Margaret Jayne Kinnett v. Strayer Education, Inc. ( 2012 )


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  •                     Case: 12-12196               Date Filed: 12/13/2012   Page: 1 of 8
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 12-12196
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 8:10-cv-02317-SDM-MAP
    MARGARET JAYNE KINNETT,
    individually and on behalf of all others
    similarly situated, et al.,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                            Plaintiffs,
    OKLAHOMA FIREFIGHTERS PENSION AND
    RETIREMENT SYSTEM,
    lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                           Movant-Appellant,
    versus
    STRAYER EDUCATION, INC.,
    ROBERT S. SILBERMAN,
    MARK C. BROWN,
    KARL MCDONNELL,
    lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (December 13, 2012)
    Case: 12-12196       Date Filed: 12/13/2012        Page: 2 of 8
    Before HULL, MARCUS and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant Oklahoma Firefighters Pension and Retirement System appeals from
    the district court’s final judgment in favor of Appellees Strayer Education, Inc.,
    Robert S. Silberman, Mark C. Brown, and Karl McDonnell (collectively, “Strayer”).
    The district court, adopting in full the report and recommendation of the magistrate
    judge, dismissed Appellant’s complaint, which alleged, on behalf of all persons who
    purchased Strayer common stock between November 1, 2007 and January 7, 2011,
    that Strayer had made false or misleading statements during that period concerning
    its recruitment and enrollment practices, in violation of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of
    the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78t(a).1 On appeal,
    Appellant argues that the district court erred in concluding that Appellant had failed
    to satisfy all three elements of a securities fraud claim ((1) a false or misleading
    1
    Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act provides:
    It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, ... [t]o use or employ, in
    connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or
    deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
    the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or
    for the protection of investors.
    15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act provides for liability of “controlling
    persons” who aid and abet “any person liable under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
    regulation thereunder.” 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a).
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    statement; (2) scienter; and (3) loss causation) and in dismissing the complaint. After
    careful review, we affirm.
    We review a district court’s order dismissing a complaint de novo. FindWhat
    Investor Group v. FindWhat.com, 
    658 F.3d 1282
    , 1295 (11th Cir. 2011). At the
    motion to dismiss stage, we accept all well-pleaded facts as true, and construe the
    reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Garfield
    v. NDC Health Corp., 
    466 F.3d 1255
    , 1261 (11th Cir. 2006).
    To state a claim under § 10(b), a plaintiff must allege:
    (1) a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) made with scienter; (3)
    a connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance on the
    misstatement or omission; (5) economic loss [i.e., damages]; and (6) a
    causal connection between the material misrepresentation or omission
    and the loss, commonly called “loss causation.”
    FindWhat, 
    658 F.3d at 1295
     (quotation omitted; emphasis added); see Dura Pharms.,
    Inc. v. Broudo, 
    544 U.S. 336
    , 341-42 (2005). Because all six elements are required
    in order to state a § 10(b) claim, and because we conclude that the element most
    starkly absent from Appellant’s pleading was loss causation, that is the only one we
    address here.
    The loss causation element requires that a defendant’s fraud be both the but-for
    and proximate cause of a plaintiff’s later losses. FindWhat, 
    658 F.3d at 1309
    ; cf.
    Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 
    544 U.S. 336
    , 344-45 (2005) (noting the “common-law
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    roots of the securities fraud action” and basing its loss causation analysis on
    common-law tort causation). Thus, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s fraud
    -- as opposed to some other factor -- proximately caused his claimed losses. Dura,
    
    544 U.S. at 342-43
    ; FindWhat, 
    658 F.3d at 1309
    . Further, a plaintiff may not
    establish loss causation by simply alleging a security was purchased at an artificially
    inflated price. Dura, 
    544 U.S. at 342-43, 347
    . However, the plaintiff need not show
    that the defendant’s misconduct was the “sole and exclusive cause” of his injury; he
    need only show that the defendant’s act was a “substantial” or “significant
    contributing cause.” FindWhat, 
    658 F.3d at 1309
    ; Robbins v. Koger Properties, Inc.,
    
