Case: 18-13780 Date Filed: 07/29/2019 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-13780
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 9:18-cr-80060-RLR-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
EDWARD GEORGE WYLIE,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(July 29, 2019)
Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Edward Wylie appeals his conviction for failure to register and update his
registration as a sex offender as required by the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA), 34 U.S.C. § 20913, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2250(a). He argues SORNA’s delegation of authority to the Attorney General to
issue regulations under § 20913(d), which allowed the Attorney General to require
him to register as a sex offender, violates the nondelegation doctrine. After
review, 1 we affirm Wylie’s conviction.
SORNA makes it a crime for anyone who travels in interstate commerce to
knowingly fail to register or update a required sex offender registration. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2250(a). The statute defines sex offenders’ registry requirements in detail and
delegates the authority to the Attorney General to determine whether to apply the
requirements to sex offenders who were convicted prior to July 27, 2006, its date
of enactment. See 34 U.S.C. § 20913 (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16913);
United States v. Ambert,
561 F.3d 1202, 1206 (11th Cir. 2009). On February 28,
2007, the Attorney General applied the SORNA registration requirements to all sex
offenders, including those convicted prior to the enactment of SORNA. 28 C.F.R.
§ 72.3;
Ambert, 561 F.3d at 1206. We later held that all sex offenders convicted
prior to July 27, 2006, were obliged to register under SORNA beginning on
1
Where an appeal raises issues of statutory interpretation and constitutional law, we
review those issues de novo. United States v. Ambert,
561 F.3d 1202, 1205 (11th Cir. 2009).
2
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February 28, 2007. United States v. Dumont,
555 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir.
2009), overruled in part on other grounds by Carr v. United States,
560 U.S. 438
(2010).
The nondelegation doctrine is based on the principle of separation of
powers.
Ambert, 561 F.3d at 1212. It states that Congress may not “transfer to
others the essential legislative functions with which it is [constitutionally] vested.”
Id. at 1213 (quoting Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935)). A
delegation is constitutional if Congress provides an “intelligible principle” for the
recipient of the delegated authority to follow.
Id. The Supreme Court has
interpreted this framework broadly and has not struck down a statute as an
impermissible delegation since 1935. See
id.
In Ambert, we held that Congress provided the Attorney General with
intelligible principles to guide his exercise of discretion under SORNA.
Id. We
explained that Congress expressly set forth broad policy goals in SORNA of
protecting the public and creating a comprehensive national registry, thus
suggesting that the Attorney General require pre-2006 offenders to register to the
extent that he determined their registration would contribute to those goals.
Id. at
1213-14. Further, we reasoned that SORNA’s detailed framework regarding the
registration process, the elements of the new federal crime, and the penalty for
violation left the Attorney General only with the discretion to determine “whether
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this statute and all of its attendant requirements articulated by the legislature apply
to a particular, capped class of offenders.”
Id. at 1214. Thus, we held that § 20913
was constitutional because Congress “delineated its general policy, the public
agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of the delegated authority.”
Id.
Despite having precedent directly on point, we held this case in abeyance
pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Gundy v. United States, No. 17-6086, __
U.S. __,
2019 WL 2527473 (2019). Gundy has now issued, and the Supreme
Court “join[ed] the consensus” of eleven Courts of Appeals and rejected the claim
“that Congress unconstitutionally delegated legislative power when it authorized
the Attorney General to ‘specify the applicability’ of SORNA’s registration
requirements to pre-Act offenders.”
Id. at *3.
The application of SORNA’s registration requirements to Wylie was
constitutional because SORNA’s delegation of authority to the Attorney General
did not violate the nondelegation doctrine. Accordingly, we affirm Wylie’s
conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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