Prakazrel Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc. , 816 F.3d 686 ( 2016 )

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-11453
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:14-cv-62649-JIC
PRAKAZREL MICHEL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
NYP HOLDINGS, INC.,
d.b.a. New York Post,
ISABEL VINCENT,
MELISSA KLEIN,
Defendants - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(March 7, 2016)
Before MARCUS, JORDAN and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
MARCUS, Circuit Judge:
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In this defamation case, well-known rapper and philanthropist Prakazrel
(“Pras”) Michel challenges the truth of an article published about him in the New
York Post’s Page Six gossip column. The article claimed that Michel had failed to
perform as expected as the headliner at a 9/11 charity event for the Hope for Them
Foundation with which he was purportedly affiliated. Michel says that the article
defamed him because he had no connection to the Foundation and had not been
scheduled to perform at the event. The district court dismissed Michel’s claims
with prejudice, finding that the article presented only non-actionable statements of
opinion under New York law.
While we believe the district court correctly dismissed the complaint, we
reach that conclusion for different reasons. Because a reasonable reader of the
article would have concluded that it presented statements of fact (not just non-
actionable opinion), the article is not privileged against a defamation action. But
because Michel has failed to adequately plead facts giving rise to a reasonable
inference that the defendants published the article with actual malice, he has
nonetheless failed to state a claim; accordingly, the complaint was properly
dismissed. However, the dismissal should have been entered without prejudice,
and Michel given leave to amend his complaint.
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I.
Plaintiff Michel is a Grammy-winning artist and founding member of the
music group the Fugees who currently engages in a series of philanthropic and
business ventures. Page Six is a well-known gossip column run by the New York
Post, a widely circulated tabloid newspaper both in New York City and across the
country. On October 5, 2015, Page Six ran a story about Michel, written by Isabel
Vincent and Melissa Klein, under the headline “Ex-Fugee rapper bailed on his own
9/11 benefit concert.” The story reads in full:
Pras Michel, the rapper who co-founded The Fugees, was
a no-show as the headliner for a 9/11 charity event in
Hell’s Kitchen to benefit his own foundation.
His Hope for Them foundation also bounced a check to
the venue, falsely claimed MTV sponsored the fund-
raiser and failed to register the charity with state officials.
The group claims to minister to the poor in Haiti but
distanced itself in promotional material from the country
for fear potential donors would confuse it with the
disgraced charity run by his cousin, ex-Fugees frontman
Wyclef Jean, said a Hope for Them insider.
Jean’s Yele Haiti charity was shut after alleged
mismanagement. It is under investigation by the state.
“Their whole basis is, ‘Don’t let anyone know that we’re
from Haiti,’ ” the insider said.
Hope for Them was founded in 2011 by Haiti native
Mike Jean, a record producer and songwriter.
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Michel was listed as a board member on the group’s Web
site early last week. By Friday, his name had
disappeared, and Mike Jean told The Post the Grammy
winner wasn’t a board member.
The event, at Stage 48 in Hell’s Kitchen last Sept. 11,
was billed as “Fashion for Charity” to help New Yorkers.
Tickets ranged from $40 to $2,000. In addition to a
fashion show, Michel was to perform.
The well-established New York Cares charity was also
brought in as a sponsor, the insider said.
MTV’s logo was prominently featured on promo
material. But the insider and MTV told The Post the
network was never a sponsor.
The only connection was event hostess Lenay Dunn, a
former host of the MTV show “10 on Top.”
Organizers said Saturday that the event pulled in $6,000
but $5,600 went to expenses, with $1,100 for Stage 48
and $500 for NY Cares.
Hope for Them owed the venue $1,100 after patrons
failed to cover a promised bar minimum, the source said.
It bounced a check to the venue, which threatened legal
action, according to e-mails from a Stage 48 staffer to
Hope for Them.
Mike Jean told The Post the bill was paid late last week.
Stage 48 refused to comment, but an e-mail indicated the
tab had not been paid as of Friday afternoon.
He said Michel couldn’t perform because he had the flu.
Michel said NY Cares would be paid.
Alleging defamation and the intentional infliction of emotional distress,
Michel filed suit against the New York Post and the article’s authors in Broward
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County circuit court in Florida. The defendants subsequently removed the case to
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging
diversity of citizenship between the parties.
In his complaint, Michel contests many of the statements in the article and
says that publication indicated a “blatant reckless disregard for the truth.” He
complains that the defendants falsely stated and/or implied that the Foundation
“belongs to Pras,” that he bounced a check to a venue, that he falsely claimed
MTV sponsored a fundraiser hosted by the Foundation, that he had an obligation to
register the charity with the state, that he had an obligation to perform at the
charity event, and that he had “bailed on” his own benefit concert. Among other
things, Michel asserted that he “has no relationship with the Foundation” and
“never guaranteed a performance at the event.” Thus, the article’s assertions to the
contrary were false. Moreover, despite the claims in the headline and article that
the event was for a 9/11 charity, 9/11 “had absolutely nothing to do with the
charity event in Hell’s Kitchen.” Finally, Michel claimed that two days before the
article was published, the Foundation’s president wrote to the reporters that “Pras
is a good friend of the organization and supports our cause but is not a board
member.” The reporters allegedly failed to follow up by further investigating that
point. In short, Michel alleged that he “had nothing to do with the event and has
no relationship with the foundation.” Michel claimed that the article’s publication
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imperiled many business ventures in which he was engaged and caused him
emotional distress.
The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the article is true, that the
contested characterizations constituted protected opinion, and that Michel had not
pled that the defendants acted with the requisite actual malice. After full briefing
and oral argument, the district court dismissed Michel’s claims with prejudice.
