Scottsdale Insurance v. Wave Technologies Communications, Inc. , 341 F. App'x 569 ( 2009 )


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  •                                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________                   FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 08-17088                 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    Aug. 12, 2009
    Non-Argument Calendar
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    ________________________
    CLERK
    D.C. Docket No. 07-01329-CV-T-30-MAP
    SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE COMPANY,
    a foreign corporation,
    Plaintiff-Counter-
    Defendant-Appellee,
    versus
    WAVE TECHNOLOGIES COMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
    a Florida corporation,
    RITA A. TODD,
    Defendants,
    RUTH COCHRAN, individually and as the personal
    representative of the Estate of Donald F. Cochran, deceased,
    Defendant-Counter-
    Claimant-Appellant,
    VIASY’S NETWORK SERVICES, INC.,
    a foreign corporation,
    Defendant-Counter-
    Claimant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (August 12, 2009)
    Before BLACK, BARKETT and COX, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    I. BACKGROUND
    Scottsdale Insurance Company (“Scottsdale”) filed a complaint for declaratory
    relief against Wave Technologies Communications, Inc. (“Wave”), Ruth Cochran,
    individually and as the personal representative of the estate of her husband Donald
    Cochran (“Cochran”), Rita A. Todd (“Todd”), and Viasys Network Services, Inc.
    (“Viasys”). The lawsuit was initiated after claims were filed with Scottsdale by
    Viasys for liability coverage covering damages caused by a Wave subcontractor’s
    operation of heavy equipment in a manner that allegedly caused a motor vehicle
    accident on April 21, 2007 (“the accident”). Todd was injured in the accident and
    Donald Cochran was killed. Viasys was the prime contractor with which Wave had
    contracted to perform work being done at the time of the accident.
    Scottsdale’s lawsuit sought a declaration that it could rescind a general liability
    insurance policy it had issued to Wave on the basis that Wave made material
    2
    misrepresentations in its application for the policy. Scottsdale alleged that Wave had
    misrepresented its business operations as involving no digging or use of heavy
    equipment and that Wave failed to disclose that it had a prior loss under another
    insurance policy. Scottsdale also alleged that, had Scottsdale known of Wave’s actual
    business, it would not have issued the insurance policy or would have charged a
    substantially higher premium for the coverage.
    Neither Wave nor Todd answered the complaint, and default judgments were
    entered against them. Cochran and Viasys (collectively, “Defendants”) answered and
    pleaded, among other defenses, that Scottsdale had waived its right to rescind the
    policy by failing to rescind it when it knew, or should have known, of
    misrepresentations in the application. Defendants also counter-claimed, seeking
    liability coverage for their damages caused by the accident.
    Scottsdale moved for summary judgment. Defendants opposed the motion, in
    part based upon an argument that, in late December 2006, around the time Scottsdale
    wrote the general liability insurance policy at issue in this case, Scottsdale’s agent
    hired a contractor to conduct a liability survey and that survey uncovered facts that
    should have caused Scottsdale to investigate the representations on Wave’s
    application. (R.1-54 at 7-9.) In its opposition papers, Viasys identified the facts
    discovered by the survey that were at odds with Wave’s application and should have
    3
    caused Scottsdale to conduct further inquiry as: (1) use of subcontractors for
    $100,000 of work per year (not identified on the application); (2) a two-year business
    history (as opposed to the “new venture” described on the application); and (3)
    performance of some “minor construction work . . . using a shovel to dig and locate
    utilities.” (as opposed to application statement that Wave did “no digging.”) (Id. at
    7, 9, 10, 18.) And, Viasys presented evidence that Scottsdale’s general agent
    Southern Cross received this information from the survey contractor and considered
    the first of these issues significant enough that Southern Cross attempted to conduct
    some follow-up investigation of that issue. (Id. at 9, 10, 18.) But, when Southern
    Cross received no response to its clarifying inquiries, it failed to relay the information
    to Scottsdale and took no further action. (Id. at 9.)
    Defendants argued that, had Scottsdale properly conducted a further inquiry
    into the discrepancies discovered by the survey, it would have discovered that: (1)
    Scottsdale previously had written a general liability policy for Wave’s business
    operations; (2) in the application for the earlier policy, Wave had been described
    properly as a cable conduit contractor engaged in excavation, tunneling, underground
    work, and earth moving who relied on significant work by sub-contractors; and (3)
    Scottsdale had received a claim under that earlier policy. (R.1-54 at 11-14.)
    Defendants further argued that Scottsdale’s failure to conduct an investigation in a
    4
    manner that discovered these facts resulted in Scottsdale’s waiver of its right to
    rescind the policy.
    The district court granted Scottsdale’s motion for summary judgment. In doing
    so, the court relied on the rule that “an insurer is entitled to rely on the representations
    of the insured even without checking its own files unless some circumstance arises
    that would call attention to the false statements.” (R.1-60 at 7 (citing Schrader v.
    Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 
    280 F.2d 355
    , 362 (5th Cir. 1960).) However, the court
    did not address Defendants’ argument that the facts raised in the liability survey
    should have spurred Scottsdale to investigate further. The court entered judgment for
    Scottsdale.
    Defendants brought timely motions to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), arguing that the court had erred so as to
    commit a manifest injustice. In these motions, Defendants again presented the
    argument that a jury question existed as to whether, when Scottsdale’s contractor
    discovered that Wave had been in business for two years, performed construction
    work, and used sub-contractors to perform significant work, Scottsdale was on notice
    that Wave may have made misrepresentations in its application and that further
    investigation was due. (R.1-62 at 3 ¶5, and 6 ¶¶15 and 17.) Defendants argued that
    summary judgment for Scottsdale was inappropriate because these facts raised a jury
    5
    question as to whether “circumstances . . . which called attention to the false
    statements” existed. (Id. at 6 ¶17.) The court denied the motion, addressing only the
    discrepancy in the amount of subcontractor work and finding that discrepancy did not
    call Scottsdale’s attention to the fact that Wave may have made misrepresentations
    on its application. (R.1-66 at 6.)
    Defendants appeal the judgment, making the arguments (as they did in their
    summary judgment opposition and Rule 59 papers) that the facts discovered by
    Scottsdale’s survey contractor raise jury questions as to whether Scottsdale was on
    notice that it should further investigate whether Wave made misrepresentations and
    as to whether the investigation that was done by Scottsdale’s general agent Southern
    Cross was reasonable.
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    This court reviews a grant of summary judgment by applying the same legal
    standards used by the district court. See, e.g., Hilburn v. Murata Elecs. N. Am., Inc.,
    
