was reasonable and motivated by a legitimate work-related purpose. Id. at 12, 16-
17 (citing O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725, 107 S. Ct. 1492, 1502 (1987)).
As these varied cases suggest, the questions of whether Fourth Amendment
principles governing a search of Rehberg’s home also should apply to subpoenas
sent to a third-party ISP for electronic data stored on the third-party’s server, and
whether Rehberg had a reasonable privacy expectation in the contents of his
personal emails sent voluntarily through that third-party ISP, are complex,
difficult, and “far-reaching” legal issues that we should be cautious about resolving
too broadly. As the Supreme Court advised us, “[t]he judiciary risks error by
elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging
technology before its role in society has become clear.” Id. at 10. Given the lack
28
of precedent, we now question whether it would be prudent in this case and on this
limited factual record to establish broad precedent as to the reasonable privacy
expectation in email content. Moreover, because this is a qualified immunity case,
we need not reach the underlying constitutional issue. Instead, we can resolve this
case narrowly, cf. id. at 1, because at a minimum Rehberg has not shown his
alleged constitutional right was clearly established.14
In determining whether a constitutional right was clearly established at the
time of violation, “[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry . . . is whether it would be
clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001); see
also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 2516 (2002) (“the salient
question . . . is whether the state of the law [at the time of violation] . . . gave [the
defendants] fair warning that their alleged treatment of [the plaintiff] was
14
In his petition for panel rehearing, Rehberg also tangentially mentions the Stored
Communications Act (“SCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2703, et seq., which provides the government a
mechanism to require the provider of a remote computing service to disclose the contents of wire
or electronic communications upon issuance of a warrant or court order. Pet. for Reh’g at 4 n.2,
10. Rehberg seemingly argues that a violation of this Act implies a violation of his
constitutional rights. However, Rehberg did not assert an SCA claim in the district court or in
his appellate brief, so we decline to address it further. Tanner Adver. Group, L.L.C. v. Fayette
County, 451 F.3d 777, 785 (11th Cir. 2006) (“‘The law is by now well settled in this Circuit that
a legal claim or argument that has not been briefed before the court is deemed abandoned and its
merits will not be addressed.’” (quoting Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324,
1330 (11th Cir. 2004)) (brackets omitted)); see also Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1321
(11th Cir. 2006) (“a valid civil complaint under the SCA must allege a violation of one of its
provisions”).
29
unconstitutional”).15
No Supreme Court decision and no precedential decision of this Circuit
defines privacy rights in email content voluntarily transmitted over the global
Internet and stored at a third-party ISP. See Quon, slip op. at 9-10. As a result,
Paulk could not have known the scope of the privacy rights, if any, that Rehberg
had in email content stored at his third-party ISP.16 The Supreme Court’s decisions
in Katz and Smith clearly established an objectively reasonable privacy right in
telephone conversation content, but, as the modern Internet did not exist at the time
of those decisions, whether the analytical framework, much less the rationale, of
those decisions transfers to privacy rights in Internet email is questionable and far
from clearly established. Indeed, in Quon, the Supreme Court only assumed,
without deciding, that the Fourth Amendment framework for analyzing physical
15
This fair and clear notice requirement may be met in three ways: (1) the words of the
pertinent federal statute or constitutional provision may be so specific as to clearly establish the
law even in total absence of judicial decisions interpreting the law, Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d
1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2002); (2) “some broad statements of principle in case law are not tied to
particularized facts and can clearly establish law applicable in the future to different sets of
detailed facts,” id. at 1351; and (3) most commonly, when we lack explicit statutory or
constitutional pronouncements and broad case holdings, we look to precedential cases that are
tied to their particular facts. Id. at 1351-52. When caselaw is needed, we look to decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court, this Court, and, where applicable, the highest court of the pertinent
state. Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1032-33 n.10 (11th Cir. 2001).
16
There is no allegation, for instance, that the Defendants searched Rehberg’s home
computer or even his entire email account. The Complaint alleges only that Paulk subpoenaed
and accessed email messages actually sent and received through Rehberg’s ISP. An email draft
never sent by Rehberg to his ISP would not have been within the scope of the subpoena.
