United States v. Rene Alba Fernandez ( 2009 )


Menu:
  •                                                          [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    NOVEMBER 24, 2009
    No. 09-10001                  THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                 CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 08-00089-CR-FTM-99SPC
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    RENE ALBA FERNANDEZ,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    _________________________
    (November 24, 2009)
    Before BLACK, PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Rene Alba Fernandez appeals his convictions and sentences for conspiracy
    to bring aliens into the United States for private financial gain, and attempting to
    bring and aid and abet the bringing of aliens into the United States for private
    financial gain. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
    I.
    Fernandez was charged with conspiracy to bring aliens into the United States
    for private financial gain, in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. §§ 1324
    (a)(1)(A)(i) and
    1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(l), (“Count 1”); and attempting to bring and aid and abet the
    bringing of aliens into the United States for private financial gain, in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. §§ 1324
    (a)(2) and 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii), (“Counts 2 and 3”). These charges
    were based on a conspiracy to bring Cuban nationals into the United States
    illegally during two trips – one in November and December 2007 and one in April
    2008. Fernandez pled not guilty to all counts and proceeded to trial.
    Trial testimony established that the United States Coast Guard, on December
    1, 2007, intercepted two vessels – on vessel manufactured by Luhrs and a Fins
    vessel with registration number FL 8945 NL, carrying 20 Cuban nationals and two
    individuals claiming to be United States residents. Jose Bello and Luis Lopez
    Cordero operated the Fins vessel, while Roman Zambrana operated the Luhrs.
    Cordero testified at trial that, in November 2007, he traveled on a vessel to
    2
    Bahia Honda, Cuba to pick up 21 Cuban nationals. He also identified
    Government’s Exhibits (“GEs”) 26, 27, and 28 as photo-pack line-ups that he had
    been shown during interviews with investigators. Defense counsel objected to the
    admission of the exhibits, but the court overruled the objection. Cordero stated
    that he had identified an individual pictured in GE 26 as Raul Rodriguez (“Chino”)
    and an individual in GE 28 as Fernandez.
    Bello testified that he had talked with Fernandez about smuggling Cubans
    into the United States, and Fernandez put him in contact with Chino. He stated
    that Chino and Fernandez drove him to a boat ramp to launch the boat that he
    drove to Cuba. Bello picked up 20 people in Cuba, but on the way back to the
    United States, the boat ran out of gasoline. On cross-examination, in response to
    defense counsel’s questioning, Bello testified that he was 28 years old and that his
    girlfriend, Adrianna Rodriguez, was 15 or 16 years old when she gave birth to his
    son. The government objected to this testimony as irrelevant. The court sustained
    the government’s objection, but refused to strike Bello’s testimony.
    Steven Buckner, a Machinery Technician Third Class Supporting Officer
    with the Coast Guard, testified that, on August 23, 2007, he boarded vessel FL
    8945 NL to conduct a safety inspection. He recalled that Chino and Fernandez
    were on board. Buckner reviewed his report, which, he stated, listed Fernandez’s
    3
    address as 2231 Northwest 7th Place, Cape Coral, Florida, and his telephone
    number as (239) 810-6152. Buckner stated that he would not recognize Fernandez
    if he saw him, because he did not remember what Fernandez looked like. After
    Buckner testified, the court asked the parties whether Buckner’s testimony was
    hearsay, since he could not identify Fernandez. The court ultimately determined
    that it would not strike Buckner’s testimony, but noted that the government would
    have to establish, through later circumstantial testimony, that the individual
    Buckner was referencing in his testimony was actually Fernandez.
    Christopher Brown, a Special Agent with ICE, testified that Chino owned a
    vessel with Florida registration number 8945 NL, which was usually kept on a Real
    Xtreme boat trailer. He testified that a December 1, 2007 photograph of
    Fernandez’s residence showed an empty boat trailer, consistent with Chino’s Real
    Xtreme boat trailer, parked outside.
    Angel Blanco, Libertad Blanco’s son, testified that he came to the United
    States on April 14, 2008 on a vessel carrying approximately 23 Cubans. Blanco’s
    sister, Anola, was also on the boat.
    Libertad Blanco (“Libertad”) testified that she once told Fernandez that she
    wanted to bring her children from Cuba to the United States. Fernandez told her
    that she would have to pay $10,000 per person once they arrived in the United
    4
    States. She stated that Fernandez introduced her to Chino and she agreed to pay
    $20,000 by April 22nd. On May 22nd, Libertad still had not paid Chino, and she
    decided to alert law enforcement, because of intense phone calls and threats
    between Chino and Fernandez, which Fernandez then relayed to her.
    Libertad met with Fernandez at a restaurant to introduce him to an
    undercover law enforcement agent, named Roberto, (subsequently referred to as
    “Gonzalez”). Libertad was asked about the understanding that was reached at the
    end of the meeting. She replied, “[t]hat between [Gonzalez] and [Fernandez], they
    would take a boat to Cuba, they would bring more people, and my –.” At this
    point, defense counsel objected, stating that Libertad’s testimony was hearsay. The
    court overruled the defense’s objection. Libertad explained that a boat would be
    made available to bring in more people from Cuba: “[Gonzalez] and [Fernandez]
    agreed that they would put a boat out to Cuba. [Fernandez] would be in charge of
    everything, and they would – that would pay off my debt, the $20,000 debt that I
    had.”