    116 F.3d 1441
    , 1447 (11th Cir. 1997).
    Appellant claims that as a result of Strayer’s fraud concerning its recruitment
    and enrollment practices, new student enrollments decreased by 20%, which in turn
    lowered the stock price. Appellant primarily focuses its loss-causation allegations on
    statements made in a question-and-answer session following a January 10, 2011,
    conference call that Strayer held with investors. During this session, Strayer’s CEO
    Silberman had the following exchange with analyst Amy Junker prior to trading on
    January 10, 2010:
    AMY JUNKER, ANALYST, ROBERT BAIRD: I’m hoping you can
    just touch a little bit on any additional color on why you think starts
    have degraded so much since last quarter. Do you still believe that
    4
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    negative press is kind of the only plausible explanation as you talked
    about last quarter? Were you seeing any evidence that students have
    become perhaps more debt averse or any of the reasons that you’re
    getting from the students themselves to indicate why this is happening?
    ROBERT SILBERMAN: Sure. I mean Karl [McDonnell] is here, and
    he can comment as well. I don’t know of any specific set of concerns
    with regard to pricing or debt capacity. Our new student enrollment was
    fairly consistent across all of our geographic regions in terms of the
    impact. So I would -- there is nothing geographic that I would look at.
    I do think that negative publicity and just a general sense of -- you have
    to bear in mind the difficulty that students go through in terms of
    deciding to go back to school, there is always a lot of reasons not to do
    it, and the negative publicity in the last four or five months certainly has
    had an impact. We have also been I would admit somewhat distracted
    internally here over the last two or three months just in dealing with
    some of the ramifications of not just the publicity but the actual
    governmental activity.
    Doc. 40 at 87, ¶ 199 (emphases added). From this exchange, Appellant argues that
    Strayer admitted that a cause in the drop in new student starts was that it had been
    forced by the government to change its recruitment practices.              Further, says
    Appellant, Strayer admitted that its prior practices had been contrary to government
    guidelines -- and were not the passive recruitment tactics that Strayer had represented
    that it used to investors -- and that these improper practices led to decreased student
    enrollment, and thus, lower stock prices.
    However, as the district court reasoned, these statements do not reveal that
    Strayer was admitting that it had engaged in improper recruitment and enrollment
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    practices, that those alleged improper practices either bolstered or were intended to
    bolster student enrollment numbers, that prior student enrollment numbers were the
    result of improper recruitment and enrollment practices, that Strayer implemented
    internal reforms as to the alleged improper practices, or that any reforms affected
    enrollment numbers. Indeed, Silberman said nothing about Strayer’s recruitment
    practices during the relevant exchange. If anything, the statements indicate that
    dealing with governmental activity is a time-consuming task that distracts
    management attention from running the university, and that Strayer believed any
    decline in enrollment derived from the negative press surrounding the government
    activity with respect to the for-profit secondary education industry, not any changes
    in its recruitment or enrollment practices.
    In short, the admission that Strayer’s enrollments were effected by
    “governmental activity” does not reveal that Strayer’s enrollment practices had not
    previously conformed with the government standards, as codified in the Higher
    Education Act or Strayer’s internal code of ethics, or that Strayer modified its
    enrollment practices because of government scrutiny. Appellant argues that it is
    ambiguous what Silberman was referring to, and that this ambiguity should not be
    resolved against Appellant on a motion to dismiss. However, the Supreme Court has
    said that factual allegations in a complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief
    6
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    above the speculative level,” Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    ,
    555 (2007), and that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
    content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
    liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009).
    Moreover, specific to the situation at hand, the Supreme Court has expressly
    demanded a complaint to allege “something beyond the mere possibility of loss
    causation.” Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at
    557 (citing Dura, 
    544 U.S. at 347
    ).
    Here, without any explicit mention of Strayer’s recruitment practices or even
    any change in any of its policies, it is simply not reasonable to infer that Silberman
    was somehow conceding that Strayer had engaged in improper recruiting or had been
    forced to change its recruiting practices to the detriment of its stock prices. As we’ve
    said, while ambiguities are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant,
    “unwarranted deductions of fact” are not admitted as true in a motion to dismiss.
    Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 
    416 F.3d 1242
    , 1246, 1248 (11th Cir.
    2005) (quotation omitted). That is exactly what Appellant is urging the courts to do.
    Accordingly, since nothing in the statements corrects any prior disclosures by Strayer
    or reveals any omissions on Strayer’s part that negatively affected the price of Strayer
    common stock, Appellant has failed to adequately allege loss causation. The district
    court did not err in dismissing Appellant’s Section 10(b) claim.
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    Nor do we find any error in the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s Section
    20(a) claim. To state a claim under § 20(a), the Appellant needed to allege that: (1)
    Strayer committed a primary violation of the securities laws; (2) the individual
    defendants possessed the power to control the general business affairs of Strayer; and
    (3) the individual defendants possessed the requisite power to directly or indirectly
    control or influence the specific corporate policy which resulted in the primary
    liability. Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 
    544 F.3d 1230
    , 1237 (11th Cir. 2008).
    Because a primary violation of the securities laws constitutes an essential element of
    a § 20(a) derivative claim, a plaintiff adequately pleads a § 20(a) claim only where
    the plaintiff adequately pleads a primary violation. Id. As we’ve discussed, Appellant
    failed to adequately plead a violation of § 10(b), and therefore, Appellant failed to
    adequately plead a § 20(a) control-person claim. See id. at 1255.
    AFFIRMED.
    8