30
searches applied to searches in the “electronic sphere.” Id. at 12. In contrast,
Rehberg has not identified any judicial decision holding a government agent liable
for Fourth Amendment violations related to email content received by a third party
and stored on a third party’s server.
Because the federal law was not clearly established, the district court erred
in denying qualified immunity to Paulk on Rehberg’s email subpoena claim.17
IV. COUNT 7 – RETALIATORY PROSECUTION
In Count 7, Rehberg alleges Hodges and Paulk violated his First
Amendment free speech rights by retaliating against him for his criticism of the
hospital in his faxes. Rehberg alleges Hodges’s and Paulk’s decisions to
investigate him, issue subpoenas, provide his information to paid civilians, and
procure wrongful indictments were in retaliation for his faxes and criticism of the
17
Rehberg’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim in Count 6 requires proving both (1) the
elements of the common-law tort of malicious prosecution; and (2) a violation of his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d
1220, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004); Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003). Rehberg
alleges his arrest was an unlawful seizure, but he also appears to contend that the unlawful
search of his phone records and emails also would support a malicious prosecution claim. We
cannot locate any case where a search without a later arrest was sufficient to support a § 1983
malicious prosecution claim. However, because Rehberg has not shown the search of his phone
records and emails violated clearly established federal law, we need not address the viability of
Rehberg’s malicious prosecution claims as to the subpoenas. Alternatively, if Rehberg is
attempting to assert only an independent Fourth Amendment claim (and not a malicious
prosecution claim) as to the subpoenas, Rehberg also has not shown the violation of clearly
established federal law.
31
hospital and were all made without probable cause.18
We first review Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 126 S. Ct. 1695 (2006),
which addresses retaliatory-prosecution claims.
A. Hartman v. Moore
In Hartman, plaintiff Moore brought a Bivens19 action against postal
inspectors and a federal prosecutor for retaliatory prosecution.20 Because of
Moore’s criticism of and lobbying to the U.S. Postal Service, postal inspectors
launched criminal investigations against Moore and pressured the United States
Attorney’s Office to indict him, “[n]otwithstanding very limited evidence.” Id. at
253-54, 126 S. Ct. at 1699-1700. Although they did not testify, the postal
inspectors drafted “witness statements” for other witnesses and provided them to
the prosecutor, who presented them to the grand jury. Moore v. United States, 213
F.3d 705, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The district court dismissed the criminal charges
18
To the extent Rehberg relies on the Fourth Amendment, “there is no retaliation claim
under the Fourth Amendment separate and distinct from [Rehberg’s] malicious prosecution . . .
claim[].” Wood, 323 F.3d at 883. “Instead, the only cause of action for retaliation that arguably
applies here is retaliatory prosecution in violation of the First Amendment.” Id.19
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999(1971).
20
Moore’s company manufactured a multiline optical character reader useful in sorting
mail. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 252, 126 S. Ct. at 1699. He lobbied the U.S. Postal Service to
purchase multiline readers and criticized its reliance on single-line readers. Id. at 253, 126 S. Ct.
at 1699.
32
against Moore for a “complete lack of direct evidence.” Hartman, 547 U.S. at 254,
126 S. Ct. at 1700.
In Moore’s subsequent Bivens action for retaliatory prosecution, the district
court granted absolute immunity to the prosecutor but denied qualified immunity to
the postal inspectors. Id. at 255, 126 S. Ct. at 1701. As to the prosecutor, the D.C.
Circuit affirmed absolute immunity for the retaliatory decision to prosecute Moore
and the prosecutor’s concealment of exculpatory evidence from the grand jury,
manipulation of evidence before the grand jury, and failure to disclose exculpatory
material before trial. Moore, 213 F.3d at 708. As to the postal inspectors, the D.C.
Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity and allowed Moore’s retaliatory-
prosecution claim to proceed against them, even though Moore had not shown an
absence of probable cause for the criminal charges against him.
