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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 18-11832
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-00130-LJA-TQL
JOHN LEVIE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
________________________
(December 7, 2018)
Before MARCUS, WILSON, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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John Levie appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social Security
Commissioner’s denial of his application for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income, pursuant to
42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).
An ALJ found that although Levie suffered from numerous impairments and could
not perform his past work, Levie was not disabled because none of his impairments
met or were equal to a listed impairment, and because he remained capable of
performing work that existed in significant numbers in the national economy. On
appeal, Levie argues that the ALJ erred (1) by not affording enough weight to the
opinions of Dr. Beaty and Dr. Smith, two of Levie’s physicians, (2) in failing to
consider the opinion of Mac Wilcox, a licensed social worker and therapist from
whom he had received treatment, and (3) by not evaluating all of his alleged
impairments. After careful review, we affirm.
I.
In Social Security appeals, we review the agency’s legal conclusions de
novo. See Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
496 F.3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007).
The agency’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence.
Id.
Substantial evidence is any relevant evidence that a reasonable person would
accept as adequate to support the conclusion. Lewis v. Callahan,
125 F.3d 1436,
1440 (11th Cir. 1997). If, in light of the record as a whole, substantial evidence
supports the Social Security Commissioner’s decision, we will not disturb it.
Id. at
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1439. Additionally, “the claimant bears the burden of proving that he is disabled,
and, consequently, he is responsible for producing evidence in support of his
claim.” Ellison v. Barnhart,
355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
Social Security Regulations prescribe a five-step process for ascertaining a
claimant’s disability status.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)–
(v). The ALJ must determine whether: (1) the claimant is engaged in substantial
gainful activity; (2) the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of
impairments; (3) that impairment, or combination of impairments, meets or equals
any of the listings of impairments; (4) the claimant can perform his past relevant
work in light of his residual functional capacity; and (5) in light of the claimant’s
age, education, and work experience, the claimant can perform other work found in
the national economy. Id.; Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
631 F.3d 1176, 1178
(11th Cir. 2011).
II.
We first consider Levie’s argument that the ALJ improperly discredited the
testimony of his psychologist, Dr. Smith, and his psychiatrist, Dr. Beaty. In
assessing a claimant’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ must state with
particularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons for
doing so. See Sharfarz v. Bowen,
825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
The testimony of a treating physician must be given substantial or considerable
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weight unless good cause is shown to the contrary. Winschel,
631 F.3d at 1179.
Good cause exists “when (1) the treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by
the evidence, (2) the evidence supported a contrary finding, or (3) the treating
physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the physician’s own
medical records.”
Id. When the ALJ articulates specific reasons for failing to give
the opinion of a treating physician controlling weight and those reasons are
supported by substantial evidence, there is no reversible error. See Moore v.
Barnhart,
405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
Here, the ALJ’s decision to give Dr. Beaty’s opinion and Dr. Smith’s
opinion less weight is supported by substantial evidence. The record reflects that
the ALJ carefully considered the treatment notes and medical opinions of Dr.
Beaty and Dr. Smith and how those opinions fit with the record as a whole. The
ALJ ultimately found that objective medical evidence in the record and evidence of
Levie’s daily activities and work history were not consistent with the opinions of
Dr. Beaty and Dr. Smith, both of which suggested a more restrictive view of
Levie’s abilities. Specifically, evidence in the record demonstrated—and Levie
acknowledged—that in addition to performing daily activities, Levie was able to
take care of his mother, remodel both his own property and other properties, and
work for Goodwill Industries during his alleged disability. The evidence also
suggests that Levie was able to function even when he did not take his medication.
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Because substantial evidence supported a contrary finding—that the claimant was
not so limited in his abilities—the ALJ had good cause to afford less weight to the
treating physicians’ opinions than the other medical opinions in evidence. See
Winschel,
631 F.3d at 1179; Phillips v. Barnhart,
357 F.3d 1232, 1240–41 (11th
Cir. 2004).
III.
Next, Levie argues that the ALJ erred in failing to consider the opinion of
Mac Wilcox, a social worker and therapist from whom he received treatment, and
that such failure merits reversal. We find this argument unavailing. First, under
SSA regulations, Wilcox—a social worker and therapist—was not an “acceptable
medical source,” and so his opinion could not have been utilized to establish the
existence of impairment in the first place. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a). Thus, the
ALJ was not required to give Wilcox’s notes any special consideration. Second,
while Levie contends that the ALJ did not consider Wilcox’s opinion, the record
reflects that the ALJ specifically referred to the fact that Levie had seen Wilcox for
treatment, and cited to the exhibits that contained Wilcox’s relevant treatment
notes. Because Levie saw Wilcox for treatment between five to seven years before
Levie’s alleged onset of disability, these notes were of limited relevance. While
we have previously said that an ALJ has an obligation to explain the weight given
to “obviously probative” evidence, Cowart v. Schweiker,
662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th
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Cir. 1981), treatment notes from a non-acceptable medical source that were taken
five to seven years prior to the claimant’s alleged onset of disability are not
obviously probative.
IV.
Next, Levie argues that the ALJ erred in failing to consider the impact of all
of his alleged impairments—specifically, ADHD, Asperger’s disorder, and
cognitive disorder—and that failure to do so is reversible error. Where a claimant
has alleged several impairments, the Commissioner must consider the impairments
in combination and determine whether the combined impairments render the
claimant disabled. See Jones v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
941 F.2d 1529,
1533 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). An ALJ’s statement that he has considered a
combination of impairments is adequate to meet this standard.
Id.
A diagnosis alone is insufficient to support a finding of disability, but must
be accompanied by evidence of functional limitation. See Moore v. Barnhart,
405
F.3d 1208, 1212−13 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). If the claimant contends that he
has an impairment that equals a listed impairment, the claimant must present
evidence that describes how the impairment has such an equivalency. Wilkinson ex
rel. Wilkinson v. Bowen,
847 F.2d 660, 662 (11th Cir.1987) (per curiam).
Here, at step two of the analysis, the ALJ determined that Levie suffered
from severe impairments, including dysthymia, anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder,
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and borderline personality disorder. The record undermines Levie’s claim that the
ALJ failed to consider that he had been diagnosed with ADHD, Asperger’s
disorder, and cognitive disorders. In fact, in discussing the medical evidence
contained in the various exhibits submitted by Levie, the ALJ specifically noted
that various mental health professionals had diagnosed him with those particular
disorders. After considering other acceptable medical opinions, including opinions
from Dr. Carden and state agency psychologists, as well as Levie’s daily activities
and work history, the ALJ concluded that these disorders did not impose
significant functional limitations. Specifically, the ALJ found that Levie’s
symptoms were not as severe or persistent as Levie alleged.
In his written decision, the ALJ stated that he had considered Levie’s
impairments—both singly and in combination—and concluded that they did not
meet the severity of any of the relevant listings. Such a statement is sufficient to
find that the ALJ considered the impact of the claimant’s impairments alone and in
combination. See Jones,
941 F.2d at 1533. Further, while the ALJ did not find all
of Levie’s mental disorders to be “severe,” the ALJ took Levie’s social skills and
adaptive functioning into account, suggesting that Levie should only perform
simple work, should have no interaction with the general public or close teamwork
with coworkers, and should not work around crowds of twenty or more people.
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Overall, we find that the ALJ conducted a careful analysis of Levie’s impairments
and properly considered Levie’s functional limitations. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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