Keith v. Harned v. United States , 511 F. App'x 829 ( 2013 )


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  •           Case: 11-14095   Date Filed: 02/27/2013        Page: 1 of 7
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 11-14095
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket Nos. 7:08-cv-90033-HL-TQL; 7:00-cr-00012-HL-MSH-6
    KEITH V. HARNED,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllRespondent-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (February 27, 2013)
    ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
    Case: 11-14095        Date Filed: 02/27/2013       Page: 2 of 7
    Before PRYOR and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.1
    PER CURIAM:
    We grant the petition for panel rehearing filed by Keith Harned, vacate our
    original opinion issued on December 31, 2012, and substitute the following
    opinion to reflect that it is rendered by a quorum of the panel. To the extent that
    Harned requests we reexamine our original decision, Harned’s petition is
    DENIED.
    Keith Harned appeals pro se the denial of his motion to vacate his sentence
    of 210 months of imprisonment for conspiracy to launder monetary instruments.
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    . Based on his involvement in a Ponzi scheme to sell promissory
    notes with no source of income other than the investors’ funds, a jury convicted
    Harned of numerous crimes including conspiring to launder monetary instruments
    that were derived from unlawful activity, 
    18 U.S.C. § 1956
    (a)(1)(A)(i), and that
    exceeded $10,000, 
    id.
     § 1957. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty as to
    the conspiracy, and later the district court found that the object of the conspiracy
    was to launder monetary instruments that were derived from unlawful activity, id.
    § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), and sentenced Harned to 210 months of imprisonment. Harned
    argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the jury return a
    1
    In response to the petition for rehearing filed by Keith Harned, Judge Beverly B. Martin
    recused herself from consideration of this appeal. Because the remaining members of the panel
    are in agreement, this appeal is decided by a quorum. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 46
    .
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    special verdict identifying the object of the conspiracy. Because Harned cannot
    prove that his counsel acted deficiently given the law of this Circuit at the time of
    his trial or that he was prejudiced by counsel’s performance, we affirm.
    We review de novo the denial of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
    Chandler v. United States, 
    218 F.3d 1305
    , 1312 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). To
    prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove that
    his counsel’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result of
    that deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687, 
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    ,
    2064 (1984). To avoid the “distorting effects of hindsight,” we evaluate counsel’s
    performance based on his “perspective at the time,” 
    id. at 689
    , 
    104 S. Ct. at 2065
    ,
    to determine whether a reasonable attorney would have taken the same action,
    Chandler, 
    218 F.3d at 1315
    . Under that standard, counsel may be deemed deficient
    for failing to pursue issues involving well-defined legal principles, but “if a
    reasonable attorney in . . . counsel’s position could have concluded that a given
    portion of an opinion was dictum discussing an unsettled question of law and not
    binding authority for his case, that attorney’s performance will not be deemed
    deficient for not raising that issue to the court.” Black v. United States, 
    373 F.3d 1140
    , 1144 (11th Cir. 2004). Ultimately, a defendant cannot prevail unless he also
    can prove that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
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    unprofessional errors, the result of [his trial] would have been different.”
    Strickland, 466 U.S at 694, 
    104 S. Ct. at 2068
    .
    Harned cannot prove that his trial counsel performed deficiently. This issue
    is controlled by our decision in Black v. United States, where we rejected the
    argument that appellate counsel should have predicted that his client had a right to
    a special verdict when the caselaw on the subject was unsettled. 
    373 F.3d at
    1142–
    46. As in Black, the law at the time of Harned’s trial, United States v. Dennis, 
    786 F.2d 1029
     (11th Cir. 1986), provided that the failure to use a special verdict form
    in a dual object drug conspiracy was reversible error only if the jury instructions
    and the evidence supported solely a conviction for the drug with the lower penalty.
