United States v. Jonas Michel , 511 F. App'x 918 ( 2013 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-12946
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 9:11-cr-80089-DTKH-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JONAS MICHEL,
a.k.a. Ya Yo,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(March 6, 2013)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Jonas Michel appeals his conviction and 72-month sentence for
being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18
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U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal he argues that the district court abused its discretion
by failing to order sua sponte a competency hearing prior to accepting his guilty
plea. He further argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the
district court failed to weigh properly his diminished capacity.
I. Competency
We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s failure to order sua
sponte a hearing on a defendant’s competency to stand trial. See United States v.
Williams, 468 F.2d 819, 820 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it did not order sua sponte a competency hearing). A
defendant is competent where he has “sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding,” and has a rational and
factual understanding of the proceedings against him. United States v. Rahim, 431
F.3d 753, 759 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he defendant must
be competent at all stages [of the proceedings.]” Id.The district court must order a competency hearing “if there is reasonable
cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental
disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is
unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him
or to assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). A competency hearing
is thereby required where a bona fide doubt exists as to whether the defendant is
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competent. See Rahim, 431 F.3d at 759. We consider three factors in determining
whether the district court denied a defendant due process by failing to order sua
sponte a competency hearing: (1) whether the defendant evidenced irrational
behavior; (2) whether the defendant’s demeanor indicated a lack of competence to
proceed; and (3) whether there is any prior medical opinion regarding the
defendant’s competence. See Tiller v. Esposito, 911 F.2d 575, 576 (11th Cir.
1990). This analysis focuses on what the district court did in light of what it knew
at the relevant time. See id. A defendant’s failure to raise the competency issue
before the district court is persuasive evidence that competency is not in doubt.
See United States v. Rodriguez, 799 F.2d 649, 655 (11th Cir. 1986).
We conclude from the record that Michel has not demonstrated that the
district court abused its discretion when it failed to order sua sponte a competency
hearing before it accepted his plea.
II. Substantive Reasonableness
We review the reasonableness of a defendant’s sentence under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S. Ct.
586, 591, 169 L. Ed. 2d 445 (2007), and the party challenging the sentence bears
the burden of demonstrating that it is unreasonable, United States v. Talley, 431
F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). The district court must impose a sentence that is
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of
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sentencing listed in § 3553(a)(2), including the need to reflect the seriousness of
the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, deter criminal
conduct, protect the public, and provide needed educational or vocational training,
or medical care. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The district court must also consider the
nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s history and
characteristics, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable Guidelines range,
pertinent policy statements from the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need for restitution. Id. § 3553(a)(1),
(3)-(7).
A district court abuses its discretion and imposes a substantively
unreasonable sentence when it balances the § 3553(a) factors in such a way that is
not reasonable, or places unreasonable weight on a single factor. United States v.
Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189, 1192-94 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1813 (2011). We will only reverse a sentence as substantively
unreasonable if, after considering the totality of the facts and circumstances, we are
left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear
error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors so that the sentence falls
outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.
Id. at 1189-90. The weight given to the § 3553(a) factors is committed to the
district court’s sound discretion, and we will not substitute our own judgment in
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that respect so long as the district court does not commit a clear error of judgment.
See United States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219, 1223 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1204 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,132
S. Ct. 1066 (2012). Sentences that fall within the applicable Guidelines range are
ordinarily expected to be reasonable, and the fact that a sentence falls appreciably
below the statutory maximum further tends to indicate substantive reasonableness.
See United States v. Valnor, 451 F.3d 744, 751-52 (11th Cir. 2006); Talley, 431
F.3d at 788.
We conclude from the record that Michel has not demonstrated that his
sentence is substantively unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm Michel’s
conviction and sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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