United States v. Cedric Lamar Jackson , 463 F. App'x 835 ( 2012 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 11-10515 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar MARCH 8, 2012
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:05-cr-00479-WCO-AJB-3
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CEDRIC LAMAR JACKSON,
a.k.a. Detroit,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(March 8, 2012)
Before CARNES, WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In 2008, Cedric Lamar Jackson was sentenced to five years’ incarceration
and three years’ supervised release after he pled guilty to conspiracy to commit
several sex trafficking offenses. Jackson now appeals his 24-month sentence
following the revocation of his supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3). He argues his sentence is substantively unreasonable. Upon careful
review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse of
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591 (2007). The party
challenging the sentence has the burden of establishing it is unreasonable. United
States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). We will reverse only if left
with the “definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear
error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that
lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.”
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1813 (2011).
Upon determining a defendant violated a condition of supervised release,
the district court may revoke the term of supervision and impose imprisonment
after considering the § 3553(a) factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). If the district court
decides a sentence outside of the Guidelines range is warranted, it must consider
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the extent of the deviation and ensure that the § 3553(a) factors, as a whole, justify
the degree of the variance. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir.
2008).
Jackson has not met his burden of establishing the district court abused its
discretion. The court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors, and disagreed
with Jackson’s characterization of his violations as “technical.” The court
concluded Jackson had been unable to adjust to free society and that he posed a
threat to others, based on both his recent behavior and his past criminal history.
The court’s conclusions were adequately supported by Jackson’s own admissions
to the court and to his probation officers, by his presentence investigation report,
and by the testimony presented during his sentencing hearing. Accordingly,
Jackson’s 24-month sentence—the statutory maximum—was not outside the range
of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case. See Irey, 612 F.3d at
1190.
AFFIRMED.
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