United States v. Alfred Omega Foster , 626 F. App'x 820 ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-10437
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-00143-CG-C-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ALFRED OMEGA FOSTER,
a.k.a. Alpha Omega Foster,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
________________________
(September 11, 2015)
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, JILL PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
ED CARNES, Chief Judge:
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After a trial lasting less than seven hours from start to finish, a jury
convicted Alfred Foster of one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He contends that the district court committed
plain error, and the government engaged in plain misconduct, when Assistant
United States Attorney Gina Vann commented extensively, repeatedly, and
improperly on his valid invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. He asserts other government misconduct, including the AUSA’s
remark during closing argument that “when [Foster] testified he said: ‘I traded
meth for sex with a white female.’” As Foster argues, that remark was improper
because: he had not given that testimony; it violated the court’s earlier ruling that
evidence of Foster trading meth for sex was irrelevant and inadmissible; and it
unnecessarily injected race and sex into the case.
I.
Given the position of the parties and the undisputed evidence, the only
contested element of the charged offense was whether Foster intended to exercise
dominion and control over, and thereby constructively possess, a shotgun and a
rifle seized by law enforcement from a bedroom Foster occupied in a house owned
by a friend of his who also lived there. There was no fingerprint or DNA evidence
that Foster had ever touched either firearm. The government attempted to prove
that he intended to constructively possess them by establishing that they were
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located next to several methamphetamine labs, that Foster admitted to officers that
he had distributed meth, and that firearms are common tools of the drug trade.
In her opening argument, the AUSA told the jury that the evidence would
show that Foster told law enforcement that he “ma[d]e and s[old] meth to make
money, and sometimes [he] trade[d] meth for sex.”1 Deputy John Cassady testified
for the government about his interview of Foster on the day that the firearms were
seized:
AUSA: . . . [W]hat did the defendant tell you?
CASSADY: He advised that he was a convicted felon. He then
advised he had been cooking methamphetamine
since November 2012, but he advised he only
cooked three successful batches of
methamphetamine. He advised that he first shared
the batch, the successful batch, with a white female
named Sadie, and the second and third batches he
advised were unsuccessful cooks. He said the
reason they were bad was because they were
gooey. He then later told me that he cooked some
meth because he trades it for sexual favors.
DEFENSE: Judge, we object again[2] to the relevancy of this.
THE COURT: All right. I sustain the objection to that portion of
the interview.
1
This statement was made during opening argument without objection. The court later
ruled that evidence that Foster had traded meth for sex was irrelevant and inadmissible.
2
Foster had filed a pretrial motion in limine arguing that evidence of meth and meth
paraphernalia, which was found throughout the house where he lived with his friend, was not
relevant to a firearms charge. The court denied the motion as to the meth and meth paraphernalia
found in the bedroom Foster occupied. He does not challenge that ruling.
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AUSA: Well, may we approach, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
(At the side bar, jury not present.)
AUSA: Your Honor, I believe what the witness testified
about was the distribution of meth, and it is our
position that he is a drug dealer and drug dealers
have guns as tools of the drug trade. We have to
establish that he was distributing meth, and
whether he traded it —
THE COURT: I don’t have any problem with you establishing
that he was distributing it. But the fact that he was
trading it for sexual favors —
DEFENSE: Yeah.
THE COURT: — you can just — I think you can fashion your
question so that you don’t have to get into that
kind of details about it.
....
(In open court, defendant and jury present.)
AUSA: Okay. Officer, I guess what I should ask you, a
better way, is did the defendant admit that he was
distributing or giving the drugs, the meth, to other
people?
CASSADY: Yes, ma’am.
Foster’s defense depended on the jury crediting his testimony that he had no
intent to possess the firearms found in the bedroom he was occupying in his
friend’s home. He testified that while he did have two drug-related convictions
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and another conviction for receiving stolen property, he had never been convicted
of an offense involving a firearm and he “d[id]n’t particularly care for them.”
Regarding the two firearms in question, Foster testified that he had no knowledge
of the one found in the closet of the bedroom because he did not use that closet and
he believed the one hanging on the wall of the bedroom belonged to his friend.
On cross-examination, the AUSA attacked Foster’s credibility, as she was
entitled to do. In response to a question about whether he was distributing
methamphetamine from his friend’s house, Foster invoked his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. The court ruled that the invocation was valid
and Foster would not be required to answer the question. The court then told the
AUSA that she could “ask him as many questions as [she] want[ed] and him claim
the Fifth if he want[ed] to.” But she went beyond that and asked argumentative
questions designed to show that Foster was invoking his constitutional rights
because he was guilty of a crime or crimes:
AUSA: When you say you take the Fifth, that means you
don’t want to answer that question because it’ll get
you in trouble?
