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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 18-13764
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-24666-UU
MARCO WATTS,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CLUB MADONNA, INC.,
a Florida for-profit corporation,
LEROY C. GRIFFITH,
Defendants - Appellants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(August 8, 2019)
Before MARTIN, JILL PRYOR and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Marco Watts, a disc jockey, sued Club Madonna, Inc., a gentlemen’s club,
and its owner Leroy C. Griffith (collectively and individually “Club Madonna”) for
unpaid minimum and overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”) and Florida state law. After Club Madonna failed to timely file its
response to Watts’s motion for partial summary judgment and the district court
denied Club Madonna’s request for an extension, the district court granted partial
summary judgment to Watts. Club Madonna moved for reconsideration of the
district court’s summary judgment order, but the district court denied that motion.
On appeal, Club Madonna argues that the district court abused its discretion in
denying its motions for an extension and reconsideration and erred in granting
partial summary judgment to Watts. After careful review, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We limit our recitation of the facts to the procedural history of this case
because the underlying facts are irrelevant to our disposition of this appeal.
Watts, a disc jockey at Club Madonna, sued the club for unpaid minimum
and overtime wages under the FLSA,
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, and Florida state law.
In its scheduling order, the district court set June 8, 2018 as the deadline for the
parties to move for summary judgment and June 22, 2018 as the deadline for the
parties’ joint pretrial stipulations, jury instructions, and proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law. On June 8, 2018, Watts moved for partial summary
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judgment on the question of whether he was an employee of Club Madonna as
opposed to an independent contractor. Under the district court’s local rules, Club
Madonna’s response was due 14 days later, on June 22, 2018—the same date the
parties’ joint filings were due. See S.D. Fla. R. 7.1(c).
June 22, 2018 fell on a Friday. At 6:11 p.m. that day, Club Madonna filed
an unopposed motion for a five-day extension to respond to Watts’s motion for
partial summary judgment. In the motion, Club Madonna’s counsel explained that
(1) it had just received an hour earlier Watts’s drafts of the joint pretrial stipulation,
jury instructions, and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law; (2) it was
still waiting on the transcript of Watts’s deposition, which was supposed to be
ready by the following Monday; and (3) its counsel was understaffed. The parties
filed their joint pretrial stipulation, joint jury instructions, and individually
proposed verdict forms that day, but Club Madonna failed to timely file its
summary judgment response.
The following Monday, the district court denied Club Madonna’s motion for
an extension to file its summary judgment response, explaining that it “had
considered the motion[] [and] the pertinent portions of the record and [wa]s
otherwise fully advised in the premises.” Doc. 64 at 1. 1 The same day, the district
court granted partial summary judgment to Watts, considering the facts asserted in
1
“Doc. #” refers to the numbered entry on the district court’s docket.
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Watts’s motion to be undisputed, as permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(e)(2) and (3).
Club Madonna then filed a motion for reconsideration of the district court’s
order granting partial summary judgment to Watts, arguing that its failure to
respond timely to Watts’s motion for partial summary judgment constituted
excusable neglect and that the district court, “for all practical purposes,” had
entered a “default” against it. Doc. 66 at 6. Club Madonna requested that the
district court vacate its order granting partial summary judgment to Watts and
permit Club Madonna to file its proposed summary judgment response that it
attached to its motion for reconsideration. The district court denied Club
Madonna’s motion for reconsideration, explaining that failure “to manage a busy
caseload . . . is not sufficient grounds for reconsideration.” Doc. 67 at 2.
After the parties agreed to stipulate as to the number of days and hours
Watts worked at Club Madonna, the only remaining issue of fact to be tried, the
district court entered final judgment in favor of Watts. Club Madonna timely
appealed.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review for abuse of discretion denials of motions for extensions of time,
Barrett v. Walker Cty. Sch. Dist.,
872 F.3d 1209, 1230 (11th Cir. 2017), and
motions for reconsideration of nonfinal orders, Region 8 Forest Serv. Timber
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Purchasers Council v. Alcock,
993 F.2d 800, 805-06 (11th Cir. 1993). “A district
court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper
procedures in making the determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly
erroneous.” Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc.,
376 F.3d 1092, 1096 (11th Cir.
2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). The abuse-of-discretion standard means
that the “district court has a range of options[,] and so long as the district court
does not commit a clear error in judgment, we will affirm the district court’s
decision.” Young v. City of Palm Bay,
358 F.3d 859, 863 (11th Cir. 2004).
We review de novo a district court’s grant of partial summary judgment.
O’Neal v. United States,
258 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2001).
III. DISCUSSION
Club Madonna contends that the district court (1) abused its discretion in
denying Club Madonna’s unopposed motion for an extension to file its response to
Watts’s motion for partial summary judgment; (2) abused its discretion in denying
Club Madonna’s motion for reconsideration of the order granting partial summary
judgment to Watts; and (3) erred in granting partial summary judgment to Watts.
