USCA11 Case: 22-10929 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 03/01/2023 Page: 1 of 12
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10929
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ANTONIO JAMAR LASTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00076-SDG-RGV-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10929
Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
After a jury convicted defendant Antonio Jamar Laster of
one count of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute meth-
amphetamine and one count of attempting to possess with intent
to distribute methamphetamine, the district court sentenced him
to 210 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Laster challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence on both counts and the substantive
reasonableness of his sentence. After careful consideration, we af-
firm.
I.
A grand jury returned an indictment charging Laster with
(1) conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or
more of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine
and (2) attempting to possess with intent to distribute at least 500
grams or more of a mixture or substance containing metham-
phetamine. Because Laster had previously been convicted of a
“serious violent felony” and given the quantity of methampheta-
mine allegedly involved, Laster faced a mandatory minimum sen-
tence of 15 years and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1). Laster pled not guilty to the charges.
A.
At trial, the government introduced evidence showing the
following. On October 9, 2020, law enforcement officers sur-
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22-10929 Opinion of the Court 3
veilled a suspected drug stash house in Marietta, Georgia. In the
afternoon, officers saw two men leave the house and drive away
in a car. Officers followed the car to a nearby supermarket park-
ing lot, where they watched it park next to a car occupied by two
women. The officers saw one of the men pass a black plastic gro-
cery bag to one of the women. One group of officers followed the
men and saw that they drove back to the stash house. Another
group of officers followed the women. They pulled the women’s
car over. When the officers searched the car, they found one kilo-
gram of methamphetamine inside a black plastic grocery bag, the
same one the officers saw the men pass to the women.
For the remainder of the day, officers continued to surveil
the stash house. A few hours later, they saw a Toyota Camry
leave the stash house. The officers followed the Camry to a park-
ing lot in Woodstock, Georgia, approximately two miles from the
stash house. In the parking lot, the officers saw the Camry park
adjacent to a blue Nissan Sentra. The vehicles were positioned so
that the driver’s door of the Camry was next to the driver’s door
of the Sentra.
One officer approached the Camry, which was occupied by
a driver and a passenger. When the officer looked in the vehicle,
he saw a plastic bag resting on the passenger’s lap, and inside the
bag was a substance that appeared to be methamphetamine. Of-
ficers searched the Camry and found three kilograms of metham-
phetamine.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10929
Officers also approached the Sentra. An officer asked the
driver, who turned out to Laster, for identification. Laster provid-
ed his driver’s license. He told the officer that he had traveled
from Tennessee to see family. He claimed that he had gotten lost
and stopped in the parking lot for directions. He said that he met
the car’s passenger, Bryan Hernandez, in the parking lot and that
Hernandez was helping him with directions.
Officers obtained a warrant to search the Sentra. The offic-
ers found no drugs in the car. But they found $23,100 in cash in
the vehicle.
Officers also obtain a warrant to search Laster’s phones. On
one of his phones, they discovered messages between Laster and
a contact saved under the name “Fatboy.” On October 8—the day
before the two cars met in the parking lot—Laster and Fatboy ex-
changed messages discussing that Laster was planning to travel
from Tennessee to Atlanta the next day to purchase three kilo-
grams of drugs for $23,100. On October 9, Laster messaged Fat-
boy to let him know when he began the drive.
Officers also uncovered messages that Laster had ex-
changed with an unsaved contact. On October 9, this contact
messaged Laster with the address of the parking lot in Wood-
stock. Laster messaged the contact when he arrived at the parking
lot. The contact then instructed Laster how to divvy up the
$23,100 that was to be paid for the drugs and told Laster to give
the money to an individual driving a “Brown Blazer.” Doc. 137 at
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22-10929 Opinion of the Court 5
80. 1 Hernandez had driven a brown Chevrolet Trailblazer to the
parking lot.
At trial, Hernandez testified for the government. He ex-
plained that on October 9 a member of a Mexican drug cartel had
messaged him to go to the parking lot in Woodstock and pick up
money from a man in a blue Nissan Sentra. When Hernandez ar-
rived at the parking lot, he got in Laster’s blue Sentra, counted
money from Laster, and waited for the drugs to be delivered.