    A few days after the meeting at the restaurant. Libertad and Gonzalez met
    Fernandez, Fernandez’s wife, Chino, a man named Sergio, and two other
    individuals, at the garage where Fernandez worked. Sergio wanted Libertad to pay
    him the $20,000, because he was the person who had brought Libertad’s children
    5
    into the country. At the conclusion of the meeting, Libertad was given one more
    month to repay the money. Libertad explained that Chino owed Fernandez
    $15,000 – $10,000 for boat repairs, and $5,000 for “an outing that he had been
    on.”
    Maria Conde, a translator, recognized GEs 31-A, 31-B, 32-A, 32-B, 33-A,
    33-B, 34, 34-A, 35, 35-A, 36, and 36-A, because she “worked on them” and
    “produced them.” She explained that another employee in her office listened to the
    tapes and did the transcription, and that she then reviewed the transcripts in
    conjunction with the recordings to ensure their accuracy. She stated that GEs
    31-B, 32-B, and 33-B were true and accurate transcripts of GEs 31-A, 32-A, and
    33-A; and GEs 34-A, 35-A, and 36-A were true and accurate transcripts of GEs 34,
    35, and 36.
    Selecio Gonzalez, a U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agent, testified
    that he participated in the investigation of Fernandez, using the undercover name
    “Roberto.” Gonzalez identified GE 33-B as a transcript a conversation he had with
    Fernandez. Defense counsel objected to the introduction of GEs 31-A, 31-B, 32-A,
    32-B, and 33-B, “based upon the fact that a proper predicate has not been
    established.” The court overruled the defense’s objection and admitted the
    exhibits.
    6
    During a meeting between Gonzalez, Fernandez, and Libertad, Fernandez
    discussed the December 2007 smuggling trip, stating that “we lost that trip.”
    Fernandez also explained to Gonzalez that, of the 23 Cubans that were brought into
    the country with Libertad’s children, 18 people had paid. He stated that “[w]e gave
    20,000 dollars for gas.” Gonzalez testified that Fernandez told him that Chino
    owed him $7,000 – $5,000 “from a prior incident,” and $2,000 for assisting Sergio
    in his trip to Cuba.
    Paul Mangone, a Senior Special Agent with the U.S. Department of
    Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), identified GE
    21 as two pieces of paper that he removed from a small black notebook found in a
    filing cabinet in Chino’s home. Defense counsel objected to the admission of the
    exhibit “on relevancy grounds,” but the court overruled the objection.
    Christopher Brown identified GE 23 as a receipt from Atlantic Radio
    Telephone reflecting the purchase of 150 prepaid minutes for an Iridium satellite
    phone. Defense counsel objected to admission of the receipt, but the court
    overruled the objection, subject to later testimony connecting the receipt to Chino
    and Fernandez. Brown testified that the receipt, dated April 3, 2008, was found in
    Chino’s vehicle. Brown also testified that Fernandez’s wife, Maria Perez, owned a
    cell phone with the number (786) 539-6591. The government then asked the court
    7
    to rule on the admissibility of Buckner’s previous testimony, noting that the phone
    number given by Buckner “is the same phone number that the witness just testified
    that record relates to.” Defense conceded that the court could “admit [Buckner’s
    testimony] now.” The court admitted Buckner’s previous testimony.
    Brown testified that tracking data showed that the Luhrs vessel departed a
    home in Pirate Harbor, Florida at 1:56 am on November 29, 2007, and traveled to a
    destination near the coast of Cuba. Between November 28 and December 3, 2007,
    a satellite phone associated with the Luhrs vessel called Perez’s cell phone 17
    times, and Chino placed 62 calls to Perez. He stated that the Iridium satellite
    phone linked to the receipt found in Chino’s vehicle traveled from Cape Coral,
    Florida to Cuba, and then back to Florida between April 11, 2008 and April 13,
    2008. Between April 10 and April 15, 2008, Chino called Perez’s phone 26 times,
    and Perez called Chino 45 times.
    Joseph Gonzalez, a Special Agent with ICE, testified that Fernandez told
    him during an interview “that Chino pays him approximately $1,000 as a finders
    fee per person.” Fernandez also told Joseph Gonzalez that Chino owed him about
    $5,000 for introducing Libertad to Chino and arranging for her family to be
    brought to the United States.
    After Joseph Gonzalez’s testimony, the government rested. Fernandez
    8
    moved for a Fed.R.Crim.P. Rule 29 judgment of acquittal on all counts, and the
    court denied the motion.
    Perez testified that her 17-year-old daughter, Adrianna Rodriguez, began a
    relationship with Bello when she was 14 years old and had a two-year old son with
    him.
