Colin Runge v. Officer Randall Snow , 514 F. App'x 891 ( 2013 )

Case: 12-13193 Date Filed: 03/27/2013 Page: 1 of 12
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-13193
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 3:10-cv-00900-HES-JRK
COLIN RUNGE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
OFFICER RANDALL SNOW,
individually,
OFFICER D.A. PRATICO,
individually,
Defendants-Appellants,
GORDON SNOW, III,
individually, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(March 27, 2013)
Case: 12-13193 Date Filed: 03/27/2013 Page: 2 of 12
Before HULL, JORDAN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff Colin Runge filed a complaint alleging violations of federal law
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against Officer Randall Snow, Officer D.A.
Pratico, and civilian observer Gordon Snow, III, in their individual capacities, and
Jacksonville Sheriff John Rutherford, in his official capacity (collectively
“Defendants”), relating to his early morning arrest on October 13, 2007. Runge
asserted eight claims in his complaint: Counts I and II assert claims against
Officers Snow and Pratico for excessive force in violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; Count III asserts a
claim for municipal liability against Sheriff Rutherford; and Count IV alleges a
conspiracy to violate Runge’s civil rights against Officer Snow and Gordon Snow.
Counts V through VIII assert state law claims, and the district court’s disposition
of these claims was not appealed to this Court.
Before the district court, Defendants moved for summary judgment. As
relevant to the instant appeal, Officers Snow and Pratico (collectively
“Appellants”) asserted qualified immunity. The district court denied Officer
Snow’s motion for summary judgment, denying Officer Snow qualified immunity
on the excessive force claim and holding that material issues existed for the jury as
2
Case: 12-13193 Date Filed: 03/27/2013 Page: 3 of 12
to the Count IV civil rights conspiracy claim. The district court also denied
Officer Pratico’s motion for summary judgment, holding that Officer Pratico was
not entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. Both officers
appeal from the district court’s denial of their summary judgment motions. After
thorough review of the record, we affirm the district court’s denial of summary
judgment on these claims.
I. Background1
On October 13, 2007, at approximately 3:30 a.m., Officer Snow, an officer
for the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office, was dispatched to the campus of Jacksonville
University in response to a report of a student who was allegedly causing a
disturbance. Gordon Snow, his brother, was in the police car as a civilian
observer. After arriving at the Jacksonville University campus, Officer Snow
arrested Runge for disorderly intoxication and resisting an officer without
violence. Officer Snow handcuffed Runge and placed him in the back of the
police car. Officer Snow and Gordon Snow then transported Runge to the sally
port at the back of the Duval County Jail. The actions below took place at this
1
On interlocutory appeal of a district court’s denial of qualified immunity, “we do
not make credibility determinations or choose between conflicting testimony, but instead accept
Plaintiff’s version of the facts drawing all justifiable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor.” See
Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1267 (11th Cir. 2005)
3
Case: 12-13193 Date Filed: 03/27/2013 Page: 4 of 12
location and many of the relevant events were captured on video cameras at the
jail facility.
The video captures Officer Snow and Gordon Snow arriving at the jail in a
patrol car. The video then shows Officer Snow forcibly pull Runge, who is
handcuffed, out of the car and to the pavement below. The district court described
this as being pulled “with such force that [Runge] and the officer both begin
falling to the ground.” D.C. Order at 4. The footage does not record Runge and
Officer Snow landing on the pavement or what happens immediately afterwards.
However, neither party disputes that Officers Snow and Pratico placed a hobble
restraint on Runge.2
After approximately two minutes off camera, Officer Snow, Officer Pratico,
and Gordon Snow are seen on the video carrying Runge, who is in the hobble
restraint, towards the door to the jail. Officer Snow is holding Runge’s left arm,
Gordon Snow is holding his right arm, and Officer Pratico is holding his legs. We
agree with the district court’s description of what occurred next: “Defendants
continue carrying Runge until [his] head makes contact with the door. The video
clearly shows [Runge’s] head recoiling upon hitting the door. The defendants then
2
The hobble restraint results in the hands and feet being strapped relatively close
together behind the back, rendering the subject immobile. See Lewis v. City of West Palm
Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1290 (11th Cir. 2009).
