Robert Langermann v. Samuel J. Dubbin , 613 F. App'x 850 ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-15136
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-22531-KMM
ROBERT LANGERMANN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SAMUEL J. DUBBIN,
JONATHAN W. CUNEO,
STEVE W. BERMAN,
ILYA RUBINSTEIN,
“Elie”,
DAVID C. WROBEL, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(June 3, 2015)
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Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Langermann brought this action alleging that the Defendants
improperly denied him benefits he is due under a class action settlement. The
district court dismissed his suit as barred by res judicata and denied his pending
summary judgment motion as moot. The district court also imposed a filing
injunction against Langermann as a Rule 11 sanction because this is his third
attempt to litigate these same claims. He appeals, and we affirm.
I
In the waning months of World War II, United States Army forces in Austria
seized a train laden with gold, jewelry, works of art and other valuable personal
property—riches that had been confiscated from some 800,000 Jews by Hungary’s
Nazi-allied government. In the spring of 1945, the Hungarian government secreted
the loot westward into Austria, away from the advancing Soviet Army, where it
was intercepted. The United States government, which kept and housed the seized
property, declared the treasure’s rightful owners “unidentifiable.” Despite pleas
from organizations representing Hungarian Jewry, the United States refused to
return or repatriate the property, which it deemed ownerless. Some was auctioned
off, some was transferred to the Austrian postwar government, some was pilfered
from U.S. storage, and some was requisitioned by high-ranking U.S. officers for
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their own personal use. The train, owing to its origin and its surfeit of gold,
became known as the “Hungarian Gold Train.”
More than fifty-five years later, a group of Hungarian Jews brought a
putative class action against the United States in the District Court for the Southern
District of Florida, alleging that the United States government’s conduct related to
the Gold Train violated, among other things, the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause.
In 2005, a district court certified a class of nearly 50,000 people with
ownership claims to property on the Gold Train and approved a $25.5 million
settlement. The settlement did not call for direct distribution of funds to class
members. Instead, it created a cy pres distribution system: the funds would “be
used for the direct provision of social services and humanitarian relief to eligible
Victims of Nazi Persecution who are in need.” To effect this goal, social service
agencies would field requests for settlement funds from needy Holocaust survivors.
The agencies would be responsible for verifying the requesters’ eligibility and need
for funds based on documentation or home visits.
II
That brings us to our plaintiff, Robert Langermann. He is a member of the
certified plaintiff class: a Jew who was born in Hungary in 1935, survived the
Holocaust, immigrated to the United States in 1958, became a citizen in 2002, and
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lives in Nevada. This action is Langermann’s third attempt to convince a court that
the social service agencies responsible for disbursing the funds violated the terms
of the settlement.
Two agencies named as Defendants in this action—Jewish Family Service
Agency of Las Vegas (JFSA) and The Blue Card, Inc. (TBCI)—were responsible
for determining Langermann’s eligibility for settlement funds. Langermann
received over $7,000 from 2006 through 2009. But after a dispute over whether he
was married, he refused to provide documentation to TBCI, to sign a release
allowing TBCI to obtain information about him, or to permit a home visit to verify
his continuing eligibility and need for settlement funds. Because he refused, TBCI
denied Langermann’s requests for funds. In response, he filed a motion for
contempt in the class action. He alleged that TBCI and JFSA should be held in
contempt because by demanding he sign a release or permit a home visit, they
violated both the terms of the class settlement and his constitutional rights. The
district court, which continued to oversee the class action, denied Langermann’s
motion.
