United States v. John Dennis Chapman ( 2009 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-11186 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECEMBER 16, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 07-00412-CR-20-CAP-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOHN DENNIS CHAPMAN,
RIGOBERTO SANCHEZ,
a.k.a. Rigo,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(December 16, 2009)
Before CARNES, MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
John Chapman and Rigoberto Sanchez appeal their convictions for
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least 5 kilograms of cocaine, 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II), 846, and Sanchez appeals his conviction
for possession with intent to distribute at least 5 kilograms of cocaine, id. §§
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii)(II); 18 U.S.C. § 2. Chapman also appeals his conviction
for conspiracy to launder money. Id. § 1956(h). Chapman and Sanchez argue that
there is insufficient evidence to support their convictions, they were entitled to
reductions of their sentences for their minor roles in the conspiracy and their
acceptance of responsibility, and their sentences are unreasonable. Chapman also
argues that his sentence is unconstitutional. Sanchez argues that the government
failed to prove that he participated in a single conspiracy and the district court
erred in admitting evidence from expert witnesses. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
We divide our discussion of the background into three parts. First, we
discuss the investigation that led to the charges against Chapman and Sanchez.
Next, we discuss their trial. Last, we discuss Chapman’s posttrial motion,
objections to the presentence investigation reports, and the sentences imposed.
A. The Investigation and Charges Against Chapman and Sanchez
Between April and December 2007, agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency
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investigated a Mexican organization that trafficked in cocaine. Agents learned
that, after the drugs entered the United States, the cocaine was transported to
houses in Atlanta, Georgia, in vehicles or tractor trailer trucks of Palmer Trucking
Line, a company owned by Troy Palmer and that employed Chapman as a driver.
Agents intercepted telephone calls in which Ramon Madrigal stated that he had
transported cocaine to an individual named Compadre in Atlanta, Georgia.
Compadre was later identified as Ramiro Campuzano-Velasco. Agents learned
that Campuzano-Velasco supervised the Atlanta operation, of which Sanchez and
Chapman were members.
On October 18, 2007, federal agents intercepted telephone calls that the
Atlanta operation planned to transport $300,000. The agents overheard
Campuzano-Velasco direct Sanchez to deliver a duffle bag containing cash to the
driver of a tractor trailer truck. After agents observed the exchange, they stopped
the truck and seized $350,000.
Several days later, federal agents intercepted several telephone calls
arranging for Campuzano-Velasco and Sanchez to receive 45 kilograms of cocaine.
Agents videotaped Campuzano-Velasco and Sanchez accepting two large duffle
bags from Chapman and giving one duffle bag to Chapman. The agents later
intercepted a telephone call in which Madrigal explained to Campuzano-Velasco
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that the duffle bag given to Chapman contained payment for the cocaine.
In November 2007, federal agents collected other evidence about Sanchez’s
activities. Agents intercepted two telephone calls in which Campuzano-Velasco
instructed Sanchez to collect packages of $100,000 and $40,000. On another
occasion, agents tape recorded conversations between Campuzano-Velasco and
other members of the conspiracy discussing Sanchez’s receipt of 120 kilograms of
cocaine and planning Sanchez’s delivery of the cocaine for resale. On November
25, 2007, agents recorded conversations between Campuzano-Velasco and
Sanchez about the location of a house where Sanchez was to accept a delivery of
100 kilograms of cocaine. The next day, agents seized 99 kilograms of cocaine
discovered inside a tractor trailer truck parked outside the house.
Chapman, Sanchez, and 21 other members of the conspiracy were charged in
an eleven count indictment for conspiracy and drug crimes. Chapman was indicted
for three crimes: conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least 5 kilograms
of cocaine between April 2007 and December 6, 2007, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II), 846; possession of at least 5 kilograms of cocaine on October
23, 2007, id. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii)(III); 18 U.S.C. § 2; and conspiracy to
launder money, id. § 1956(h). Sanchez was indicted for five crimes: conspiracy to
distribute at least 5 kilograms of cocaine between April 2007 and December 6,
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2007, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II), 846; two counts of possession
with intent to distribute cocaine on October 23 and November 26, 2007, id. §§
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii)(II); 18 U.S.C. § 2; conspiracy to launder money, id. §
1956(h); and laundering money, id. § 1956(a)(2)(A). Both men pleaded not guilty
to the charges. The government later moved to enhance Chapman’s sentence based
on his two prior felony convictions in California and Iowa for the distribution and
possession of methamphetamine.
B. The Trial and Chapman’s Posttrial Motion
The morning of trial, Sanchez entered a change of plea to guilty to
conspiracy to launder money and laundering money, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2,
1956(a)(2)(A), 1956(h), and the government stated it would try Sanchez for his
drug charges. During a hearing in camera, Sanchez stated that he wanted to plead
guilty to his drug charges, but he vacillated about whether he committed the
crimes. The district court accepted Sanchez’s pleas of guilty only to the crimes of
conspiracy to launder and laundering money.
