United States v. Esteban Alcapone Rosario , 520 F. App'x 928 ( 2013 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-14300
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-00416-WBH-GGB-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ESTEBAN ALCAPONE ROSARIO,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(June 4, 2013)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Appellant Esteban Alcapone Rosario appeals his conviction for knowingly
making a material false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Federal Air Marshal
Service, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. On appeal, Rosario argues that the
government presented insufficient evidence that the false statement made to the
Federal Air Marshal, concerning the actual number of guns in his luggage, was
“material,” and, thus, the district court should have granted his Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 29 motion and his motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.
“We review both a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and the
denial of a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal de novo.” United States v.
Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 497 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 826 (2011). In
considering the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask whether, viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. We resolve
all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict. Id.To sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 for making a false statement
to a federal government agency, we must find that the government offered enough
evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt: “(1) that the defendant made a false
statement; (2) that the statement was material; (3) that the defendant acted with
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specific intent to mislead; and (4) that the matter was within the purview of a
federal government agency.” United States v. McCarrick, 294 F.3d 1286, 1290
(11th Cir. 2002). Rosario only challenges the second element, the materiality of
his false statement.
The question of materiality must be submitted to the jury. United States v.
Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 522–23, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2320 (1995). Determining
whether a statement is material involves the consideration of “at least two
subsidiary questions of purely historical fact: (a) ‘what statement was made?’ and
(b) ‘what decision was the agency trying to make?’ The ultimate question:
(c) ‘whether the statement was material to the decision,’ requires applying the legal
standard of materiality . . . to these historical facts.” Id. at 512, 115 S. Ct. at 2314.
To be material, the statement “must have a natural tendency to influence, or be
capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was
addressed.” Id. at 509, 115 S.Ct. at 2313 (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted). “The government is not required to prove that the statement had actual
influence.” United States v. Boffil–Rivera, 607 F.3d 736, 741 (11th Cir. 2010).
We conclude from the record here that the government presented sufficient
evidence to justify the district court’s denial of Rosario’s Rule 29 motion for a
judgment of acquittal, and to convict Rosario of making a material false statement
to a Federal Air Marshal regarding the number of firearms in his luggage.
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Testimony established that TSA requires all passengers to declare all firearms in
order to protect the security of airports and aircraft, and that undeclared firearms
present security concerns such as the possible placement of loaded firearms on an
aircraft. Further, considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, a rational factfinder could have found the essential element of
materiality beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable jury could conclude that a
false statement as to the number of guns in a bag had the potential to influence a
Federal Air Marshal and the TSA in deciding how and whether to further
investigate Rosario and his luggage. As corroborated by testimony at trial,
although there is no limit to the number of weapons a passenger may bring aboard,
at some point the number could become suspicious and worthy of investigation.
Thus, Rosario’s false statement was at least capable of influencing a federal
government agency. See id. at 741–42 (requiring the government to prove only
that a false statement is capable of influencing a federal agency, not that it actually
influenced the agency). Accordingly, we affirm Rosario’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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