[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 08-12266 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 13, 2010
________________________
JOHN LEY
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 07-00089-CR-J-32-TEM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WILTON JOSEPH FONTENOT,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(July 13, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT, BARKETT and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:
Wilton Fontenot appeals his conviction under
18 U.S.C. § 1519 for making a
false entry in a document with the intent to impede an investigation within the
jurisdiction of a United States agency. Fontenot claims that, to convict under §
1519, the Government must prove he knew the investigation would be a federal
investigation. Finding this claim without merit under plain error review, we affirm
Fontenot’s conviction.
I.
This appeal stems from an altercation between a corrections officer,
Sergeant Wilton Joseph Fontenot, and a prison inmate, Corey Milledge, at
Florida’s Union Correctional Facility on November 22, 2003. The altercation
occurred when Fontenot and his subordinate, Officer Clyde Daniel, tried to enter
inmate Milledge’s cell to perform an inspection. After the altercation, Fontenot
wrote a use of force report, which indicated that he followed Florida Department of
Corrections procedures and that Milledge attacked him through the feeding slot in
his cell door. Officer Joni White, who was stationed in the control room where she
could see some of the events unfold on surveillance cameras, reported details that
differed from Fontenot’s account. Daniel, who had accompanied Fontenot to
Milledge’s cell, wrote a use of force report that matched Fontenot’s, but he later
2
told an investigator that he had falsified his report at Fontenot’s request.
According to Daniel’s later account, Fontenot entered Milledge’s cell in violation
of department procedures and initiated the altercation by punching Milledge in the
head. The altercation ended when Fontenot choked Milledge into unconsciousness
with a plastic trash bag.
Approximately three years later, Fontenot was charged with several federal
offenses relating to the altercation, including one count of violating
18 U.S.C. §
1519 by knowingly making false entries in a report with the intent to obstruct an
investigation within the jurisdiction of a federal agency.1 Section 1519 provides:
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up,
falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible
object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the
investigation or proper administration of any matter within the
jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any
case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such
matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more
than 20 years, or both.
At trial, Fontenot testified, contrary to his use of force report, that he had
entered Milledge’s cell in violation of department procedures but that Milledge had
initiated the altercation by attacking Fontenot and Daniel. Fontenot claimed he had
falsified his use of force report in an attempt to insulate White and Daniel—who
1
This was the third of three counts on which Fontenot was indicted. The first count
charged Fontenot with violating
18 U.S.C. § 242, and the second count charged him with
violating
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3). The jury acquitted Fontenot on counts one and two.
3
were both junior to him and on probationary status—from severe disciplinary
repercussions that would have resulted from violating department procedures.
After closing arguments, the district court instructed the jury, regarding the §
1519 violation, that
[t]he government is not required to prove that the defendant knew his
conduct would obstruct a federal investigation, or that a federal
investigation would take place, or that he knew of the limits of federal
jurisdiction. However, the government is required to prove that the
investigation that the defendant intended to impede, obstruct, or
influence did, in fact, concern a matter within the jurisdiction of an
agency of the United States.
Fontenot did not object to this instruction, nor did he move the court for a
judgment of acquittal on this point. The jury returned a guilty verdict on the §
1519 count, and the court sentenced Fontenot to fifteen months’ imprisonment.
II.
A.
Fontenot appeals his conviction, arguing that to obtain a conviction under
18
U.S.C. § 1519, the Government had to prove that the defendant knew that the
report would be part of a federal investigation. Because the Government offered
no evidence that Fontenot knew a federal investigation would follow the
altercation, he argues, there was insufficient evidence to convict him.
4
Fontenot is actually challenging the court’s § 1519 jury instruction under the
guise of an insufficient evidence claim: he argues that the Government was
required to and failed to offer evidence that he knew he would be obstructing a
federal investigation, but the court instructed the jury that the Government need
only prove that the investigation he intended to impede “did, in fact, concern a
matter within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States.” Fontenot’s
argument, in essence, is that there was insufficient evidence to convict him under
the jury instruction that the court should have given. Because Fontenot did not
object to the court’s instruction, our review is limited to plain error. United States
v. Mitchell,
146 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 1998).
