Ernest McDuffie, III v. City of Jacksonville, Florida, Etc. , 625 F. App'x 521 ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-11088
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:12-cv-01283-MMH-JRK
ERNEST MCDUFFIE, III,
d.b.a. D&M Contracting Company,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA, ETC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(September 17, 2015)
Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Ernest McDuffie, III, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to the City of Jacksonville (City) on his pro se civil action
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d,
et. seq. (Title VI). McDuffie contends (1) the district court in granting summary
judgment to the City on his claim that the City violated the Equal Protection
Clause by passing an ordinance about the licensing of journeymen, and (2) the
district court erred in granting summary judgment on his claim that the City
violated Title VI by discriminating against him on the basis of race when it did not
approve three funding projects. As the parties are familiar with the facts of the
case, we weave them into the discussion only as necessary. Upon review, we
affirm. 1
1. Section 1983
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the City on
McDuffie’s § 1983 claim because McDuffie presented insufficient evidence to
show that Jacksonville Ordinance 2010-680 (the Journeyman Ordinance) was
1
McDuffie’s brief, construed liberally, see Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262,
1263 (11th Cir. 1998), also asserts the following additional arguments: (1) the City failed to
comply with federal regulations applicable to national banking associations; (2) the City violated
§ 3 of the Small Business Act; (3) the district court abused its discretion by (a) failing to strike
the City’s summary judgment motion because it did not comply with a local rule, (b) granting
summary judgment before he received an opportunity to conduct full discovery, and (c) failing to
conclude the City’s summary judgment motion was filed in bad faith; and (4) the district court
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause by granting summary judgment to
the City. We reject these arguments without discussion.
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motivated by intent to discriminate. See Elston v. Talladega Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
997 F.2d 1394, 1406 (11th Cir. 1993) (“To establish an equal protection clause
violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a challenged action was motivated by
an intent to discriminate.”). The ordinance on its face was race-neutral: it merely
struck a requirement that journeymen with expired licenses had to file a renewal
application “within six months” after the license elapsed in order for the
Construction Trades Qualifying Board (CTQB) 2 to waive a required examination:
Failure of the holder of the delinquent certificate of competency to renew
prior to the expiration of the current licensure cycle renders the certificate of
competency invalid. The holder of the invalid certificate of competency
must reapply in the same manner, including examination and all applicable
fees. However, the Board may waive the examination requirements for good
cause shown. if an application is filed within six months after expiration of
the certificate of competency.
See Jacksonville, Fla., Ord. 2010-680 amending Chapter 342 (Construction Trades
Regulations), Section 342.118(c) of the Jacksonville Code of Ordinances.
Moreover, McDuffie presented no evidence from which discriminatory intent
could be inferred. For instance, he did not present evidence the City Council
deviated from its normal procedures when passing the Journeyman Ordinance, nor
did he point to any discriminatory statements in the ordinance’s legislative history.
See Elston, 997 F.2d at 1406 (“Discriminatory intent may be established by
2
The CTQB is an independent board of the City of Jacksonville made up of 18 members
who are appointed by the mayor and confirmed by the City Council. The CTQB licenses,
regulates, and disciplines roughly 9,000 locally licensed construction, electrical, and apartment
maintenance personnel.
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evidence of . . . procedural and substantive departures from the norms generally
followed by the decision-maker, and discriminatory statements in the legislative or
administrative history of the decision.”). To the contrary, evidence from both
parties established the sole purpose of the Journeyman Ordinance was to allow the
CTQB greater latitude in waiving the examination requirement for journeymen
with expired licenses.
According to McDuffie, however, the Journeyman Ordinance was motivated
by discriminatory intent because (i) the ordinance requires more construction
workers to become journeymen, (ii) African-American workers were historically
unable to become journeymen, and (iii) a previous law that required a minimum
ratio of journeymen on projects stifled the growth of African-American-owned
businesses. McDuffie’s reading of the Journeyman Ordinance is incorrect. The
ordinance did not change the requirements for the use of journeymen on
construction sites. It simply deleted the requirement that an applicant must file an
application “within six months” after expiration of a license in order to have the
exam waived, thereby giving the CTQB greater latitude in waiving the exam
requirement for workers with expired licenses. McDuffie’s unsupported allegation
that the Journeyman Ordinance reinstated a journeyman work ratio, standing alone,
cannot create a genuine issue of fact as to whether the ordinance was motivated by
discriminatory intent. See Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005)
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(“[U]nsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary
judgment motion.”). Accordingly, the district court did not err by granting
summary judgment on McDuffie’s § 1983 claim.
2. Title VI
The district court also did not err in granting summary judgment to the City
on McDuffie’s Title VI claim. First, the district court correctly concluded
McDuffie could not bring a disparate impact claim against the City under Title VI
because Title VI does not create a private right of action for such a claim. See
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding there is no private right
of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI); see
also Liese v. Indian River Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334, 346 (11th Cir. 2012)
(“[P]rivate individuals may recover compensatory damages under Title VI only in
cases of intentional discrimination.”).
Second, the district court did not err, much less clearly err, in finding the
City was not motivated by discriminatory intent when it declined to award
McDuffie contracts for three proposed rehabilitation projects. See Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 290 (1982) (“[A] court of appeals may only
reverse a district court’s finding on discriminatory intent if it concludes that the
finding is clearly erroneous.”); Elston, 997 F.2d at 1405 (reviewing a district
court’s findings as to whether a defendant engaged in intentional discrimination for
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clear error). The undisputed evidence shows McDuffie lost out on these contracts,
not because of his race, but because his bid proposals did not comply with the
City’s requirement that bids include a complete work write-up. See Department of
Housing and Urban Development Rental Rehabilitation Loan Program Policy &
Procedures Manual (Program Manual) § 9.1 (explaining a “Bid Package” consists
of “a complete work write-up, spec’s, drawings, [etc.]”); Program Manual § 9.6
(“The bid will be reviewed to make sure all items are addressed” and “[i]f the bid
is incorrect, it shall be returned to the owner(s) requesting the additional
information.”). The City gave McDuffie ample opportunity to submit revised
complying bids; however, McDuffie refused to do so because he did not want to
bid against himself. McDuffie points to no evidence suggesting the winning
bidders did not have to comply with the same bid requirements or that he was
otherwise singled out on account of his race. See Love v. DeCarlo Homes, Inc.,
482 F.2d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 1973)3 (“Racial discrimination normally involves
treating, in similar circumstances, a member or members of one race different from
the manner in which members of another race are treated.”). The district court
therefore did not err in granting summary judgment to the City on McDuffie’s Title
VI claim.
3
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this
Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior
to the close of business on September 30, 1981.
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For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order granting
summary judgment to the City.
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