    Fernandez testified that Libertad once asked him if he knew anyone that
    could bring her children into the United States. He introduced Libertad to Chino,
    telling Libertad that Chino might know someone that could help her bring her
    children into the country. He stated that he never asked Libertad for money for
    introducing her to Chino. Fernandez denied driving with Bello and Chino to a boat
    ramp to launch the Fins vessel. He also stated that he did not know that Chino was
    involved in Cuban smuggling. When asked about his comments to Gonzalez in
    reference to the December 2007 smuggling trip, Fernandez stated “that trip is not
    mine and I don’t have anything to do with it.”
    After Fernandez’s testimony, the defense rested, renewed its previous
    objections, and again moved for a Rule 29 judgment of acquittal with respect to
    Counts 1, 2, and 3. The court denied the Rule 29 motion. The jury found
    Fernandez guilty of all three counts, and it found that Fernandez committed all
    three offenses for purposes of private financial gain.
    9
    The presentence investigation report (“PSI”) set Fernandez’s base offense
    level at 12, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(a)(3). Fernandez received a 6-level
    increase under § 2L1.1(b)(2), because his offense involved at least 43 illegal aliens.
    His base offense level was increased by an additional two levels, pursuant to
    § 2L1.1(b)(6), because the offense involved “intentionally or recklessly creating a
    substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person.” Fernandez
    also received a two-level enhancement under § 3C1.1, for obstruction of justice
    based on his false testimony at trial. Fernandez’s total offense level of 22
    combined with criminal history category VI to yield a guideline imprisonment
    range of 63 to 78 months. Fernandez objected to the application of the
    § 2L1.1(b)(6) and § 3C1.1 enhancements.
    At the sentencing hearing, Fernandez argued that he should not receive a
    two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, because he testified “based upon
    what he thought the facts of the case were” and his testimony was not material,
    since the jury found him guilty of all counts. The court determined that the
    § 3C1.1 enhancement was warranted, based on Fernandez’s testimony that (1) he
    did not accompany Bello and Chino to launch Chino’s speedboat, (2) he did not
    know that Chino was involved in Cuban smuggling, and (3) he did not have
    anything to do with the alien smuggling trip. With respect to the § 2L1.1(b)(6)
    10
    enhancement, Fernandez argued that there was no evidence that the particular
    vessels used in the smuggling operations were unsafe. The court overruled
    Fernandez’s objection.
    The court adopted the factual statements and guideline calculations set forth
    in the PSI, stated that it had considered the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, and noted
    that Fernandez was involved in two separate transactions and was an active
    participant in both, although Chino was “more the organizer” than Fernandez.”
    The court sentenced Fernandez to 63 months’ imprisonment on each count, to run
    concurrently with one another, followed by a term of three years’ supervised
    release on each count, to run concurrently.
    II.
    Substantial Evidence Supporting Convictions
    We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases de
    novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United
    States v. Williams, 
    527 F.3d 1235
    , 1244 (11th Cir. 2008). “[E]vidence is sufficient
    to support a conviction if a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence
    established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotations omitted). We
    “assume that the jury made all credibility choices in support of the verdict” and
    “accept all reasonable inferences that tend to support the government’s case.” 
    Id.
    11
    A.     Count 1 – Conspiracy
    Pursuant to 
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(A)(i), it is a crime for “[a]ny person
    who[,] . . . knowing that a person is an alien, [to] bring[] to or attempt[] to bring to
    the United States in any manner whatsoever such person at a place other than a
    designated port of entry. . . .” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(A)(i). It is also a crime for a
    person to enter into a conspiracy to commit such an act. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(1)(A)(v)(I). “The essential elements of criminal conspiracy are an
    agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime and an overt act in
    furtherance of the agreement by one of the conspirators.” United States v. Avila-
    Dominguez, 
    610 F.2d 1266
    , 1271 (5th Cir. 1980). “Once the existence of the
    conspiracy is established, there must be substantial evidence that each alleged
    conspirator knew of, intended to join and participated in the conspiracy.” 
    Id.
    “The existence of an agreement may be proven by circumstantial evidence,
    including inferences from the conduct of the alleged participants or from
    circumstantial evidence of a scheme.” United States v. Silvestri, 
    409 F.3d 1311
    ,
    1328 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). Furthermore, the government
    is not required to “prove that each conspirator agreed with every other conspirator,
    knew of his fellow conspirators, was aware of all of the details of the conspiracy,
    or contemplated participating in the same crime.” United States v. Browne, 505
    
    12 F.3d 1229
    , 1274 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 
    128 S.Ct. 2962
     (2008).
    The evidence at trial established an agreement between Fernandez, Chino,
    and several other individuals, to bring Cuban aliens into the United States illegally.
    Libertad testified that Fernandez spoke with individuals who would bring her
    children to the United States, and later introduced her to these individuals. She
    stated that Fernandez called to tell her when the vessel had departed from the
    United States, and later called to inform her that her children had arrived in the
    country. During a meeting with Gonzalez and Libertad, Fernandez stated that only
    18 of the 23 Cubans, brought into the United States with Libertad’s children, had
    paid. Referring to this trip, he noted that “[w]e [paid] $20,000 dollars for gas.”
