Robert Kelvin Lindbloom vs W. Brad Steube ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 11-10460 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar SEPTEMBER 8, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 8:10-cv-02108-RAL-TBM
ROBERT KELVIN LINDBLOOM,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll llPlaintiff-Appellant,
versus
W. BRAD STEUBE,
individually,
W. BRAD STEUBE,
as Sheriff of Manatee County, Florida,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(September 8, 2011)
Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Kelvin Lindbloom appeals pro se the dismissal of his second amended
complaint against Brad Steube, the Sheriff of Manatee County, Florida. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The district court dismissed Lindbloom’s complaint on the ground that it
failed to state a claim for relief. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(6). We affirm.
Lindbloom alleged that he received warnings from deputies of the Sheriff’s
Office not to trespass on property of the Old Parrish School House, and that the
deputies filed official reports that accused Lindbloom falsely of refusing to leave
the building when requested by an employee of Manatee County. Lindbloom
alleged that the reports subjected him to personal humiliation and damaged his
professional reputation. Lindbloom alleged that he is no longer able to attend
meetings on the property and is unable to vote. Lindbloom also alleged that the
deputies “act[ed] in accordance with” policies and procedures implemented by
Steube, but Lindbloom did not describe those policies and procedures.
The district court did not err by dismissing Lindbloom’s complaint.
Lindbloom failed to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” that is,
from which the district court could “draw the reasonable inference” that Sheriff
Steube did anything to violate Lindbloom’s constitutional rights. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. ____,129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Lindbloom complained about
violations of his rights to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth
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Amendment, but Lindbloom did not allege that he was a member of a protected
class who had been discriminated against, see Sweet v. Sec’y, Dept. of Corr., 467
F.3d 1311, 1318–19 (11th Cir. 2006), or that he had been deprived of a recognized
liberty or property interest, other than “injury to [his] reputation,” Behrens v.
Regier, 422 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2005). Lindbloom complained about a
violation of his right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment based on the
dissemination of allegedly false statements in the official reports, but Lindbloom
had no “constitutional right to be free from public embarrassment or damage to his
reputation.” Carroll by Carroll v. Parks, 755 F.2d 1455, 1457 (11th Cir. 1985).
Lindbloom also complained that he had been defamed, but he did not allege facts,
such as a loss of his job or a “significant alteration of some other legal right or
status,” that would establish that his injury “r[o]se to the level of a constitutional
deprivation.” Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 581, 582 (11th Cir. 1990).
Lindbloom also failed to state a claim against Steube individually because
Lindbloom based his complaint on actions of the deputies. See Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3105 (1985) (“Personal-capacity
suits seek to impose personal liability upon a governmental official for actions he
takes under color of state law.”).
The district court did not err when it dismissed Lindbloom’s complaint with
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prejudice. The district court twice ordered Lindbloom to amend his complaint, but
he failed on both occasions to state a claim for which relief could be granted. In
response to Steube’s motion to dismiss, Lindbloom asked the district court to
“apply its legal acumen and experience to glean [the second amended] Complaint
for facts which would support a cause of action.” Because Lindbloom had already
amended his complaint twice, and did not request another opportunity to amend,
he cannot complain about being denied a third opportunity to amend his
complaint.
We AFFIRM the dismissal of Lindbloom’s complaint.
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