Barry Steven Slakman v. L. Gale Buckner, James Donald , 434 F. App'x 872 ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 11-10474 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 22, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-02918-CC
BARRY STEVEN SLAKMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
L. GALE BUCKNER,
JAMES DONALD,
ROBERT E. KELLER,
TERRY BARNARD,
ALBERT MURRAY,
all members of Georgia Board of Pardons and Parole,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(July 22, 2011)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Barry Steven Slakman, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of
his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted and the denial of his motion for relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e).
On appeal, Slakman argues that the district court erred in dismissing his § 1983
complaint because: (1) the Georgia Board of Pardons and Parole (“GBPP”)
violated his right against double jeopardy when it failed to consider his period of
incarceration between August 1993 and his re-trial in 2001 in considering his
suitability for parole; (2) he was subjected to excessive punishment when the
GBPP considered his sentences to be consecutive rather than concurrent, and failed
to use objective criteria for evaluating prisoners with the opportunity of parole; (3)
the GBPP acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it based its decision to deny his
parole on the severity of his crime, and used knowingly false information in
making his parole suitability determination; and (4) he was denied equal protection
of the laws when other similarly situated inmates were granted parole. After
thorough review, we affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part.
We review de novo appeals from a 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) sua sponte
dismissal for failure to state a claim. Leal v. Georgia Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d
1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001). A complaint fails to state a claim when, taking the
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complaint’s allegations as true, it does not appear that a claim to relief “is plausible
on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)
(quotation omitted). To state a claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege that (1)
the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States Constitution
or federal law and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of state law.”
Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010). However, “pro se
pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys
and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100
(11th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).
First, we reject Slakman’s claim that the Georgia Board of Pardons and
Parole (“GBPP”) violated his right against double jeopardy when it failed to
consider his period of incarceration between August 1993 and his re-trial in 2001
in considering his suitability for parole. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that
“[n]o person shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Supreme Court has stated that double
jeopardy protection does not exist for the revocation of probation. United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 137 (1980); United States v. Whitney, 649 F.2d 296,
298 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (same);1 see also Jonas v. Wainwright, 779 F.2d 1576,
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In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we
adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to close
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1577 (11th Cir. 1986) (extending the reasoning for not applying the double
jeopardy clause to the vacation of a presumptive parole release date); Smith v.
Bell, 588 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1979) (affirming without discussion the denial of
Smith’s claim that the parole commission improperly denied his release on parole
by subjecting him to double jeopardy).
Slakman’s double jeopardy rights were not violated when the GBPP denied
his parole. Not only have we previously considered, and rejected the argument that
the denial of parole triggers the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause before
it, but we have held that the decision of a parole board in denying parole to a
prisoner is not designed to punish a criminal defendant for violation of a criminal
law. See Whitney, 649 F.2d at 298; Smith, 588 F.2d at 169.
Next, we are unpersuaded by Slakman’s argument that he was subjected to
excessive punishment when the GBPP considered his sentences to be consecutive
rather than concurrent, and failed to use objective criteria for evaluating prisoners
with the opportunity of parole. The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids cruel and unusual punishment. U.S.
Const. amend. VIII. However, “the denial or postponement of parole is merely a
of business on September 30, 1981, as well as all decisions by a Unit B panel of the former Fifth
Circuit, Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982).
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disappointment rather than a punishment of cruel and unusual proportions.”
Damiano v. Florida Parole & Prob. Comm’n, 785 F.2d 929, 933 (11th Cir. 1986).
Slakman argues that Damiano is distinguishable because it cited to a
decision in which we held that the “psychological distress which prisoners suffer
from the arbitrary and capricious denials of paroles” does not equate to cruel and
unusual punishment, Craft v. Texas Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 550 F.2d 1054,
1056 (5th Cir. 1977), and that he has suffered more than “psychological distress.”
However, in Damiano, the prisoner did not argue, and we did not base our
decision, on the psychological distress caused by the parole board’s extension of
the prisoner’s presumptive parole release date, but rather on whether such an
extension was excessive. 785 F.2d at 931, 933. We held that this extension was
not cruel and unusual, or excessive, and, thus, did not implicate the Eighth
Amendment. Id. Similarly, here, the GBPP’s decision to deny Slakman parole
constitutes “merely a disappointment,” rather than a punishment of cruel and
unusual proportions. His claim fails.
Third, we find no merit in Slakman’s claim that the GBPP acted arbitrarily
and capriciously when it based its decision to deny his parole on the severity of his
crime, and used knowingly false information in making his parole suitability
determination. The Due Process Clause offers two different kinds of constitutional
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protection: procedural due process and substantive due process, and a violation of
either may form the basis for a suit under § 1983. McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d
1550, 1555-56 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc). “[C]onduct by a government actor will
rise to the level of a substantive due process violation only if the act can be
characterized as arbitrary or conscience shocking in a constitutional sense.”