At trial, Daniel Titus of the Drug Enforcement Agency testified about how
Madrigal and Campuzano-Velasco established an Atlanta base of operations to
receive cocaine transported from Mexico. Titus explained that Madrigal,
Campuzano-Velasco, and other members of the conspiracy coordinated and
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monitored how cocaine was imported through California and Texas, distributed to
customers, and proceeds were packaged and transported to Mexico. Titus also
explained how federal agents intercepted telephone calls between Madrigal and
Campuzano-Velasco that led to seizures of 50 kilograms of cocaine on August 18,
2007, and 89 kilograms of cocaine on August 22, 2007. Sanchez objected to
evidence about crimes that occurred before he joined the conspiracy, but the
district court overruled the objection.
Palmer testified about Chapman’s knowledge of the conspiracy. Palmer
testified that, after he was apprehended transporting marijuana, Chapman retrieved
Palmer’s truck. Palmer stated that he “assumed” he had told Chapman that he was
transporting drugs, and Palmer testified that he had told Chapman the shipments of
money he had transported were proceeds of drug transactions.
Campuzano-Velasco implicated Sanchez in the conspiracy. Campuzano-
Velasco testified that in September 2007 his brother and Sanchez joined the drug
operation and, the next month, Sanchez transported two shipments of cocaine
weighing 62 kilograms and 45 kilograms. Campuzano-Velasco watched a
videotape and identified Sanchez as accepting suitcases that contained cocaine.
Campuzano-Velasco testified that on November 25, 2007, Sanchez failed to obtain
100 kilograms of cocaine because police were at the house where a driver of a
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tractor trailer truck was to deliver the cocaine. Campuzano-Velasco explained that
he and Sanchez had planned to obtain the cocaine the next day, but police seized
the truck containing the cocaine.
Before two forensic chemists testified, Sanchez objected to the admission of
200 copies of bench notes and charts that the government had provided that
morning. Sanchez argued that the late disclosure interfered with his ability to
cross-examine the chemists or call rebuttal witnesses, and the government
responded that Sanchez could have prepared his defense using the chemists’
curriculum vitae and summaries of their proposed testimonies. The district court
overruled Sanchez’s objection.
The chemists testified about the weight of cocaine seized by police on three
different dates: on August 18, 2007, the cocaine weighed 50.04 kilograms; on
August 22, 2007, the cocaine weighed 88.37 kilograms; and on November 26,
2007, the cocaine weighed 99.3 kilograms. Sanchez cross-examined the chemists
about whether their testing complied with Agency protocols and whether the
machines used to test the cocaine were calibrated properly.
Both Chapman and Sanchez moved for a judgment of acquittal. Chapman
argued the evidence was insufficient to submit the charges to the jury. Sanchez
argued that the government had introduced irrelevant and prejudicial evidence
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about drug seizures that had occurred before Sanchez joined the conspiracy and the
government had failed to prove that on November 26, 2007, Sanchez had
possessed with the intent to distribute cocaine. The district court denied
Chapman’s and Sanchez’s motions.
Sanchez requested the district court instruct the jury about multiple
conspiracies. Sanchez argued that his offenses involved separate conspiracies, and
the government responded that Sanchez committed his crimes during a single
conspiracy. The district court found that “it is really all one conspiracy involving
drugs and money laundering” and denied Sanchez’s motion.
The jury found Chapman and Sanchez guilty of conspiracy to possess and
distribute at least 5 kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II), 846, but not guilty of possession with intent to distribute
cocaine on October 23, 2007, id. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii)(II); 18 U.S.C. § 2. The
jury also found Chapman guilty of laundering money, id. § 2, 1956(a)(2)(A), and
the jury found Sanchez guilty of possession with intent to distribute cocaine on
November 26, 2007, id. § 2; 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(ii)(II).
C. Posttrial Proceedings
Chapman challenged the sufficiency of the evidence a second time in a
written motion for a judgment of acquittal. Chapman argued that the government
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had presented conflicting evidence of his guilt and the jury had acquitted him of
possessing cocaine in spite of a videotape that depicted Chapman participating in
the transaction. The district court denied the motion.
Chapman objected to his presentence investigation report on four grounds.
First, Chapman objected to the calculation of his base offense level of 34, United
States Sentencing Guideline §§ 2D1.1(c)(3), 2S1.1(a)(1) (Nov. 2008), and he
argued that he was not responsible for 45 kilograms of cocaine. Second, Chapman
argued that he was entitled to reductions for his minor role in the conspiracy, id. §
3B1.2(b), and his acceptance of responsibility, id. § 3E1.1. Third, Chapman
argued that his treatment as a career criminal, id. § 4B1.1, violated his rights to due
process and equal protection because the convictions were stale and his sentence of
life imprisonment was cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. Fourth, Chapman requested a downward departure based on the
sentences imposed on his codefendants.
