David Lynn Collins v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections ( 2013 )

Case: 11-15368 Date Filed: 02/12/2013 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 11-15368
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 3:09-cv-00117-LC-EMT
DAVID LYNN COLLINS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(February 12, 2013)
Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 11-15368 Date Filed: 02/12/2013 Page: 2 of 3
David Lynn Collins, a Florida state prisoner, appeals the district court’s
denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas petition. In light of a recent district
court decision, Shelton v. Dep’t of Corr., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2011)
(Shelton I), the district court granted Collins a certificate of appealability (COA) as
to the issues of whether (1) defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel by failing to move to dismiss or for a judgment of acquittal, and failing to
request a special jury instruction or object to the prosecutor’s closing argument,
based on the ground that the State cannot aggregate the amount of cocaine
transactions when the State has failed to prove that a defendant specifically
intended to sell, purchase, deliver, or possess a total of 28 grams or more of
cocaine at different times; and (2) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise the issue that the State may not aggregate cocaine weights from several
purchases of personal-use cocaine on different occasions to prove conspiracy to
traffic or trafficking in cocaine. On appeal, Collins argues we should reverse the
denial of his § 2254 habeas petition.
The district court’s denial of a § 2254 petition is reviewed de novo. McNair
v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2005). In Shelton I, the petitioner
sought federal habeas corpus relief, challenging the constitutionality of Florida
Statute § 893.13, which had been amended to eliminate the mens rea requirement
for drug offenses. 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1293. The district court found that § 893.13
2
Case: 11-15368 Date Filed: 02/12/2013 Page: 3 of 3
as amended was facially unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process
Clause, and granted the petitioner habeas relief. Id. at 1308. During the pendency
of Collins’ appeal to us, the Florida Supreme Court upheld § 893.13 as
constitutional under the due process requirements as articulated by that court and
the U.S. Supreme Court. State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d 412, 423 (Fla. 2012). Also
during the pendency of Collins’ appeal, we issued an opinion reversing the district
court’s grant of habeas relief in Shelton I, holding the state court did not
unreasonably apply clearly established federal law, as determined by the U.S.
Supreme Court. Shelton v. Sec., Dep’t of Corr., 691 F.3d 1348, 1353-56 (11th Cir.
2012) (Shelton II). In doing so, we expressed “no view on the underlying
constitutional question,” but held that Adkins was not an unreasonable application
of federal law. Id. at 1355.
The district court did not err in denying Collins’ § 2254 habeas petition, in
light of the narrow grant of COA through which we review that denial. The
district court only granted a COA for us to consider Collins’ first and second
grounds for relief in light of Shelton I. We reversed Shelton I in Shelton II. See
Shelton II, 691 F.3d at 1353-56. Therefore, we affirm the denial of Collins’ § 2254
habeas petition. See Murray v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1250-51 (11th Cir.
1998) (holding that appellate review is limited to the issues specified in the COA).
AFFIRMED.
3