Langermann then filed a new civil action in the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada, making the same substantive allegations against TBCI,
JFSA, and a host of other Defendants, including one of the class’s lawyers and the
District Judge presiding over the class action. In response, class counsel filed a
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motion in the class action (in the Southern District of Florida) seeking an
injunction to prevent Langermann from collaterally attacking the class settlement
in Nevada. The motion was granted, and a Southern District of Florida District
Judge enjoined Langermann from prosecuting the ancillary action in Nevada. The
District Judge observed that each of Langermann’s Nevada claims were premised
on the class action, its settlement, its allocation plan, and its final order, and that
pursuing the Nevada action would lead to relitigation of rulings made in the class
action, including the earlier order denying Langermann’s motion for contempt. We
affirmed the injunction on appeal. Rosner v. United States, 517 F. App’x 762
(11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). The District Court for the District of Nevada
dismissed Langermann’s action with prejudice. Langermann’s appeal of that
dismissal remains pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
III
This appeal arises out of Langermann’s third attempt to show that JFSA and
TBCI violated the terms of the settlement. He filed this action in the Southern
District of Florida, again naming JFSA and TBCI as well as, this time, three of the
class’s lawyers (Samuel Dubbin, Jonathan Cuneo and Steve Berman), the
executive director of TBCI (Ilya Rubinstein), and TBCI’s attorney (David
Wrobel). The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that it was barred by
res judicata, and denied as moot a pending motion for summary judgment filed by
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Langermann. The district court also found that the complaint was frivolous, so it
imposed a Rule 11 sanction enjoining Langermann from filing any further
pleadings or motions against the Defendants without leave of Court. Langermann
appeals each of those rulings.
IV
A. Res Judicata
Res judicata makes an earlier judgment “an absolute bar to [a] subsequent
action or suit between the same parties.” In re Atlanta Retail, Inc., 456 F.3d 1277,
1285 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). It not only bars matters actually
litigated in the earlier action; when it applies, res judicata also bars “every claim
which might have been presented” in the earlier action. Id. (quotation omitted)
(alteration adopted). Res judicata applies if four elements are met: (1) a final
judgment on the merits; (2) rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) between the same parties, or their privies; and (4) the causes of action involved
in both cases are the same. Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 193 F.3d 1235, 1238
(11th Cir. 1999). We review de novo whether a claim is barred by res judicata. Id.
The district court held that all four elements of res judicata were present, and that
the order denying contempt in the class action barred this suit. We agree.
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1. Finality
Res judicata finality is closely related to finality for appealability under the
final-order rule, 28 U.S.C. § 1291. First Ala. Bank of Montgomery, N.A. v.
Parsons Steel, Inc., 825 F.2d 1475, 1480 n.5 (11th Cir. 1987). An order is final
under § 1291 if it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court
to do but execute its judgment. Thomas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 594
F.3d 823, 829 (11th Cir. 2010). A postjudgment order is final for § 1291 if it
disposes of all issues raised in the motion. Id. The order denying Langermann’s
contempt motion in the class action was a postjudgment order. The order, which
held that the agencies had not violated the terms of the class settlement, disposed
of all issues Langermann raised in his motion. The order was a final judgment for
purposes of § 1291 and, by extension, res judicata.
2. Competent Jurisdiction
The District Court for the Southern District of Florida, which oversaw the
class action, undoubtedly had jurisdiction to decide Langermann’s earlier contempt
motion. In its final order approving the class settlement, the district court
expressly retained jurisdiction over the action to monitor the progress of the
settlement and the allocation of settlement funds.
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3. Privity
Privity describes a relationship between a party and a nonparty that is
sufficiently close so that a judgment binds both. Hart v. Yamaha-Parts Distribs.,
Inc., 787 F.2d 1468, 1472 (11th Cir 1986). 1 Langermann’s contempt motion
specifically sought a contempt order against JFSA and TBCI. Langermann argues
that the parties named in this appeal were not all named in his contempt motion.
That is true. But his contempt motion specifically accused Mr. Rubinstein, the
director of TBCI, and Mr. Wrobel, an attorney for TBCI, of misconduct. Their
relationship with TBCI is sufficiently close for them to be considered TBCI’s
privies. And Langermann certified in his contempt motion that he had
unsuccessfully attempted to resolve his dispute with the three class attorneys
named as Defendants here. For that reason, they would have been bound by any
judgment arising from the contempt motion. This action and the earlier contempt
motion thus involved the same parties or their privies.
4. Same Causes of Action
Cases involve the same causes of action if they arise out of the same nucleus
of operative facts. Ragsdale, 193 F.3d at 1239. Res judicata bars not only those
claims that were actually litigated in the prior suit, but any and all claims that could
1
In the same vein, the Supreme Court has said that a judgment may bind a nonparty
representative of a party, despite the general rule that judgments exert no binding force against
nonparties. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–95, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2172–73 (2008).