    Gonzalez testified that Chino owed Fernandez $7,000 – $5,000 from “a prior
    incident” and $2,000 “for assisting Sergio in showing him the route that he had to
    take, taking the vessel out to Sergio, [and] meeting the refueler.” He later noted
    that “$2,000 is for sure owed to [Fernandez] for what he did with bringing in
    [Libertad’s] son and daughter, that he admitted to.” These assertions are supported
    by Fernandez’s statements during a recorded conversation with Gonzalez. Phone
    records also showed that, during the April 2008 smuggling operation, in which
    Libertad’s children were brought into the country, Chino called Perez’s cell phone
    26 times and Perez called Chino 45 times over a 5-day period. Finally, Fernandez
    13
    himself admitted to Joseph Gonzalez that Chino paid him approximately $1,000
    per person as a “finders fee” and that Chino owed him $5,000 for introducing him
    to Libertad and arranging for her family to be brought. There was also evidence
    that one of Fernandez’s co-conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of
    the conspiracy, as Libertad’s children were actually brought, illegally, from Cuba
    into the United States. Fernandez’s own statements that he was paid
    approximately $1,000 per person as a “finders fee,” as well as Gonzalez’s
    testimony that Gonzalez was owed $2,000 for assisting Sergio during the April
    2008 smuggling operation, similarly support the jury’s finding that Fernandez
    participated in the conspiracy for purposes of private financial gain. Accordingly,
    viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, there was
    sufficient evidence to support Fernandez’s conviction on Count 1. See Williams,
    
    527 F.3d at 1244
    .
    B.     Counts 2 and 3 – Attempting and Aiding and Abetting
    Section 1324 also provides for criminal penalties against an individual who,
    “for the purpose of . . . private financial gain,” “knowing or in reckless disregard of
    the fact that an alien has not received prior official authorization to come to, enter,
    or reside in the United States, brings to or attempts to bring to the United States in
    any manner whatsoever, such alien.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1324
    (a)(2)(B)(ii).
    14
    To prove an attempt offense, the government must prove (1) that the
    defendant had the specific intent to engage in the criminal conduct for which he is
    charged and (2) that he took a substantial step toward commission of the offense.
    See United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 
    17 F.3d 1354
    , 1369 (11th Cir. 1994). A
    substantial step “must be more than remote preparation, and must be conduct
    strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant’s criminal intent.” United
    States v. Ballinger, 
    395 F.3d 1218
    , 1238 n.8 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations
    omitted).
    To prove a substantive alien-smuggling offense under a theory of aiding and
    abetting, pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 2
    , the evidence must establish that (1) the
    substantive offense was committed by someone, (2) the defendant committed an
    act that contributed to and furthered the offense, and (3) the defendant intended to
    aid in its commission. United States v. Comacho, 
    233 F.3d 1308
    , 1317 (11th Cir.
    2000).
    The attempt charge focused on Fernandez’s action with respect to the
    November-December 2007 smuggling venture. Fernandez’s intent to commit that
    particular smuggling offense is evidenced by his statements to Gonzalez.
    Fernandez noted that the boat used during this venture was intercepted by the
    Coast Guard, and a child on board was dehydrated. He then stated “[w]e lost that
    15
    trip.” Fernandez’s use of the word “we,” as well as his knowledge of the
    circumstances surrounding the November-December 2007 smuggling operation
    indicate that he was involved in the operation. There is also evidence that
    Fernandez took a substantial step in furtherance of the November-December 2007
    operation. Bello testified that Fernandez put him in contact with Chino after Bello
    told Fernandez about his plans to smuggle individuals from Cuba. Bello also
    stated that Fernandez drove him to Chino’s house to meet with Chino the day
    before Bello traveled to Cuba. He stated that Fernandez was present during Chino
    and Bello’s discussions and, later, Fernandez asked Bello if he “knew what he was
    doing.” The next morning, Fernandez accompanied Chino and Bello to the boat
    ramp to launch the boat that Bello drove to Cuba. Brown testified that an empty
    boat trailer “consistent with the boat trailer that the Fins normally is on or was on”
    was parked at Fernandez’s residence on December 1, 2007. This evidence, viewed
    in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient for jurors to infer that
    Fernandez attempted to smuggle aliens into the United States in late November and
    early December 2007. See Williams, 
    527 F.3d at 1244
    .
    There was also sufficient evidence to support Fernandez’s conviction for
    aiding and abetting. First, the substantive offense was committed by someone,
    because the evidence showed that Sergio brought Libertad’s children into the
    16
    United States. Secondly, Fernandez committed an act that contributed to and
    furthered the offense. According to Gonzalez, Fernandez assisted Sergio by
    showing him the route that he had to take, taking a vessel out to Sergio, and
    meeting the refueler. Fernandez also introduced Libertad to Chino for the purpose
    of arranging their illegal entry into the United States. With respect to the
    November-December 2007 smuggling venture, Bello testified that Fernandez put
    him in contact with Chino when Bello mentioned that he was planning a smuggling
    operation, and that Fernandez accompanied Chino and Bello to launch the vessel
    that Bello drove to Cuba. Finally, the fact that Fernandez expected to be paid for
    his assistance indicates that he intended to aid in the commission of the offense.
