United States v. Jose Macia-Sanchez ( 2012 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JAN 6, 2012
No. 11-12618
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-00529-TWT-JFK-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSE MACIA-SANCHEZ,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(January 6, 2012)
Before CARNES, WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jose Macia-Sanchez appeals his 77-month sentence imposed following his
guilty plea to illegal reentry, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2). Macia-
Sanchez argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.
We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008). “The
review for substantive unreasonableness involves examining the totality of the
circumstances, including an inquiry into whether the statutory factors in [18
U.S.C.] § 3553(a) support the sentence in question.” United States v. Gonzalez,
550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). “[T]he party who challenges the sentence
bears the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in the light of
both [the] record and the factors in section 3553(a).” United States v. Talley, 431
F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). “The weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a)
factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” United
States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation and alteration
omitted). We vacate a sentence only if “left with the definite and firm conviction
that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the
§ 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable
sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160,
1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1813 (2011) (quotation
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omitted). Although we do not automatically presume a sentence within the
guidelines range is reasonable, we ordinarily expect a sentence within the
guidelines range to be reasonable. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th
Cir. 2008).
When sentencing a defendant, a district court shall consider: (1) the nature
and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense, to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, to protect the public
from further crimes of the defendant, and to provide the defendant with training,
medical care, or correctional treatment; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4)
the sentencing guidelines’ range; (5) pertinent Sentencing Commission policy
statements; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among
similarly situated defendants with similar records; and (7) the need to provide
restitution to victims. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
After considering the record and the parties’ briefs, we find that Macia-
Sanchez has not established that his sentence is unreasonable. Macia-Sanchez has
a substantial criminal history, including multiple drug trafficking and firearm
offenses, as well as four prior deportations. Macia-Sanchez’s latest illegal reentry
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occurred less than a year after his last deportation. The district court calculated
Macia-Sanchez’s guideline range to be 77 to 96 months’ imprisonment, found his
arguments in favor of a variance unavailing, and sentenced him to 77 months
imprisonment. After considering the totality of the facts and circumstances in
light of the 3553(a) factors, we conclude the district court’s sentence falls within
the range of reasonableness. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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