In reversing the D.C. Circuit’s denial of qualified immunity to the postal
inspectors, the Supreme Court in Hartman concluded that to bring a retaliatory-
prosecution claim, the plaintiff must show an absence of probable cause for the
prosecution. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 252, 126 S. Ct. at 1699. The Supreme Court
first noted, “as a general matter the First Amendment prohibits government
officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions, including criminal
prosecutions, for speaking out.” Id. at 256, 126 S. Ct. at 1701 (citations and
33
quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court, however, explained that a
retaliatory-prosecution suit cannot be brought against the prosecutor, but only
against the “non-prosecuting official” who successfully induced the prosecutor to
bring charges that would not otherwise have been brought, as follows:
A Bivens (or § 1983) action for retaliatory prosecution
will not be brought against the prosecutor, who is
absolutely immune from liability for the decision to
prosecute. Instead, the defendant will be a
nonprosecutor, an official, like an inspector here, who
may have influenced the prosecutorial decision but did
not himself make it, and the cause of action will not be
strictly for retaliatory prosecution, but for successful
retaliatory inducement to prosecute. The consequence is
that a plaintiff like Moore must show that the
nonprosecuting official acted in retaliation, and must also
show that he induced the prosecutor to bring charges that
would not have been initiated without his urging.
Id. at 261-62, 126 S. Ct. at 1704-05 (emphasis added). To sue for retaliatory
prosecution, a plaintiff must establish a “but-for” causal connection between the
retaliatory animus of the non-prosecutor and the prosecutor’s decision to prosecute.
See id. at 256, 261, 126 S. Ct. at 1701, 1704 (discussing “but-for cause” and “but-
for basis” for the prosecutor’s decision to prosecute).21
And Hartman indicates that to establish a prima facie case of this but-for
21
In a footnote, the Supreme Court noted that Moore’s complaint charged the prosecutor
with acting in both an investigatory and prosecutorial capacity, but that no appeal or claim
against the prosecutor was before the Supreme Court. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 262 n.8, 126 S. Ct.
at 1705 n.8.
34
causal connection, a plaintiff must plead and prove both (1) a retaliatory motive on
the part of the non-prosecutor official, and (2) the absence of probable cause
supporting the prosecutor’s decision. Id. at 265, 126 S. Ct. at 1706; see also Wood,
323 F.3d at 883 (First Amendment retaliatory-prosecution claim is defeated by the
existence of probable cause). A retaliatory motive on the part of a “non-
prosecuting official” combined with an absence of probable cause will create “a
prima facie inference that the unconstitutionally motivated inducement infected the
prosecutor's decision to bring the charge.” Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265, 126 S. Ct. at
1706. Importantly, the absence of probable cause “is not necessarily dispositive”
of whether the unconstitutionally motivated inducement succeeded, but will create
a prima facie inference that it did. Id. The burden then shifts to the defendant
official to show “that the action would have been taken anyway, independently of
any retaliatory animus.” Id. at 261, 126 S. Ct. at 1704. In other words, the
defendant official will not be liable if he can show the prosecutor would have taken
the action complained of anyway. Id.B. Rehberg’s Retaliatory-Prosecution Claims
Hartman dictates the outcome of Rehberg’s retaliatory-prosecution claim in
Count 7. First, as to Hodges, Rehberg alleges Hodges was in communication with
Burke about the decision to prosecute, even after Hodges recused. Hodges’s
35
alleged decision to prosecute Rehberg, even if made without probable cause and
even if caused solely by Paulk’s and his unconstitutional retaliatory animus, is
protected by absolute immunity. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 261-62, 126 S. Ct. at 1704-
05.
As to Paulk, Rehberg must show investigator Paulk’s retaliation against
Rehberg successfully induced the prosecution and was the “but-for” cause of the
prosecution. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265, 126 S. Ct. at 1701. Accordingly, Rehberg
must show that prosecutor Burke (himself or with Hodges’s influence) would not
have prosecuted Rehberg but for Paulk’s retaliatory motive and conduct.22
The very detailed allegations in Rehberg’s complaint satisfy the two
requirements for a prima facie case of retaliatory prosecution: non-prosecutor
Paulk’s retaliatory motive, and the absence of probable cause for prosecutor Burke
to bring charges. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265, 126 S. Ct. at 1706. For example,
Rehberg alleges “[t]here was no probable cause for the underlying criminal charges
against Mr. Rehberg and such charges would not have been brought if there was no
retaliatory motive.” Rehberg supports this alleged lack of probable cause by
alleging Paulk admitted that “he never interviewed any witnesses or gathered any
22
Count 7 of Rehberg’s complaint does not name Burke as a defendant, but Count 7
claims Paulk’s retaliatory motive and actions “wrongfully influenced and instigated the
prosecutorial decision to bring charges against Mr. Rehberg.”
