Garland Hogan v. United States , 550 F. App'x 756 ( 2013 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-12979
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket Nos. 9:09-cv-81530-DTKH,
9:99-cr-08125-DTKH-2
GARLAND HOGAN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(December 19, 2013)
Before WILSON, PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Garland Hogan, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of his
counseled 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence
following his convictions for one count of conspiracy to commit wire and mail
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, nine counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1341, one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and one count of money laundering, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1957. Hogan claimed that his trial counsel, Nathan Clark, rendered
constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to seek to suppress statements that
Hogan made at a pretrial debriefing in 1999. At the debriefing, he made
statements indicating that he had lied to the grand jury under oath. At the
underlying criminal trial, the government presented these statements as evidence of
his guilt.
A magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing and issued a report and
recommendation (R&R) recommending that Hogan’s § 2255 motion be denied
because the debriefing did not constitute a plea negotiation. The magistrate
discredited Hogan’s testimony, and concluded that Hogan had written a comment
stating that he did not attend the debriefing with the intent of pleading guilty on a
memo related to the debriefing. The district court adopted the R&R in full and
denied Hogan’s motion.
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On appeal, Hogan argues that Clark provided ineffective assistance by
failing to file a motion to suppress the statements he made at the debriefing. He
contends that the government’s statements in the debriefing memo along with the
testimony at the § 2255 hearing demonstrate that the debriefing was essentially
part of a plea negotiation. He claims Clark’s failure to seek to suppress Hogan’s
statements constituted deficient performance, which was prejudicial because the
government relied heavily on his admission that he lied to the grand jury to
undermine his credibility at trial and prove that he had the requisite knowledge and
intent to commit the offenses.
“In a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding, we review a district court’s legal
conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error.” Devine v. United States,
520 F.3d 1286, 1287 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). “A claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo.”
Id. Substantial deference is given to the factfinder in reaching credibility
determinations. Id. We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Lucas
v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2001).
To make a successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must show both that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient
performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,
104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). We are not required to consider the two prongs in
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any particular order. Dell v. United States, 710 F.3d 1267, 1274 (11th Cir. 2013).
Because the petitioner must establish both prongs, we “need not address the
performance prong if the defendant cannot meet the prejudice prong, or vice
versa.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Regarding the performance prong, “counsel is strongly presumed to have
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of
reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct.
at 2066. The prisoner must “establish that counsel performed outside the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance and made errors so serious that he
failed to function as the kind of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.”
Butcher v. United States, 368 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2004). To show
prejudice, a defendant must establish “a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. “The prejudice prong
requires a petitioner to demonstrate that seriously deficient performance of his
attorney prejudiced the defense.” Butcher, 368 F.3d at 1293.
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “[t]he
admissibility . . . of a plea, plea discussion, and any related statement is governed
by Federal Rule of Evidence 410.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(f). Rule 410 states, in
relevant part, that any statement made in the course of any Rule 11 proceeding is
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not admissible against a defendant in any civil or criminal proceeding. Fed. R.
Evid. 410(a)(3). A court cannot admit a statement made during plea discussions if
the discussions did not result in a guilty plea or resulted in a later-withdrawn guilty
plea. Fed. R. Evid. 410(a)(4). “To determine whether a discussion should be
characterized as a plea negotiation the trial court must determine, first, whether the
accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of
the discussion, and, second, whether the accused’s expectation was reasonable
given the totality of the objective circumstances.” United States v. Merrill, 685
F.3d 1002, 1013 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Clark’s failure to file a suppression motion did not constitute deficient
performance because the debriefing was not a plea negotiation for the purposes of
Rule 11 and Rule 410. Critically, Hogan’s comments on the debriefing memo
indicate that he never expressed a desire to plead guilty, which demonstrates that
he did not have a subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the debriefing. See
Merrill, 685 F.3d at 1013. Though Hogan says that the comments in the memo
were not written by him, he admitted to sending the edited memo to Clark via e-
mail and Clark said that he relied on Hogan’s statement that he did not participate
in the debriefing with the intent of pleading guilty. Further, the magistrate
discredited Hogan’s testimony and concluded that he had prepared the comment in
the memo. See Devine, 520 F.3d at 1287 (“We allot substantial deference to the
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factfinder in reaching credibility determinations with respect to witness
testimony.” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)).
Even if Hogan had the subjective expectation to negotiate a plea, he
admitted that he voluntarily participated at the debriefing and that he understood
that he was not being promised any benefit for his cooperation, and there was
never a firm plea offer from the government. Given the government’s firm
position that it would not promise any benefits to Hogan for his cooperation, any
expectation that Hogan had to negotiate a plea was not objectively reasonable. See
Merrill, 685 F.3d at 1013. Ultimately, even if Hogan had a colorable argument
that his statements at the purported plea negotiations were inadmissible, counsel’s
failure to raise the issue cannot be construed to be “outside the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.” Butcher, 368 F.3d at 1293. Thus, Hogan has
failed to make a showing of deficient performance on the part of his trial counsel.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Hogan’s § 2255 motion.
AFFIRMED.
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