Case: 18-14021 Date Filed: 02/01/2019 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 18-14021
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cv-00050-RH-CAS
LINCOLN LANE ADDLEMAN, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Defendant,
MCMILLIAN,
Detective,
LEON COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT,
HUSKEY,
Detective,
LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(February 1, 2019)
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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Lincoln Addleman, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s sua sponte
dismissal of his
42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. Addleman primarily argues that the
district court erred in dismissing his complaint because he sufficiently alleged that
Florida’s Sexual Offender Act,
Fla. Stat. § 943.0435, violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the United States Constitution and his substantive due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal under
28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr.,
254 F.3d 1276, 1278–79 (11th Cir.
2001). Under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), a district court shall dismiss a case in which the
plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis if the complaint fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Although this Court
liberally construes a pro se litigant’s filings, we will not “serve as de facto
counsel” or “rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica
Ltd.,
760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). In evaluating
any litigant’s arguments on appeal, we are constrained, of course, by prior binding
precedent until it is overruled by the Supreme Court or by our Court sitting en
banc. Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp.,
850 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2017) (citation
omitted).
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The registration law relevant to this appeal—Florida’s Sexual Offender
Act—requires an individual convicted of a qualifying offense to register with the
local sheriff’s office within 48 hours of establishing a permanent or transient
residence in Florida.
Fla. Stat. § 943.0435(2)(a). The Act does not provide for a
hearing before a person is deemed a sex offender under Florida law—the triggering
fact is the prior conviction itself. See generally § 943.0435.
The district court here did not err when it sua sponte dismissed Addleman’s
complaint because Addleman’s arguments concerning Florida’s Sexual Offender
Act are foreclosed by precedent. See Evans, 850 F.3d at 1255. First, to
Addleman’s assertion that the Act violates the Ex Post Facto Clause by
impermissibly “retak[ing]” his civil rights when he has already been paroled, this
Court has determined that Florida’s Sexual Offender Act registration requirement
is nonpunitive and does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 1 See Houston v.
Williams,
547 F.3d 1357, 1364 (11th Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court similarly has
determined that the retroactive application of Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration
Act, which, like Florida’s Act, requires a sex offender to register with law
1
Addleman also challenges Florida’s Sexual Predator Act, but this Act does not apply to him:
Addleman was convicted of statutory rape in 1979 and the Sexual Predator Act applies only to
offenses committed after October 1, 1993. See
Fla. Stat. § 775.21(4)(a). Addleman cannot
establish standing to challenge this Act because he does not allege that he was required to submit
to its requirements or that he suffered any other type of injury related to the Act. See Tanner
Adver. Grp., LLC v. Fayette Cty.,
451 F.3d 777, 791 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
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enforcement, does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. See Smith v. Doe,
538
U.S. 84, 105–06 (2003).
Addleman’s substantive due process claim that Florida’s Sexual Offender
Act curtails his “civil right of travel” is also foreclosed by binding precedent
because this Court previously has held that the Act does not unreasonably burden a
sex offender’s right to travel. 2 See Doe v. Moore,
410 F.3d 1337, 1348–49 (11th
Cir. 2005).
Accordingly, the district court did not err in sua sponte dismissing
Addleman’s complaint.
AFFIRMED.
2
Addleman also raises a procedural due process claim, however, this claim is waived because he
raises it for the first time on appeal. See Bryant v. Jones,
575 F.3d 1281, 1296 (11th Cir. 2009).
4