Concluding that the district court committed no abuse of discretion or error that
would merit vacatur, we affirm.
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A. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Club Madonna
an Extension to File Its Summary Judgment Response.
A district court may extend a deadline before the original deadline has
expired if the requesting party demonstrates “good cause.” See Fed. R. Civ. P.
6(b)(1)(A). We have no cases applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
6(b)(1)(A)’s good cause standard, so we look to our cases analyzing the same
standard under Rule 16(b)(4), which permits district courts to modify scheduling
orders. Under Rule 16(b)(4), the party requesting the extension demonstrates good
cause only if, “despite [its] diligence,” the party cannot meet the deadline. Sosa v.
Airprint Sys., Inc.,
133 F.3d 1417, 1418 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Neither of the reasons Club Madonna offers for why the district court should
have granted the extension demonstrates diligence—or good cause. First, Club
Madonna argues that its receipt from Watts of the drafts of the parties’ joint filings
at 4:58 p.m. on Friday, June 22, 2018 presented “extenuating and unexpected
circumstances,” making it “impossible” for Club Madonna to timely finalize the
parties’ joint filings and respond to Watts’s motion for partial summary judgment.
Appellants’ Initial Br. at 23. But Club Madonna had long known of the deadlines
looming on that Friday. The district court entered its scheduling order on February
13, 2018. That order set deadlines of June 8, 2018 for the parties to move for
summary judgment and June 22, 2018 for their joint pretrial stipulations, jury
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instructions, and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Given the
district court’s local rule requiring opposing memoranda of law to be filed no later
than 14 days after service of the motion being opposed, S.D. Fla. R. 7.1(c), Club
Madonna’s counsel knew it was possible that Watts would move for summary
judgment on June 8, 2018 and that its response would be due 14 days later—on
June 22, 2018.
Thus Club Madonna knew as early as February 13, 2018 that Friday, June
22, 2018 might be a day of dual deadlines for the parties’ joint filings and Club
Madonna’s response to a motion for summary judgment that Watts might file.
And it knew when Watts moved for partial summary judgment—two weeks before
June 22, 2018—that the dual deadlines would in fact be in effect. Given the two
weeks that Club Madonna had to meet the dual deadlines, Club Madonna’s receipt
on Friday evening of Watts’s drafts of the parties’ joint filings cannot demonstrate
good cause for Club Madonna’s missing the deadline for its summary judgment
response.
Second, Club Madonna argues that it was still waiting on the transcript from
Watts’s deposition, which did not become available until after its summary
judgment response was due. This reason might carry more weight if the response
Club Madonna wanted to file cited Watts’s deposition, but Club Madonna admits
on appeal that Watts’s deposition “was not necessary – and ultimately was not
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even utilized” in the draft summary judgment response Club Madonna attached to
its motion for reconsideration. Appellants’ Initial Br. at 25. Club Madonna’s
admission negates this argument for why it showed good cause to support its
extension request.
Two more facts weigh heavily against finding good cause here. First, the
district court had already denied a request from Watts for an extension to file his
motion for partial summary judgment. Club Madonna thus was on notice that the
district court was disinclined to grant extensions. Second, Club Madonna waited
until after the close of business on the day its summary judgment response was due
to ask for an extension. “Counsel thus left to chance” whether the district court
would deny Club Madonna’s request for an extension, leaving it no time to finalize
its summary judgment response. Sosa,
133 F.3d at 1419; see also Bruce v. County
of Rensselaer, No. 02-CV-0847,
2003 WL 22436281, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 20,
2003) (“A party takes significant risks when it seeks an extension of a deadline late
on the day of the deadline; that is, at the proverbial eleventh hour. . . . The filing of
a request for an extension on the final day of the time period . . . is evidence of
being remiss in one’s duties.”).
“[W]e stress the broad discretion district courts have in managing their cases
. . . [and] ensur[ing] that their cases move to a reasonably timely and orderly
conclusion. This discretion is not wholly unfettered, but it is and must be broad.”
