United States v. Lawrence Lockhart , 499 F. App'x 960 ( 2012 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-12448
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:11-cr-00287-GAP-KRS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LAWRENCE LOCKHART,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(December 5, 2012)
Before HULL, JORDAN and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Lawrence Lockhart appeals his total sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment,
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imposed below the applicable guideline range of 188 to 235 months’
imprisonment, after he pled guilty to distribution and possession with intent to
distribute cocaine base (“crack cocaine”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(C). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm Lockhart’s sentence.
I.
According to the presentence investigation report (“PSI”), Lockhart was
arrested after he sold eight grams of crack cocaine to a confidential source. The
PSI classified Lockhart as a career offender, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, due to
him having at least two qualifying prior convictions, and, thus, he had an
enhanced offense level of 34. After a 3-level reduction for his acceptance of
responsibility, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), (b), he had a total offense level of
31, a criminal history category of VI, and an applicable guideline range of 188 to
235 months’ imprisonment.
The PSI stated that, between 1989 and 1990, Lockhart was convicted of
petit theft, battery, aggravated battery, three counts of aggravated assault on a law
enforcement officer, improper exhibition of a weapon or firearm, possession of a
firearm by a convicted felony, and possession of cocaine and cannabis. In 2000,
he was convicted of fleeing and attempting to elude a law enforcement officer,
reckless driving, criminal mischief, and trespass to the land of another. Other than
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various convictions for traffic offenses, his only other conviction until the instant
offense occurred in 2003, for delivery of cocaine.
Before sentencing, Lockhart requested a downward variance from the
applicable guideline range. Specifically, he requested a sentence within the range
of 41 to 51 months’ imprisonment, which was the guideline range that would have
applied had he not been classified as a career offender. He argued that the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors supported the variance, noting that his offense was
relatively minor and that the seriousness of his misbehavior had decreased over the
past 20 years.
At sentencing, the government objected to Lockhart’s request for a
downward variance because Lockhart’s criminal history was violent, involved
drug activity, and was extensive. Lockhart responded that his criminal history was
“problematic,” but most of his violent history occurred when he was 18 or 19
years of age. Further, his last drug offense occurred in 2003. Lockhart also had
his daughter and his girlfriend provide statements concerning the positive role he
played in their lives and the lives of his children. Lockhart, speaking on his own
behalf, apologized for committing his offense and requested leniency.
In considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors, the district court stated that,
although drug trafficking was a serious problem in the United States, Lockhart’s
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offense was minor, as it involved eight grams of crack cocaine. The district court
had concerns about the severity of the enhancement in light of the circumstances
of Lockhart’s criminal history, which demonstrated that the most serious offenses
occurred 20 years before the instant offense. The court stated that it was uncertain
whether anything it did would deter the drug trade, but found that the need-to-
deter factor, in this case, was not a mitigating factor. The court further stated that
it was difficult to determine what sentence would promote respect for the law and
just punishment in light of the fact that the career offender guideline applied. The
court then imposed a sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment based on the statutory
factors, finding that the sentence was more than adequate and sufficient, but not
greater than necessary to comply with the statutory objectives.
II.
On appeal, Lockhart argues that his sentence was substantively
unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances. According to Lockhart, his
offense of conviction was a minor, non-violent drug crime. Further, his criminal
history reflected that most of his previous convictions were from over 20 years
ago. Thus, Lockhart contends that the career offender guideline should have had
no role in the district court’s analysis of the § 3553(a) factors, and the court should
have imposed a sentence within the guideline range that would have applied had
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he not been classified as a career offender.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse of
discretion standard of review. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.
Ct. 586, 591, 169 L. Ed. 2d 445 (2007). A district court’s sentence need not be the
most appropriate one, but rather need only be a reasonable one. United States v.
Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1191 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). We may set aside a sentence
only if we determine, after giving a full measure of deference to the sentencing
judge, that the sentence imposed truly is unreasonable. Id. The party challenging
the sentence has the burden of establishing that the sentence was unreasonable
based on the record and the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States
v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005).
In reviewing a sentence’s substantive reasonableness, we examine the
totality of the circumstances, which includes an inquiry into whether the § 3553(a)
factors support the sentence in question. United States v. Gonzales, 550 F.3d
1319, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2008). The district court must impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes listed in
§ 3553(a)(2), including the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote
respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, deter criminal
conduct, and protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct. See
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18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In imposing a particular sentence, the court must also
consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and
characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable
guideline range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the
need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide
restitution to victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
Where a defendant’s criminal record shows that the defendant should be
classified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, his offense level is driven
by the statutory maximum penalty for the offense, rather than the quantity of drugs
he was trafficking. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). Yet, the Guidelines sentence range
yielded pursuant to § 4B1.1 is still advisory. See United States v. Williams, 435
F.3d 1350, 1354-56 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that the district court had applied the
career offender guideline and that the resulting guideline range was advisory, and
affirming the imposition of a sentence outside of the advisory guideline range,
where the court had not imposed the sentence solely because of a disagreement
with the Guidelines, but rather gave specific, valid reasons for its sentence).
Lockhart has not shown that the district court imposed a substantively
unreasonable sentence. Lockhart’s sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment was well
below the applicable guideline range of 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment. The
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record demonstrates that the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors in
imposing the sentence, and there is nothing in the record demonstrating that the
sentence is unreasonable based on those factors. Although the district court
recognized several reasons for varying from the applicable guideline range of 188
to 235 months’ imprisonment, Lockhart still had a significant criminal history,
involving previous drug convictions, aggravated assault on a law enforcement
officer, and aggravated battery. The court found that the sentence imposed was
certainly sufficient, but not greater than necessary to comply with the statutory
objectives, and Lockhart has not shown otherwise. Accordingly, the district
court’s decision to not sentence Lockhart within the guideline range that would
apply in the absence of the career offender guideline was not substantively
unreasonable.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Lockhart’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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