Applying New York law, the district court concluded that the article consisted only
of non-actionable statements of opinion. Specifically, the district court determined
that the article’s tone and the context of its appearance in the Page Six gossip
column would cause a reasonable reader to interpret the article’s statements as
being those of opinion, not fact.
Addressing the Page Six context, the district court wrote this:
As to the latter, the New York Post’s Page Six traffics in
celebrity gossip. Its reputation is well-known, and is
captured succinctly in the lede to a December 2004
profile published in another prominent New York
publication—Vanity Fair:
Anonymous tips, political agendas, raging lawyers,
outrageous sex stories—so goes life at “Page Six,”
the New York Post gossip column Rupert
Murdoch ordered up in 1977. The Page has since
broken news of Donald and Marla’s affair, Woody
Allen’s relationship with his “stepdaughter,” and
Kirstie Alley’s possum-nursing fetish. Listening
to staffers, sources, and subjects, an alumnus
chronicles the feuds, scoops, and characters that
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have made the column as powerful as the
boldfaced names it covers.
Frank DiGiacomo, The Gossip Behind the Gossip,
Vanity Fair, Dec. 2004. As such, Page Six is just the
place that a reasonable reader would “anticipate [the use]
of epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole.”
Moreover, the district court described the tone of the article as suggesting that it
was founded on opinion because it was rife with rumor, speculation, and seemingly
tenuous inferences. The article also identified the sources of its information,
providing the factual basis for those inferences. Having concluded that the article
represented protected statements of opinion and, thus, that the complaint should be
dismissed, the district court declined to address the defendants’ other arguments.
Michel timely filed this appeal.
II.
We review de novo an order granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. Simpson v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., 744 F.3d 702, 705
(11th Cir. 2014). The allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true and
construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ironworkers Local Union 68
v. AstraZeneca Pharm., LP, 634 F.3d 1352, 1359 (11th Cir. 2011). To survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
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factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009). We are, of course, free to affirm the district court’s dismissal on “any
ground that is supported by the record.” United States v. Elmes, 532 F.3d 1138,
1142 (11th Cir. 2008).
III.
The suit was commenced in Florida contesting the publication of an article
in New York regarding an event that occurred in New York. The district judge
concluded that New York law should apply.
In a diversity action such as this one, a federal court must apply the choice-
of-law principles of the state in which it sits. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). “Florida resolves conflict-of-laws questions
according to the ‘most significant relationship’ test outlined in the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws.” Grupo Televisa, S.A. v. Telemundo Commc’ns
Grp., Inc., 485 F.3d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Bishop v. Florida
Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1980). When determining the most
significant relationship, the courts consider “(a) the place where the injury
occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the
domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the
parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
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centered.” Bishop, 389 So. 2d at 1001 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws § 145). These factors are considered “according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue.” Id.
Here, the application of New York law is plainly appropriate for two
reasons. First, it is beyond real dispute that New York has the most significant
relationship to the case. The article was published in New York, regarding an
event that took place in New York, and that allegedly caused harm to Michel’s
business interests in New York. Both the New York Post and the reporter
defendants are domiciled in New York. While Michel is domiciled in Florida, that
consideration is of little relative importance. Moreover, Michel consented in his
briefing and oral argument before the district court that New York law should
apply to the case. He does not contest the application of New York law on appeal
and, indeed, cites extensively to New York law in his briefs. Because “no party
has challenged the choice of New York libel law, all are deemed to have consented
to its application.” Celle v. Filipino Reporter Enters. Inc., 209 F.3d 163, 175 (2d
Cir. 2000) (citing, inter alia, Templeman v. Chris Craft Corp., 770 F.2d 245, 248
(1st Cir. 1985)).
IV.
Michel alleges the Page Six article about him was defamatory and caused
him significant harm. Under New York law, a defamation claim requires the
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plaintiff to show: “(1) a false statement that is (2) published to a third party (3)
without privilege or authorization, and that (4) causes harm, unless the statement is
one of the types of publications actionable regardless of harm.” Stepanov v. Dow
Jones & Co., 987 N.Y.S.2d 37, 41–42 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014). “The essence of the
tort of libel is the publication of a statement about an individual that is both false
and defamatory.” Brian v. Richardson, 660 N.E.2d 1126, 1129 (N.Y. 1995). As a
matter of constitutional law, where a public figure sues for defamation, he must
prove the publication of a knowing or reckless falsehood (the “actual malice”
standard) to recover. Ortiz v. Valdescastilla, 478 N.Y.S.2d 895, 898 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1984) (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964)).
Here, the parties dispute three points: whether the statements constituted
facts or opinions, whether they were published with actual malice, and whether
they were actually true. We address each in turn.
A.
Under New York defamation law, only statements of fact -- as opposed to
statements of opinion -- can be actionable. As the New York Court of Appeals has
written, “Since falsity is a sine qua non of a libel claim and since only assertions of
fact are capable of being proven false, we have consistently held that a libel action
cannot be maintained unless it is premised on published assertions of fact.” Brian,
660 N.E.2d at 1129; accord Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270,
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1275 (N.Y. 1991). The immunity granted to opinions reflects, in part, the First
Amendment principle that there can be no false ideas. See Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974). Thus, in New York, opinions cannot be
grounds for a defamation suit no matter how offensive or offensively framed they
may be. Mann v. Abel, 885 N.E.2d 884, 885–86 (N.Y. 2008). Whether a
particular statement constitutes fact or opinion “is a question of law for the courts,
to be decided based on what the average person hearing or reading the
communication would take it to mean.” Davis v. Boeheim, 22 N.E.3d 999, 1004–
05 (N.Y. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mann, 885 N.E.2d at
885. In making this determination, we note that New York’s law on this point is
broader and more protective of speech than the requirements found in the Federal
Constitution. See Celle, 209 F.3d at 178 (“Unlike the Federal Constitution, the
New York Constitution provides for absolute protection of opinions.”); Gross v.
