United States v. Stanley Jennings ( 2009 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECEMBER 2, 2009
No. 09-11083 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 91-14013-CR-FAM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
STANLEY JENNINGS,
a.k.a. Rickey,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(December 2, 2009)
Before EDMONDSON, MARCUS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Stanley Jennings appeals the District Court’s refusal to reduce further his
sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We see no reversible error; we affirm.
Petitioner believes that the District Court erred when it did not apply
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), to his conviction for conspiracy
and distribution of cocaine base: crack cocaine. Petitioner has previously filed a
section 3582 appeal in this court, arguing that his term of imprisonment was above
the statutory minimum. We affirmed the District Court’s decision.
Later, Petitioner filed another section 3582 claim because of the retroactive
change in the crack cocaine sentencing guidelines. The District Court reduced his
sentence, but not enough for the Defendant, who filed this appeal.
We review a district court’s legal conclusions on its scope of authority under
the sentencing guidelines de novo. United States v. Campbell, 491 F.3d 1306,
1315 (11th Cir. 2007).
First, we address Petitioner’s argument that we overrule United States v.
Melvin, 556 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2009), as wrongly decided. We are bound by
previous panels of this court, and we have no authority to overrule those panels.
United States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1993).
Petitioner argues that, although Apprendi lacks retroactive effect, a section
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3582(c)(2) proceeding somehow renders a judgment no longer final. We note, that
in a section 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction, the District Court does not conduct a de
novo re-sentencing. United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 781 (11th Cir. 2000).
The specific issues that petitioner raises as reason to reduce further his sentence --
that the jury did not determine drug quantity -- have already been addressed by this
court. See, United States v. Jennings, 02-16256 (Aug. 05, 2003). See also, United
States v. Moreno, 421 F.3d 1217, 1219-20 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2005). Because the statute dictates that the
judgment is final for all other purposes, section 3582(c)(2) only applies to the very
narrow issue addressed by the changed statute; the determination of drug quantity
was final and cannot be reviewed. By the way, it is possible that the law-of-the-
case doctrine applies here. We alternatively rule that petitioner’s argument is
foreclosed by our earlier ruling.
AFFIRMED.
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