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have been raised arising out of the nucleus of operative facts. Maldonado v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 664 F.3d 1369, 1375–76 (11th Cir. 2011); see also In re Piper Aircraft
Corp., 244 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001). Langermann’s claims in this action
arise out of the same nucleus of operative facts as his claims in the contempt
motion. Each of his claims stems from his contention that the agencies violated the
terms of the class settlement by demanding that he sign a release or permit a home
visit.
Langermann insists that the causes of action in this case are different
because he complains of a second demand for a release or a home visit in 2012,
which came after his contempt motion was denied. But that alone does not make
the causes of action distinct. The terms of the settlement caused TBCI to make the
2012 demand, just as they caused any earlier demand. Both demands were part of
the same nucleus of operative facts, so the causes of action in both cases were the
same. See Restatement (Second) of Judgment § 24, cmt. d (1982) (“When a
defendant is accused of successive but nearly simultaneous acts, or acts which
though occurring over a period of time were substantially of the same sort and
similarly motivated, fairness to the defendant as well as the public convenience
may require that they be dealt with in the same action.”); see also Trustmark Ins.
Co. v. ESLU, Inc., 299 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding identity of
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causes of action where “[b]oth [cases] involve breaches of the same contract,
committed by the same party and involving the same general type of conduct”).
* * *
The order denying Langermann’s contempt motion was (1) a final judgment
on the merits; (2) rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) between the
same parties or their privies as in this suit; and (4) involved the same causes of
action as this suit. The district court did not err in giving res judicata effect to the
order denying contempt and barring this action.
B. Rule 11 Sanctions
As a Rule 11 sanction, the district court imposed an injunction that barred
Langermann from filing further pleadings against the Defendants unless he
(1) notified the court of the order imposing the injunction; (2) gave the court an
opportunity to pre-screen his proffered filing; and (3) obtained the court’s leave to
file the pleading based on a determination that the claims are neither frivolous nor
barred by res judicata.
Rule 11 sanctions are warranted when a party files a pleading that (1) “has
no reasonable factual basis”; (2) “is based on a legal theory that has no reasonable
chance of success and cannot be advanced as a reasonable argument to change
existing law”; or (3) “is filed in bad faith or for an improper purpose.” Worldwide
Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 87 F.3d 1252, 1254 (11th Cir. 1996) (quotation
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omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b), (c). Federal courts have the inherent
power and a constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct that
interferes with their functions. Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1073 (11th
Cir. 1986) (en banc). Rule 11 sanctions should not go beyond what is necessary to
deter the sanctioned conduct. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). “The only restriction this
Circuit has placed upon injunctions designed to protect against abusive and
vexatious litigation is that a litigant cannot be completely foreclosed from any
access to the court.” Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir.
1993) (quotation omitted). We review Rule 11 sanctions only for abuse of
discretion. McGreal, 87 F.3d at 1254.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the complaint
violated Rule 11(b) and imposing sanctions. The specific sanction imposed was
neither an abuse of discretion nor inconsistent with our precedent limiting a district
court’s ability to prevent abusive litigation.
C. Denial of Pending Summary Judgment Motion as Moot
After dismissing Langermann’s complaint, the district court denied all
pending motions “as moot.” An issue is moot “when it no longer presents a live
controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief.” Friends of
Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir. 2009).
Federal courts cannot decide issues that have become moot; doing so is tantamount
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to issuing an advisory opinion that is beyond our Article III authority. Id.
(quotation omitted). To decide moot issues “that do not matter to the disposition of
a case is to separate Lady Justice’s scales from her sword. That we will not do.”
Id. (citing George E. Allen, The Law as a Way of Life 27 (1969) (“The scales of
justice without the sword is the impotence of law.”)). We review questions of
mootness de novo. CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d
1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2006). Any issue in Langermann’s summary judgment
motion no longer presented a controversy because the case had been decided
against him. The district court did not err in denying the motion as moot.
V
Upon careful review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs,
we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Langermann’s complaint as barred by res
judicata, its imposition of a filing injunction as a permissible Rule 11 sanction, and
its dismissal of his summary judgment motion as moot.
AFFIRMED.
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