4
Case: 12-13193 Date Filed: 03/27/2013 Page: 5 of 12
place [Runge] on the ground, still in the hobble restraint, on his stomach.” D.C.
Order at 4. Runge, while still in the hobble restraint, is then left on his stomach
for approximately eight minutes before he is carried inside the jail.
After being taken inside the intake area of the jail, the jail nurse refused his
admittance for medical reasons. We agree with the district court’s description of
what occurred next:
After being refused admittance, [Runge] is recorded [exiting]
the intake area, still in handcuffs but no longer in hobble restraint,
and then being grabbed by Officer Snow and dragged to the patrol car
by his shirt. Once there, Officer Snow is shown placing his forearm
against [Runge’s] throat and forcing him backward until he is pinned
against the hood of the car. From there, Officer Snow opens the back
passenger door of the patrol car, pushes [Runge] head-first into the
backseat, and proceeds to kick or shove him with his foot. It is not
clearly shown on the video where Officer Snow’s foot makes contact.
D.C. Order at 4.3
Runge was then taken to the hospital for treatment. The hospital records
indicate that he suffered hematoma and contusions of the face, as well as
contusions to his chest. He also alleges psychological and mental suffering as a
result of the incident.
II. Standard of Review
3
It is apparent from the video that, when the district court referred to the hood of
the car, the district court meant the hood of the trunk of the police car.
5
Case: 12-13193 Date Filed: 03/27/2013 Page: 6 of 12
We review de novo summary judgment rulings and draw all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Craig v. Floyd
Cnty., 643 F.3d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is only
appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute of material fact
and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Roberts v.
Spielman, 643 F.3d 899, 901 (11th Cir. 2011).
“We review de novo a district court’s resolution of qualified immunity on
summary judgment.” Hoyt v. Cooks, 672 F.3d 972, 977 (11th Cir. 2012).
Qualified immunity offers “complete protection for government officials sued in
their individual capacities as long as their conduct violates no clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known,” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1193-94 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation
marks omitted), “protecting from suit all but the plainly incompetent or one who is
knowingly violating the federal law,” Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1250 (11th
Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). If the public official first shows that he was
acting within the scope of his discretionary authority—a burden undisputably met
by Appellants here—the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish that qualified
immunity is not appropriate. Id. To determine whether a plaintiff has met his
burden, a court must both “decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged . . .
6
Case: 12-13193 Date Filed: 03/27/2013 Page: 7 of 12
make out a violation of a constitutional right” and “whether the right at issue was
‘clearly established’ at the time of [defendants’] alleged misconduct.” Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). A court may undertake these two inquiries in
either order. Id. at 236.
III. Analysis
A. Excessive Force
We first turn to Appellants’ argument that the district court erred by not
granting them qualified immunity on Runge’s excessive force claims. “The Fourth
Amendment’s freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures encompasses the
plain right to be free from the use of excessive force in the course of an arrest.”
Lee, 284 F.3d at 1197. “[C]laims that law enforcement officers have used
excessive force . . . in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’
. . . should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’
standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); accord Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007) (“[A]ll that matters is whether [the defendants’] actions
were reasonable.”). To assess the reasonableness of a seizure, “we must balance
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment
interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the
intrusion,” Scott, 550 U.S. at 383 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
7
Case: 12-13193 Date Filed: 03/27/2013 Page: 8 of 12
703 (1983)) (alteration omitted), “requir[ing] careful attention to the facts and
circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight,” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
Here, we agree with the district court that, construing the facts as we must in
favor of Runge, the evidence establishes that both Officers Snow and Pratico used
excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Although it is undisputed that Officer Snow had probable cause to arrest
Runge, this fact alone is not dispositive for Fourth Amendment purposes. See
Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198. The alleged crimes were not relatively severe, and Runge
at all relevant times was either in handcuffs or in a full hobble restraint device.
Runge posed very little, if any, immediate threat to the safety of the officers at the
jail. Additionally, Runge posed very little, if any, flight risk as there were at least
two officers in the vicinity of Runge at all relevant times. Despite these facts, and
viewing the record again in light most favorable to Runge, at least one officer
intentionally led Runge’s head into a metal door. As noted above, Officer Snow
was located near Runge’s head, holding him up at his left arm, while Officer
Pratico was holding up Runge’s feet as they hit the door with Runge’s head.
