United States v. Cesar Sierra , 501 F. App'x 900 ( 2012 )


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  •             Case: 11-14746    Date Filed: 12/17/2012   Page: 1 of 8
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 11-14746
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 2:10-cr-00183-MEF-CSC-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    CESAR SIERRA,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ___________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Alabama
    ____________________________
    (December 17, 2012)
    Before BARKETT, PRYOR and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Cesar Sierra appeals the district court=s denial of his motion to suppress,
    Case: 11-14746     Date Filed: 12/17/2012    Page: 2 of 8
    arguing that he was stopped for a traffic infraction based on his ethnicity in violation
    of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteen Amendment, was detained longer
    than necessary during the stop, and did not voluntarily consent to the officer=s search
    of his vehicle. After careful review of the briefs and the record, we affirm.
    I.
    A police officer saw Mr. Sierra=s eighteen wheeler cross the fog line several
    times while it was traveling on an interstate near Montgomery, Alabama. Because of
    this improper lane use, the officer stopped the truck to make sure that the driver was
    not under the influence or sleepy from driving more hours than truckers are
    permitted to travel per day. The officer asked Mr. Sierra for his license, registration,
    and driver=s logbook, which contained no entries for the preceding twenty hours. He
    saw chicken bones on the passenger-side floorboard of the truck and noticed several
    things about Mr. Sierra: his hands were shaking, his carotid artery was pulsating, and
    his breathing was rapid and labored. These signs of nervousness did not decrease
    even after the officer told Mr. Sierra he was getting a warning instead of a ticket.
    The officer asked Mr. Sierra to come back to his police car so that he could
    write up the warning citation, run a warrant check, and verify information about the
    truck. When the checks came back clean, the officer wrote out the warning citation
    and handed it, along with his other documentation, to Mr. Sierra, who was sitting in
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    the front passenger seat of the police cruiser pursuant to the officer=s request. As Mr.
    Sierra moved to get out of the police car, the officer inquired whether he could ask
    Mr. Sierra another question. Mr. Sierra agreed and stayed in the car, leaving the door
    partially open. After explaining that he was a part of a highway safety team that, in
    addition to patrolling for traffic violations, watched out for the transportation of
    stolen property, weapons, and drugs, the officer asked Mr. Sierra if he had any such
    illegal contraband in his truck. Mr. Sierra said he did not. The officer then asked Mr.
    Sierra if he could search the truck. Mr. Sierra said he could. In the sleeper
    compartment of its cab, the officer found cocaine hidden under some plywood in a
    storage area.
    Mr. Sierra was charged with possession of cocaine with the intent to
    distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. ' 841(a)(1). He filed a motion to suppress the
    drug evidence and, after an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge recommended
    that the motion be denied. The district court accepted that recommendation and
    denied the motion. Mr. Sierra then pled guilty and was sentenced to 108 months=
    imprisonment. In his plea agreement, Mr. Sierra reserved the right to challenge the
    district court=s denial of his motion to suppress. He does so now.
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    II.
    A[W]hen reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review findings of
    fact for clear error and the application of the law to those facts de novo.@ See United
    States v. Segura-Baltazar, 
    448 F.3d 1281
    , 1289 (11th Cir. 2006). As an initial
    matter, we discern no clear error in the findings of fact, which the magistrate judge
    made after hearing testimony about and watching a video of the traffic stop, and
    which the district court adopted over Mr. Sierra=s objections.
    Mr. Sierra contends that the district court=s denial of his motion to suppress
    was erroneous for three reasons: the officer stopped him because of his Hispanic
    ethnicity to look for non-traffic criminal activity; the officer did not have reasonable
    suspicion to detain him beyond what was necessary to issue the warning citation;
    and his consent to the search was not voluntary. 1 Mr. Sierra=s arguments fail, as we
    explain.
    A.
    1
    Mr. Sierra also briefly argues that Ahis statements to law enforcement after his arrest were taken
    in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
     (1966).@ Because he has not elaborated any
    arguments on the merits of this issueCby, for example, telling us exactly which statements he
    believes are inadmissible under Miranda and whyCit is waived. See, e.g., Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs.
    v. New Life Art, Inc., 
    683 F.3d 1266
    , 1280 n.41 (refusing to consider Abald and conclusory@
    statements). For the same reason, Mr. Sierra has also waived any challenge to the scope of the
    search.
