United States v. Timothy Tad Smith , 353 F. App'x 229 ( 2009 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOVEMBER 17, 2009
No. 09-11655 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 08-00387-CR-T-26EAJ
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TIMOTHY TAD SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(November 17, 2009)
Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Timothy Tad Smith appeals his convictions for receiving and possessing
unregistered firearms, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and 5871, and
manufacturing unregistered firearms, in violation of §§ 5861(f) and 5871. On
appeal, Smith argues that Willie Edom, a deputy with the Hillsborough County
Sheriff’s Office, violated his Fourth Amendment rights by engaging in a
warrantless search of his storage unit, which was based on Edom’s erroneous legal
conclusions that the storage facility manager had authority to consent to the search.
He contends that, because Edom’s search was illegal, his subsequent consent to
another search and statements to police were tainted and should have been
suppressed.
We review a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress under
a mixed standard of review, reviewing the district court’s “findings of fact for clear
error and its application of law to those facts de novo.” United States v. Mercer,
541 F.3d 1070, 1073-74 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied 129 S.Ct. 954 (2009). The
district court’s factual findings are construed in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party. Id. at 1074.
The Fourth Amendment provides “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A search pursuant to
voluntary consent does not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on
2
warrantless searches. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct.
2041, 2043-44, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Consent to search may be provided by a
third party who possesses common authority over the premises for most purposes,
so that it is reasonable to recognize that the third party has the right to permit
inspection and others have assumed the risk that the third party might allow the
area to be searched. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7, 94 S.Ct. 988,
993 n.7, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). A defendant can knowingly and voluntarily
contractually agree to allow third parties to enter a space where the defendant has
an expectation of privacy. See United States v. Griffin, 555 F.2d 1323, 1324-25
(5th Cir. 1977) (holding that a warrantless search of pharmacy records was
reasonable where the defendant “agreed by contract to maintain records of the
prescriptions which he billed to the state and to make these records available for
inspection at any time”).
The district court did not err in denying Smith’s motion to suppress because
Smith’s rental agreement gave the storage facility manager actual authority over
Smith’s storage unit in certain circumstance, and provided that the owner’s agents
and other representatives, including police, could enter his storage unit in order to
make repairs to, and ensure the safety and preservation of, the unit. Once the
facility manager observed water coming from the storage unit, which breached the
3
terms of the rental agreement, he had actual authority to open the unit, and when he
observed AK-47 firearms within the unit, which also breached the terms of the
rental agreement, he had actual authority to consent to a search by police. Because
Edom’s search was not in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Smith’s consent to a
subsequent search, as well as his statements to police were not tainted by an illegal
search. Accordingly, upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’
briefs, we affirm the district court’s denial of Smith’s motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
4