Gavino Hunil Vail v. U.S. Attorney General ( 2009 )


Menu:
  •                                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    Dec. 18, 2009
    No. 09-11870                    THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                   CLERK
    ________________________
    Agency No. A088-613-876
    GAVINO HUNIL VAIL,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ________________________
    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    _________________________
    (December 18, 2009)
    Before EDMONDSON, BIRCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Gavino Hunil Vail, a Guatemalan citizen proceeding pro se, seeks review of
    the denial of his claims for asylum and withholding of removal under the
    Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 
    8 U.S.C. §§ 1158
    , 1231, and relief under
    the Convention Against Torture (CAT), 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.16
    (c). The Immigration
    Judge (IJ) denied Vail’s request for asylum as time-barred, and denied his request
    for withholding of removal based primarily on an adverse credibility
    determination. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Vail contends
    that the IJ and BIA erred by denying his application for asylum and withholding of
    removal, because a single encounter with unknown, masked men who robbed Vail
    and his father amounted to past persecution.1
    Because the BIA expressly adopted the IJ’s reasoning and added its own
    analysis, we will review both of their decisions. See Jiang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    568 F.3d 1252
    , 1256 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
    An alien cannot apply for asylum unless he demonstrates “by clear and
    convincing evidence that the application has been filed within 1 year after the date
    of the alien’s arrival in the United States.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (a)(2)(B). Section
    1158(a)(3) provides: “No court shall have jurisdiction to review any determination
    of the Attorney General under paragraph (2).” 
    Id.
     § 1158(a)(3). That provision
    1
    Vail challenged the denial of his request for CAT relief before the BIA but does not
    challenge it before this Court. We therefore deem that claim to be abandoned. See Sepulveda v.
    U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    401 F.3d 1226
    , 1228 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that an appellant’s failure to
    offer argument on an issue constitutes abandonment of that issue).
    2
    “divests our Court of jurisdiction to review a decision regarding whether an alien
    complied with the one-year time limit or established extraordinary circumstances
    that would excuse his untimely filing.” Chacon-Botero v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    427 F.3d 954
    , 957 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Mendoza v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    327 F.3d 1283
    , 1287 (11th Cir. 2003)). Because we have no jurisdiction to review the denial
    of Vail’s request for asylum as time-barred, we dismiss Vail’s petition as to his
    asylum claim.
    We do have jurisdiction over Vail’s claim that he qualified for withholding
    of removal. Vail shall not be removed to Guatemala if doing so would threaten his
    life or freedom on account of “race, religion, nationality, membership in a
    particular social group, or political opinion.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1231
    (b)(3)(A). Vail bears
    the burden of demonstrating that it is “more likely than not” he will be “persecuted
    or tortured upon being returned.” Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    401 F.3d 1226
    ,
    1232 (11th Cir. 2005). To meet that burden, he must offer “credible, direct, and
    specific evidence in the record.” Forgue v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    401 F.3d 1282
    , 1287
    (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
    We review the IJ’s and BIA’s factual findings under the highly deferential
    substantial evidence test, under which we must affirm the decision “if it is
    supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
    considered as a whole.” Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1283–84 (citations and quotation
    3
    marks omitted). We cannot reverse those findings unless the record compels it.
    Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 
    386 F.3d 1022
    , 1027 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
    The IJ’s adverse credibility determination was due to several discrepancies
    in the record, including: (1) Vail’s first asylum application did not mention any
    specific incidents that occurred in Guatemala, or his uncle’s assassination in 1980;
    (2) Vail testified that he filed his application so he could renew his driver’s license;
    (3) The basis of Vail’s first application was persecution for his political opinion,
    but Vail’s second application was based on different grounds; (4) Vail testified
    inconsistently regarding the year of his uncle’s death and the year in which Vail
    and his father were robbed by unknown men.
    We have held that “an adverse credibility determination alone may be
    sufficient to support the denial of an asylum application.” Forgue, 
    401 F.3d at 1287
    . “Once an adverse credibility finding is made, the burden is on the applicant
    alien to show that the IJ’s credibility decision was not supported by ‘specific,
    cogent reasons’ or was not based on substantial evidence.” 
    Id.
     Vail has failed to
    meet that burden. His brief asserts that the IJ made a mistake, but it does not
    specifically challenge the credibility finding. “While we read briefs filed by pro se
    litigants liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed
    abandoned.” Timson v. Sampson, 
    518 F.3d 870
    , 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal
    citations omitted). In any event, the IJ gave specific, cogent reasons for her
    4
    credibility determination, which is supported by substantial evidence. Thus, Vail’s
    testimony cannot establish that he would likely be persecuted or tortured upon
    being returned to Guatemala.
    Although “an adverse credibility determination does not alleviate the IJ’s
    duty to consider other evidence produced by an asylum applicant,” Forgue, 401
    F.3d at 1287, Vail has not produced any corroborating evidence that compels us to
    reverse the IJ’s findings. Vail submitted a copy of his uncle’s death certificate, but
    the document does not say how Vail’s uncle was killed or that he was assassinated
    for political reasons. As the IJ noted, the alleged assassination occurred
    approximately 15 years before Vail initially left Guatemala in 1995. Vail also
    submitted the 2007 Country Report on Guatemala, but that document does not
    show that Vail was targeted for discrimination because he is Mayan.
    Because substantial evidence supports the IJ’s and BIA’s denial of Vail’s
    application for withholding of removal, we deny the petition for review as it
    pertains to withholding of removal.
    PETITION DISMISSED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.
    5