United States v. Robert Steven Harrelson ( 2012 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 11-13024 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar MARCH 15, 2012
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 8:10-cr-00254-EAK-EAJ-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ROBERT STEVEN HARRELSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(March 15, 2012)
Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
On the night of March 26, 2010, officers of the Hardee County (Florida)
Sheriff’s drug task force team, acting on information provided by the DeSoto
County (Florida) Sheriff’s office to the effect that Robert Harrelson was headed
for Hardee County in his truck to deliver methamphetamine to a suspected drug
trafficker, stopped Harrelson’s vehicle, searched it, found a large role of currency
(on Harrelson’s person) and, in a zippered bag, 6.8 grams of methamphetamine
and drug paraphernalia. The officers arrested Harrelson, and a Middle District of
Florida grand jury indicted him for possession with the intent to distribute
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Harrelson moved the district court to suppress the evidence seized from his
person and his vehicle, and the district court, adopting the recommendation of the
magistrate judge made after conducting an evidentiary hearing on the motion,
denied the motion. Harrelson thereafter consented to a bench trial before the
district court. The court found him guilty as charged and sentenced him to prison
for 24 months. Harrelson now appeals his conviction, contending that the district
court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
The district court denied Harrelson’s motion to suppress on two alternative
grounds: (1) the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Harrelson for
methamphetamine trafficking; and (2), the officers had probable cause to stop his
vehicle for having unlawfully tinted windows and/or a modified muffler.
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Harrelson argues that the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing supported
neither ground. He says the first ground lacks support because the officers were
acting merely on an “impermissible hunch.” The second ground fails because the
officers lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle for traffic law violations. We
consider these arguments in turn.1
I.
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable search and
seizure. U.S. Const. Amend. IV. Law enforcement officers may seize a suspect
for a brief, investigatory stop where the officers have a reasonable suspicion that
the suspect was involved in, or is about to be involved in, criminal activity. Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L. Ed.2d 889 (1968). Reasonable
suspicion is determined from the collective knowledge of all of the officers
involved in the stop. United States v. Williams, 876 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir.
1989). The reasonable suspicion must be more than an “inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883. We look at
the totality of the circumstances to ascertain “whether the detaining officer ha[d] a
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“A district court's ruling on a motion to suppress presents mixed questions of law and
fact.” United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 748-49 (11th Cir. 2002). We review the
court’s findings of fact for clear error and its application of the law to those facts de novo. Id. at
749.
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particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States
v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 750, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002).
Officers may “draw on their own experience and specialized training to make
inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to
them that might well elude an untrained person.” Id. at 273, 122 S.Ct. at 750-51(quotation omitted). While a “mere hunch” is insufficient to justify a stop, the
likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable
cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence
standard. Id., 122 S.Ct. at 751.
Here, the totality of the circumstances demonstrate that the police were
acting upon more than an “impermissible hunch” when they conducted an
investigative stop of Harrelson’s vehicle. As he testified at the evidentiary
hearing, Lieutenant Aument of the DeSota County Sheriff’s office learned on
March 16, 2010 from a known, previously reliable CI that Little Rob was a
supplier of methamphetamine and drove a red Ford F-150 truck. Through his
investigation, he identified Little Rob as Harrelson.
Ten days later, on March 26, Aument received a tip from Officer Pitts of the
Arcadia (Florida) Police Department that Harrelson was going to deliver
methamphetamine to a residence in Arcadia. The Arcadia police were watching
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for Harrelson’s Ford truck, but never observed it entering the city limits. When
Aument learned that Harrelson had not gone to Arcadia, he contacted Sergeant
Davis with the Hardee County drug task force and told him to watch for Harrelson
driving the red F-150; Aument’s investigation revealed that Harrelson had very
close ties to individuals in Hardee County, and the information was that Harrelson
would be delivering methamphetamine that night.
Based on Davis’s on-going investigation of Harrelson, Davis suspected that
Harrelson may be visiting an associate who lived on Morgan Road in Hardee
County and was under investigation for selling methamphetamine. Davis
instructed his detectives to set up in various locations and keep an eye out for
Harrelson’s red Ford truck. Given the fact that the officers were relying on
information gained from on-going law enforcement investigations of Harrelson
and in light of their professional experiences, the magistrate judge, and thus the
district court, did not err in finding that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that
Harrelson was transporting methamphetamine. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273, 122
S.Ct. at 750-51.
II.
A traffic stop is reasonable, and therefore constitutional, if the officer
conducting the stop has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has
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occurred. United States v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2008). To
determine whether the officer had probable cause, we do not focus on the officer’s
subjective motives; rather, we focus on whether the circumstances, viewed
objectively, justified the stop. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. at 812-13, 116
S.Ct. at 1774. Whren “squarely rejected the pretextual stop analysis”; the
reasonableness of a traffic stop is determined irrespective of the officer’s intent.
United States v. Holloman, 113 F.3d 192, 194 (11th Cir. 2007). That is, “[Whren]
conclusively refute[d] the notion that ulterior motives may invalidate police
conduct that is justified on the basis of probable cause to believe that a violation of
law has occurred.” Id. Holloman held that, because the officers making the
traffic stop had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred, they
did not violate the Fourth Amendment, “notwithstanding their subjective desire to
intercept any narcotics being transported” into the county. Id.; see also Draper v.
Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2004) (discussing Whren and
Holloman in the context of a suit brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
determining that the “only question” for purposes of determining whether the
traffic stop at issue was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment was whether the
officer had probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred, although the
motorist alleged that the officer’s reason for the stop was pretextual).
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Harrelson does not contest the fact that the police had probable cause to
believe that he had committed a traffic violation. He argues, instead, that since the
officers did not come across him as part of a routine patrol, but had been sent out
to look out for him, Whren is inapplicable.
The pertinent language in Whren does not suggest that only those traffic
stops that arise from suspicious behavior observed by an officer while on routine
patrol are “run-of-the-mine” cases. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 818-19, 116 S.Ct. at
1776-77. Rather, Whren indicates that a stop must be conducted in an
extraordinary manner to be considered not “run-of-the-mine.” See id. at 818, 116
S.Ct. at 1776. No evidence was submitted at the suppression hearing to the effect
that the stop was conducted in an extraordinary manner. Consequently, the district
court did not err in denying Harrerlson’s motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
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