FOSTER: It means that I’m exercising my Fifth Amendment
rights.
AUSA: And your Fifth Amendment means you don’t have
to answer the question because it’ll get you in
trouble; right? Yes or no?
FOSTER: The Fifth Amendment —
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AUSA: Yes or no, sir? That’s a yes or no question.
FOSTER: You would be more familiar with it than I am.
DEFENSE: Judge, she’s asking him to draw a legal conclusion.
AUSA [to court]: I’m asking him to tell the jury why he says that
he’s taking the Fifth.
AUSA [to Foster]: Yes or no?
FOSTER: Because the question that you asked involves a
case that is still pending in the grand jury in the
state of Alabama.
AUSA: And any answer truthfully could hurt you?
FOSTER: I have the right against self-incrimination.
AUSA: Absolutely, sir. And the reason you’re taking that
right is because the answer would incriminate you;
right?
FOSTER: Again —
AUSA: Yes or no?
FOSTER: — I plead the Fifth.
AUSA: You take the Fifth on that, on that question, too?
FOSTER: It’s a clever way around me not answering the
question.
AUSA: It is a clever way. So one question you won’t
answer is whether you’re distributing, the second
one is you won’t answer why you won’t answer
the question; right? Twice?
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FOSTER: That’s correct.
AUSA: Okay. So you take the Fifth twice?
FOSTER: That’s correct.
Foster never testified that he traded meth for sex.
During her closing argument, the AUSA emphasized Foster’s “many lies.”
She argued: “[W]hen he wasn’t lying and backtracking on what he said on the
scene, he was trying to take the Fifth Amendment. So I submit to you that he was
lying.” Later, during her rebuttal argument, the AUSA commented again — and
this time extensively — on Foster’s invocation of his right to remain silent:
Now, this is not the defendant’s first rodeo. Okay. He’s been in
trouble before. And he came in here today and he tried to take the
Fifth about some things. Now, if the Fifth was really a viable option
and . . . taking the Fifth was really something he wanted to do, why
didn’t he take it on the scene that night? Because if he had taken it on
the scene — his motive for taking it today was to protect himself and
his friend. (Indicating.) Well, if he had taken the Fifth on the scene,
he wouldn’t have been telling on himself and he wouldn’t have been
telling on his friend.[3]
So to come in here now and say he’s taking the Fifth, again, that’s just
something that just belies logic. Because if his whole motivation was
to protect his friend, he would have just taken the Fifth on the scene.
3
On the scene, Foster told Deputy Cassady that the meth labs found in his bedroom
belonged to him. On the stand, he changed his story and testified that the labs actually belonged
to the other person living in the house at the time, his friend Mark Bush. When pressed to
explain the inconsistent statements, he stated that he claimed possession on the scene out of a
desire to protect his friend.
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The AUSA also argued that Foster’s intent to possess the firearms was
shown by evidence that he was distributing meth from his friend’s house. In
summarizing that evidence, she stated:
Do you remember when [Foster] testified he said: “I traded meth for
sex with a white female”? And the only reason I’m saying “white
female” is because that’s the way the defendant described it.
At no time during the AUSA’s closing arguments did defense counsel object.
II.
“An appellate court may not correct an error the defendant failed to raise in
the district court unless there is: (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects
substantial rights.” United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir.
2005) (quotation marks omitted). “If all three conditions are met, an appellate
court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the
error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
In Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court held that where the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is asserted on a matter by a
testifying defendant and “unqualifiedly granted” by the court, it is error for the
court to allow the prosecutor to comment on the defendant’s refusal to testify on
that matter. 318 U.S. 189, 196, 63 S. Ct. 549, 553 (1943). The Court explained:
If the privilege claimed by the witness be allowed, the matter is at an
end. The claim of privilege and its allowance is properly no part of
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the evidence submitted to the jury, and no inferences whatever can be
legitimately drawn by them from the legal assertion by the witness of
his constitutional right. The allowance of the privilege would be a
mockery of justice, if either party is to be affected injuriously by it.
. . . [I]f [the privilege] is claimed and granted outright, [the accused]
has every right to expect that the ruling is made in good faith and that
the rule against comment will be observed.