New York Times Co., 623 N.E.2d 1163, 1167 (N.Y. 1993); Immuno AG., 576
N.E.2d at 1278.
When determining whether a statement reflects a fact or an opinion, New
York courts generally engage in a three-part analysis. The test is well-settled and
requires that courts consider:
(1) whether the specific language in issue has a precise
meaning which is readily understood; (2) whether the
statements are capable of being proven true or false; and
(3) whether either the full context of the communication
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in which the statement appears or the broader social
context and surrounding circumstances are such as to
signal readers or listeners that what is being read or heard
is likely to be opinion, not fact.
Davis, 22 N.E.3d at 1005 (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations
adopted); Mann, 885 N.E.2d at 886; Brian, 660 N.E.2d at 1129; Gross, 623 N.E.2d
at 1167. “The third factor lends both depth and difficulty to the analysis, and
requires that the court consider the content of the communication as a whole, its
tone and apparent purpose.” Davis, 22 N.E.3d at 1005 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, New York courts generally analyze the totality of the statements
and the context in which they have arisen in order to determine their effect upon
the average reader. Brian, 660 N.E.2d at 1129–30; Immuno AG., 567 N.E.2d at
1278. Statements “couched in loose, figurative or hyperbolic language in charged
circumstances” are more likely to be deemed opinions. Immuno AG., 567 N.E.2d
at 1281. Significantly, the court’s role is not to sift through a statement to identify
and isolate factual assertions. Rather, the court should weigh the totality of
circumstances to determine whether “the reasonable reader would have believed
that the challenged statements were conveying facts about the libel plaintiff.”
Brian, 660 N.E.2d at 1130 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, there is no meaningful argument regarding the application of the first
two factors. The heart of Michel’s claim boils down to the published statements
that he was a “no-show” for -- or “bailed on” -- a headlining performance at a
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benefit concert for “his own” foundation. Each of these statements would be
readily understood by a reasonable reader. As the defendants write in their
briefing before this Court, the term “no-show” is “commonly understood to mean
that someone said they would do something but did not.” See also “No-Show,”
Merriam-Webster Unabridged Dictionary (3d ed. 2015) (“[A] person who is
expected but does not show up”). We fully agree with the defendants’
interpretation of the statement. As we see it, the phrase would be readily
understood by readers to mean that the plaintiff failed to appear at an event he was
otherwise obliged or required to attend, thus satisfying the first prong of New
York’s fact/opinion analysis. We also agree that the statement is composed of two
separate factual assertions: first, that Michel had some obligation to perform, and
second, that he did not perform. The term “bailed on” would be readily understood
as a stronger statement that the plaintiff did not appear after having committed to
appear and perform at the charity event. Plainly, it suggests not only a failure to
honor an obligation or commitment to do something, but also that the failure was
somehow unwarranted or caused particular harm. Michel alleges that these
statements have impeached his “honesty, integrity, virtues, morals and the like.”
The article’s statements that Michel was a “no-show” at the charity event are
allegedly made more damning because he was the show’s “headliner” and the
concert was intended to benefit “his own” foundation. There is little debate about
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the meaning of “headline” -- a headliner is the star attraction of a show or event
whose name takes top billing. “Headliner,” Merriam-Webster Unabridged
Dictionary (3d ed. 2015). This would be commonly understood by the Post’s
readers. Those readers would also readily understand that when the Foundation
was referred to as “his own” it meant that Michel had some direct, significant, and
immediate relationship with the Foundation. Indeed, “his” is a term of possession.
Thus, although reasonable readers would not think that Michel “owned” the
Foundation, they would be justified in concluding that he had either created or
funded the organization or served the charity in some significant way, maybe as an
officer, director, employee, or major benefactor of the Foundation, or that he had
some other palpable association with the charity. In short, they would believe that
he was affiliated in some direct way with the life of the Foundation. These
statements allegedly do additional harm to Michel’s reputation because they
suggest that his failure to appear as the star attraction at his own charity event
would do harm to an organization to which he owed particular allegiance. A
reasonable reader would have had little difficulty discerning the meaning and
import of these statements.
Moreover, each of the statements to which Michel objects is readily capable
of being proven true or false. Either Michel was committed to perform at the event
or he was not. The exact basis of the commitment to perform is not important.
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What is essential to the assertion is that there was some basis to conclude that
Michel was, in some way, obligated to perform. This is an empirical determination
subject to verification. Similarly, Michel either attended and performed at the
event or he did not. His attendance or non-attendance is not a matter of subjective
opinion; it is a matter of objective empirical fact. True or false, the assertion that
Michel was a “no-show” for the benefit concert is plainly a statement of fact.
Likewise, Michel’s status as the “headliner” for the event is subject to easy
verification or refutation. All one would have to do would be to look at the
advertisements for the concert or at its program to determine if Michel’s name
received top billing. Finally, the statement that the Foundation was “his own” can
be proven true or false. The article alleges a significant relationship while Michel
disclaims any relationship at all. Either Michel had such a relationship with the
Foundation or he did not. In either event, the claim -- like all of these statements --
is subject to empirical verification and, thus, falls comfortably within the realm of
fact.