    Evidentiary Issues
    We review a district court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of
    discretion. United States v. Cole, 
    755 F.2d 748
    , 766 (11th Cir. 1985). “An
    erroneous evidentiary ruling will result in reversal only if the resulting error was
    not harmless.” Untied States v. Hands, 
    184 F.3d 1322
    , 1329 (11th Cir. 1999). “An
    error is harmless unless there is a reasonable likelihood that [it] affected the
    defendant’s substantial rights.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotations omitted).
    A.     Photo Pack Line-Up (GEs 26-28)
    To determine whether an out-of-court identification was properly admitted,
    17
    we first ask “whether the original identification procedure was unduly suggestive.”
    United States v. Brown, 
    441 F.3d 1330
    , 1350 (11th Cir. 2006). If the procedure
    was unduly suggestive, we next consider “whether, under the totality of the
    circumstances, ‘the identification was nonetheless reliable.’” 
    Id.
     If a defendant
    fails to argue or present evidence suggesting that identification techniques were
    “unduly suggestive,” a district court does not abuse its discretion in admitting the
    identification evidence without further inquiry. 
    Id.
    As an initial matter, although the government argues that Fernandez’s
    confrontation clause argument should be reviewed for plain error, Fernandez, in
    objecting to the admission of the photo pack line-up in the district court, argued
    that “the agent that actually showed these items to [Cordero] . . . needs to be able to
    testify,” regarding how the photo line-up was created and how Cordero made the
    identifications. Thus, it appears that Fernandez preserved his confrontation clause
    argument. However, even under an abuse-of-discretion standard, Fernandez’s
    argument must fail. Because Fernandez never argued, in either the district court or
    on appeal, that the identification techniques employed were “unduly suggestive,”
    the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the identification
    evidence without requiring an agent to testify about the identification process. See
    Brown, 
    441 F.3d at 1350
    .
    18
    B.      Government’s Objection to a Question Regarding Bello’s Character
    Evidence of prior bad acts “is not admissible to prove the character of a
    person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Fed.R.Evid. 404(b).
    “The rule is one of inclusion which allows [prior bad acts] evidence unless it tends
    to prove only criminal propensity.” United States v. Cohen, 
    888 F.2d 770
    , 776
    (11th Cir. 1989). Evidence of prior bad acts is subject to a three-part test: “(1) the
    evidence must be relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character; (2) the
    probative value must not be substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice; and
    (3) the government must offer sufficient proof so that the jury could find the
    defendant committed the act.” United States v. Ellisor, 
    522 F.3d 1255
    , 1267 (11th
    Cir. 2008).
    In the district court, defense counsel stated that the purpose of Bello’s
    testimony regarding Rodriguez’s age at the time she gave birth to his son was “to
    show that [Bello] was engaged in criminal activity when he first came [to the
    United States.]” Thus, it appears that defense counsel’s intent was to use Bello’s
    testimony “to prove only criminal propensity.” See Cohen, 
    888 F.2d at 776
    .
    Although Fernandez argues on appeal that Bello’s testimony was relevant to the
    truthfulness of his testimony, it is not clear how Bello’s relationship with an
    underage woman would have any bearing on his propensity for truthfulness.
    19
    Finally, although the court sustained the government’s objection to the
    questioning, it refused to strike Bello’s testimony that he was 28 years old and
    Rodriguez was 15 or 16 at the time she gave birth to his child. Later, Perez
    testified that Bello and Rodriguez began their relationship when Rodriguez was 14
    years old, and Rodriguez testified that she was 17 years old and had a son that was
    1 year and 10 months’ old. Accordingly, even if the district court had erred in
    excluding the testimony, the error would have been harmless, because Bello’s
    testimony would have been cumulative in light of Perez’s and Rodriguez’s
    subsequent testimony. See Hands, 184 F.3d at 1329 (providing that “an erroneous
    evidentiary ruling will result in reversal only if the resulting error was not
    harmless”).
    C.      Buckner’s Testimony
    A knowing and affirmative withdrawal of a previously articulated objection
    constitutes a waiver that precludes appellate review of the alleged error, and the
    plain error doctrine is inapplicable. See United States v. Horsfall, 
    552 F.3d 1275
    ,
    1283-84 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
    129 S.Ct. 2034
     (2009).
    The district court initially admitted Buckner’s testimony “subject to some
    evidence presented later” that would connect to Fernandez the address and phone
    number Buckner had recorded. Subsequently, Brown testified that the phone
    20
    number (239) 810-6152 was registered to Perez. At this point, defense counsel
    agreed that the court could “admit [Buckner’s testimony] now subject to some
    evidence presented later.” The court asked for “[a]ny argument as to the
    admissibility of [Buckner’s] testimony in light of the evidence we’ve received to
    date,” and defense counsel responded “[n]ot at this time.” Defense counsel never
    again addressed the admissibility of Buckner’s testimony during the course of trial.