36
evidence indicating that Mr. Rehberg committed any aggravated assault or
burglary,” and Paulk’s false testimony was the only evidence Burke presented in
support of the first indictment. Without Paulk’s allegedly false testimony, Burke
could not have procured the first indictment because there was no other evidence.
Rehberg also alleges Hodges and Paulk acted in retaliation for Rehberg’s criticisms
of the activities and financial management of a public hospital to which they had
close political connections and personal relationships and that chilling Rehberg’s
speech was a motivating factor in all of Hodges’s and Paulk’s conduct in
investigating and prosecuting him.
In sum, Rehberg sufficiently has alleged the requisite retaliatory motive,
absence of probable cause, and but-for causation (i.e., that Burke would not have
prosecuted Rehberg but for Paulk’s false testimony). Therefore, at this pleading
juncture, the district court did not err in denying absolute and qualified immunity
to Defendant Paulk on Rehberg’s retaliatory-prosecution claim.
C. Retaliatory Investigation Claim
Rehberg’s complaint also alleges a “retaliatory investigation” claim against
Hodges and Paulk. For example, Rehberg’s complaint alleges Hodges and Paulk
together decided to investigate Rehberg and took several steps during the
investigation because each of them had retaliatory animus. These allegations of
37
coordinated and joint actions are replete throughout the complaint. E.g., Compl. ¶¶
99 (“Mr. Paulk and Mr. Hodges instituted an investigation . . .”), 124 (“Chilling his
political speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the wrongful conduct of
Mr. Paulk and Mr. Hodges in investigating Mr. Rehberg . . .”), 157-61 (conspiracy
claim).
Hartman does not help us with this claim because the Supreme Court
pointedly did not decide whether “simply conducting retaliatory investigation with
a view to promote prosecution is a constitutional tort.” Hartman, 547 U.S. at 262
n. 9, 126 S. Ct. at 1705 n. 9 (“Whether the expense or other adverse consequences
of a retaliatory investigation would ever justify recognizing such an investigation
as a distinct constitutional violation is not before us”).23
As noted above, only qualified immunity, not absolute immunity, applies to
conduct taken in an investigatory capacity as opposed to a prosecutorial capacity.
As we explain above, it was not clearly established that the subpoenas to Rehberg’s
phone and email providers violated his Fourth Amendment rights. We also are
inclined to agree with the government that Hodges and Paulk’s retaliatory animus
does not create a distinct constitutional tort.24
23
Rehberg does not allege he incurred any expenses in the investigation stage.
24
The initiation of a criminal investigation in and of itself does not implicate a federal
constitutional right. The Constitution does not require evidence of wrongdoing or reasonable
suspicion of wrongdoing by a suspect before the government can begin investigating that
38
But even if we assume Rehberg has stated a constitutional violation by
alleging that Hodges and Paulk initiated an investigation and issued subpoenas in
retaliation for Rehberg’s exercise of First Amendment rights, Hodges and Paulk
still receive qualified immunity because Rehberg’s right to be free from a
retaliatory investigation is not clearly established. The Supreme Court has never
defined retaliatory investigation, standing alone, as a constitutional tort, Hartman,
547 U.S. at 262 n.9, 126 S. Ct. at 1705 n.9, and neither has this Court. Without
this sort of precedent, Rehberg cannot show that the retaliatory investigation
alleged here violated his First Amendment rights. See Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d
898, 907 (11th Cir. 2009) (“In order to determine whether a right is clearly
established, we look to the precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States,
this Court’s precedent, and the pertinent state’s supreme court precedent,
interpreting and applying the law in similar circumstances”). Hodges and Paulk
accordingly are entitled to qualified immunity for Rehberg’s retaliatory
investigation claims in Count 7.