Having found that the first two factors for distinguishing between fact and
opinion strongly indicate that the challenged statements were factual, we turn to
the third prong of the test in order to analyze context. Nothing about the context in
which those statements appeared overcomes the conclusion that these statements
were assertions of fact. To the contrary, an examination of the context underscores
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the finding that a reasonable reader would conclude the article presented
statements of fact.
A review of salient New York cases sustains this reading. In Steinhilber v.
Alphonse, 501 N.E.2d 550 (N.Y. 1986), the New York Court of Appeals relied on
both the broad and immediate context of statements to determine that they
represented non-actionable opinion. The case arose from a message that played for
anyone who called a phone number given to members of the Local 1120 union. Id.
at 551. The message contained a series of crude and juvenile jokes insulting
Steinhilber’s appearance, intelligence, and talent. Id. The Court of Appeals noted
that a public debate in the midst of a heated labor dispute was exactly the sort of
context in which listeners and readers would anticipate “the use of epithets, fiery
rhetoric or hyperbole” without assuming those epithets to be statements of fact. Id.
at 556 (brackets omitted). Moreover, any listener who missed the broader context
would find it “evident that the tape-recorded message was intended to be invective
expressed in the form of heavy-handed and nonsensical humor.” Id. at 555.
The controversy in Brian v. Richardson, 660 N.E.2d 1126 (N.Y. 1995),
arose from an op-ed published in the New York Times that called for an
investigation of an individual for his alleged involvement in stealing proprietary
software, among other misconduct. Id. at 1128. While the Court of Appeals noted
that the article’s appearance on the opinion pages was a factor it considered, the
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statements were not shielded from liability based solely on their placement in a
particular section of the paper. Id. at 1130. Rather, based on the text of the article
itself, the Court of Appeals concluded that a reasonable reader would consider the
author to have been making allegations -- as opposed to assertions of fact -- given
his self-identification as an interested party, his marshalling of rumors with limited
supporting facts, and his call for a full-scale investigation. Id. at 1131.
Similarly, in Mann v. Abel, 885 N.E.2d 884 (N.Y. 2008), the New York
Court of Appeals found challenged statements to be immune where a local
newspaper printed on its opinion page a piece very critical of the Rye Town
Attorney, Yale Mann. Id. at 885. The piece, preceded by an editorial note
indicating it was an expression of opinion, referred to Mann as a “political hatchet
Mann” and said that he was “leading the Town of Rye to destruction.” Id. The
court concluded that these obviously rhetorical flourishes along with the broad
context in which the piece appeared -- on the opinion page with a note indicating
that it represented the author’s opinion -- were likely to be interpreted by
reasonable readers as expressions of opinion. Id. at 886.
In Levin v. McPhee, 119 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 1997), the Second Circuit applied
New York law when considering a New Yorker article implying that the plaintiff
had a hand in committing murder. Although presented as a work of nonfiction
research, the article sent “a number of clear signals” to readers that the particular
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allegations were the result of speculation, including describing the events as
shrouded in mystery, presenting multiple narratives as “versions” of what may
have happened, and labeling one version as “imagined.” Id. at 197. In this
context, the court concluded that the reader would not have interpreted the
allegations to be presentations of fact. Id.Finally, in contrast, in Gross v. New York Times Co., 623 N.E.2d 1163(N.Y. 1993), the Court of Appeals declined to grant immunity to statements
contained in a series of newspaper articles purporting to show that New York
City’s Chief Medical Officer had “produced a series of misleading or inaccurate
autopsy reports on people who died in custody of the police.” Id. at 1165. The
articles included interviews with several pathologists and colleagues who described
the Medical Officer’s work as biased in favor of the police. Id. at 1165–66. The
Court of Appeals found that the broad context of the statements -- stories in the
news section with the appearance of being the product of careful deliberation --
would give reasonable readers cause to believe the statements were matters of fact.
Id. at 1166. Moreover, the articles were written in such a way that charges of
specific misconduct, although couched in the language of hypotheses and
conclusions, would be interpreted by reasonable readers as statements of fact. Id.
at 1168.
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An examination of context in this case strongly suggests that the statements
at issue would cause a reasonable reader to conclude that the challenged statements
were factual assertions and not expressions of opinion. Neither the broad context
nor the specific language employed in the article indicate to readers that the
statements were anything but a report of factual events. First, that the article
appeared on Page Six -- a well-known gossip column -- does not require us to
conclude that reasonable readers would interpret the reporting of facts on the page
to be statements of opinion. While it is surely true that a reader would not expect
to encounter the type of hard-hitting investigative journalism that might appear on
the front page of the New York Times or the Washington Post, the mere placement
of a story in a particular section of the paper is not enough to categorically
preclude it from a defamation action. Brian, 660 N.E.2d at 1130. Indeed, in Brian,
the New York Court of Appeals applied that rule to the opinion page of the
newspaper -- a section far more indicative of opinions than the gossip page. In
short, the article’s placement on the gossip page does not, standing on its own,
compel finding that the factual averments found in the article must be considered
to be opinion. Huggins v. Moore, 689 N.Y.S.2d 21, 32 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999),
rev’d on other grounds, 726 N.E.2d 456 (N.Y. 1999) (“[S]tatements made in . . . a
gossip context do not gain some sort of immunity as pseudo-opinion simply
because they are not hard news.”).
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Moreover, even a reader of the gossip column would have some reasonable
expectation that the celebrity news being reported was actually true as opposed to
merely reciting the author’s opinion as to what a particular celebrity has been
doing. Further, like the story in Gross, the article here was not presented as
breaking news. Notably, it was not printed until more than three weeks after the
events it described. As in Gross, this might suggest to the reasonable reader that a
greater degree of deliberation went into formulating the story, further removing it
from the immediacy and contention that marked instances of opinion in cases like
Steinhilber.