    Accordingly, Fernandez has waived and cannot now assert any argument that the
    district court erred in admitting Buckner’s testimony. See Horsfall, 
    522 F.3d at 1283-84
    . Furthermore, even if Fernandez’s claim was not waived, any error would
    be harmless, because other testimony, presented by Brown, established that
    Fernandez resided at 2231 Northwest 7th Place, and that the phone number listed
    in Buckner’s report was registered to Fernandez’s wife.
    D.     Libertad’s Testimony
    We review determinations of the admissibility of evidence for abuse of
    discretion. United States v. Miles, 
    290 F.3d 1341
    , 1351 (11th Cir. 2002)
    (reviewing the admissibility at trial of hearsay evidence under Fed.R.Evid.
    810(d)(2)(E)). Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than one made by the
    declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
    truth of the matter asserted.” Fed.R.Evid. 801(c).
    21
    The specific testimony to which Fernandez objected at trial was Libertad’s
    statement that the agreement reached from the meeting at the restaurant was that
    Gonzalez and Fernandez would organize another smuggling trip to Cuba to pay off
    the $20,000 debt Libertad owed to Chino. This testimony does not constitute
    hearsay, because Libertad did not testify about any specific statement that
    Gonzalez or Fernandez made during the meeting. Instead, she testified regarding
    the context, that is, the understanding that resulted from a meeting in which she
    participated. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    admitting Libertad’s testimony.
    E.     Transcripts of Meetings Between Fernandez and Gonzalez
    Transcripts may be provided to a jury to assist it in evaluating recorded
    conversations, provided that the transcripts are accurate. United States v. Rochan,
    
    563 F.2d 1246
    , 1251 (5th Cir. 1977). While the individual who typed a transcript
    may lay the foundation for its use, “the issue in the authentication of supplemental
    transcripts is not who made them; the issue is whether they are accurate.” 
    Id.
     “In
    this respect, a supplemental transcript is like a photograph that supplements the
    testimony of a live witness. . . . [T]he witness who lays the foundation need not be
    the photographer nor need he know anything of the time, conditions, or
    mechanisms of the taking; he need only be familiar with the object the photograph
    22
    represents.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotations omitted).
    When a transcript contains a translation of conversations spoken in a foreign
    language, a qualified witness must authenticate and verify the translation. See
    United States v. Llinas, 
    603 F.2d 506
    , 509-10 (5th Cir. 1979). A party who wishes
    to challenge the accuracy of a translation bears the burden of presenting another
    translation so that the jury may choose which version to believe. United States v.
    Rosenthal, 
    793 F.2d 1214
    , 1238 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Llinas, 
    603 F.2d at 509
    ).
    As an initial matter, Fernandez objects to the introduction of the transcripts
    of the recorded conversations, not to the introduction of the CDs. Accordingly, the
    relevant inquiry is the accuracy of the transcripts. Rochan, 
    563 F.2d at 1251
    .
    Conde identified GEs31-A, 32-A, 33-A, 34, 35, and 36 as the audio CDs that she
    translated and GEs 31-B, 32-B, 33-B, 34-A, 35-A, and 36-A as accurate transcripts
    of the conversations contained on the CDs. She stated that she reviewed the CDs
    in conjunction with the transcripts and made corrections to the transcripts where
    necessary. Because Conde testified that the transcripts were accurate and
    Fernandez fails to allege that any specific sections of the transcripts are inaccurate,
    the district court did not err in admitting the transcripts. See Rochan, 563 F.3d at
    1251; Rosenthal, 
    793 F.2d at 1238
    ; Llinas, 
    603 F.2d at 509-10
    .
    F.     GEs 21 and 23
    23
    We review a district court’s rulings on the relevance of evidence for abuse of
    discretion. United States v. Todd, 
    108 F.3d 1329
    , 1332 (11th Cir. 1997). The
    Federal Rules of Evidence provide that only relevant evidence is admissible.
    Fed.R.Evid. 402. “Relevant evidence” is “evidence having any tendency to make
    the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
    more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
    Fed.R.Evid. 401. When proffered evidence is “of substantial probative value, and
    will not tend to prejudice or confuse, all doubt should be resolved in favor of
    admissibility.” Todd, 
    108 F.3d at 1332
    .
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting GE 21 because the
    exhibit was relevant to Fernandez’s connection to the conspiracy. The exhibit,
    which was two pieces of paper found in the home of one of Fernandez’s
    co-conspirators, showed that a number of individuals, including Libertad’s
    children, had not yet paid. This corroborates Fernandez’s statement to Gonzalez
    that only 18 out of the 23 Cuban migrants that were brought into the country
    during the April 2008 trip had paid. Thus, the paper shows that Fernandez had
    knowledge of the specific details of the April 2008 trip and supports the argument
    that he was involved in the conspiracy. The court also did not abuse its discretion
    in admitting GE 23, because the receipt evidenced the purchase of minutes for a
    24
    satellite phone used in the smuggling offense. Accordingly, the district court did
    not abuse its discretion in admitting GEs 21 and 23.
