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United States v. Thomas Stacey McDonald ( 2012 )


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  •            Case: 11-14182    Date Filed: 11/16/2012        Page: 1 of 7
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 11-14182
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 3:11-cr-00030-LC-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    THOMAS STACEY MCDONALD,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (November 16, 2012)
    Before MARTIN, JORDAN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 11-14182     Date Filed: 11/16/2012   Page: 2 of 7
    Thomas Stacey McDonald pleaded guilty to theft of government property
    valued at over $1,000, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 641
    . McDonald’s Presentence
    Investigation Report (PSR) recommended a sentence guideline range of 30 to 37
    months, based on a criminal history category of VI, and a total offense level of 12,
    including a two-level obstruction of justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
    Although McDonald pleaded guilty in a timely manner, the PSR did not
    recommend a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under
    U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 because McDonald had engaged in conduct constituting
    obstruction of justice. Id., comment. (n.4). The district court adopted the findings
    of fact contained in the PSR, and sentenced McDonald to 84 months imprisonment
    based on the PSR’s finding that McDonald’s “criminal history category
    substantially under-represent[ed] the seriousness of [McDonald’s] criminal
    history.” See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1). This appeal followed.
    McDonald argues here that his sentence must be vacated because the district
    court erred by applying the two-level obstruction of justice enhancement and by
    denying the two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. McDonald did
    not object to the PSR’s recommendation against an adjustment for acceptance of
    responsibility at the time of his sentencing. Nor did he object to the obstruction of
    justice enhancement. “We review sentencing arguments raised for the first time
    2
    Case: 11-14182     Date Filed: 11/16/2012    Page: 3 of 7
    on appeal for plain error.” United States v. Bonilla, 
    579 F.3d 1233
    , 1238 (11th
    Cir. 2009). “In order to find plain error, (1) there must be error; (2) the error must
    be plain; and (3) the error must affect substantial rights.” 
    Id.
     (quotation marks
    omitted). Additionally, “the decision to correct the forfeited error is within the
    sound discretion of the court of appeals, and we should only exercise that
    discretion if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
    judicial proceedings.” 
    Id. at 1239
     (quotation marks and alteration omitted).
    McDonald’s argument that the district court committed plain error in
    applying the obstruction of justice enhancement is not persuasive. Under the
    Guidelines, the court may assess a two-level enhancement if the defendant
    “willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the
    administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or
    sentencing of the instant offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The
    obstruction must relate to either the defendant’s offense of conviction and any
    relevant conduct, or an otherwise closely related case, such as that of a co-
    defendant. Id.; see also id., comment. (n.1). Obstructive conduct may include
    “providing materially false information to a judge,” or making a “materially false
    statement to a law enforcement officer that significantly obstructed or impeded the
    official investigation or prosecution of the instant offense.” Id., comment. (n.4(F)-
    3
    Case: 11-14182     Date Filed: 11/16/2012   Page: 4 of 7
    (G)).
    Here, immediately after pleading guilty, McDonald sent a signed, notarized
    letter to the Assistant U.S. Attorney prosecuting his case in which he made
    materially false statements regarding the culpability of his co-defendant and his
    wife, Teresa McDonald (Teresa). In pertinent part, the letter requested that the
    government drop “all charges” against Teresa because “[she] had no knowledge
    that the bike that [McDonald] told her to pick up was not paid for.” The letter was
    forwarded to the magistrate judge presiding over Teresa’s case. Teresa later
    pleaded guilty to theft of government property. During her plea colloquy, Teresa
    informed the court that the contents of the letter were untrue and asked that they
    be disregarded. A defendant need not have been successful in his attempt to
    obstruct or impede the administration of justice in order for the enhancement to
    apply. See United States v. Taylor, 
    88 F.3d 938
    , 944 (11th Cir. 1996). Therefore,
    the district court did not err in applying the obstruction of justice enhancement
    here.
    Likewise, the district court did not err in refusing to grant McDonald a two-
    level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The Guidelines provide for a two-
    level downward adjustment if the defendant “clearly demonstrates acceptance of
    responsibility for his offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). “Entry of a plea of guilty
    4
    Case: 11-14182     Date Filed: 11/16/2012    Page: 5 of 7
    prior to the commencement of trial” is evidence of acceptance of responsibility,
    but “[a] defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to an adjustment . . . as a
    matter of right.” Id., comment. (n.3). This is particularly true where, as here, “a
    defendant [has] falsely denie[d], or frivolously contest[ed], relevant conduct that
    the court determines to be true.” See id., comment. (n.1(A)). Moreover, unless it
    is an “extraordinary” case, “[c]onduct resulting in an [obstruction of justice]
    enhancement . . . ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted
    responsibility for his criminal conduct.” See id., comment. (n.4).
    “In light of our affirmance of the enhancement for obstruction of justice,
    [McDonald] would be entitled to an acceptance of responsibility adjustment only
    if this were an extraordinary case.” United States v. Amedeo, 
    370 F.3d 1305
    ,
    1321 (11th Cir. 2004). McDonald argues that extraordinary circumstances exist
    here because he “admitted his guilt from day one to anyone who would listen and
    explained the reasons for his illegal actions: his drug addiction.” We have,
    however, consistently held that a district court does not err in refusing to grant an
    acceptance of responsibility adjustment where the defendant admits his guilt, but
    also provides materially false information to authorities. See, e.g., 
    id.
     at 1320–21;
    United States v. Arguedas, 
    86 F.3d 1054
    , 1060 (11th Cir. 1996).
    Even if we accept for the sake of argument McDonald’s claim that his case
    5
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    is extraordinary because “[h]e simply wrote the prosecutor in an attempt to protect
    his wife,” McDonald still cannot satisfy the requirements of the plain error test.
    Not only must there have been an “error” that is “plain,” but that error must have
    affected McDonald’s “substantial rights.” Bonilla, 
    579 F.3d at 1238
    . In order for
    an error to have affected a defendant’s substantial rights, the defendant “must
    establish a reasonable probability of a different result but for the error.” United
    States v. Rodriguez, 
    627 F.3d 1372
    , 1382 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks
    omitted). “That means that where the effect of an error on the result in the district
    court is uncertain or indeterminate—where we would have to speculate—the
    appellant has not met his burden of showing a reasonable probability of a different
    result.” 
    Id.
     (quotation marks omitted).
    Here, at sentencing, the district court imposed a sentence above
    McDonald’s recommended guideline range based on a determination that his
    “[c]riminal [h]istory [c]ategory substantially underrepresents the seriousness of
    [his] criminal history and the likelihood that [he will] commit other crimes.” The
    court also stated clearly that McDonald’s sentence would have been higher but for
    the mitigating factors presented by McDonald’s attorney, which included
    McDonald’s desire to shield his wife from criminal prosecution. Because the
    district court varied above the Guidelines range, on this record it is not apparent
    6
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    that McDonald’s sentence would have been different even if the district court had
    granted the acceptance of responsibility reduction.
    For these reasons, McDonald’s sentence is
    AFFIRMED.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-14182

Judges: Martin, Jordan, Anderson

Filed Date: 11/16/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024