    181 F.3d 1220
    , 1225 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is
    appropriate where “‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
    party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’” Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of the
    Univ. Sys. of Ga., 
    247 F.3d 1262
    , 1271 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
    56(c)).
    6
    III. DISCUSSION
    The parties do not disagree over the applicable law. There is no dispute that
    an intentional misrepresentation by an applicant of a material fact, relied on by the
    insurer, allows the insurer to void a policy. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Strudel, 
    243 F.2d 90
    , 93 (5th Cir. 1957). However, if the insurer either did not rely on the
    misrepresentation or should not have relied on the misrepresentation, then it cannot
    void the policy. 
    Id.
     Thus, if the insurer “has sufficient indications that would have
    put a prudent man on notice and would have caused him to start an inquiry which, if
    carried out with reasonable thoroughness, would reveal the truth, he cannot blind
    himself to the true facts and choose to ‘rely’ on the misrepresentation.” 
    Id.
     (citation
    omitted.) And, “if the insurer chooses to make an independent inquiry and the subject
    matter and the circumstances are such that he is in a position to ascertain the facts by
    a reasonable search, then he cannot plead reliance even if his investigation is as a
    matter of fact cursory and did not reveal the true facts . . . .” 
    Id.
    Applying this law, we conclude that summary judgment was inappropriate.
    Defendants’ briefs and the evidence submitted at the summary judgment stage
    demonstrate that there is a question of fact as to whether the three discrepancies
    discovered during the liability survey should have caused Scottsdale to inquire further
    into the true facts of Wave’s business. While a reasonable jury could conclude that
    7
    these discrepancies were not significant enough to warrant further investigation by
    Scottsdale and thus cause Scottsdale to realize that it had, in its possession,
    documents that demonstrated the misrepresentations on Wave’s second application
    for insurance, a reasonable jury also could find otherwise. And, a reasonable jury
    could conclude that the investigation Scottsdale undertook (through its general agent
    Southern Cross) was performed in such a manner as to waive reliance on the
    misrepresentations that Scottsdale would have discovered if it had performed the
    investigation in a more diligent manner.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment for Scottsdale is vacated and
    the case is remanded for further proceedings.
    JUDGMENT VACATED AND CASE REMANDED.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 08-17088

Citation Numbers: 341 F. App'x 569

Judges: Black, Barkett, Cox

Filed Date: 8/12/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024