V. COUNT 8 – FABRICATION OF EVIDENCE AND PRESS
STATEMENTS AGAINST BURKE
Count 8 is against only Burke. Rehberg alleges Burke violated his
suspect. See United States v. Aibejeris, 28 F.3d 97, 99 (11th Cir. 1994). No § 1983 liability can
attach merely because the government initiated a criminal investigation.
39
“constitutional rights” by (1) “participat[ing] in fabricating evidence”; (2)
presenting Paulk’s perjured testimony to the grand jury; and (3) making
defamatory statements to the media which “damaged Mr. Rehberg’s reputation.”25
As a special prosecutor appointed to stand in for Hodges, Burke receives the
full scope of absolute prosecutorial immunity and is absolutely immune for
Rehberg’s claims of malicious prosecution and the presentation of perjured
testimony to a grand jury. For the same reasons explained above, Burke also is
absolutely immune for participating in the conspiracy to fabricate Paulk’s grand
jury testimony against Rehberg.
Burke’s statements to the media, however, are not cloaked in absolute
immunity because “[c]omments to the media have no functional tie to the judicial
process just because they are made by a prosecutor,” and they are not part of the
prosecutor’s role as an advocate of the State. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 277-78,
113 S. Ct. at 2618 (“The conduct of a press conference does not involve the
initiation of a prosecution, the presentation of the state’s case in court, or actions
preparatory for these functions”); Hart v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288, 1297 (11th Cir.
2009). Burke’s immunity for the alleged press statements must arise, if at all,
through qualified immunity.
25
Burke is not alleged to have participated in subpoenaing Rehberg’s telephone and
Internet providers.
40
A tort claim, such as Rehberg’s defamation allegation in Count 8, does not
give rise to a § 1983 due process claim unless there is an additional constitutional
injury alleged. Cypress Ins. Co. v. Clark, 144 F.3d 1435, 1438 (11th Cir. 1998).
“The Supreme Court . . . held that injury to reputation, by itself, does not constitute
the deprivation of a liberty or property interest protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Behrens v. Regier, 422 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701-02, 96 S. Ct. 1155, 1160-61 (1976)).26 Damages
to a plaintiff’s reputation “are only recoverable in a section 1983 action if those
damages were incurred as a result of government action significantly altering the
plaintiff’s constitutionally recognized legal rights.” Cypress, 144 F.3d at 1438.
This doctrine is known as the “stigma-plus” test, Cannon v. City of W. Palm
Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001), and requires the plaintiff to show
both a valid defamation claim (the stigma) and “the violation of some more
tangible interest” (the plus). Behrens, 422 F.3d at 1260 (quotation marks omitted).
“To establish a liberty interest sufficient to implicate the fourteenth amendment
safeguards, the individual must be not only stigmatized but also stigmatized in
26
Rehberg does not specifically identify what constitutional provision Burke’s media
statements violated. We assume Rehberg asserts a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.
See, e.g., Paul, 424 U.S. at 712, 96 S. Ct. at 1165-66; Cypress, 144 F.3d at 1436. Rehberg does
not identify another constitutional theory that might support a § 1983 action for false statements
to the media.
41
connection with . . . [a] government official’s conduct [that] deprived the plaintiff
of a previously recognized property or liberty interest in addition to damaging the
plaintiff’s reputation.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).27 The “stigma-
plus” test requires not only allegations stating a common-law defamation claim,
but also an additional constitutional injury, tied to a previously recognized
constitutional property or liberty interest, flowing from the defamation. Cypress,
144 F.3d at 1436-37.
Rehberg’s complaint alleges damage to his reputation but does not allege the
required deprivation of any previously recognized constitutional property or liberty
interest. The only factual allegations Rehberg makes regarding Burke’s media
statements are these: “Mr. Rehberg . . . was subjected to extensive publicity in the
media where he was identified as being charged with multiple felonies and
misdemeanors, and publicly identified by the acting District Attorney as having
committed an assault and burglary. The damage of three indictments on his public
27
“While we have in a number of our prior cases pointed out the frequently drastic effect
of the ‘stigma’ which may result from defamation by the government in a variety of contexts,
this line of cases does not establish the proposition that reputation alone, apart from some more
tangible interests such as employment, is either ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ by itself sufficient to
invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause.” Paul, 424 U.S. at 701, 96 S. Ct. at
1160-61; see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 234, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 1794 (1991) (“Most
defamation plaintiffs attempt to show some sort of special damage and out-of-pocket loss which
flows from the injury to their reputation. But so long as such damage flows from injury caused
by the defendant to a plaintiff’s reputation, it may be recoverable under state tort law but it is not
recoverable in a Bivens action.”).