    Cumulative Error
    “The cumulative error doctrine provides that an aggregation of
    non-reversible errors (i.e., plain errors failing to necessitate reversal and harmless
    errors) can yield a denial of the constitutional right to a fair trial, which calls for
    reversal.” United States v. Baker, 
    432 F.3d 1189
    , 1223 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation
    marks omitted). Where there is no error or only a single error, there can be no
    cumulative error. United States v. Waldon, 
    363 F.3d 1103
    , 1110 (11th Cir. 2004).
    As discussed above, the evidentiary rulings challenged by Fernandez were
    not erroneous. Because the district court committed no errors in ruling on
    Fernandez’s objections, Fernandez’s cumulative error argument must also fail. See
    Waldon, 
    363 F.3d at 1110
    .
    U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(6) Enhancement
    With respect to sentencing guideline issues, we review legal questions de
    novo and factual findings for clear error. United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 
    363 F.3d 1134
    , 1136-37 (11th Cir. 2004).
    Section 2L1.1(b)(6) provides that if an alien smuggling, transporting, or
    harboring offense “involved intentionally or recklessly creating a substantial risk
    25
    of death or serious bodily injury to another person,” the offense level is increased
    by two levels. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(6). Reckless conduct under this subsection
    “includes a wide variety of conduct (e.g., transporting persons in the trunk or
    engine compartment of a motor vehicle, carrying substantially more passengers
    than the rated capacity of a motor vehicle or vessel, or harboring persons in a
    crowded, dangerous, or inhumane condition).” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1, comment. (n.5).
    The PSI stated that a 2-level enhancement, pursuant to § 2L1.1(b)(6) was
    appropriate, because (1) each vessel used in the smuggling operations contained
    more people than is safe according to www.boatingbasicsonline.com, and (2) there
    were a total of 22 individuals, including 2 children, but only 10 life vests on board
    the Fins vessel during the December 1, 2007 smuggling venture. At the sentencing
    hearing, Fernandez objected to the application of the enhancement, but he did not
    object to the accuracy of the facts on which the court based the enhancement.
    Because Fernandez failed to object to the facts set forth in the PSI, we accept those
    facts as true and determine whether the § 2L1.1(b)(6) enhancement is warranted
    where the vessels involved in the smuggling operations contained more people
    than is safe, and there were only 10 life vests on board a vessel carrying 22
    individuals from Cuba to Florida. See United States v. Shelton, 
    400 F.3d 1325
    ,
    1330 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that where a defendant fails to object to factual
    26
    statements in the PSI, the facts are deemed admitted as true).
    Fernandez argues that he did not intend to create a substantial risk of death
    or serious bodily injury to another person, but such intent is not required to trigger
    the enhancement; instead, it is sufficient if the defendant recklessly created such a
    risk. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(6). The commentary to § 2L1.1(b)(6) specifically
    lists “carrying substantially more passengers than the rated capacity of a
    . . . vessel” as reckless conduct that would justify imposition of the enhancement.
    U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1, comment. (n.5). In this case, the vessels not only carried more
    passengers than was safe, but one vessel carried enough life vests for less than half
    of the passengers on board. Under these circumstances, the district court did not
    err in imposing the two-level enhancement.
    U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 Enhancement
    When the district court imposes an enhancement for obstruction of justice,
    we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its application of
    the Sentencing Guidelines to those facts de novo. United States v. Massey, 
    443 F.3d 814
    , 818 (11th Cir. 2006).
    Section 3C1.1 permits a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice if
    “the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede,
    the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or
    27
    sentencing of the instant offense of conviction” and “the obstructive conduct
    related to (i) the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct;
    or (ii) a closely related offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. We have explained that:
    The district court must make an independent factual finding that
    the defendant gave perjured testimony on a material matter in
    order to apply the enhancement. It is preferable that the district
    court make specific findings as to each instance of obstruction
    by identifying the materially false statements individually. It is
    sufficient, however, that the district court makes a general
    finding of obstruction of justice that encompasses all of the
    factual predicates of perjury.
    United States v. Vallejo, 
    297 F.3d 1154
    , 1168 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations
    and citations omitted). Statements are “material” when, “if believed, [they] would
    tend to influence or affect the issue under determination.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1,
    comment. (n.6). The commentary to § 3C1.1 explains that “[t]his provision is not
    intended to punish a defendant for the exercise of a constitutional right.” U.S.S.G.
    § 3C1.1, comment. (n.2). Where a defendant denies his guilt under oath in a
    manner that constitutes perjury, however, the enhancement is appropriate. Id. The
    Supreme Court has held that a defendant commits perjury where he “gives false
    testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false
    testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.” United
    States v. Dunnigan, 
    507 U.S. 87
    , 94, 
    113 S.Ct. 1111
    , 1116, 
    122 L.Ed.2d 445
    (1993).