The jury found Laster guilty of conspiring to possess with
intent to distribute methamphetamine and attempting to possess
with intent to distribute methamphetamine. The jury found that
each offense involved 500 grams or more of a mixture or sub-
stance containing methamphetamine.
B.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court calculated
Laster’s Sentencing Guidelines range as 235 to 292 months. Laster
asked the court to impose a 180-month sentence, which was the
statutory mandatory minimum for the offense. 2 See 21 U.S.C.
1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
2 Because each offense involved “500 grams or more of a mixture or sub-
stance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine” and Laster had
a prior conviction “for a serious drug felony or serious violent felony,” he
faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years.
21 U.S.C. § 841(b).
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-10929
§ 841(b)(1). The government urged the court to impose a sen-
tence of 210 months, which was below the guidelines range.
Ultimately, the district court imposed a 210-month sen-
tence. The court explained that it had considered the sentencing
factors set forth at
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 3 It stated that it had con-
sidered the “seriousness of the offenses” for which Laster had
been convicted. Doc. 139 at 24. The court also discussed Laster’s
criminal history, noting that he had previously been convicted of
aggravated robbery, which the court characterized as a “very se-
rious violent offense.”
Id. The court also noted the need “to spe-
cifically deter [Laster] from future violations of law.”
Id.
This is Laster’s appeal.
3 Under § 3553(a), the district court is required to impose a sentence “suffi-
cient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of the
statute.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). These purposes include the need to: reflect the
seriousness of the offense; promote respect for the law; provide just punish-
ment; deter criminal conduct; protect the public from the defendant’s future
criminal conduct; and effectively provide the defendant with educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.
Id.
§ 3553(a)(2). The court must also consider the nature and circumstances of
the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sen-
tences available, the applicable guidelines range, the pertinent policy state-
ments of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sen-
tencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. Id.
§ 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
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22-10929 Opinion of the Court 7
II.
We review de novo a defendant’s challenge to the suffi-
ciency of the evidence, viewing “all evidence in the light most fa-
vorable to the government” and “resolving any conflicts in favor
of the government’s case.” United States v. Watts,
896 F.3d 1245,
1250–51 (11th Cir. 2018). We cannot overturn a jury’s verdict “if
any reasonable construction of the evidence would have allowed
the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a defer-
ential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S.
38, 41 (2007). “The party challenging the sentence bears the bur-
den to show that [the sentence imposed] is unreasonable in light
of the record and the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Tome,
611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
III.
On appeal, Laster challenges his convictions on the basis
that there was insufficient evidence to convict him. He also ar-
gues that the 210-month sentence imposed was substantively un-
reasonable.
A.
Laster argues that there was insufficient evidence for the
jury to convict him of conspiring to possess with intent to distrib-
ute methamphetamine or attempting to possess with intent to
distribute methamphetamine. We address each argument in turn.
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-10929
To support Laster’s conviction for conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 846, the government had to prove beyond a reasona-
ble doubt that: (1) a conspiracy to possess methamphetamine
with intent to distribute existed between two or more persons,
(2) Laster knew of the conspiracy, and (3) Laster knowingly and
voluntarily became a part of the conspiracy. See United States v.
Andrews,
953 F.2d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 1992). To prove Laster’s
knowing and voluntary participation, the government had to
prove that Laster “had a deliberate, knowing, and specific intent
to join the conspiracy.” United States v. Jenkins,
779 F.2d 606, 609
(11th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he de-
fendant’s knowledge of and membership in the conspiracy may
be proven by acts on his part which furthered the goal of the con-
spiracy.” United States v. Cross,
928 F.2d 1030, 1042 (11th Cir.
1991).
Laster does not contest that the government proved that
there was a conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with intent
to distribute. But he argues that the government failed to prove
that he knew of the conspiracy or knowingly and voluntarily par-
ticipated in it. He claims that the government’s evidence was in-
sufficient because no drugs were found on Laster’s person or in
his vehicle. But we have recognized that “[o]nce the existence of a
conspiracy is established, only slight evidence is necessary to con-
nect a particular defendant to the conspiracy.” United States v.