8
Case: 12-13193 Date Filed: 03/27/2013 Page: 9 of 12
Appellants argue that Runge’s head hitting the metal intake door was an
accident and was at most negligent. They argue that videos of the incident support
that this was an accident and that there was no constitutional deprivation. We
disagree. A reasonable juror, after viewing the incident from the various camera
angles and the events immediately preceding and following, could find that one or
both of the Appellants intentionally led Runge’s head into the jail intake door.4 As
we have held on numerous occasions, the gratuitous use of force when a criminal
suspect is restrained and not resisting arrest constitutes excessive force. See Reese
v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 2008); Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526
F.3d 1324, 1333-34 (11th Cir. 2008); Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1347-48
(11th Cir. 2002); Slicker v. Jackson, 215 F.3d 1225, 1232-33 (11th Cir. 2000).
Moreover, this Court’s precedent gave clear notice to a reasonable officer that this
excessive force used without justification is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Lee, 284
F.3d at 1199; Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1348-49; Slicker, 215 F.3d at 1232-33.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to
4
At least with respect to Officer Snow, the inference that this was an intentional
and gratuitous use of force is bolstered by his actions soon thereafter. As noted above, the video
shows Officer Snow’s right forearm against Runge’s throat, forcing Runge’s head back over the
hood of the trunk. The video shows a handcuffed Runge, who, looking at the facts in a light
most favorable to Runge, is offering very little, if any, resistance. A reasonable jury could find
from the video that Officer Snow was intentionally using gratuitous force. The video even shows
a quick chopping movement of Officer Snow’s right forearm against Runge’s throat, from which
a reasonable jury could infer an intent to injure.
9
Case: 12-13193 Date Filed: 03/27/2013 Page: 10 of 12
Officers Snow and Pratico.
B. Conspiracy
Officer Snow also argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on
Runge’s claim that he and Gordon Snow conspired to deprive Runge of his
constitutional rights in violation of § 1983. A plaintiff may state a § 1983 claim
for conspiracy to violate constitutional rights by showing a conspiracy existed that
resulted in the actual denial of some underlying constitutional right. GJR Invs.,
Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998). “The plaintiff
attempting to prove such a conspiracy must show that the parties ‘reached an
understanding’ to deny the plaintiff his or her rights. The conspiratorial acts must
impinge upon the federal right; the plaintiff must prove an actionable wrong to
support the conspiracy.” Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 468 (11th Cir.
1990) (citations omitted) (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1563 (11th
Cir. 1990)). Factual proof of the existence of a § 1983 conspiracy may be based
on circumstantial evidence. See Burrell v. Bd. of Trs. of Ga. Military Coll., 970
F.2d 785, 789 (11th Cir. 1992).
We agree with the district court that genuine issues of material fact exist
from which a reasonable jury could find that Officer Snow and Gordon Snow
reached an understanding to deny Runge of his constitutional rights. The evidence
10
Case: 12-13193 Date Filed: 03/27/2013 Page: 11 of 12
shows that Gordon Snow was with Officer Snow during the arrest and in the
police car transporting Runge to the jail. Gordon Snow takes a relatively active
role in the events at the jail. For example, after Runge has been forcibly removed
from the police car by Officer Snow, Gordon Snow is seen retrieving something
from the police car and bringing it off camera (where Officer Snow and Runge are
located). After Gordon Snow briefly returns to the view of the camera, he walks
back off camera where Officers Snow and Pratico are with Runge. He remains out
of camera view until he is seen carrying Runge (along with the two officers)
towards the jail door and ultimately hitting Runge’s head into the jail door.
Gordon Snow is then seen retrieving a pair of shoes from the back of the police car
and placing them on Runge’s back. Additionally, Gordon Snow is within inches
of Officer Snow as Officer Snow places his forearm against Runge’s throat for
approximately five seconds. A genuine issue of material fact exists from which a
reasonable jury could find that Officer Snow and Gordon Snow conspired to deny
Runge his constitutional rights.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of qualified
immunity to Officers Snow and Pratico as to Runge’s excessive force claims. We
also affirm the district court’s denial of Officer Snow’s motion for summary
11
Case: 12-13193 Date Filed: 03/27/2013 Page: 12 of 12
judgment on Runge’s § 1983 conspiracy claim.
AFFIRMED.
12