To reverse under the plain error standard, there must be (1) error, (2) that is
plain, and (3) that affects the appellant’s substantial rights. United States v. Evans,
478 F.3d 1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 2007). If these conditions are satisfied, we have
discretion to recognize forfeited errors that seriously “‘affect[] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’”
Id. (quoting United States
v. Moriarty,
429 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)). An error is plain
when it “is ‘obvious’ and is ‘clear under current law.’” United States v.
Humphrey,
164 F.3d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 734,
113 S. Ct. 1770, 1777,
123 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1993)). “It is the law
5
of this circuit that, at least where the explicit language of a statute or rule does not
specifically resolve an issue, there can be no plain error where there is no
precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolving it.” United
States v. Lejarde-Rada,
319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
B.
Fontenot’s argument fails because it is not clear under current law that §
1519 requires that the defendant know that the investigation will fall within the
jurisdiction of the federal government. To begin with, the text of the statute does
not clearly compel this interpretation. See United States v. DBB, Inc.,
180 F.3d
1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999) (“The starting point for all statutory interpretation is
the language of the statute itself.”). In relevant part, § 1519 prohibits falsifying
documents “with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or
proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or
agency of the United States.” (emphasis added). The plain statutory language does
not compel Fontenot’s desired interpretation; it is at least plausible to read the
second clause as a simple jurisdictional element that operates independently of the
defendant’s intent or knowledge.2
2
We make no holding regarding the actual requirements of the statute. For our
purposes, it is sufficient to observe that the statutory language is not so clear as to allow reversal
for plain error in the jury instructions.
6
Moreover, the little legislative history addressing this clause does not clearly
resolve the issue in Fontenot’s favor. See DBB, Inc., 180 F.3d at 1281 (explaining
that a court will look at legislative intent when the plain meaning is ambiguous).
Senator Leahy, for example, submitted a report suggesting the opposite
interpretation:
Section 1519 is meant to apply broadly to any acts to destroy or
fabricate physical evidence so long as they are done with the intent to
obstruct, impede or influence the investigation or proper
administration of any matter, and such matter is within the jurisdiction
of an agency of the United States, or such acts done either in relation
to or in contemplation of such a matter or investigation.
S. Rep. No. 107-146, at 14 (2002).
Lastly, the United States Supreme Court has not addressed this statute, and
this circuit has only published two cases interpreting § 1519, neither of which
addresses the issue Fontenot raises. In United States v. Hunt,
526 F.3d 739 (11th
Cir. 2008), a panel of this court upheld a § 1519 conviction against a challenge that
the statute did not give fair warning that it would apply to Hunt’s conduct as
required by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.3 Id. at 741. Hunt, a
police officer, had falsified a police report to cover up the use of excessive force
3
The other published case, United States v. Hoffman-Vaile,
568 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir.
2009), does not address whether knowledge of federal jurisdiction is required at all. It holds (in
relevant part) that federal grand jury subpoenas fall under § 1519 because they are issued “‘in
relation to or contemplation of’ any matter ‘within the jurisdiction of any department or agency
of the United States[.]’” Id. at 1343 (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 1519) (alteration in original).
7
during an arrest and was later investigated by the FBI.
Id. at 742. He argued that §
1519, which was passed as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, was targeted at
corporate fraud, not conduct like his. Id. at 744. The Hunt court held that the
statute did give fair warning that it applied to Hunt’s conduct because a “person of
ordinary intelligence would understand a police report to be a ‘record’ or
‘document’” under the statute and would understand an FBI investigation to be a
“‘matter within the jurisdiction of [a] department . . . of the United States.’” Id. at
743 (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 1519) (alteration in the original). Hunt also challenged
the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him, claiming the prosecution never
offered evidence of his intent. The court reviewed the circumstantial evidence
presented, including Hunt’s own testimony and evidence that Hunt knew the FBI
investigated claims of excessive force, and concluded that sufficient evidence did
exist to support the conviction.
Id. at 745.