Gates,
967 F.2d 497, 499 (11th Cir. 1992).
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22-10929 Opinion of the Court 9
Here, the government introduced sufficient evidence to
connect Laster to the conspiracy. The jury heard that Laster
drove his Nissan Sentra to the parking lot where he met up with
two men in the Camry. The jury also heard that at the meeting
the two men in the Camry had three kilograms of methamphet-
amine and Laster had $23,100 in cash. And messages from Laster’s
phone were introduced to show that he coordinated with “Fat-
boy” and another contact about his plan to travel from Tennessee
to the Atlanta area to purchase three kilograms of methamphet-
amine for $23,100. Furthermore, Hernandez testified to the jury
that he went to the parking lot to make sure that Laster brought
sufficient money before the drugs were delivered. From this evi-
dence, a jury could conclude that Laster knew of and voluntarily
joined the conspiracy.
Regarding the crime of attempting to possess with intent to
distribute methamphetamine in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
the government had to prove that Laster “possessed the mens rea
required for the underlying crime and took a substantial step to-
ward the commission of that crime.” United States v. Amede,
977 F.3d 1086, 1099 (11th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks
omitted). We have explained that “[m]ere planning or preparation
to engage in a crime is not enough to constitute a substantial
step.” United States v. Singer,
963 F.3d 1144, 1160 (11th Cir. 2020)
(internal quotation marks omitted). To take a substantial step,
“the defendant must engage in objectively culpable and unequiv-
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-10929
ocal acts toward accomplishing the crime.”
Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Laster argues that the government’s evidence was insuffi-
cient because there was no evidence that he ever paid anyone for
drugs or that any drug transaction ever took place. Even so, gov-
ernment’s evidence was sufficient to show that Laster took a sub-
stantial step towards completing the crime. The messages on
Laster’s phone showed that he planned to drive from Tennessee
to the Atlanta area to purchase three kilograms of drugs for
$23,100. The evidence further showed that Laster then actually
traveled with $23,100. Upon arriving at the parking lot in Wood-
stock, Laster messaged with a contact to complete the transac-
tion. When Hernandez arrived at the parking lot, Laster gave him
the cash for the purchase, which Hernandez counted, and then
waited for the drugs to be delivered. Viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government, we conclude that this ev-
idence was sufficient to prove that Laster took a substantial step
towards possessing with the intent to distribute methampheta-
mine.
B.
Turning to the sentencing issue, Laster argues that his 210-
month sentence was substantively unreasonable. But we cannot
say that the district court abused its discretion.
When reviewing for substantive reasonableness, we ordi-
narily will vacate a sentence “only if[] we are left with the definite
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22-10929 Opinion of the Court 11
and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error
of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sen-
tence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated
by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey,
612 F.3d 1160, 1190
(11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The weight given to any specific § 3553(a) factor is committed to
the sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. Cro-
teau,
819 F.3d 1293, 1309 (11th Cir. 2016). A district court “has
considerable discretion in deciding whether the § 3553(a) factors
justify a variance and the extent of the variance.” Id. Although we
do not presume that a sentence falling within the guideline range
is reasonable, we ordinarily expect such a sentence to be reasona-
ble. Id. at 1309–10. In addition, “[a] sentence imposed well below
the statutory maximum penalty is another indicator of reasona-
bleness.” Id. at 1310.
Laster argues that the 210-month sentence that the district
court imposed was “unduly harsh” and not supported by the
§ 3553(a) factors. Appellant’s Br. at 8. We disagree. The district
court varied downward from the guidelines range when it im-
posed the 210-month sentence. Although Laster argues that the
district court should have granted a more substantial downward
variance, the district court had “considerable discretion” in de-
termining the extent of the variance. Croteau,
819 F.3d at 1309.
We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion when it
gave weight to certain § 3553(a) factors, including the nature and
circumstances of the offense, Laster’s history and characteristics,
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12 Opinion of the Court 22-10929
and the need for deterrence. In addition, Laster’s sentence was
below the guidelines range and well below the statutory maxi-
mum of life imprisonment, two factors that further indicate the
sentence was reasonable. See id. at 1309–10.
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment
and sentence of the district court.
AFFIRMED.