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Chrysler Int’l Corp. v. Chemaly,
280 F.3d 1358, 1360 (11th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted); see also Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga.,
263 F.3d 1234, 1269
(11th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e accord district courts broad discretion over the
management of pre-trial activities, including discovery and scheduling.”);
Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp.,
123 F.3d 1353, 1366 (11th Cir. 1997)
(“[D]istrict courts enjoy broad discretion in deciding how best to manage the cases
before them.”); United States v. McCutcheon,
86 F.3d 187, 190 (11th Cir. 1996)
(explaining that a district court is given “broad discretion . . . to manage its own
docket”). Because of the broad discretion district courts retain to manage their
dockets, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying Club
Madonna’s request for an extension to file its summary judgment response. 2
2
We previously have explained that a district court abuses its discretion if it “imposes
some harm, disadvantage, or restriction upon someone that is unnecessarily broad or does not
result in any offsetting gain to anyone else or society at large.” Klay,
376 F.3d at 1096. Club
Madonna tries to capitalize on this articulation of the abuse-of-discretion standard by arguing
that “the prejudice caused by the brief delay [had the district court granted the extension] would
have been non-existent,” whereas “the harm done to [Club Madonna] in precluding presentation
of [its] meritorious defense was so disproportionately severe” that “the district court’s actions
constituted an abuse of discretion.” Appellants’ Initial Br. at 27-28. Yet Klay’s examples were
cases in which we held that the district court abused its discretion in fashioning a nationwide
rather than a more geographically limited injunction, Keener v. Convergys Corp.,
342 F.3d 1264,
1269-71 (11th Cir. 2003), or certifying a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)
when certification under Rule 23(b)(1) would have served the plaintiffs just as well and been less
prejudicial to the defendants, Piazza v. Ebsco Indus., Inc.,
273 F.3d 1341, 1352 & n.5 (11th Cir.
2001). Given the cases cited in Klay,
376 F.3d at 1096, we do not read its statement about
balancing harms and benefits as applying to areas like case management, in which district courts
enjoy very “broad discretion,” Chrysler,
280 F.3d at 1360.
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B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Club
Madonna’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Although Club Madonna’s motion for reconsideration requested
reconsideration of the district court’s summary judgment order, the arguments it
made in that motion were about the district court’s refusal to extend the deadline
for Club Madonna to file its summary judgment response. On appeal, Club
Madonna argues that the district court’s denial of the motion for reconsideration
was an abuse of discretion because Club Madonna showed excusable neglect in
failing to timely file its summary judgment response and the district court’s denial
of its motion for reconsideration works a “manifest injustice.” Appellants’ Initial
Br. at 28-29.3 Because these arguments merely attempt to relitigate the district
court’s denial of Club Madonna’s motion for an extension, we reject Club
Madonna’s arguments about the motion for reconsideration for the same reasons
we rejected its arguments about the motion for an extension.4
3
Club Madonna also argues that the district court’s denial of its motion for
reconsideration violated due process, but it cites no authority supporting this assertion and
therefore has abandoned it. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.,
739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th
Cir. 2014) (“We have long held that an appellant abandons a claim when he either makes only
passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and
authority.”).
4
“We may affirm the district court[] . . . on any ground that appears in the record,
whether or not that ground was relied upon or even considered by the court below.” Thomas v.
Cooper Lighting, Inc.,
506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007).
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C. The District Court Did Not Err in Granting Partial Summary Judgment to
Watts.
In its opening brief on appeal, Club Madonna’s only argument for why the
district court erred in granting partial summary judgment to Watts is that “the
district court for all practical purposes entered a default against” Club Madonna, an
unduly “punitive remedy.” Id. at 18-19. But under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 55(a) and (b), a default may be entered only by the clerk, and a default
judgment may be entered only by the clerk or by the court upon a party’s
application; here, neither the clerk nor the district court entered a default or default
judgment. Instead, in accordance with Rule 56(e)(2) and (3), the district court
considered the facts asserted in Watts’s motion to be undisputed and granted
partial summary judgment on the basis that these undisputed facts and the
supporting materials showed Watts was entitled to partial summary judgment.
Club Madonna’s argument about the district court’s summary judgment order
constituting a default or a default judgment therefore fails.
In its reply brief on appeal, Club Madonna argues that the district court
failed to fully examine the record to ensure that the evidence available at the time it
issued its summary judgment order supported the grant of partial summary
judgment to Watts. Club Madonna has abandoned this argument, having failed to
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make it to the district court in its motion to reconsider 5 and in its opening brief on
appeal. See Big Top Koolers, Inc. v. Circus-Man Snacks, Inc.,
528 F.3d 839, 844
(11th Cir. 2008) (“We decline to address an argument advanced by an appellant for
the first time in a reply brief.”); Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co.,
385 F.3d
1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (“This Court has repeatedly held that an issue not
raised in the district court and raised for the first time in an appeal will not be
considered by this [C]ourt.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We therefore
decline to address this argument. The district court did not err in granting partial
summary judgment to Watts.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
5
Club Madonna asserted in its motion to reconsider that “many of the uncontroverted
facts that were taken as true by the [district court] are not even supported by the record,” Doc. 66
at 7, but it cited no examples of the district court’s reliance on facts that were unsupported or
contradicted by other evidence in the record as it existed when the district court granted partial
summary judgment. The district court had no duty to dig through the record to attempt to
substantiate Club Madonna’s unsubstantiated statement. Cf. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v.
Weitz,
913 F.2d 1544, 1550 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Taking appellant’s contention to its logical
conclusion would render the summary judgment process an exercise in futility, and would place
the onus on the district court to distill any possible argument [that] could be made based on the
materials before the court. Presenting such arguments in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment is the responsibility of the non-moving party, not the court . . . .”).
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