Importantly, Hunt did not address whether § 1519 requires knowledge that
the investigation falls under federal jurisdiction. Hunt’s knowledge that the FBI
could investigate his conduct was relevant because it was used circumstantially to
establish Hunt’s intent to impede an investigation. The Hunt court never held that
knowledge of federal jurisdiction was an element of the offense; Hunt’s knowledge
8
was merely sufficient in that case to prove intent.4 There is thus no circuit law that
clearly requires the government to prove that a defendant knows the investigation
falls under federal jurisdiction as Fontenot argues.
III.
Because it is not clear under current law that the Government had to prove
that Fontenot knew his conduct could be subject to a federal investigation, the
district court’s instruction to the contrary was not plain error.5 Fontenot’s
conviction is therefore
AFFIRMED.
4
In his brief, Fontenot cites the following passage from Hunt to support his position:
“Adequate circumstantial evidence exists to support the jury’s conclusion. The Government put
forth evidence Hunt knew claims of excessive force would be investigated by the FBI . . . .”
United States v. Hunt,
526 F.3d 739, 745 (11th Cir. 2008). When read in context, this passage is
equivocal. The court was responding to Hunt’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to
prove he intended to obstruct the investigation because in his view the evidence showed that he
simply made a misstatement in his report. The court mentioned the FBI merely because that was
the law enforcement agency that had in fact investigated Hunt and because there was evidence
that Hunt had anticipated that investigation. Indeed, in addressing Hunt’s due process challenge
earlier in its opinion, the Hunt court wrote, “[w]e hold § 1519’s plain language placed Hunt on
notice that his action of knowingly making a false statement about the circumstances of
Woodard’s arrest with the intent to impede an FBI investigation was conduct sufficiently
proscribed by § 1519.” Id. at 744. This passage establishes only that intent to impede an FBI
investigation is sufficient to trigger § 1519—it does not make it clear that such intent is required.
5
Fontenot seems to argue in the alternative that there was insufficient evidence to
convict him under the jury instructions as given. This argument lacks merit. Fontenot testified
that he knowingly included false information in his use of force report and that he did so to
impede an investigation. An FBI agent testified about her FBI investigation into the altercation
between Fontenot and Milledge, from which a jury could infer that the investigation fell within
the jurisdiction of a federal agency or department.
9
BARKETT, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:
I agree that we need not reach the merits in this case (as Mr. Fontenot has not
met his burden on plain error review), but I believe that the following additional
excerpts from the legislative history are illuminating.
Chairman John Conyers, in introducing the legislation and reading from the
section-by-section analysis of the bill, noted that § 1519 created a new “felony
which could be effectively used in a wide array of cases where a person destroys or
creates evidence with the specific intent to obstruct a federal agency or a criminal
investigation.” 148 Cong. Rec. E463-01, E463 (daily ed. Apr. 9, 2002) (statement
of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.).
Section 1519’s expansive scope is reaffirmed by Senator Leahy’s remarks
when introducing the bill he co-sponsored. Senator Leahy elaborated that for
prosecutions brought under § 1519, “[t]here would be no technical requirement that
a judicial proceeding was already underway or that the documents were formally
under subpoena.” 148 Cong. Rec. S1783-01, S1786 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 2002)
(statement of Sen. Leahy). Months later, Senator Leahy quoted a portion of the
section-by-section analysis of the bill to explain that while other statutes “such as
18 U.S.C. § 1503, ha[d] been narrowly interpreted by courts, including the Supreme
Court in United States v. [Aguilar],
115 S. Ct. 593 (1995), to apply only to
10
situations where the obstruction of justice can be closely tied to a pending judicial
proceeding,” § 1519 was intended to “apply broadly” to remove these “technical
requirement[s], which some courts have read into other obstruction of justice
statutes, to tie the obstructive conduct to a pending or imminent proceeding or
matter by intent or otherwise.” Id. at S7419. Senator Leahy further quoted the
section-by-section analysis to emphasize that:
The fact that a matter is within the jurisdiction of a federal agency is
intended to be a jurisdictional matter, and not in any way linked to the
intent of the defendant.
Id.
11
