Andrew Joyce v. Sheriff Robert Crowder , 509 F. App'x 969 ( 2013 )

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            Case: 12-14172    Date Filed: 02/21/2013   Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-14172
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 2:10-cv-14348-DLG
ANDREW JOYCE,
RAQUEL CASTIEL, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
SHERIFF ROBERT CROWDER,
SGT. JASON WARD, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(February 21, 2013)
Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Andrew Joyce, Raquel Castiel, Tiara Falk, and Katherine Saucier
Case: 12-14172    Date Filed: 02/21/2013   Page: 2 of 4
(collectively “Plaintiffs”) appeal the district court’s entry of summary judgment in
favor of Martin County Sheriff Robert L. Crowder on First Amendment claims for
liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services,

436 U.S. 658

, 690 (1978),
and the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Deputies Ruben
Romero, Chris Conrad, and Jason Ward (collectively “arresting officers”), on
Florida state law false arrest claims. After careful review, we affirm.
In a previous appeal to this court, we held that the arresting officers had “at
least arguable probable cause” to arrest Plaintiffs for trespassing. See Joyce v.
Crowder, 480 F. App’x 954, 960 (11th Cir. 2012). Because the only issue we
faced in the prior appeal was whether the arresting officers were entitled to
qualified immunity from

42 U.S.C. § 1983

 claims alleging First and Fourth
Amendment violations, and because all that was required for qualified immunity
was arguable probable cause, see, e.g., Jones v. Cannon,

174 F.3d 1271

, 1283 n.3
(11th Cir. 1999), we did not decide whether the officers had actual probable cause
to arrest Plaintiffs.
After thorough review of the record, we hold that the arresting officers in
this case had probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs for trespass in violation of Florida
2
Case: 12-14172        Date Filed: 02/21/2013        Page: 3 of 4
law.1 Of the four elements required to prove trespass, only the notice element is
seriously at issue. We hold that the arresting officers had actual probable cause in
that they were told by Sergeant Cunningham that the protesters were on the west
side of the fence on private property. The arresting officers reasonably assumed
that the protesters had to have crossed the fence, thus constituting probable cause
that the protesters had the notice required by Florida law for violation of its
trespassing statute.2
1
Plaintiffs’ arguments that there was no probable cause for their arrests focus on
the lack of notice they had that they were trespassing on the property, and the fact that the Florida
trespassing statute requires “notice.” See

Fla. Stat. § 810.09

(1)(a)(1). But the question before us
is not whether Plaintiffs’ were actually guilty of the crime of trespassing. See Coffin v. Brandau,

642 F.3d 999

, 1007 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Probable cause requires more than a mere suspicion, but
not the level of convincing proof necessary to support a conviction.”); see also Walker v. State,

707 So. 2d 300

, 312 (Fla. 1997) (“The standard of conclusiveness and probability [required for
probable cause] is less than that required to support a conviction.” (quoting Blanco v. State,

452 So. 2d 520

, 523 (Fla.1984))). Instead, probable cause under both federal law and Florida law
exists “when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, of which he or she has
reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to believe, under the
circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an
offense.” Coffin, 707 F.3d at 1006-07 (citing Lee v. Ferraro,

284 F.3d 1188

, 1195 (11th Cir.
2002)). Accordingly, “[p]robable cause does not require the same type of specific evidence of
each element of the offense as would be needed to support a conviction.” State v. Perez,

277 So. 2d 778

, 781 (Fla. 1973) (citing Draper v. United States,

358 U.S. 307

 (1959)). The facts before
us establish that the information the arresting officers possessed was sufficient to establish
probable cause that Plaintiffs’ had committed, were committing, or were about to commit an
offense. See Coffin, 707 F.3d at 1006-07.
2
The relevant subsections of Fla Stat. § 810.09(1)(a) read:
A person who, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters upon or
remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance:
1. As to which notice against entering or remaining is given, either by actual
communication to the offender or by posting, fencing, or cultivation . . . commits
3
Case: 12-14172       Date Filed: 02/21/2013       Page: 4 of 4
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims
against Sheriff Crowder under Monell,

436 U.S. at 658

, because there was no
underlying constitutional violation.3 See Redd v. City of Enterprise,

140 F.3d 1378

, 1383 (11th Cir. 1998) (“When a police officer has probable cause to believe
that a person is committing a particular public offense, he is justified in arresting
that person, even if the offender may be speaking at the time that he is arrested.”).
Additionally, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ state law false
arrest claims against the arresting officers. See Bolanos v. Metro. Dade Cnty.,

677 So. 2d 1005

, 1005 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that, under Florida law,
“probable cause is a complete bar to an action for false arrest”).
AFFIRMED.
the offense of trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance.
3
Plaintiffs’ claim that Sheriff Crowder violated their First Amendment rights under
a ratification theory fails for the same reason. See Matthews v. Columbia Cnty.,

294 F.3d 1294