It is also worth observing that the analysis of broader context is hampered
because this case comes before us on a motion to dismiss. The procedural posture
limits the information available for assessing the article’s broader context. Thus,
for example, we do not know what other articles appeared on the page that day, to
say nothing of the days immediately before and after. Thus, apart from knowing
that Page Six is a gossip column, we know precious little about the context in
which the article appeared. Presumably, other information would become
available during the course of discovery. In any event, the broader context of the
article does not decide the matter one way or the other. And examination of the
immediate context found in the article itself removes whatever doubt may remain
about the factual nature of the challenged statements.
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The immediate context of the allegedly defamatory statements -- the text of
the article itself -- would lead a reasonable reader to the conclusion that the article
presents factual statements. Indeed, while focused on celebrity behavior instead of
the pressing geopolitical issues of the day, the article reads almost exactly like
what one would expect from a straight news story. It opens with a lede
highlighting the story’s main idea: that Michel was a “no-show” at a charity event
for an organization with which he had close ties. It then goes on to offer more
detail -- supported by quotations from named and anonymous sources -- about that
lede. The reader learns from the article that the Foundation bounced a check to the
venue and failed to register with state charity officials; that Michel had been listed
on the Foundation’s website as a board member, although that reference was
removed; the date, location, and ticket prices of the event; that NY Cares was a co-
sponsor but, despite advertising to the contrary, MTV was not; that the event ended
up losing money; that the Foundation’s founder said Michel could not perform
because he had the flu; and that Michel said NY Cares would be paid. The style
and tone of the article are wholly consistent with what one would expect to find in
fact-based news reporting. A reasonable reader who happened to pick up the paper
would have no indication that the story presented anything other than a factual
narrative of events.
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Unlike in some of the New York cases we have highlighted, there are no
overt indications here that the reporters were presenting opinions as opposed to
facts. In sharp contrast, in Mann, the publisher included a disclaimer at the top of
the article clearly labeling what followed as a statement of opinion. While subtler,
the reporter in Levin signaled through the use of such terms as “versions” and
“imagined” that he was not offering statements of fact. But here there is no
softening language to signal readers that they are not reading a factual account.
The article does not open with a disclaimer of opinion. Instead, it opens with a
straightforward statement of verifiable fact -- “Pras Michel, the rapper who co-
founded The Fugees, was a no-show as the headliner for a 9/11 charity event in
Hell’s Kitchen to benefit his own foundation.” Nor does the rest of the article
provide any reason to doubt that the events being described are what actually
happened. There is nothing indicating that the article’s account of events
surrounding the charity is merely a version of what might have happened. Instead,
the article presents a litany of factually verifiable statements and direct quotations
from sources without any disclaimers -- explicit or implicit -- from which a reader
would conclude that those statements were anything less than factual.
Moreover, the article’s tone and rhetoric do not implicitly suggest to its
readers that they are not reading a factual account of events. In contrast to the
overblown rhetoric found in Steinhilber, the unverifiable statements in Mann, or
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the call for investigation in Brian, the Page Six article about Michel was not
couched in loose, figurative, or hyperbolic language or invective that would alert
readers they were not reading a factual news account. If the New York Post, in
fact, intended the article to be interpreted as an expression of the authors’ opinions,
it provided no indication of that intent in the article itself.
We add that the article’s use of slang terms like “bailed on” and “no-show”
is hardly indicative of opinion. The terms are informal, but they are not
conjectural, filled with invective, or otherwise indicative of opinion as opposed to
fact. One only needs to compare the language used here with the language found
in Mann or Steinhilber to see the difference. The rhetorical flights (or excesses) in
those cases are not matched by this article’s few instances of informal language.
The language the article employed would be taken by its readers “to mean that
someone said they would do something but did not.” This is a factual statement
subject to empirical verification and is wholly different from claims that a public
official is leading a town to its destruction. Cf. Mann, 885 N.E.2d at 885. A
reporter need not write in the Queen’s English for a reasonable reader to conclude
that an article is presenting assertions of fact.
Likewise, we reject the defendants’ suggestion that because the article
presents its sources and allows readers to decide the veracity of the article for
themselves, the assertion of fact is transformed into an opinion. In Gross, for
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instance, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the claim that the stories
presented only opinion and instead concluded that they presented actionable
statements of fact even though the articles presented quotations from pathologists
and other sources of information in support of their general thesis. Gross, 623
N.E.2d at 1168. While the inclusion of the underlying information -- particularly
information that runs contrary to the article’s conclusion -- for the purpose of
allowing readers to decide an issue for themselves can be a factor in determining
whether an article ought to be viewed as presenting opinion, that inclusion was not
dispositive and did not outweigh the multiple indications already discussed that
would lead a reasonable reader to conclude that the article offered factual
statements.
Even when viewing the allegedly defamatory statements contained on Page
Six in context, a reader would not fairly conclude that they presented only the
reporters’ opinions. Thus, as we see it, this case could not be dismissed because
the article contained only non-actionable opinion.
The district court also erred by relying on a passage chosen from a Vanity
Fair article about Page Six’s reputation. The clear rule in this Circuit is that
consideration of material falling outside the pleadings converts a motion to dismiss
into one for summary judgment. See Trustmark Ins. Co. v. ESLU, Inc., 299 F.3d
1265, 1267 (11th Cir. 2002). And in doing so, the judge must give notice to the
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parties and allow them 10 days in which to supplement the record. Id. We strictly
enforce this rule and require that a case be reversed and remanded in the event that
the necessary notice has not been provided. Jones v. Auto. Ins. Co. of Hartford,
Conn., 917 F.2d 1528, 1532 (11th Cir. 1990).