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    Mr. Sierra concedes that he has not provided any evidence to support his
    claim of selective enforcement, offering only his counsel=s Agood faith belief@ that
    the traffic stop was ethnicity-based and pretextual. Even if he could produce some
    evidence to back up that belief, however, the Supreme Court has Aconclusively
    refute[d] the notion that ulterior motives may invalidate police conduct that is
    justified on the basis of probable cause to believe that a violation of law has
    occurred.@ United States v. Holloman, 
    113 F.3d 192
    , 194 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing
    Whren v. United States, 
    517 U.S. 806
    , 811B12 (1996)). AThus, the only question for
    purposes of examining the constitutionality of [a] stop is: Did [the officer] have
    probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred?@ Draper v. Reynolds,
    
    369 F.3d 1270
    , 1275 (11th Cir. 2004). Here, the officer certainly had probable cause
    to stop Mr. Sierra: he observed Mr. Sierra=s truck cross over the highway fog line
    several times, which is a traffic violation. See, e.g., Ala. Code ' 32-5A-88; Ala.
    Code ' 32-6-49.3(21)(b); United States v. Harris, 
    928 F.2d 1113
    , 1116 (11th Cir.
    1991) (finding probable cause where officer stopped motorist for twice weaving into
    emergency lane). That probable cause forecloses an Equal Protection claim.
    B.
    Mr. Sierra next argues that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain
    him after issuing the warning citation. But reasonable suspicion is not the only thing
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    that can justify Aquestioning beyond that related to the initial stop@Csuch
    questioning is also permissible Aif the initial detention has become a consensual
    encounter.@ United States v. Pruitt, 
    174 F.3d 1215
    , 1220 (11th Cir. 1999). A traffic
    stop becomes a consensual encounter when a reasonable person Awould have felt
    free to terminate@ it under the totality of the circumstances. See United States v.
    Ramirez, 
    476 F.3d 1231
    , 1240 (11th Cir. 2007). Although not itself determinative,
    we have deemed an encounter consensual where an officer had returned a motorist=s
    paperwork and their subsequent exchange appeared cooperative and non-coercive.
    See 
    id.
     That is what happened here. As the initial traffic stop was coming to a close
    and Mr. Sierra moved to leave the police car with his warning and documentation,
    the officer asked if he could pose another question to him. Mr. Sierra said yes and
    remained in the car with his door ajar. At that point, Athe exchange [became]
    cooperative in nature@ because Mr. Sierra Ahad everything he reasonably required to
    proceed on his journey@ but chose to answer the officer=s questions instead of ending
    the encounter. See 
    id.
     A reasonable person in Mr. Sierra=s situation would have felt
    free to leave, and the fact that Mr. Sierra stayed does not transform the subsequent
    conversation into an unlawful detention.
    C.
    Finally, Mr. Sierra argues that he did not voluntarily consent to the search of
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    his truck.AIn assessing voluntariness, the inquiry is factual and depends on the
    totality of the circumstances.@ United States v. Purcell, 
    236 F.3d 1274
    , 1281 (11th
    Cir. 2001). We evaluate the totality of the circumstances by looking at Aseveral
    indicators, including the presence of coercive police procedures@ and Athe
    defendant=s cooperation with the officer.@ See 
    id.
     A district court=s determination that
    consent was voluntary is a finding of fact that we will not disturb absent clear error.
    See 
    id.
    The magistrate judge=s determination that Mr. Sierra=s consent was voluntary,
    which the district court adopted, is not clearly erroneous. When he consented to the
    search, Mr. Sierra=s license was not being withheld. He was not being detained until
    a drug-sniffing dog could arrive. He was not under arrest, handcuffed, or in the back
    of the patrol car. Instead, Mr. Sierra had all of his necessary paperwork and wasCby
    his own choiceCsitting in the front seat of the cruiser, door ajar, talking to the
    officer. Although Mr. Sierra argues that he Amisunderstood the consequences@ of the
    search, the magistrate judge found nothing in the record to support such a
    contention. The magistrate judge, after considering evidence from the hearing and
    watching a video of the exchange, determined that Mr. Sierra was polite during the
    stop, could communicate with the officer, answered all of his questions, expressed
    an understanding of the circumstances, and had sufficient intelligence to
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    comprehend the consequences of consenting to a search. Given these facts, the
    conclusion that Mr. Sierra voluntarily consented is not error, let alone clear error.
    See United States v. Schuster, 
    684 F.2d 744
    , 747 (11th Cir. 1982) (rejecting
    argument that consent was not voluntary because defendant did not know informant
    was working with law enforcement and Atherefore had no conception of the
    consequences of giving@ informant consent to enter apartment).
    III.
    The district court=s denial of Mr. Sierra=s motion to suppress is affirmed.
    AFFIRMED.
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