United States v. Denson Jaccarus Washington ( 2013 )

Case: 12-12546 Date Filed: 05/01/2013 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-12546
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:11-cr-00064-RH-CAS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DENSON JACARRUS WASHINGTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(May 1, 2013)
Before HULL, MARTIN, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Denson Washington pleaded guilty to three counts of distributing cocaine
base, and one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, all in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). The Probation Office prepared a
Presentence Investigation Report recommending application of the career offender
enhancement, United States Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1 (2011), based on
Washington’s prior convictions for burglary and possession with intent to sell
cocaine. The career offender enhancement exposed Washington to a guideline
range of 188 to 235 months imprisonment, based on a total offense level of 31 and
a criminal history category of VI. Washington did not object to his classification
as a career offender, and after weighing the sentencing factors listed under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court sentenced Washington to a low-end guideline
sentence of 188 months imprisonment on each count, all sentences to run
concurrently. In arriving at its sentence determination, the district court expressly
weighed the circumstances of Washington’s offense against his “continuous
pattern of criminal conduct,” his ongoing threats of harm to law enforcement
officers and others, and his need for medical and drug abuse treatment.
On appeal, Washington argues that his sentence must be vacated because it
is unreasonable. To determine whether a sentence is reasonable, we “must first
ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as
failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the
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Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597
(2007). Then, “[a]ssuming that the district court’s sentencing decision is
procedurally sound,” we must “consider the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard . . . tak[ing] into account
the totality of the circumstances.” Id.Washington concedes that the district court did not commit procedural error
in determining his sentence. He argues, however, that his career offender guideline
sentence is substantively unreasonable because “[t]he career offender guideline as
applied . . . failed to properly reflect [§] 3553(a) considerations and did not allow
for an individualized treatment of [his] characteristics, [and] his background.” We
are not persuaded by Washington’s argument. Contrary to Washington’s
assertions, the district court expressly considered the § 3553(a) factors, as well as
his individual characteristics and background, in arriving at its sentencing
determination. In any event, even if we thought Washington deserved a lesser
sentence, our law is clear that “[w]e may not . . . set aside a sentence merely
because we would have decided that another one is more appropriate.” United
States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1191 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). “We may set aside
a sentence only if we determine, after giving a full measure of deference to the
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sentencing judge, that the sentence imposed truly is unreasonable.” Id.; cf. United
States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[O]rdinarily we would
expect a sentence within the Guidelines range to be reasonable.”).
Given all the circumstances, Washington has not demonstrated that his
sentence “truly is unreasonable.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1191. Thus, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him at the low-end of his career offender
guideline range. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597; Talley, 431 F.3d at
788.
AFFIRMED.
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