    
    Id.
     at 1039–40; see United States v. Shenberg, 
    89 F.3d 1461
    , 1472 (11th Cir. 1996)
    (holding that “the district court acted within its discretion in denying appellants’
    request for a special verdict on the RICO conspiracy count”); see also United
    States v. Hernandez, 
    141 F.3d 1042
    , 1051 & n.2 (11th Cir. 1998) (rejecting
    Hernandez’s argument that the district court should have obtained a special verdict
    identifying the object of his conspiracy to commit conspiracy and arson). Harned’s
    counsel reasonably could have concluded that Dennis was unaffected by the
    decisions of the Supreme Court in Edwards v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 511
    , 
    118 S. Ct. 1475
     (1998), and this Court in United States v. Riley, 
    142 F.3d 1254
     (11th Cir.
    1998). Edwards and Riley held that, when a jury returns a general verdict of guilty
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    as to a conspiracy to possess cocaine and crack, the district court is allowed at
    sentencing to consider as relevant conduct the quantities of both drugs in imposing
    a sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines so long as the sentence does not
    exceed the penalty for the drug with the lowest maximum sentence. 
    523 U.S. at
    513–14, 
    118 S. Ct. at 1477
    ; 
    142 F.3d at 1256
    . Although the opinions in Edwards
    and Riley speculated that the outcome might have differed had the defendants
    received a sentence above the maximum statutory penalty for their cocaine
    offenses, Edwards, 
    523 U.S. at 515
    , 
    118 S. Ct. at 1477
    ; Riley, 
    142 F.3d at 1256
    , “a
    fair reading of Edwards could [have] le[d] an attorney to believe that the relevant
    language requiring a special verdict was dictum.” Black, 
    373 F.3d at 1145
    . After
    reading Riley, which did not mention Dennis, Harned’s counsel reasonably could
    have concluded that Dennis remained the law in the Eleventh Circuit and that
    Harned was not entitled to a special verdict. Black, 
    373 F.3d at 1145
    .
    Counsel also reasonably could have concluded that Dennis remained the law
    of the Circuit after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Apprendi v. New
    Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    , 
    120 S. Ct. 2348
     (2000). As we explained in Black, counsel
    could have read the “‘holding’ in Edwards to which the [Court in] Apprendi . . .
    refer[red] [in footnote 21] [as] not a holding that sentences cannot exceed the
    statutory maximum sentence for the lower-sentenced drug, but rather [as] a holding
    that a maximum sentence set by a statute will trump any contrary provisions
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    provided in the Sentencing Guidelines.” Black, 
    373 F.3d at
    1146 n.3. Counsel
    reasonably could have concluded that there was no serious argument to advance in
    Harned’s favor until we issued United States v. Allen, 
    302 F.3d 1260
     (11th Cir.
    2002), which held, “as an issue of first impression in this Circuit,” that if the
    objects in a dual drug conspiracy have different statutory maximum penalties, the
    jury must return a special verdict identifying the object of the conspiracy. 
    Id.
     at
    1275–76. We did not issue Allen until approximately seven months after Harned’s
    conviction.
    Harned argues that appellate counsel should have sought relief based on
    Allen, but we decline to review an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief
    to which the government has not had an opportunity to respond. See United States
    v. Jernigan, 
    341 F.3d 1273
    , 1284 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003). We cannot say that
    Harned’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to forecast a change in the law.
    Even if we were to assume that Harned’s trial counsel was deficient for
    failing to request a special verdict, Harned could not establish a reasonable
    probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different had the jury
    used a special verdict form. We held on direct appeal that there was sufficient
    evidence to support Harned’s conviction for conspiring to launder monetary
    instruments under section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), United States v. Cawthon, No. 02-
    12360, slip op. at 12 (11th Cir. Aug. 6, 2003); United States v. Lindsey, No. 04-
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    10111, slip op. at 12 (11th Cir. Oct. 13, 2006), which has a higher statutory
    maximum sentence than section 1957. Furthermore, we held that, although the
    district court erred by enhancing Harned’s sentence based on facts not found by a
    jury, that error was harmless because it did not affect Harned’s substantial rights.
    Lindsey, slip op. at 18. The district court determined Harned’s sentence based on
    the statutory sentencing factors, 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    .
    We AFFIRM the denial of Harned’s motion to vacate.
    7