Robert Lee Stunzig, Jr. v. Jessica Flammer Koch ( 2017 )

Case: 16-10513 Date Filed: 05/03/2017 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-10513
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:15-cv-02518-CEH-EAJ
ROBERT LEE STUNZIG, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JESSICA FLAMMER KOCH,
State Attorney,
PHILLIP FEDERICO,
Judicial Officer,
CHRIS HELINGER,
Judicial Officer,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(May 3, 2017)
Case: 16-10513 Date Filed: 05/03/2017 Page: 2 of 4
Before MARCUS, WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Stunzig, Jr., proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s sua sponte
dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Judge Chris Helinger, Judge Philip
Federico, and Assistant State Attorney Jessica Koch, in which he alleges Fourth,
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations arising out of the disposition
of a previous state criminal trial in which Stunzig was the defendant. The court
dismissed the amended complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), without addressing his second amended complaint. On appeal,
Stunzig argues that he stated sufficient facts to support the constitutional violations
alleged. After review, 1 we affirm.
I. DISCUSSION
Though we liberally construe Stunzig’s pro se pleadings, Tannenbaum v.
United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), he has still not alleged
sufficient facts to state a claim against any of the defendants, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
US 662, 678 (2009) (stating a complaint must provide more than “labels and
conclusions” in order to state a claim). Stunzig’s complaint only discusses his
1
A district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is reviewed de novo, using the same standards that govern Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) dismissals. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1489–90 (11th Cir. 1997). We
generally review the denial of a motion to amend a complaint for an abuse of discretion but
review questions of law de novo. Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282,
1291 (11th Cir. 2007).
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inability to cross-examine witnesses during pretrial proceedings, and thus he fails
to state a claim for Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause violations. United
States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802, 806–07 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting the Supreme
Court has never held a defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights extend beyond
trial). Stunzig also fails to state a claim for due process violations because he did
not link a particular defendant to these violations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As to
his malicious prosecution claim against Koch, Stunzig fails to state facts sufficient
to show that there was no probable cause for his arrest or that Koch pursued his
criminal prosecution with malice. Kjellsen v. Mills, 517 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir.
2008) (holding that to state a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff
must show, inter alia, that the defendant instituted or continued a criminal
prosecution with malice and without probable cause). Stunzig merely alleges he
was prosecuted for a crime under Florida law and that he was acquitted. There are
no facts in his complaint to substantiate his bare assertions that his constitutional
rights were violated. Furthermore, the district court did not err in denying leave to
amend because Stunzig’s second amended complaint demonstrates amendment
would have been futile, as the allegations there are equally conclusory and devoid
of factual content. See Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007)
(“Leave to amend a complaint is futile when the complaint as amended would still
be properly dismissed . . . .”).
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II. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing Stunzig’s § 1983
action. 2
AFFIRMED.
2
We also deny Stunzig’s “Motion for Default Judgment” and “Supplement of Default
Judgment,” in which he moves us to grant “the relief requested in the original complaint” due to
the Appellees’ failure to file an appellate brief, pointing to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55. However, the
rules applicable to this Court do not provide for such relief. See Fed. R. App. P. 31(c) (“An
appellee who fails to file a brief will not be heard at oral argument unless the court grants
permission.”).
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