Id. at 196–97, 63 S. Ct. at 553 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
The government does not challenge the district court’s ruling that Foster
could invoke, and did properly and validly invoke, his right to remain silent on the
issue of whether he was distributing meth. So we will take it as given, for
purposes of this appeal only, that he did. Once the privilege was asserted by Foster
and “unqualifiedly granted” by the court, the AUSA should not have commented
on it. That is the plain holding of the Supreme Court’s Johnson decision. See id.
at 196, 63 S. Ct. at 553. And as our predecessor court explained:
[T]o meet the requirements of a fair trial as embodied in the Fifth
Amendment, the trial judge must protect an accused’s right of silence.
The trial judge’s approval of an improper comment or refusal to
disapprove the comment and do whatever is necessary to protect a
defendant from being penalized by relying on his constitutional right
amounts, in our opinion, to sufficient participation in the comment or
sanction of the comment so that it may be properly characterized as a
violation of the Fifth Amendment.
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De Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140, 154 (5th Cir. 1962) 4; see also McGahee v.
Massey, 667 F.2d 1357, 1362 (11th Cir. 1982) (“The [F]ifth [A]mendment stands
as a sentinel for the protection of a defendant’s constitutional right to remain silent.
Concomitant with that right is the prohibition of prosecutorial comment on its
exercise.”). The AUSA, by her improper questions and comments, “manifestly
intended to urge the jury to draw an inference from [Foster’s] silence that he [was]
guilty.” United States v. Thompson, 422 F.3d 1285, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005). We
conclude that her conduct plainly violated Foster’s Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent and it was plain error for the court to permit it.
Unfortunately, there was more. During closing argument the AUSA
remarked that Foster, who is black, had testified that he “‘traded meth for sex with
a white female.’” That statement is egregiously improper for three reasons. First,
it falsely attributes to Foster testimony he did not give. See Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d
1538, 1548 (11th Cir. 1994) (“Little time and no discussion is necessary to
conclude that it is improper for a prosecutor to use misstatements and
falsehoods.”). Second, even if we assume that the AUSA confused Foster’s
testimony with Deputy Cassady’s testimony about what Foster had told him, it
misrepresents even that. Cassady testified that Foster told him that he shared one
4
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we
adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before
October 1, 1981.
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batch of meth with a white female named Sadie, but not that he had traded it to her
for sex. Cassady further testified that Foster “later told me that he cooked some
meth because he trades it for sexual favors,” but he did not say that those with
whom Foster had traded it were white females. See Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d
1383, 1413 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (“Even if brief, use of race as a factor in
closing argument obviously would be improper and would have great potential for
prejudice.”) (citation omitted), vacated on other grounds, 478 U.S. 1016, 106 S. Ct.
3325 (1986); United States v. Rodriguez, 765 F.2d 1546, 1560 (11th Cir. 1985)
(“A prosecutor is forbidden to make improper suggestions, insinuations and
assertions calculated to mislead the jury and may not appeal to the jury’s passion
or prejudice.”) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). Third, the AUSA’s
statement violated the court’s earlier ruling — surely not forgotten over the lunch
break — that evidence Foster had traded meth for sex was irrelevant and
inadmissible. In short, the AUSA’s argument misrepresented testimony, violated a
clear ruling of the court, and injected race and sex into a case that had nothing to
do with either.
The question is whether the combination of these errors and misconduct
warrant the reversal of Foster’s conviction under the plain error rule. Based on the
unique circumstances and facts of this case, we conclude that it does. There is no
doubt that there were errors and that they were plain as could be. We also
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conclude that the errors affected Foster’s substantial rights because the entire case
turned on his credibility. It all boiled down to the simple, solitary question of
whether the jury believed Foster’s testimony that he did not intend to possess the
firearms that were found in close proximity to him in his friend’s house. He
testified he did not; the government argued he did. This brief trial was rife with
prosecutorial misconduct that was designed to, and likely did, destroy Foster’s
credibility.
That leaves us with the fourth requirement of the plain error test, which is
that the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1298. The meaning of those words
is not always clear, but they clearly fit here. It is unfair, undermines the integrity
of the trial process, and affects the public reputation of judicial proceedings to
allow a prosecutor in cross-examination and closing argument to assail a defendant
for invoking his constitutional rights, argue that it is proof of guilt, misrepresent
testimony to the jury, and inject race and sex into a case where neither belonged.
We do not decide whether we would reach the same result based on one of the
errors alone, or any combination less than all of them, because we do not have to. 5
5
Out of a desire to be fair to AUSA Vann, we asked her to attend oral argument in this
case. After hearing argument on the merits by the Public Defender and another AUSA, we gave
Ms. Vann the opportunity to explain her conduct. Suffice it to say, the proffered explanation was
unconvincing.
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We REVERSE Foster’s conviction, VACATE his sentence, and REMAND
the case for a new trial.
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