The district court overruled Chapman’s objections to the presentence report.
The district court found that Chapman was responsible for 45 kilograms of cocaine
and his prior convictions were not stale. The district court rejected Chapman’s
challenge to his classification as a career criminal and requests for reductions based
on his minor role and acceptance of responsibility. The court sentenced Chapman
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to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for conspiring to distribute cocaine, a
concurrent sentence of 240 months of imprisonment for conspiring to launder
money, and 10 years of supervised release.
Sanchez objected to his presentence report on three grounds. First, Sanchez
requested a reduction for his minor role in the conspiracy on the grounds that he
lacked decision-making authority and served as a worker and driver in the cocaine
operation. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). Second, Sanchez requested a reduction for his
acceptance of responsibility about his involvement in laundering money. Id. §
3E1.1. Third, Sanchez requested a downward departure based on the sentences of
his codefendants.
The district court overruled Sanchez’s arguments. The court ruled that
Sanchez was not entitled to a minor role reduction because Sanchez “was a great
soldier” in the conspiracy and served as “some kind of lieutenant in the
organization.” The court also ruled that Sanchez was not entitled to a reduction for
acceptance of responsibility because the government introduced “overwhelming”
evidence that Sanchez committed drug offenses, but he had denied guilt and was
not “fully open, truthful, and remorseful in a such a way that he would receive
[the] adjustment.” The district court sentenced Sanchez to three concurrent terms
of 292 months of imprisonment for his two drug offenses and conspiring to launder
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money, a concurrent term of 240 months of imprisonment for laundering money,
and five years of supervised release.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We apply three standards of review in this appeal. We review de novo the
denial of a judgment of acquittal, and we construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government. United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1253 (11th
Cir. 2007). We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Kennard, 472 F.3d 851, 854 (11th Cir. 2006). The determination of the
defendant’s role in the offense is a finding of fact reviewed for clear error. United
States v. Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 937 (11th Cir. 1999). We review the
reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 46, 128 S. Ct. 586, 594 (2007).
III. DISCUSSION
Chapman and Sanchez present several arguments for our consideration. All
fail. We address each argument in turn.
A. Chapman Has Abandoned His Challenge To the Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Chapman contends that the government failed to prove that he was guilty of
conspiring to distribute of cocaine and launder money, but he has abandoned these
arguments. Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(9)(A) requires an appellant to
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include in his argument his “contentions and reasons for them, with citations to the
authorities and parts of the record on which [he] relies.” Chapman’s argument
consists of three sentences in which he asserts he moved for an acquittal and “[t]he
gravaman of [his] motion [was] that the evidence [was] insufficient to sustain
conviction.” Because Chapman neglected to provide any meaningful discussion of
the evidence, we consider the argument abandoned. See Singh v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
561 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[A]n appellant’s simply stating that an
issue exists, without further argument or discussion, constitutes abandonment of
that issue and precludes our considering the issue on appeal.”).
B. Sufficient Evidence Supports Sanchez’s Convictions.
Sanchez argues there is insufficient evidence that he conspired to distribute
cocaine and launder money or that, on November 26, 2007, he was in possession of
cocaine, but we disagree. Evidence established that Sanchez joined the conspiracy
with Campuzano-Velasco’s brother and, acting under the direction of Campuzano-
Velasco and other coconspirators, Sanchez transported multiple bundles of drugs
and cash packaged to avoid the detection of law enforcement. See United States v.
Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1326–27 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Seher, 562
F.3d 1344, 1365 (11th Cir. 2009). Evidence also established that on November 26,
2007, Sanchez aided and abetted coconspirators in the distribution chain by
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attempting a second time to obtain a shipment of cocaine. See United States v.
Perez, 922 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1991). The district court did not err by
denying Sanchez’s motions for judgment of acquittal.
C. The Evidence Established That Sanchez’s Crimes Were Committed During a
Single Conspiracy.
Sanchez argues that the evidence established multiple conspiracies instead of
the single conspiracy charged in the indictment. Sanchez argues there was a
misjoinder of charges and a variance between his indictment and the evidence,
which he contends established that members of the drug organization formed
multiple conspiracies to distribute drugs and launder money. Sanchez also argues
that the district court admitted irrelevant and extraneous evidence. These
arguments fail.
The record establishes that Sanchez participated in a single conspiracy. The
government introduced evidence consistent with the indictment that Sanchez and
his codefendants participated in a conspiracy involving separate drug and money
laundering transactions. See United States v. Seher, 62 F.3d 1344, 1366 (11th Cir.