42
record will remain with him and his wife and children for the rest of their lives.”
He continues by alleging, “[t]hese wrongful indictments will always be associated
with his name and have caused and will cause significant personal, professional
and economic damages to Mr. Rehberg.” Rehberg alleges Burke’s media
statements “wrongfully damaged [his] reputation.”
In short, Rehberg’s defamation allegations are too generalized to show a
previously recognized constitutional deprivation flowing from Burke’s alleged
defamatory statements. Damage to reputation alone is insufficient to state a
Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. Cypress, 144 F.3d at 1437-38(“Indeed, [in Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 111 S. Ct. 1789 (1991)] the
[Supreme] Court specifically rejected the notion that defamation by a government
actor that causes injury to professional reputation violates procedural due
process”).
The district court averted this settled law by connecting Burke’s media
statements to “the alleged Fourteenth Amendment violation alleged by Plaintiff,
i.e., violation of his right to be free from prosecution based upon false
evidence/charges.” This was error. The “stigma-plus” test requires the plaintiff to
show deprivation of a previously recognized Fourteenth Amendment property or
liberty interest “in connection with” the claimed defamation. Even liberally
43
construed, Rehberg’s complaint does not allege a procedural due process claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272, 114
S. Ct. 807, 812 (1994). Rehberg does not allege Dougherty County or the
individual defendants denied him the constitutionally required procedures
necessary to challenge his indictments and arrest. Indeed, Rehberg’s successful
challenges to the three indictments show otherwise. And, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, there is no substantive due process right to be free from malicious
prosecution without probable cause. Id. at 274, 114 S. Ct. at 813. A malicious
prosecution claim arises under the Fourth Amendment, not Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process.
Therefore, the only remaining “plus” Rehberg identifies is the right to be
free from malicious prosecution and unreasonable detention under the Fourth
Amendment. However, Rehberg’s complaint does not allege that Burke’s media
statements caused Rehberg’s indictments and arrest.28 For example, there is no
allegation that the grand jury relied on Burke’s press statements in indicting
Rehberg or that the Defendants relied on Burke’s media statements as probable
cause to arrest Rehberg. Paul’s “stigma-plus” test is not satisfied by simply
28
The complaint does not clearly state whether Burke made his media statements before
Rehberg was indicted or after, but the complaint also does not allege any fact showing that
Burke’s media statements caused Rehberg to be indicted.
44
alleging a constitutional violation somewhere in the case. The constitutional
violation must itself flow from the alleged defamation.29
In any event, Rehberg cannot use the prosecution itself (the indictment and
arrest) as the basis for constitutional injury supporting a § 1983 defamation claim.
The Seventh Circuit considered this precise situation, concluding the plaintiff must
point to some constitutional wrong, other than the indictment and related events, in
order to support a § 1983 constitutional claim based on defamation. “Identifying
the arrest and imprisonment as the loss of liberty does not assist [the plaintiff],
however, because [the prosecutor] has absolute immunity from damages for these
events.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 797 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1085, 115 S. Ct. 740 (1995) (rejecting plaintiff’s arrest as a sufficient
“plus” under the stigma-plus test). The Seventh Circuit explained that, “the
Supreme Court [] adopt[ed] a strict separation between the prosecutor’s role as
advocate and the ancillary events (such as press conferences) surrounding the
prosecution. It would be incongruous to treat the press conference and the
prosecution as distinct for purposes of immunity but not for purposes of defining
29
The district court cited Riley v. City of Montgomery, Ala., 104 F.3d at 1253, for the
proposition that fabricating evidence violates an accused’s constitutional rights, and thus since
Rehberg alleges fabrication in this case, he satisfied Paul’s “stigma-plus” test. Even assuming
evidence was fabricated and that this fabrication was a constitutional violation, nothing in the
complaint connects Hodges’s and Paulk’s alleged evidence fabrication to Burke’s press
statements.