In this case, the district court relied on material outside of the pleadings as a
primary reason for determining the context of the allegedly defamatory statements.
Indeed, the colorful history of Page Six detailed in the Vanity Fair article appears
to be the sole basis for the district court’s conclusion that “Page Six is just the
place that a reasonable reader would anticipate the use of epithets, fiery rhetoric or
hyperbole.” The district court provided no notice to the parties that it was relying
on material outside the pleadings and denied the plaintiff the opportunity to present
the court with additional evidence. Thus, we conclude that the district court erred
both substantively and procedurally in determining that the Page Six story
presented statements of non-actionable opinion.
B.
The district court still properly dismissed the complaint because Michel did
not adequately plead that the statements were published with actual malice. At the
outset, Michel has argued that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
adequately plead actual malice. Relying on a series of cases issued before the
Supreme Court decided Iqbal and Twombly, Michel claims that defamation suits
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involving public figures, and thus requiring an allegation of actual malice, should
not be dismissed without first conducting discovery. But these holdings are
completely out of line with the current state of the law. Iqbal itself directly held
that malice and other degrees of intent are subject to the plausibility pleading
standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 686–87. Indeed, after Iqbal and Twombly, every
circuit that has considered the matter has applied the Iqbal/Twombly standard and
held that a defamation suit may be dismissed for failure to state a claim where the
plaintiff has not pled facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference of actual
malice. See Biro v. Conde Nast, 807 F.3d 541, 544–45 (2d Cir. 2015); McDonald
v. Wise, 769 F.3d 1202, 1220 (10th Cir. 2014); Pippen v. NBCUniversal Media,
LLC, 734 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2013); Mayfield v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car
Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 377 (4th Cir. 2012); Schatz v. Republican State
Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 58 (1st Cir. 2012). Joining that chorus, we hold
that the plausibility pleading standard applies to the actual malice standard in
defamation proceedings.
Moreover, application of the plausibility pleading standard makes particular
sense when examining public figure defamation suits. In these cases, there is a
powerful interest in ensuring that free speech is not unduly burdened by the
necessity of defending against expensive yet groundless litigation. Indeed, the
actual malice standard was designed to allow publishers the “breathing space”
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needed to ensure robust reporting on public figures and events. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
at 271–72. Forcing publishers to defend inappropriate suits through expensive
discovery proceedings in all cases would constrict that breathing space in exactly
the manner the actual malice standard was intended to prevent. The costs and
efforts required to defend a lawsuit through that stage of litigation could chill free
speech nearly as effectively as the absence of the actual malice standard altogether.
Thus, a public figure bringing a defamation suit must plausibly plead actual malice
in accordance with the requirements set forth in Iqbal and Twombly.
Determining whether an individual is a public figure -- and thus subject to
the actual malice analysis -- is a question of law for the court to decide. Brewer v.
Memphis Pub. Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1247 (5th Cir. 1980). There is no question that
the plaintiff here is a public figure. He describes himself in his complaint as “a
two-time Grammy winning artist, a founding member of the famous music group,
the Fugees, and . . . an acclaimed philanthropist.” And in subsequent court
documents, he describes himself as a “world-renown[ed] philanthropist.”
Moreover, at oral argument before the district court, Michel’s attorney conceded
that his client “is a celebrity, he’s a public figure.” Plaintiff has not argued
otherwise in his briefing or oral argument before this Court. The actual malice
standard applies to Prakazrel Michel.
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To plead actual malice, then, Michel must allege facts sufficient to give rise
to a reasonable inference that the false statement was made “with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Sullivan, 376
U.S. at 280. The test is not an objective one and the beliefs or actions of a
reasonable person are irrelevant. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731
(1968). Rather, we ask whether the defendant, instead of acting in good faith,
actually entertained serious doubts as to the veracity of the published account, or
was highly aware that the account was probably false. Id.; Silvester v. Am. Broad.
Cos., 839 F.2d 1491, 1493 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
64, 74 (1964)); Sweeney v. Prisoners’ Legal Servs. of New York, Inc., 647 N.E.2d
101, 104 (N.Y. 1995); Hoesten v. Best, 821 N.Y.S.2d 40, 49 (N.Y. App. Div.
2006). The Supreme Court has written that this showing can be inferred in certain
circumstances:
Professions of good faith will be unlikely to prove
persuasive, for example, where a story is fabricated by
the defendant, is the product of his imagination, or is
based wholly on an unverified anonymous telephone call.
Nor will they be likely to prevail when the publisher’s
allegations are so inherently improbable that only a
reckless man would have put them in circulation.
Likewise, recklessness may be found where there are
obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or
the accuracy of his reports.
St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732.
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Actual malice requires more than a departure from reasonable journalistic
standards. Levan v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 190 F.3d 1230, 1239 (11th Cir.
1999). Thus, a failure to investigate, standing on its own, does not indicate the
presence of actual malice. Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S.
657, 692 (1989); Sweeney, 647 N.E.2d at 104. Rather there must be some showing
that the defendant purposefully avoided further investigation with the intent to
avoid the truth. Id.; Grier v. Johnson, 648 N.Y.S.2d 764, 768 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996).
Moreover, where the publisher includes information contrary to the general
conclusions reached in an article, that showing tends to undermine the claims of
malice. See, e.g., Lohrenz v. Donnelly, 350 F.3d 1272, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2003). For
example, where a news report informed its audience that its primary source was
“not an unimpeachable source of information,” it served to undermine claims
showing that the report was issued with actual malice. Silvester, 839 F.2d at 1498.
