United States v. Clarence Clark ( 2010 )


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  •                                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________                    FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 09-13350                  ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    JANUARY 21, 2010
    Non-Argument Calendar
    JOHN LEY
    ________________________
    ACTING CLERK
    D. C. Docket No. 97-00074-CR-CAR-5
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    CLARENCE CLARK,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Georgia
    _________________________
    (January 21, 2010)
    Before BLACK, PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Clarence Clark appeals the district court’s denial of his 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2) motion for a sentence reduction. Upon review, we affirm.
    Clark was charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute crack,
    possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and aiding and abetting the distribution
    of crack. The government filed notice of its intent to seek enhanced penalties
    under 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (b)(1) and 851. After a jury trial, Clark was convicted and
    sentenced to life imprisonment based on the presentence investigation report
    (“PSI”) and the guidelines calculations.
    On direct appeal, this court concluded that the sentence violated Apprendi v.
    New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000), because the judge, rather than the jury, had
    determined the amount of drugs involved in the offenses. Therefore, because the
    life sentence exceeded the maximum allowed under § 841(b)(1)(C), the court
    vacated and remanded for resentencing. The probation officer did not prepare a
    corrected PSI before resentencing. At resentencing in 2002, the district court
    reduced the sentence to the statutory maximum of thirty years’ imprisonment under
    § 841(b)(1)(C). This court affirmed the amended sentence.
    In 2008, Clark filed a pro se motion for a sentence reduction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c), alleging that Amendment 706 would have reduced his guidelines
    range. The district court appointed counsel, who then filed a motion to withdraw
    as counsel. Upon consideration, the court denied the § 3582(c) motion, granted
    counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirmed the sentence imposed. This appeal
    2
    followed.
    Clark argues that, because his original sentence was vacated for violating
    Apprendi, the district court improperly relied on the guideline calculations set forth
    in his original PSI when determining whether he was eligible for a sentence
    reduction. He also contends that the district court failed to (1) calculate his
    original and amended base offense levels and guideline ranges, (2) consider the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) sentencing factors, and (3) explain its reasons for denying a
    sentence reduction.
    We review a district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence under
    § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion and its conclusions regarding the scope of its
    legal authority de novo. United States v. Williams, 
    549 F.3d 1337
    , 1339 (11th Cir.
    2008).
    A district court may modify a term of imprisonment in the case of a
    defendant who was sentenced based on a sentencing range that subsequently has
    been lowered by the Sentencing Commission. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2). Any
    reduction, however, must be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued
    by the Sentencing Commission.” 
    Id.
     A reduction of a term of imprisonment is not
    “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
    Commission,” and thus is not authorized under § 3582(c)(2), if the retroactive
    3
    amendment does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable
    guideline range. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). “Where the statutorily authorized
    maximum sentence is less than the minimum of the applicable guideline range, the
    statutorily authorized maximum sentence shall be the guideline sentence.”
    U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a). Under § 841(b)(1)(C), the statutory maximum sentence is
    thirty years’ imprisonment. 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(C).
    Here, the district court properly denied Clark’s § 3582(c) motion because
    Amendment 706 did not reduce Clark’s guideline sentencing range and, therefore,
    Clark was not eligible for a sentence reduction. Although the government
    concedes that Clark’s offense level was determined under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, it
    explains that the total offense level was 46,1 and the 2-level reduction under
    Amendment 706 would only reduce his level to 44, leaving his guidelines range
    unchanged and the statutory maximum under § 841(b)(1)(C) still applicable.
    Moreover, Clark’s arguments challenging his original sentencing
    calculations may not be raised in the present action, because § 3582(c)(2)
    proceedings do not constitute de novo resentencings. United States v. Bravo, 
    203 F.3d 778
    , 781 (11th Cir. 2000). Finally, because Clark was not eligible for a
    1
    In its statement of reasons at sentencing, the district court indicated the offense level
    was 43. Clark concedes on appeal that it was 46. Even if the level was 43, Clark would not be
    entitled to relief under § 3582(c) because his sentencing range would be thirty years.
    4
    § 3582(c) sentence reduction, the court was not required to consider the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) sentencing factors, and any error in failing to calculate Clark’s amended
    base offense level and guideline range was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm the
    district court’s denial of Clark’s § 3582 motion.
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-13350

Judges: Black, Pryor, Kravitch

Filed Date: 1/21/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024