Timothy Williams v. David Scott ( 2017 )

Case: 15-12146 Date Filed: 03/21/2017 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-12146
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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-03567-TWT
TIMOTHY WILLIAMS,
DIOSIA WILLIAMS,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
DAVID SCOTT, et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(March 21, 2017)
Before TJOFLAT, ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges, and GOLDBERG, Judge.∗
TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:
∗
Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, Senior Judge for the U.S. Court of International
Trade, sitting by designation.
Case: 15-12146 Date Filed: 03/21/2017 Page: 2 of 5
The plaintiffs brought this malicious prosecution action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against a sheriff’s deputy1 of Cobb County, Georgia after Cobb County
Assistant District Attorney recommended that the arrest warrant for plaintiff
Timothy Williams be dismissed. This case comes before us on appeal from the
District Court’s order granting the deputy’s, P.D. Chesney’s, motion for summary
judgment on grounds that Deputy Chesney had qualified immunity because he had
arguable probable cause to seek a warrant for the Mr. Williams’s arrest. We affirm
on the grounds that the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs
showed that Deputy Chesney did not act with malice and we do not reach the issue
of qualified immunity.
I.
The prosecution of which the plaintiffs complain was brought by the Cobb
County District Attorney’s Office after Deputy Chesney obtained a warrant for Mr.
Williams’s arrest. Mr. Williams was arrested on June 9, 2011 and Deputy Chesney
subsequently swore out the warrant before a Cobb County magistrate that same
day. The warrant charged Mr. Williams with three crimes: (1) identity fraud, (2)
making terroristic threats, and (3) possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
1
In addition, the plaintiffs sued the Cobb County District Attorney’s Office; Cobb
County Sheriff’s Office; the Cobb County District Attorney; the Assistant District Attorney
responsible for Mr. Williams’s prosecution; the Cobb County Sheriff; and U.S. Congressman
David Scott. As the order on Deputy Chesney’s Motion is all that is before us on appeal, we will
only be referring to the plaintiffs’ claims against the deputy.
2
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Deputy Chesney sought the warrant after his supervisor agreed that there was
probable cause for the charges, and after the Sheriff’s Office consulted with
Assistant District Attorney Jesse Evans. In his initial appearance before a
magistrate, Mr. Williams was denied bail and remanded to jail. On July 29, 2011,
a preliminary hearing—at which Mr. Williams was represented by counsel—was
held before a different magistrate to determine whether there was probable cause to
keep Mr. Williams under arrest, and whether to admit him to bail. At the hearing,
Mr. Williams conceded probable cause and the state consented to admit him to bail
under a bond. The Assistant District Attorney prosecuting the case, Kimberly
Schwartz, determined that there was not sufficient evidence to pursue the case,
and, upon her recommendation, the arrest warrant was dismissed on December 31,
2012.
II.
We review district court orders granting or denying summary judgment de
novo. Holloman v. Mail-Well Corp., 443 F.3d 832, 836 (11th Cir. 2006). A
district court must grant summary judgment when the movant shows that there is
no genuine issue of material fact and that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). This decision is based on the evidence viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Holloman, 443 F.3d at 836.
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Malicious prosecution is a constitutional tort cognizable under § 1983 for
violations of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d
1000, 1002–03 (11th Cir. 1998). The elements of malicious prosecution, drawn
from both federal and Georgia law, include “(1) a criminal prosecution instituted or
continued by the present defendant; (2) with malice and without probable cause;
(3) that terminated in the plaintiff accused’s favor; and (4) caused damage to the
plaintiff accused.” Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881–82 (11th Cir. 2003). “A
police officer who applies for an arrest warrant can be liable for malicious
prosecution if he should have known that his application failed to establish
probable cause or if he made statements or omissions in his application that were
material and perjurious or recklessly false.” Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259,
1267 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted). On the
other hand, that the prosecutor likewise believed there to be probable cause is
strong evidence that the defendant officer did not act with the requisite malice. See
Marshall v. Browning, 712 S.E.2d 71, 74 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (finding a lack of
actual malice where the police officer sought an arrest warrant in consultation with
a district attorney).
In this case, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the question of
malice. The uncontradicted evidence, interpreted in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, clearly shows that Deputy Chesney lacked malice in obtaining the arrest
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Case: 15-12146 Date Filed: 03/21/2017 Page: 5 of 5
warrant against Mr. Williams for the charge of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, and was therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Deputy
Chesney did not make the decision to seek the arrest warrant in a vacuum—it was
done in consultation with his supervising officer and with the District Attorney’s
Office. Moreover, Assistant District Attorney Schwartz had the full investigative
file for almost a year and a half before she determined that there was not enough
evidence to pursue the charges. The involvement of his supervising officer and,
crucially, the District Attorney’s Office clearly demonstrates that Deputy Chesney
was not in a position where he should have known that he lacked probable cause to
obtain the warrant, and, therefore, that he lacked malice. Wigington, 811 F.3d at
1267; Marshall, 712 S.E.2d at 74. To infer that Deputy Chesney acted with malice
would be to find a mass dereliction of constitutional duty or a far reaching
conspiracy amongst officers of the Cobb County Sheriffs’ Office and the Cobb
County District Attorney’s Office’s, beginning before the warrant was obtained
and continuing almost a year and a half thereafter. There is absolutely no evidence
to support such a conclusion, so we therefore affirm the District Court’s order of
summary judgment.
AFFIRM.
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