Similarly, where a magazine article cast doubt on its primary source by quoting
other individuals calling the source a “liar” and a “con man,” but explaining why
the magazine chose to rely on the source anyway, the plaintiff had not proven
actual malice. McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine, 74 F.3d 1296, 1304 (D.C. Cir.
1996). The reasoning behind the rule is simple. Where a publisher gives readers
sufficient information to weigh for themselves the likelihood of an article’s
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veracity, it reduces the risk that readers will reach unfair (or simply incorrect)
conclusions, even if the publisher itself has. Moreover, discouraging the inclusion
of such contrary sources for fear of fueling a defamation lawsuit would run counter
to the constitutional goal of promoting the free and robust discussion of public
events. Thus, reporting perspectives contrary to the publisher’s own should be
interpreted as helping to rebut, not establish, the presence of actual malice.
Here, Michel has not sufficiently pled facts giving rise to a reasonable
inference that the defendants published the story knowing that it was false or with
reckless disregard for whether it was false or not. For starters, we can disregard
the portions of the complaint where Michel alleges in a purely conclusory manner
that the defendants were “reckless” in publishing the article. Allegations such as
these amount to little more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” which are insufficient to
support a cause of action. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Setting those aside, there remain
two allegations that require further analysis.
First, Michel claims that:
Defendants wrote, published and disseminated the Article
without conducting any due diligence on the matter
covered or attempting any real outreach to uncover if any
truth existed relating to the matter that was being asserted
therein.
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This statement treads perilously close to being a conclusory assertion of the
elements of the cause of action. But reading the paragraph favorably for the
plaintiff, it asserts the fact that defendants conducted no investigation before
reporting the allegedly defamatory statements about Michel. Even so, this does not
make a showing of actual malice. As we noted already, the failure to investigate,
standing alone, does not give rise to a conclusion that the defendants acted with
actual malice. Rather, the plaintiff must plead facts giving rise to a reasonable
inference that the defendants acted to intentionally avoid learning the truth.
The complaint here does not present factual allegations sufficient to give rise
to such an inference. More significantly, the conclusory statement is rebutted by
the article itself, which was included as an exhibit to the complaint. See Griffin
Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen the
exhibits contradict the general and conclusory allegations of the pleading, the
exhibits govern.”). The article indicates that the reporters spoke with, consulted, or
otherwise reached out to a Foundation insider, event organizers, the founder of the
Foundation, the venue, the Foundation’s website, and state charity records. The
complaint fails to explain why none of that qualified as “real outreach” or due
diligence. That many of the sources were not identified by name does not render
them or the reliance on them invalid. Indeed, reliance on unnamed sources is
typical in gossip columns (and in much other reporting as well). Even if the
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statements made in the article were false as an objective matter, the allegations
here are insufficient to show that the defendants knew they were false or acted in
reckless disregard of their falsity. Rather, the record before the district judge
indicates that the reporters conducted some outreach and engaged in due diligence.
The second allegation that could support a showing of actual malice presents
a closer question, but likewise fails. The complaint alleges:
17. The Article was published on October 5, 2014 at 3:36
a.m. EDT.
18. On October 3, 2014 at 9:33 p.m. EDT, the
Foundation’s president wrote to Defendant, Vincent,
“[Michel] is a good friend of the organization and
supports our cause but is not a board member.”
(emphasis added)
19. Vincent and Klein failed to follow up on that
statement. They did not ask any further questions about
[Michel’s] role (if any) with the Foundation. They made
no effort to determine whether [Michel] was actually a
part of the Foundation after its president explicitly said
he was not a board member. They did not even seek to
obtain the Foundation’s articles of incorporation, which
reveal that [Michel] is neither an officer nor director of
the Foundation. Yet, in the first paragraph of the
Article, Defendants refer to the Foundation as “his
own,” in reference to Pras.
These allegations are significant because they purport to show that two days before
the article was published the defendants had actual knowledge that Michel was not
a board member of the organization, but nonetheless published the article claiming
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the Foundation was Michel’s “own.” Michel argues that this shows, at a
minimum, a reckless disregard for the truth. It does not.
The complaint here really alleges that the reporters should have conducted
more investigation after receiving the email from the Foundation’s president. But,
again, the failure to investigate does not give rise to a finding of actual malice.
And, indeed, the reporters engaged in more investigation than the plaintiff credits
them for. Even if the reporters stopped all efforts before receiving that email, there
is still no basis from which a reasonable inference of actual malice can be drawn.
This is made particularly clear by the portion of the article that reports on the email
itself. The defendants noted in the article that “Michel was listed as a board
member on the group’s Web site early last week. By Friday, his name had
disappeared, and Mike Jean told The Post the Grammy winner wasn’t a board
member.” Far from intentionally avoiding the truth, the defendants included
information contrary to their conclusions in the text of the article itself. In doing
so, they undermined Michel’s claim that they acted with actual malice. See, e.g.,
Silvester, 839 F.2d at 1498.
Even in light of the email from the Foundation’s president, there is no
indication that the article’s characterization of Michel’s relationship with the
Foundation was fabricated by the defendants, wholly imaginary, based on an
unverified anonymous phone call, inherently improbable, or obviously worthy of
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doubt. See St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732. The characterization was based on sources
inside the Foundation and the Foundation’s own (since revised) website. No facts
alleged in the complaint give rise to an inference that any of these sources were as
dubious as an unverified anonymous phone call. Nor is it inherently improbable
that Michel would be affiliated with a charity focused on Haiti given his self-
described reputation as a “world-renown[ed] philanthropist” who has “devoted
much of his life to assisting those in need in Haiti and elsewhere around the
world.” In short, the allegations presented in this portion of the complaint fail to
give rise to a reasonable inference of any of the hallmarks of actual malice.
