Scott Stevens v. Dana Meier ( 2013 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-15652
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:08-cv-00056-WCO
iPARAMETRICS, LLC,
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant,
versus
RICHARD M. HOWE,
Respondent,
DANA MEIER,
M3 COST MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.,
JON MEIER,
Defendants-Counter Claimants-Appellees,
SCOTT M. STEVENS,
Respondent-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(June 27, 2013)
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Before HULL, PRYOR and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Scott M. Stevens, an attorney, appeals pro se the formal reprimand that he
received for misrepresenting to the district court and a Georgia court that Jon
Meier was indebted to iParametrics, LLC. The district court sua sponte sanctioned
Stevens for violating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(c)(3). We affirm.
iParametrics sued Jon Meier, his wife, Dana Meier, and their company, M3
Cost Management Services, Inc. Later, an arbitrator awarded iParametrics a
judgment of $501,711 against Dana Meier and M3, but found Jon Meier not liable.
The district court confirmed the arbitration award and entered judgment against
Dana Meier and M3.
Stevens sought to enforce the judgment against Jon Meier. iParametrics
retained Stevens to collect the judgment, and Stevens applied for a writ of
execution against Jon Meier, Dana Meier, and M3. The Clerk of the district court
granted Stevens’s application, and the Clerk issued a writ of execution. Stevens
later recorded the writ of execution in the Superior Court of Forsyth County,
Georgia. Another attorney in Stevens’s law firm mailed collection letters to Jon
Meier and later mailed post-judgment interrogatories to him too. Jon Meier failed
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to respond, and Stevens then moved the district court to compel Meier to respond
to the discovery request.
After the district court performed a “cursory review of the motion and
record” and discovered that judgment had not been entered against Jon Meier, the
district court denied Stevens’s motion to compel and instructed Stevens and the
other attorney in his firm to show cause why they should not be sanctioned under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. With respect to Stevens, the district court
identified three actions that it considered sanctionable: (1) falsely representing that
a judgment had been entered against Jon Meier in the application for a writ of
execution; (2) applying for a writ of execution against Meier when he did not have
a judgment against him; and (3) falsely representing that a judgment had been
entered against Meier in the motion to compel discovery. Stevens then moved the
district court to “correct the Writ of Execution . . . by removing the name of Jon
Meir [sic] which was inadvert[e]ntly included on said Writ of Execution,” and
Stevens withdrew his motion to compel.
In response to the order to show cause, Stevens admitted that the writ should
not have been filed against Jon Meier, but attributed the mistakes to a “clerical
error” committed by a paralegal. Stevens stated that the paralegal had filed the
application for a writ of execution using Stevens’s electronic signature, and that he
had relied on the application to prepare his motion to compel. Stevens argued that
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the clerical error did not come to his attention until the district court had issued its
order to show cause.
During a hearing on the order to show cause, Stevens acknowledged that he
was counsel of record and responsible for the content of his filings. Stevens
argued that his conduct was unintentional and that sanctions were unnecessary to
deter future similar conduct. Following the hearing, Stevens submitted to the
district court a copy of an affidavit that he recently had filed requesting that the
Superior Court of Forsyth County cancel the writ of execution against Jon Meier.
The district court entered an order that formally reprimanded Stevens for
failing to comply with Rule 11 and that withdrew and dissolved the writ of
execution against Jon Meier. The district court found that the writ of execution
was objectively frivolous because iParametrics had not obtained a judgment
against Meier, and that Stevens had failed to reasonably inquire into Meier’s
liability before applying for the writ of execution or filing the motion to compel.
The district court determined that Stevens had “acted with ‘deliberate indifference”
by disregarding the “significant impact” the writ could have had on Meier; failing
to detect the error when it “could have been discovered . . . [with] ease”; and
neglecting his duty to “ensure that [the writ of execution] was factually and legally
[accurate].” And the district court found “troubling” Stevens’s “lack of the
appreciation for the certification requirements of Rule 11” and “even more
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troubling . . . that this [was] not an isolated incident” because “Stevens apparently
failed to satisfy his Rule 11 obligations . . . when he subsequently engaged in debt
collection efforts against Jon Meier and submitted a motion . . . to find him in
contempt.” The district court determined that a reprimand was “sufficient to deter
future instances of [similar] conduct and encourage Stevens to take his Rule 11
obligations more seriously.”
We review the imposition of sanctions under Rule 11 for an abuse of
discretion. Kaplan v. DaimlerChrysler, A.G., 331 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir.
2003). A district court abuses its discretion by imposing sanctions only if it
“base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous
assessment of the evidence.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405,
110 S. Ct. 2447, 2461 (1990).
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it sanctioned Stevens.
When an attorney signs and “present[s]” pleadings to the district court, he certifies
that he has conducted a reasonable inquiry, his claims “are warranted by existing
law,” and his “factual contentions have evidentiary support.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a),
(b). Stevens violated Rule 11 by filing pleadings that were factually and legally
inaccurate. Because no judgment had been entered against Jon Meier, Stevens’s
application for a writ of execution and motion to compel discovery from Meier
were “objectively frivolous,” and Stevens “should have been aware that [his
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filings] were frivolous.” See Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 524 (11th Cir.
1998).
The district court was entitled to find that Stevens’s conduct was “akin to
contempt.” See Kaplan, 331 F.3d at 1256. Stevens could readily have discovered
and corrected his pleadings, but instead his misrepresentations went undetected for
over a year. After the district court issued its order, Stevens waited more than a
month to remedy the misrepresentations made to the district court, and he delayed
even longer before cancelling the writ against Jon Meier in the state court.
The district court complied with all the procedural requirements of Rule 11
before sanctioning Stevens. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1), (c)(3). The district court
notified Stevens that he had violated Rule 11, and the district court held a hearing
at which Stevens could respond before imposing a sanction. The district court did
not abuse its discretion by formally reprimanding Stevens based on the potential
seriousness of his misrepresentation, the extent of his negligence, and his delays in
undertaking corrective measures.
We AFFIRM the formal reprimand of Stevens.
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