Letrenia L. Williams v. Tim Geithner ( 2009 )


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  •                                                            [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    JUNE 5, 2009
    No. 08-13840               THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar              CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 06-00876-CV-CC-1
    LETRENIA L. WILLIAMS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    TIM GEITHNER,
    Secretary Department of
    Treasury,
    Defendant-Appellee,
    BETTYE ATWATER,
    PAM GILSMAN, et al.,
    Defendants.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    _________________________
    (June 5, 2009)
    Before BIRCH, PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Letrenia L. Williams, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s
    grant of summary judgment to the Department of Treasury in her employment
    discrimination action. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
    I.
    Williams, a former employee of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), filed
    the instant pro se employment discrimination action, pursuant to Title VII of the
    Civil Rights Act of 1964. In her complaint, she alleged various claims, including
    racial discrimination, retaliation, and a hostile work environment. After discovery
    was completed, a magistrate judge issued a lengthy report, recommending that the
    district court grant the IRS summary judgment on all of Williams’s claims. On
    January 16, 2008, the district court adopted the magistrate’s report and entered a
    final judgment in the IRS’s favor.
    Williams thereafter filed three motions for reconsideration. On April 16,
    2008, the district court entered a single order denying all three motions. Williams
    then filed a “motion for relief from judgment and orders,” citing both
    Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) and 60(b). On June 17, 2008, the district court denied the
    motion, citing the court’s local rule prohibiting a party from filing a motion to
    2
    reconsider the denial of a previous motion to reconsider.
    Less than one week later, Williams filed a notice of appeal, but did not
    specify the order from which she was appealing. Acting sua sponte, we entered an
    order dismissing her appeal in part. We concluded that Williams’s appeal was
    untimely with respect to both the district court’s underlying January 16 order
    granting the IRS summary judgment and the court’s April 16 order denying
    Williams’s three reconsideration motions. However, we permitted Williams’s
    appeal to proceed with respect to the court’s June 17 order.
    II.
    As just discussed, we have limited the scope of this appeal to the district
    court’s June 17 order denying Williams’s fourth motion for reconsideration. We
    review the denial of a motion for reconsideration, whether brought under Rule
    59(e) or Rule 60(b), for an abuse of discretion. Farris v. United States, 
    333 F.3d 1211
    , 1216 (11th Cir. 2003) (Rule 60(b)); Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Florida,
    
    243 F.3d 1282
    , 1285 (11th Cir. 2001) (Rule 59(e)).
    III.
    On appeal, Williams offers absolutely no argument in her brief challenging
    the court’s June 17 order, as all of her arguments relate to the underlying summary
    judgment order. Indeed, Williams explicitly states in her brief that she seeks
    3
    review only of that underlying order. As a result, Williams has abandoned any
    argument on appeal challenging the June 17 order, the only order over which we
    have jurisdiction. See Horsley v. Feldt, 
    304 F.3d 1125
    , 1131 n.1 (11th Cir. 2002)
    (arguments not raised on appeal by a pro se litigant are abandoned). Accordingly,
    we affirm.1
    AFFIRMED.
    1
    In any event, we note that it is doubtful that the court abused its discretion by denying
    Williams’s fourth motion for reconsideration, as it relied on an unambiguous local rule prohibiting
    parties from filing motions to reconsider the denial of a previous motion to reconsider. N.D. Ga.
    R. 7.2(E) (“Parties and attorneys for the parties shall not file motions to reconsider the court’s denial
    of a prior motion for reconsideration.”); see Reese v. Herbert, 
    527 F.3d 1253
    , 1267 n.22 (11th Cir.
    2008) (“We give great deference to a district court’s interpretation of its local rules.”) (quotation and
    alteration omitted).
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-13840

Judges: Birch, Pryor, Fay

Filed Date: 6/5/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024