Waddell v. Hendry Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 329 F.3d 1300, 1305 (11th Cir. 2003).
In Waddell, we held that “[o]nly the most egregious official conduct can be said to
be arbitrary in the constitutional sense.” Id. We may affirm a decision of the
district court on any ground supported by the record. Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cnty.,
480 F.3d 1072, 1088 n.21 (11th Cir. 2007).
Although the district court may have erred by failing to address Slakman’s
arbitrary and capricious argument, the record supports the district court’s dismissal
of Slakman’s due process claims because the GBPP did not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in denying his parole. First, with respect to the GBPP’s consideration
of the severity of Slakman’s offense, this is not the type of “most egregious
conduct” required in an arbitrary and capricious analysis. See Waddell, 329 F.3d
at 1305. This is especially so since the Supreme Court has stated that “the gravity
of the offense” must be considered in making a parole determination. Greenholtz
v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15 (stating that
“[T]he parole determination . . . must include consideration of what the entire
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record shows up to the time of the sentence, including the gravity of the offense in
the particular case.”); see also Jackson v. Reese, 608 F.2d 159, 160 (5th Cir. 1979)
(holding that “[i]t is clear that Jackson was not denied any constitutional rights by
reason of the parole board’s consideration of the nature and circumstances of his
offense”). Slakman also cites to Day v. Hall, 528 F.3d 1315, 1317 (11th Cir.
2008), where we said that the prisoner “had a clear right to seek a parole
determination based on reasons other than the ‘circumstances and nature of the
offenses’ for which he was convicted.” Day, however, is distinguishable from the
instant case because, first, Day was not presented with the argument that the parole
board’s conduct was arbitrary and capricious and, second, in this case, there is no
indication, and Slakman does not allege, that the GBPP did not consider other
reasons for denying his parole.
In addition, Slakman’s claim that the GBPP considered information that it
knew or should have known was false and, thus, violated his right to due process,
also fails. Although Slakman is correct in noting that we have held that the use of
false information in a parole file can be a due process violation, Slakman fails to
recognize that we have held, in the same context, that “prisoners cannot make a
conclusory allegation regarding the use of [false] information as the basis of a due
process claim.” Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946 (11th Cir. 2001). Jones went on
to say that “[w]ithout evidence of the Board’s reliance on false information, a
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prisoner cannot succeed.” Id. In this case, Slakman’s complaint fails to allege
(beyond a conclusory statement) what false information was in his file, or that the
GBPP relied on that false information in making its decision. Accordingly, the
district court did not err in dismissing this claim.
We are, however, persuaded by Slakman’s claim that the district court erred
in dismissing his claim that he was denied equal protection of the laws when other
similarly situated inmates were granted parole. To state an equal protection claim
under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he is similarly situated with other
prisoners who received more favorable treatment; and (2) his discriminatory
treatment was based on a constitutionally protected interest, such as race. Jones,
279 F.3d at 946-47. “The decision to grant or deny parole is based on many
factors such as criminal history, nature of the offense, disciplinary record,
employment and educational background, etc. . . . [In order to state an equal
protection claim, a plaintiff must] show himself to be similarly situated,
considering such factors, with . . . inmates who were granted parole.” Fuller v.
Georgia State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 851 F.2d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 1988).
Slakman’s complaint has, at least facially, met this burden. Specifically, the
complaint identifies two paroled individuals whom Slakman alleges were treated
more favorably than him on account of race. The complaint provides that the
comparators are black males, while Slakman is a white male. At the time the
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comparators were paroled, they had been incarcerated for 14 years and 15 years,
respectively, while Slakman had been incarcerated for 15 years at the time he was
denied parole in 2008. The comparators were convicted of malice murder with
possession of a firearm during commission of a crime, and felony murder with
possession of a firearm during commission of a crime. Slakman was convicted of
aggravated assault and murder. Slakman received a college education and worked
for 24 years before his conviction, while both of the comparators were not college
educated, and one had no regular work history. Thus, unlike the prisoners in Jones
and Fuller, and liberally construing Slakman’s pro se complaint, Slakman has
alleged a facially plausible equal protection claim sufficient to withstand dismissal
for failure to state a claim.
Moreover, contrary to the district court’s finding that Slakman failed to
provide information regarding the circumstances of the comparators’ offenses, the
complaint did provide the underlying criminal offenses for which the comparators
had been convicted. As a result, Slakman’s complaint contained more than “labels
and conclusions” and included factual allegations of sufficient “heft” to set forth “a
plausible entitlement to relief.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555, 557, 559 (2007). Because Slakman’s equal protection claim is plausible on its
face, the district court erred in dismissing the complaint on this ground.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order as to Slakman’s equal protection
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claim.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.
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