    28
    As an initial matter, Fernandez argues that the district court should not have
    imposed this enhancement, because the jury did not determine whether his
    statements hindered the prosecution. This argument is without merit, because a
    district court may make extra-verdict factual findings at sentencing, using a
    preponderance of the evidence standard, provided that the court treats the resulting
    guideline range as advisory. United States v. Chau, 
    426 F.3d 1318
    , 1323 (11th Cir.
    2005).
    In determining that the § 3C1.1 enhancement applied, the district court made
    an independent factual finding that Fernandez gave perjured testimony on three
    material matters. See Vallejo, 
    297 F.3d at 1168
    . The court found that the
    enhancement was warranted by Fernandez’s testimony that (1) he did not know
    that Chino was involved in Cuban smuggling, (2) he did not have anything do with
    the alien smuggling trip, and (3) he denied going with Bello and Chino to launch
    Chino’s speedboat. Fernandez’s testimony that he did not have anything to do
    with the December 2007 alien smuggling trip, standing alone, justifies the
    enhancement, because it constitutes a denial of guilt under oath. See U.S.S.G.
    § 3C1.1, comment. (n.2). The district court also did not clearly err in determining
    that Fernandez’s testimony, that he did not know that Chino was involved in
    Cuban smuggling, constituted perjury. Libertad’s testimony and Fernandez’s own
    29
    statements in several recorded conversations show that Fernandez knew that
    Libertad owed Chino money for his role in illegally bringing her children from
    Cuba to the United States. Finally, Fernandez’s testimony that he did not go with
    Bello and Chino to launch Chino’s speedboat, is contradicted by Bello’s testimony
    that Fernandez was, in fact, present for the launching of the speedboat.
    The district court also correctly determined that all three of these statements
    were material. Fernandez’s statement that he did not know that Chino was
    involved in Cuban smuggling is material, because, to prove a conspiracy, it was
    necessary to show that Fernandez had an agreement with Chino to bring Libertad’s
    children to the United States. Fernandez’s statement that he was not involved in
    smuggling was material, because, if the jury would have believed this statement it
    would have found Fernandez not guilty. Finally, Fernandez’s statement that he did
    not go with Bello and Chino to launch Chino’s speedboat was material, because
    the fact that Fernandez did accompany Bello and Chino shows that he aided and
    abetted the smuggling activity. The fact that the jury did not believe Fernandez’s
    testimony is irrelevant to the issue of materiality, because the guideline
    commentary clearly states that statements are material when “if believed, they
    would tend to influence or affect the issue under determination.” See U.S.S.G.
    § 3C1.1, comment. (n.6) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the district court did not
    30
    err in applying the § 3C1.1 enhancement.
    Reasonableness of the Sentence
    We review a sentence imposed by the district court for reasonableness,
    under an abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Bonilla, 
    579 F.3d 1233
    ,
    1239 (11th Cir. 2009). A sentence may be procedurally unreasonable if the
    sentencing court fails to accurately calculate the guideline range, treats the
    guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider the factors set forth in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a), or fails to adequately explain the chosen sentence. Gall v. United
    States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , __, 
    128 S.Ct. 586
    , 597, 
    169 L.Ed.2d 445
     (2007). The
    § 3553(a) factors a district court must consider include:
    (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
    history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need
    to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
    respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for
    the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to
    protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant
    with needed educational or vocational training or medical
    care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the
    Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy
    statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to
    avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need
    to provide restitution to victims.
    United States v. Talley, 
    431 F.3d 784
    , 786 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)). The district court need not discuss or state on the record each
    § 3553(a) factor explicitly. United States v. Scott, 
    426 F.3d 1324
    , 1329 (11th Cir.
    31
    2005). Instead, an acknowledgment by the district court that it has considered the
    defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors will suffice. Id. at 1329-30. The
    sentencing court “shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
    necessary” to comply with the purposes of sentencing. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a).
    A sentence is substantively unreasonable if the district court made a clear error in
    judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. United States v. Pugh, 
    515 F.3d 1179
    , 1191 (11th Cir. 2008). “[W]hen the district court imposes a sentence
    within the advisory Guidelines range, we ordinarily will expect that choice to be a
    reasonable one.” Talley, 
    431 F.3d at 788
    .
    Fernandez’s sentence was not procedurally unreasonable, because the
    district court accurately calculated the guideline range, considered Fernandez’s
    arguments, stated that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors, and adequately
    explained the chosen sentence. Fernandez’s sentence was also substantively
    reasonable. First, his sentence was at the low end of the applicable guideline
    range. Second, as the government pointed out, Fernandez’s guideline range was
    higher than Chino’s because of Fernandez’s criminal history and because
    Fernandez did not receive credit for acceptance of responsibility. Finally, as the
    court noted, Fernandez was an active participant in two separate alien smuggling
    operations. Accordingly, we affirm Fernandez’s 63-month sentences.
    32
    AFFIRMED.
    33