2009). Testimony established that Sanchez, Campuzano-Velasco, and other
coconspirators coordinated the transportation of cocaine to Atlanta, Georgia, and
proceeds of drug sales to Mexico. See United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324,
1347–49 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1327 (11th
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Cir. 1997). Sanchez assisted Campuzano-Velasco in the Atlanta operation and he
participated in a substantial number of drug and money transactions to achieve
objectives of the conspiracy. The government introduced evidence about prior
crimes by coconspirators to assist the jury in understanding the scope of, and
Sanchez’s role in, the operation. See Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1344, 1347. Sanchez
cannot argue that he was surprised by that evidence because the indictment charged
that the conspiracy formed in April 2007, nor can he argue that the jury was
confused by the evidence because it found Sanchez guilty of conspiracy and
acquitted him of an underlying possession crime. See United States v. LeQuire,
943 F.2d 1554, 1561 (11th Cir. 1991).
D. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting Expert Testimony.
Sanchez argues that his conviction should be reversed because the
government waited until the morning of trial to disclose reports of its expert
witnesses, but this argument fails. We will reverse the decision of a district court
about evidentiary matters “‘only if such a violation prejudices a defendant’s
substantial rights,’” United States v. Chastain, 198 F.3d 1338, 1348 (11th Cir.
1999) (quoting United States v. Perez-Garcia, 904 F.2d 1534,1546 (11th Cir.
1990)), and Sanchez cannot establish that he was prejudiced by the late disclosure.
Although Sanchez complains the timing affected his ability to prepare a defense,
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Sanchez questioned the chemists about compliance with testing protocols, and he
fails to identify any data or irregularity in the reports that he could have used to
challenge the evidence or the experts’ conclusions. The district court offered
Sanchez extra time to prepare for cross-examination, but Sanchez declined that
offer. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the expert
testimony.
E. Sanchez Was Not Entitled To Reductions for a Minor Role or Acceptance of
Responsibility.
Sanchez argues that he was entitled to reductions for his minor role as a
courier and his acceptance of responsibility about laundering money, but we
disagree. Even if Sanchez was not a leader of the conspiracy, he did not play a
minor role. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.5. Within one month of joining the
conspiracy, Sanchez was entrusted to transport large amounts of cocaine and cash,
and he handled at least 325 kilograms of cocaine. Sanchez also never accepted
responsibility for his drug crimes. Id. § 3E1.1(a). Although Sanchez stated before
trial that he desired to plead guilty to his drug charges, he refused to admit he had
transported drugs, and at trial he challenged the evidence about those crimes. See
United States v. Williams, 408 F.3d 745, 756 (11th Cir. 2005). The district court
did not clearly err by finding that Sanchez did not qualify for reductions in his
sentence.
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F. Sanchez’s Sentence is Reasonable.
Sanchez argues that his sentence is unreasonable, but we disagree. The
district court considered the sentencing factors and determined that Sanchez’s
conduct warranted a sentence of 292 months of imprisonment. Although Sanchez
contends that he was entitled to a sentence equivalent to codefendants who had
pleaded guilty, “defendants who cooperate with the government and enter a written
plea agreement are not similarly situated to a defendant who provides no assistance
to the government and proceeds to trial.” United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d
1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 2009). The district court did not abuse its discretion by
sentencing Sanchez to a term at the low end of the guidelines.
G. The District Court Did Not Err When It Sentenced Chapman to Imprisonment
for Life.
Chapman challenges his sentence to imprisonment for life on three grounds.
First, Chapman argues that his enhanced sentence violates his rights to due process
and equal protection and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. Second, Chapman argues that his sentence is
unreasonable because the court failed to consider the sentences imposed on his
codefendants or other sentencing factors. Third, Chapman argues that he should
have received reductions for his minor role in the conspiracy and his acceptance of
responsibility. These arguments fail.
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The district court was required to sentence Chapman to imprisonment for
life. Chapman concedes that his argument that his mandatory minimum of life in
prison violates the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause is foreclosed by
our precedents. See United States v. Willis, 956 F.2d 248, 251 (11th Cir. 1992).
“[A] district court [also] is not authorized to sentence a defendant below the
statutory mandatory minimum unless the government filed a substantial assistance
motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 or the defendant
falls within the safety-valve of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).” United States v. Castaing-
Sosa, 530 F.3d 1358, 1360–61 (11th Cir. 2008). Because Chapman faced a
mandatory minimum sentence, any error in failing to grant a reduction for his
minor role or acceptance of responsibility was harmless. The district court did not
err when it sentenced Chapman.
IV. CONCLUSION
The convictions and sentences of Chapman and Sanchez are AFFIRMED.
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