In reply, Michel offers two additional arguments in favor of finding actual
malice, but these arguments must be discounted because they depend on facts that
were not pled in his complaint. First, Michel claims in his briefing before this
Court that the article’s concluding sentence -- “Michel said NY Cares would be
paid.” -- was an outright falsehood because Michel never made such a statement to
the defendants or, in fact, to any individual claiming to represent the New York
Post. Michel argues that the defendants demonstrated actual malice by attributing
imaginary statements to him. But in his complaint, Michel did not allege that this
statement was false or misrepresented him. That assumes significance because he
did specifically cite in his complaint to many other allegedly false statements.
Michel cannot now use his briefing to add new allegations and argue that those
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new assertions support his cause of action. Sterling Fin. Inv. Grp., Inc. v.
Hammer, 393 F.3d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 2004) (“The law in our circuit is clear
that arguments not presented in the district court will not be considered for the first
time on appeal.” (internal quotation marks omitted); Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald
& Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004) (“A plaintiff may not amend her
complaint through argument in a brief opposing summary judgment.”). Moreover,
without any allegation that Michel had been credited with statements he did not
make, the district court had no basis from which to draw a reasonable inference
that the defendants had acted with actual malice by attributing the statement to
Michel. Thus, absent any allegations about the falsity of the article’s final
sentence, Michel’s argument is unpersuasive.
We also discount Michel’s arguments regarding the “Post’s ongoing
campaign” against him. Michel claims that this campaign -- which consists of 10
stories in an eight-month period, significantly more media attention than Michel
has received from other news sources -- implies actual malice on the part of the
defendants. This argument fails because it depends on facts -- namely, the contents
of the other articles -- that were not pled in Michel’s complaint. As for the one
additional article that was included, Michel makes no allegation that it contains
false or defamatory statements. Regardless, without a more detailed pleading,
Michel’s argument should not be considered on a motion to dismiss.
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In short, Michel’s complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to give rise to a
reasonable inference that the defendants published the challenged article with
actual malice. Because the district court may be affirmed on any ground appearing
in the record, this finding is sufficient to affirm the district judge in large part even
if the challenged statements were definitively false and did not constitute
expressions of opinion. But this conclusion would not support dismissing the
complaint with prejudice, as the district judge did. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15(a)(2) advises courts to freely give parties leave to amend their complaints.
Here, there is no reason to believe that allowing Michel leave to amend his
complaint would be futile or that some other substantial reason exists to deny
leave. See Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1341–42 (11th Cir. 2014).
A dismissal based on the failure to plead facts giving rise to an inference of actual
malice should be without prejudice and the plaintiff should have the opportunity to
amend his complaint.
C.
The defendants’ final argument that the judgment of the district court should
be affirmed because Michel cannot plausibly allege that the article’s statements
were substantially false is unpersuasive. In support, the defendants point to several
apparent inconsistencies in the complaint. Thus, for example, although Michel
pled that he had nothing to do with either the Foundation or the charity event, he
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quotes from an email written by the Foundation’s president describing Michel as a
good friend of the organization, claims that his appearance at the concert was not
“guaranteed” (which could imply some non-guaranteed arrangement), and that the
event had nothing to do with 9/11 (which could imply that he had knowledge of the
event he claimed he had nothing to do with).
As a common sense matter, these apparent inconsistencies do cast a modest
pall on Michel’s claims that the article was absolutely false. But that pall is not
enough to overcome the presumption we must apply on a motion to dismiss that
the allegations in the complaint be accepted as true and taken in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Ironworkers Local Union 68, 634 F.3d at 1359. Chief
among those allegations is that Michel “had nothing to do with the event and has
no relationship with the Foundation.” While the Court is not bound to accept the
truth of general allegations in a complaint where they are contradicted by specific
factual details in attached exhibits, Griffin Indus., 496 F.3d at 1205–06, no such
contradiction exists here. Indeed, reading whatever inconsistencies exist in the
complaint as indicative of the outright truth of the defendants’ article would
require reading the complaint in the light most favorable to the defendants and not,
as the law requires, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Interpreting the
complaint in favor of Michel at this stage in the proceedings requires crediting the
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explanations he offers for the apparent contradictions and rejecting the defendants’
argument.
Moreover, the actual truth or falsity of a statement seems to be
quintessentially a question of fact that ought not to be determined on a motion to
dismiss absent some extraordinary factor not present in this case. See Kelley v.
Hearst Corp., 157 N.Y.S.2d 498, 500 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956) (observing that “the
defense of truth is a triable issue for the jury”). Here, Michel has squarely stated
that several of the statements contained in the article were outright falsehoods.
The truth of those statements -- whether Michel was affiliated with the Foundation
and whether he had been scheduled to perform as the headliner at the charity event
-- are questions of empirical fact upon which it would be improper for this Court to
rule when weighing a motion to dismiss.
V.
In short, the district court correctly dismissed the complaint. While the
article presented statements of provable fact rather than non-actionable statements
of opinion, and thus the alleged defamatory statements were not privileged under
New York law, the complaint nonetheless failed to adequately plead facts giving
rise to a reasonable inference that the defendants published the article with actual
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was false. The
complaint, therefore, fails to state a claim under the First Amendment, although
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Michel should be given the opportunity to amend his complaint to plead further
facts in support of his claims. Thus, the district court’s ruling is AFFIRMED in
part and REMANDED with instructions that Michel be afforded leave to amend
his complaint to plead actual malice.
AFFIRMED in part and REMANDED.
39