45
the actionable wrong.” Id. at 797-98. The Seventh Circuit concluded that, “a
plaintiff who uses a ‘stigma plus’ approach to avoid Paul and Siegert must identify
a ‘plus’ other than the indictment, trial, and related events for which the defendants
possess absolute prosecutorial immunity.” Id. at 798.
Therefore Rehberg failed to satisfy Paul’s “stigma-plus” test and fails to
allege a constitutional claim based on the press statements. This lack of a
constitutional claim means Burke receives qualified immunity for his press
statements. The district court erred by not finding Burke immune for the
allegations in Count 8.
VI. COUNT 10 – CONSPIRACY
Count 10 alleges Hodges, Burke, and Paulk engaged in a conspiracy to
violate Rehberg’s constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.
“A person may not be prosecuted for conspiring to commit an act that he
may perform with impunity.” Jones, 174 F.3d at 1289 (citations omitted). A
prosecutor cannot be liable for “conspiracy” to violate a defendant’s constitutional
rights by prosecuting him if the prosecutor also is immune from liability for
actually prosecuting the defendant. Rowe, 279 F.3d at 1282. And a witness’s
absolute immunity for testifying prevents any use of that testimony as evidence of
46
the witness’s membership in an unconstitutional conspiracy prior to his testimony.
Id.; Mastroianni, 173 F.3d at 1367.
Rehberg’s conspiracy allegations do not enlarge what he alleged previously
in his complaint. This opinion has already explained why Hodges, Burke, and
Paulk receive absolute or qualified immunity for all of the conduct alleged in
Counts 6 and 8 and why Hodges receives absolute immunity for the retaliatory
prosecution in Count 7. Rehberg cannot state a valid conspiracy claim by alleging
the Defendants conspired to do things they already are immune from doing
directly.
The only portion of Count 7 that remains is Rehberg’s retaliatory
prosecution claim against Paulk alone. The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars
conspiracy claims against corporate or government actors accused of conspiring
together within an organization, preventing Rehberg’s claim that Paulk “conspired”
to initiate a retaliatory prosecution. Dickerson v. Alachua County Commission,
200 F.3d 761, 767 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is not possible for a single legal entity
consisting of the corporation and its agents to conspire with itself, just as it is not
possible for an individual person to conspire with himself”); Denny v. City of
Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1190 (11th Cir. 2001) (applying intracorporate conspiracy
doctrine to city, city fire chief, and city manager). Rehberg has not alleged that
47
Paulk conspired with anyone outside of the District Attorney’s office. See Denny,
247 F.3d at 1191 (“the only two conspirators identified . . . are both City
employees; no outsiders are alleged to be involved”). The “conspiracy” occurred
only within a government entity, and thus the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine
bars Count 10 against Paulk. The district court erred in not dismissing Count 10.
VII. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, Hodges and Paulk receive absolute
immunity for Paulk’s grand jury testimony and for the related pre-indictment
conspiracy conduct alleged in Count 6; Hodges and Paulk receive qualified
immunity for the issuance of subpoenas alleged in Count 6; Hodges receives
absolute immunity for initiating a retaliatory prosecution as alleged in Count 7;
Hodges and Paulk both receive qualified immunity for the retaliatory investigation
alleged in Count 7; Burke receives absolute immunity for the allegations in Count
8, except for the alleged media statements, for which he receives qualified
immunity; and Count 10’s conspiracy claim fails. The only surviving claim from
this appeal is the retaliatory-prosecution claim in Count 7 against Paulk, for which
the district court correctly denied absolute and qualified immunity. We reverse the
district court’s order in part and remand this case for the district court to grant the
Defendants’ motions to dismiss and to enter judgment in favor of all Defendants on
48
Counts 6, 7, 8, and 10, except for the retaliatory-prosecution claim against Paulk in
Count 7.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
49