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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-11285
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-02686-WSD
JOHN QUARLES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC,
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION (FANNIE MAE),
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(February 7, 2019)
Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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John Quarles appeals pro se the District Court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (“Nationstar”) and the Federal National
Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) (collectively, “the appellees”) in his
wrongful-foreclosure action alleging violations of O.C.G.A. §§ 44-14-162 and
44-14-162.2, state contract law, the Home Affordable Modification Program
(“HAMP”), and Regulation X,
12 C.F.R. § 1024.41. On appeal, Quarles argues
that the appellees violated O.C.G.A. §§ 44-14-162 and 44-14-162.2 and breached
the contractual obligations under his security deed by failing to provide sufficient
notice of their intent to foreclose on his property, and that they breached their
contractual duties and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed to
him under the HAMP modification guidelines and Regulation X. For the reasons
explained below, we affirm. 1
I.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing all inferences in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Palm Beach Golf Ctr.-Boca, Inc.
v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A.,
781 F.3d 1245, 1253 (11th Cir. 2015). Summary
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A
genuine factual dispute exists where a reasonable fact-finder could find by a
1
Because we write for the parties, we set out only what is necessary to explain our decision.
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preponderance of the evidence that the non-moving party is entitled to a verdict.
Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley,
694 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 2012).
II.
A.
Quarles contends that appellees committed wrongful foreclosure. Under
Georgia law, a claim for wrongful foreclosure requires a showing of (1) a legal
duty owed by the foreclosing party to the plaintiff, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) a
causal connection between the breach and the plaintiff’s injury, and (4) damages.
DeGolyer v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC,
662 S.E.2d 141, 147 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
Though his brief is unclear on this point, it appears that Quarles’s wrongful-
foreclosure claim is predicated on three alleged violations of O.C.G.A. §§ 44-14-
162 and 44-14-162.2. We consider these alleged violations in turn.
Quarles first argues that appellees violated O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162(a) because
he never received notice of the foreclosure sale. Under § 44-14-162(a), a
foreclosure sale is not valid “unless notice of the sale shall have been given as
required by Code Section 44-14-162.2.” O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162(a). Quarles reads
this section to require that the debtor have actually received notice prior to the
foreclosure sale; as he argues, “[n]otice sent is not equivalent to notice given.”
Appellant’s Br. at 9. But the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that “the actual
receipt (or want of receipt) by the grantor of the notice of sale under power is
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immaterial to the right of the grantee to sale under power.” McCollum v. Pope,
411 S.E.2d 874, 874 (Ga. 1992). Here, it is undisputed that appellees mailed the
foreclosure notice in accordance with the procedures outlined in O.C.G.A. § 44-14-
162.2(a). Accordingly, Quarles’s argument that the sale is invalid because he
didn’t actually receive notice is without merit.
Next, Quarles argues that appellees violated O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162 because
the foreclosure sale was not properly advertised. As the District Court found, the
evidence on this point is undisputed and indicates that appellees did properly
advertise the sale. It appears, moreover, that Quarles held this position in the
District Court: though he formally objected to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion
on this point, he seemed to agree with the Magistrate in his Opposition to
Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment:
The Defendants claim it is undisputed that the nonjudicial
foreclosure sale was “advertised and conducted at the time and place
and in the usual manner of the sheriff’s sales in the county in which
such real estate . . . is located.” Def. SUMF at Ex. I. (Deed Under
Power) As applicable to this action, O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162(a) required
Nationstar to send notice of the nonjudicial foreclosure in accordance
with another statute O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2. The undisputed evidence
shows that Nationstar did just that.
(emphasis added). We conclude that appellees did not violate O.C.G.A. §
44-14-162.
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B.
Quarles’ remaining claims are for breach of contract under the security deed,
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing under HAMP, and violation of
Regulation X. As the District Court noted, however, Quarles did not object to the
portion of the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation that dealt with these
claims. Under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, a party who “fail[s] to object to a
magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a report and
recommendation . . . waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s
order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. We
will “only review a waived objection, for plain error, if necessary in the interests of
justice.” Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp.,
850 F.3d 1248, 1257 (11th Cir. 2017). But
review for plain error “rarely applies in civil cases,”
Id. (quoting Ledford v.
Peeples,
657 F.3d 1222, 1258 (11th Cir. 2011)), and we decline to conduct plain-
error review here.
III.
For the reasons discussed above, the District Court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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