James R. Young v. Warden, FCC Coleman - Medium , 508 F. App'x 918 ( 2013 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 11-15489
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:11-cv-00485-WTH-TBS
JAMES R. YOUNG,
Petitioner–Appellant,
versus
WARDEN, FCC COLEMAN,
Respondent–Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(February 13, 2013)
Before MARCUS, MARTIN and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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James Young, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and its
denial of his Motion for Reconsideration of that dismissal.
Young is serving a 262-month sentence in the Middle District of Florida for
unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(e).
Young’s conviction and sentence were based, in part, on his prior felony
convictions in Florida state court. In 2011, Young filed a pro se petition for habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Middle District of Florida, arguing that
his constitutional rights were violated when “the lower court ordered [him] barred
from any future pro-se filings,” and barred “the clerk of courts [from] accept[ing]
any pro-se filings . . . unless . . . signed by a member in good standing of the
Florida bar.” Young also attacked Florida state court rulings denying his motions
for post-conviction relief, arguing that “the lower court was without jurisdiction to
make the rulings that it did” because the rulings were made when he “was no
longer in state custody.”
The district court dismissed Young’s petition without prejudice, stating that
it was unclear whether Young was attacking a state or federal conviction. To the
extent that Young was challenging his federal conviction, the district court held
that Young should have filed a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in
the Northern District of Florida—the district where he was sentenced. To the
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extent that Young was challenging his state court convictions, the district court
directed that his “request for relief should be filed in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Florida pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.”
Instead of heeding the district court’s admonishments, Young then filed with
the same court a “Motion for Correction and Notice of Appeal.” This motion
clarified that Young sought relief from his “state judgment and conviction[s]” and
conceded that he was ineligible for habeas relief under § 2241 because he was “in
no form of custody, by the state” and had “completed all post-conviction
supervision imposed by the state” when he filed his habeas petition. He requested,
however, that the court interpret his habeas petition as a petition for a writ of error
coram nobis under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), and that it vacate his
state court convictions under that provision. The district court construed Young’s
motion as a Motion for Reconsideration or Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment,
and denied it without discussion. This pro se appeal followed.
We construe pro se appeals liberally. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148
F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). So construed, Young argues, first, that the
district court erred in failing to grant his habeas petition under § 2241 and, second,
that it erred in failing to treat his § 2241 petition as a § 1651(a) petition for a writ
of error coram nobis and to grant relief accordingly. We consider each argument
in turn.
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“The availability of habeas relief under § 2241 presents a question of law we
review de novo.” Darby v. Hawk-Sawyer, 405 F.3d 942, 944 (11th Cir. 2005). A
district court may entertain a habeas corpus petition only from a petitioner “in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). This “in custody” requirement is jurisdictional. Stacey v.
Warden, Apalachee Corr. Inst., 854 F.2d 401, 403 (11th Cir. 1988). To satisfy the
“in custody” requirement, “the habeas petitioner [must] be ‘in custody’ under the
conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed.” Maleng v.
Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490–91, 109 S. Ct. 1923, 1925 (1989).
Young concedes here, as he did below, that “he was no longer in state
custody” as of September 2004. Neither was he serving state probation when he
filed his § 2241 petition attacking his state court convictions. The district court
therefore lacked jurisdiction to consider, and thus properly dismissed, Young’s
§ 2241 petition attacking his state court convictions to the extent that he was no
longer in state custody or under state supervision at the time it was filed. See
Stacey, 854 F.2d at 402–03.
Young’s second claim is that the district court erred when it failed to grant
him a writ of error coram nobis vacating his state court convictions, based on his
§ 2241 petition. We review a denial of coram nobis relief for abuse of discretion.
Alikhani v. United States, 200 F.3d 732, 734 (11th Cir. 2000). To be entitled to a
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writ of error coram nobis, a petitioner must show that “there is and was no other
available avenue of relief,” and that the error alleged “involves a matter of fact of
the most fundamental character which has not been put in issue or passed upon and
which renders the proceeding itself irregular or invalid.” Id. (quotation marks
omitted). “[C]oram nobis is not available in federal court as a means of attack on a
state criminal judgment.” Theriault v. Miss., 390 F.2d 657, 657 (5th Cir. 1968).1
Young seeks a writ of error coram nobis vacating his state court convictions.
Our law is clear, however, that coram nobis in federal court is not a vehicle for
challenging those convictions. See id. Thus, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Young’s request for a writ of error coram nobis based on his
§ 2241 petition.
For these reasons, the district court’s order dismissing Young’s petition for
habeas corpus and denying his Motion for Reconsideration is
AFFIRMED.
1
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we adopted as
binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981.
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