Karen Shannon v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, d.b.a. Amtrak ( 2019 )


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  •            Case: 18-13417   Date Filed: 07/09/2019   Page: 1 of 5
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 18-13417
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-22143-UU
    KAREN SHANNON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION,
    d.b.a. Amtrak,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (July 9, 2019)
    Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, BRANCH, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit
    Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 18-13417       Date Filed: 07/09/2019   Page: 2 of 5
    Karen Shannon appeals the district court’s dismissal of her complaint based
    on the claim splitting doctrine.
    I.
    Shannon was terminated by her employer, the National Railroad Passenger
    Corporation — better known as Amtrak — in May 2017. Later that month she
    filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
    Commission. Before she received a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC,
    Shannon sued Amtrak in September 2017 (“Shannon I”). She brought claims of
    race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, interference with her rights under the
    Family Medical Leave Act, and retaliation in violation of § 1981 and the FMLA.
    Shannon received a Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC in February
    2018. Two weeks later she filed a motion to amend her complaint in Shannon I to
    add various claims, including: race, gender, age, and disability discrimination
    claims and a retaliation claim under the Florida Civil Rights Act; race and gender
    discrimination claims, race- and gender-based hostile work environment claims,
    and a retaliation claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; an age
    discrimination claim and a retaliation claim under the Age Discrimination in
    Employment Act; and a disability discrimination claim and a retaliation claim
    under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court denied her leave to
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    amend in Shannon I because Shannon filed her motion two months after the
    deadline for amended pleadings and only two months before the end of discovery.
    Two months later Shannon filed the present lawsuit (“Shannon II”). She
    brought a retaliation claim under of the Florida Whistleblower Act and claims of
    race, gender, age, and disability discrimination and a retaliation claim under the
    Florida Civil Rights Act. The district court dismissed Shannon II based on the
    claim splitting doctrine because Shannon I was still pending. The court later
    granted summary judgment against Shannon in Shannon I. She challenged that
    judgment on appeal — she did not, however, challenge the district court’s denial of
    her motion to amend — but we affirmed. Shannon v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp.,
    No. 18-13149, 
    2019 WL 2170658
    (11th Cir. May 20, 2019) (unpublished).
    Shannon now appeals the dismissal of her complaint in Shannon II.
    II.
    We review for an abuse of discretion the dismissal of a complaint based on
    the claim splitting doctrine. Vanover v. NCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 
    857 F.3d 833
    , 837
    (11th Cir. 2017). “[T]he claim-splitting doctrine derives from the doctrine of res
    judicata.” 
    Id. at 836
    n.1; see also 
    id. at 841.
    It “applies where a second suit has
    been filed before the first suit has reached a final judgment,” 
    id. at 840
    n.3
    (quotation marks omitted), and where “the first suit, assuming it were final, would
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    preclude the second suit,” 
    id. at 841
    (quotation marks omitted). See generally 
    id. at 840
    –41.
    We use a two-step test to determine whether the claim splitting doctrine
    precludes a plaintiff from raising claims in a second lawsuit. At the first step, we
    ask “whether the case[s] involve[] the same parties and their privies.” 
    Id. at 841–
    42 (quotation marks omitted). The answer here is yes: In both Shannon I and
    Shannon II, Shannon was the plaintiff and Amtrak was the defendant.
    At the second step, we ask whether the cases “arise from the same
    transaction or series of transactions” — in other words, whether they are “based on
    the same nucleus of operative facts.” 
    Id. at 842
    (quotation marks omitted). Here
    again, the answer is yes. Both Shannon I and Shannon II were rooted in Amtrak’s
    alleged discriminatory treatment of Shannon beginning in 2013 and culminating in
    her termination in 2017. As the district court noted, Shannon’s complaints in
    Shannon I and Shannon II “are so similar that they repeat language verbatim in
    numerous paragraphs, and even share typographical errors.” The only factual
    differences between Shannon I and Shannon II that Shannon identifies are minor
    details that she added to her Shannon II complaint to support her new causes of
    action. But those new causes of action and the causes of action she brought in
    Shannon I still “arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts,” so her
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    “addition of separate causes of action” in Shannon II “does not prevent application
    of the claim-splitting doctrine.” 
    Vanover, 857 F.3d at 843
    .
    Notwithstanding that analysis, Shannon argues that it was an abuse of
    discretion for the district court to apply the claim splitting doctrine in Shannon II
    after it denied her motion to amend her complaint in Shannon I. We disagree. If
    anything, the district court’s denial of her motion to amend in Shannon I and her
    failure to challenge that denial in her Shannon I appeal means that the claims she
    brought in Shannon II are barred not only by the claim splitting doctrine, but also
    by res judicata. See EFCO Corp. v. U.W. Marx, Inc., 
    124 F.3d 394
    , 399–400 (2d
    Cir. 1997) (“Where a plaintiff’s motion to amend its complaint in the first action is
    denied, and plaintiff fails to appeal the denial, res judicata applies to the claims
    sought to be added in the proposed amended complaint.”); see also Thomas v.
    Cooper Lighting, Inc., 
    506 F.3d 1361
    , 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (“We may affirm the
    district court’s judgment on any ground that appears in the record, whether or not
    that ground was relied upon or even considered by the court below.”).
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-13417

Filed Date: 7/9/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 7/9/2019